Why Euro Area National Central Banks’ balance sheets matter by Portelli, Charmaine
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Enabling Open Access to Birkbeck’s Research Degree output




Citation: Portelli, Charmaine (2021) Why Euro Area National Central
Banks’ balance sheets matter. [Thesis] (Unpublished)
c© 2020 The Author(s)
All material available through BIROn is protected by intellectual property law, including copy-
right law.







Why Euro Area National Central Banks’ 











Thesis submitted for the degree of 
 Doctor of Philosophy  










I wish to declare that no part of this doctoral thesis contains material previously 
submitted to the University of London or to any other university or institution for any 
degree.  
 
The fourth chapter of this thesis, titled ‘The True Size of the Eurosystem: New Insights 
from the Euro Area National Central Banks’ Balance Sheets’ is a joint work with Prof. 
Stephen Wright. Most of the hard work on this front, and indeed on the Chapter as a 
whole, was carried out by myself.  
 






London, United Kingdom 
 






The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the new field of monetary policy analysis – the 
analysis of central banks’ balance sheets. Within this field, this thesis conducts an 
analysis of the balance sheets of the national central banks operating within the 
Eurosystem, the literature on which so far has remained scarce. Through various 
investigations, this thesis argues that the Euro Area National Central Banks’ (EANCB) 
balance sheets do matter because they have the power to reveal facts that are obscured 
in the aggregate Eurosystem balance sheet.  
 
Focusing specifically on the Eurosystem, this thesis provides a new dataset - a 
breakdown of the balance sheets of all NCBs within the Eurosystem covering the 2006-
2016 period. Based on this dataset, this thesis, firstly, compiles a gross balance sheet of 
the Eurosystem, which does not consolidate intra-Eurosystem transactions. This new 
measure, however, presents a paradox, which though it remains unresolved, motivates 
an examination of the relationship between the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem, 
leading to the identification of interesting insights.  
 
This thesis establishes that the size of most of the EANCBs’ balance sheets are strongly 
correlated with the size of their share in the ECB capital and this relationship is even 
stronger when the gross balance sheet of the Eurosystem is used. Other evidence is 
found supporting the notion that the EANCBs more or less run on autopilot – in line 
with shares in the paid-up equity in the ECB. An econometric analysis is also carried 
out confirming this behaviour of the EANCBs. 
 
This thesis also conducts a detailed comparative analysis of developments in the 
composition of the EANCBs’ balance sheets. A new framework is proposed that treats 
the balance sheets exhaustively, including the intra-Eurosystem transactions between 
EANCBs – in contrast with a framework already in the literature, Pattipeilohy (2016). 
Through this new framework, a comparative analysis is conducted on the typology of 
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Before the global financial crisis, within contemporary central bank operating 
frameworks – despite the differences in their economic and financial structures and 
central banking traditions across jurisdictions – monetary authorities primarily 
pursued their mandates through the setting of an operational target for a short-term 
interest rate. Within such frameworks, the balance sheet of the central bank played a 
subordinate role. With the advent of the financial crisis, however, central banks 
around the world moved beyond their traditional operating frameworks, using their 
balance sheets to perform a variety of interventions, altering their size and 
composition to varying degrees. Thus, the appropriate degree of monetary 
accommodation called for more active management of the size and composition of 
central bank balance sheet assets rather than the relatively more passive approach 
adopted prior to the financial crisis, whereby liquidity provision was demand driven 
with limited scope to affect broad financial conditions. This has led to the evolution 
of the use of central bank balance sheets as a flexible instrument of monetary policy - 
becoming an integral part of the central banks’ toolkit.   
 
Since the beginning of the financial crisis in 2007, the most obvious development in 
the central bank balance sheets has been an increase in their size. Indeed, at their 
respective peaks1, the balance sheets of central banks like the Federal Reserve and the 
Bank of England had more than quadrupled while the Eurosystem’s balance sheet 
 
1 At their respective peaks, the Bank of England’s balance sheet had grown by 398 per cent (Nov 2012), 






had more than doubled. This subject has been extensively dealt with in the literature 
and it emerged clearly that what happened during the financial crisis was  not merely 
a ‘doubling’ of what had gone on before but a transformation of their traditional 
dynamics, compared to normal times. For this reason, central bank balance sheet 
analysis and the examination of the components of their balance sheets has – without 
any doubt – become crucial for these “main” central banks such as the Federal 
Reserve and the Bank of England, which operate on the basis of their own monetary 
policy framework.  
 
There is a noteworthy peculiarity with the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Eurosystem – these are balance sheets of decentralised systems, which 
are composed of the balance sheets of the US Federal Reserve Banks and of the 
National Central Banks within the Euro Area, plus the ECB, respectively. This 
peculiarity has, so far, been rather ignored in the literature.  
 
Focusing particularly on the Eurosystem, it consists now of nineteen Euro Area 
National Central Banks (EANCBs) plus the ECB. The EANCBs are separate legal 
entities owned by their national governments and publish their own balance sheets, 
while the ECB is, as Heinsohn and Steiger (2002) puts it, ‘only the torso of a central 
bank’. Put differently, the Eurosystem consists of the ECB’s balance sheet (which is 
relatively tiny) together with the individual balance sheets of the national central 
banks within the Euro Area. 
 
While the balance sheets of ‘main’ central banks, as noted above, had a crucial role in 
the setting of monetary policy in times of crisis, the balance sheets of the individual 
national central banks serve an additional purpose – they contain information on the 
relationships between the national central banks as well as between each EANCB and 
the Eurosystem. This is the main motivation for this thesis. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate the factors that have shaped the development 





In other words, through balance sheet analysis applied to the Euro Area National 
Central Banks, the relationships between the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem 
are identified, in turn, shedding new insights on what was happening in the 
Eurosystem – insights that remain unrevealed if one looks merely at the balance sheet 
of the Eurosystem as whole.  
 
The analysis in this thesis starts, in Chapter 2, by conducting a review of the literature 
related to various themes that are interlinked to the balance sheets of “main” central 
banks such as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the Eurosystem – themes 
which are either applicable to or help in creating a contrast with regional or national 
central banks. Chapter 2 concludes by reviewing the very scarce literature that 
pertains to the balance sheets of Euro Area national central banks, detailing the gaps 
left unanswered.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a new dataset – a detailed breakdown of the balance sheets of all 
NCBs within the Eurosystem covering eleven years to 2016. While this data collection 
lays the groundwork for my own investigations, it is in itself a contribution to 
knowledge as it offers scope for use in a wide range of other empirical investigations.  
 
The three chapters that follow address distinct questions on the inter-relationships 
between the Eurosystem, the EANCBs and the ECB. Chapter 4 compiles a gross 
balance sheet of the Eurosystem through a simple amalgamation of the nineteen 
individual EANCBs’ and the ECB’s balance sheet, which, in contrast to the official 
balance sheet published by the ECB, does not net intra-Eurosystem transactions. 
Determining the ‘true size’ of the Eurosystem gives rise to a paradoxical issue which, 
though it remains unresolved, motivates an examination of the relationship between 
the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem, leading to the identification of interesting 
observations. This chapter also compares the relationship of the EANCBs vis-à-vis the 
Eurosystem with that between the Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve 
System. Chapter 5 estimates dynamic models that determine the rate at which 





capital. Moreover, this Chapter provides insights into the behavior of EANCBs with 
respect to their balance sheet and to what degree this is implicitly controlled by the 
ECB. Chapter 6 conducts a detailed comparative analysis of developments in both the 
size and the composition of the balance sheets of the EANCBs by proposing a new 
framework building on the one presented by Pattipeilohy (2016). While the latter was 
designed for “main” central banks such as the Bank of England, the Fed and the 
Eurosystem, the alternative framework was designed to account for the position of 
each EANCB vis-à-vis the rest of the central banks within the system. As 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework allows for particular focus on domestic assets, some 
validity is identified in applying it to the EANCBs, despite that its application does 
not treat the EANCBs’ balance sheets exhaustively. Chapter 7 concludes with a 
synthesis of the main findings and suggestions for further research. The Appendices 
provide the complete dataset, details on the methodological approach adopted in the 
analysis presented in Chapter 6 as well as other detailed data related to different 



















As noted by Rule (2015), ‘the balance sheet of the central bank is critical to everything 
the central bank does’. Indeed, the structure and evolution of a central bank’s balance 
sheet is a crucial tool in understanding the policy goals that the central banks aim to 
achieve and its effectiveness in doing so. Nevertheless, in the years leading to the 
beginning of the recent financial crisis, as quantitative monetary targets (such as 
targeting specific narrow measures of money) were being replaced by policy interest 
rates or inflation targets, interest in the central bank’s balance sheet waned. The 
financial crisis, however, revived interest in the central bank’s balance sheet as both 
the initial crisis response and the subsequent implementation of unconventional 
monetary policy, led to significant increases in the size of the balance sheets of “main” 
central banks. Indeed, as Bagus and Schiml (2009) highlighted, recent developments 
in monetary policy demand new analytical tools, in particular an analysis of central 
banks’ balance sheets. 
 
Despite that the central bank’s balance sheet plays a critical role in the functioning of 
an economy, the theory of balance sheet analysis has been widely neglected in 
economic theory, in contrast with balance sheet analysis in business which is an 
established research field and a practice conducted by many observers. The central 
bank’s balance sheet is important as its main liabilities – banknotes and commercial 
bank reserves – provide the ultimate means of settlement for transactions. As noted 
by Rule (2015), central banks exploit this role when achieving their policy goals by 





represent the means that the central bank can use to defend the price of its currency 
internally and externally through sales against its liabilities. Also, as demonstrated 
during the recent financial crisis, the assets can be used in policies to support a 
struggling financial system and inject confidence into it. Indeed, as Bagus and 
Howden (2009) noted, in times when traditional tools to analyse monetary policy 
become limited, such as when reaching the zero-lower bound on interest rates, an 
analysis of the quality of the assets held by a central bank becomes increasingly 
important. In sum, as Bholat and Darbyshire (2016) noted, central bank financial 
statements, particularly the balance sheet, are important because they reflect major 
policy intervention.  
 
The question why central bank balance sheet matters requires a vast answer since it 
touches upon a wide range of themes, which, despite being different, are all 
interlinked to the balance sheet. For this reason, the existing literature on the central 
banks’ balance sheets is vast. On the other hand, there is very sparse literature on the 
balance sheets of central banks that operate within a system of central banks such as 
the EANCBs. Despite the fact that the subject matter of this thesis is the latter, since 
the principles pertaining to the balance sheets of “main” central banks are either 
applicable to or help in creating a contrast with regional or national central banks, 
this Chapter is deliberately designed to start with a review of the literature related to 
“main” central banks such as the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. The first 
part of this Chapter organises the related literature under different themes starting 
from the historical power of the central bank balance sheets and moving on to their 
role in macroeconomics, in signalling risk and in responding to the crisis, their 
financial strength and their composition. While providing a review of the ongoing 
debates or conclusions reached on these themes related to the balance sheets of 
“main” central banks, it provides the right context for the studies on the EANCBs 
presented in this thesis.  
 
As noted earlier, in conducting this review, it immediately emerges that there is a 





National Central Banks are very scarce and cover only specific aspects of the balance 
sheet, namely Target2, Euro banknotes and reserves. The second part of this Chapter 
reviews this limited literature. An appraisal of the gaps to which this thesis provides 
a contribution – particularly the role of the balance sheet to determine the relationship 
between the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem – concludes this Chapter. 
 
2.1 Why Central Banks’ Balance Sheets Matter: Brief Literature Review 
 
2.1.1 The Historical Power of Central Banks’ Balance Sheets 
 
Central bank balance sheets have historically played a special role in ensuring 
monetary and financial stability. From very early on, central banks were entrusted 
with the responsibility of issuing notes and were recognized as credible lenders of 
last resort. During the Gold Standard period, central banks were crucial to preserving 
the integrity of the international monetary system. Indeed, the severe financial crisis 
in the US in 1907 led the US Congress to establish the Federal Reserve System, 
allowing the Fed to use its balance sheet to promote a currency that would be flexible 
enough to meet the needs of a growing economy. Despite this, there were also periods 
characterized by failure of major central banks such as in the 1930s, when it has been 
argued that central banks failed to use their balance sheets sufficiently to lower long-
term rates and to halt a series of bankruptcies (Caruana, 2011). 
 
During periods characterized by stability and economic prosperity, however, interest 
in central bank’s balance sheet diminished in many economies as well as in the 
literature, particularly as central banks moved away from pursuing quantitative 
monetary policy targets and towards price targets in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
This waning of interest in central bank balance sheet was intensified by what 
happened in the late 1990s when the policy focus of most central banks in advanced 
economies was, almost exclusively, on policy interest rates. This was the period 
labelled the ‘Great Moderation’, when balance sheets took a back seat in the 





operational role in the implementation of monetary policy. However, this was 
changed, firstly by the financial crisis in Japan in the 1990s, the Asian financial crisis 
in the 1997/1998 and subsequently during the recent financial crisis. These two major 
shocks induced the revival of policy focus on central bank balance sheets.  
 
2.1.2 The Role of Central Banks’ Balance Sheets in Macroeconomics 
 
The size and structure of central bank balance sheets can signal potential 
macroeconomic imbalances and growing risks across the financial system. 
Notwithstanding this, as noted by Filardo and Yetman (2011), within most of the 
benchmark macroeconomic models used in recent years, central bank balance sheets 
played no role. This may have been considered as a reasonable simplification as 
monetary policy was centred on a paradigm in which policymakers set short-term 
interest rates while the limited size and stable composition of central bank balance 
sheets tended to be passive. Recent events, however, posed a challenge to the 
canonical model as central bank balance sheets grew rapidly and their composition 
changed, in part reflecting extraordinary policy actions. This, in addition to the fact 
that changes in central bank balance sheets have had important macroeconomic 
effects, brought about renewed interest. Indeed, progress has been reported in 
introducing central bank balance sheets into conventional monetary policy models – 
presenting new analytical frameworks that provide a meaningful role for central bank 
balance sheets.  
 
Various studies proposed different approaches to incorporate a role for central bank 
balance sheets in standard models used for policy analysis. For example, Durré and 
Pill (2010) suggested a model based on the inter-relationship between inflation and 
fiscal policy - a model that is built on the fiscal theory of the price level (Woodford 
1995). An alternative means to ensure that central bank balance sheets play an 
important role is to assume that other economic actors face leverage constraints as 





In sum, many economists agree that central bank balance sheets may, in principle, 
play a significant role in the economy and reveal important insights about monetary 
policy. However, as the standard macroeconomic models fail to incorporate the role 
of central bank balance sheets, literature has turned its focus on developing models 
that depart from the standard model and allow for analysing the effects of 
extraordinary policies and the macroeconomic risks and policy challenges posed by 
large balance sheets.  
  
2.1.3 The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet and its Financial Strength  
 
One point which is taking centre stage in the recent literature on the central banks’ 
balance sheet concerns the financial strength of the central bank as captured by its net 
worth2. As noted by Cukierman (2011), the issue of central bank capital and the 
distribution of profits appears, at first glance, similar to concerns of private 
corporations. However, as Rule (2015) noted, unlike with private financial 
institutions, central banks are not subject to regulatory capital requirements. Since 
central banks are usually owned by the state, the decision of how much capital a 
central bank holds is typically a question of political economy rather than purely 
finance. Indeed, as noted by former Bank of Japan Governor Fukui (2003), there is 
consensus that central banks’ concerns with the soundness of their own capital base 
are typically focused on ‘political economic instincts,’ rather than just purely 
economic reasons. As a result, capital buffers typically vary significantly among 
central banks.  
 
Theoretically, central banks can operate even when capital is negative – a central bank 
can issue liabilities regardless of its net worth and since it is part of the government, 
it is reasonable to consolidate the central bank’s balance sheet with the government’s 
broader balance sheet (Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 2015). However, Schoenmaker 
(2000) argued that the balance sheet of a central bank, like that of any other business 
in the monetary economy, has to consist not only of assets and liabilities but also of a 
 





surplus of the former over the latter. With this capital or equity it safeguards itself 
against the threat of bankruptcy. With these contrasting views, there is no consensus 
in the literature as to whether a central bank needs capital. 
 
Some of the literature argues that a strong central bank balance sheet position helps 
underpin public confidence in the central bank’s operational independence and 
commitment to fulfilling its mission and objectives, uninfluenced by their political 
masters. For example, Adler, Castro and Tovar (2012) used linear and nonlinear 
techniques on a sample of 41 countries and found that central bank financial strength 
can be a statistically significant factor explaining large negative interest rate 
deviations from an estimated ‘optimal’ level used as a proxy measure of monetary 
policy constraints. Stella (2011) found that inflation in central banks with weak 
financial positions is on average more than twice as high as for those central banks 
with stronger financial positions.  
 
Other authors such as Perera, Ralston and Wickramanayake (2013) also concluded 
that the financial health of a central bank’s balance sheet is a prerequisite for desirable 
policy outcomes. Indeed, their analysis, which covered a cross-section of countries, 
found a statistically significant and robust negative relationship between central bank 
financial strength and inflation. On this matter, Bindseil et al (2004) developed a 
simple comprehensive model of the relationship between a central bank’s balance 
sheet structure and its inflation performance and concluded that capital seems to 
remain a key tool to ensure that independent central bankers always concentrate on 
price stability in their monetary policy decisions. As Brione (2004) commented, this 
paper contributed to the growing debate on the importance of a central bank’s balance 
sheet.  
 
Another pressing question concerns the optimal level of the capital of the central 
bank. Sinclair and Milton (2011) in the introduction to their book The Capital Needs of 
the Central Bank, discussed three different viewpoints on this issue: firstly that for a 





capital should be derived from first principles, and thirdly, evidence may be 
considered as a tool to judge the appropriateness of financing arrangements for 
central banks.  On this issue, the proposition presented throughout this book is that 
there is no single formula for a central bank’s optimum capital that holds for all 
countries. Indeed, in the literature, there is no precise definition of what the optimal 
level of capital should be.  
 
Stella (2005) identified four different ways that central banks have used in practice to 
determine their own level of capital: (1) An absolute nominal value of capital; (2) A 
target ratio of capital to another central bank balance sheet item; (3) A target ratio of 
capital to a macroeconomic variable; (4) According to the perceived risks to the 
‘solvency’ of the bank. Prior to this, Stella (1997) argued that the appropriate level of 
central bank net worth is sufficient to ensure that in the normal course of operations, 
the bank will preserve its financial independence from the Treasury. Martinez-Resano 
(2004) also attempted to define the factors which determine the optimal level of 
capitalisation. He surveyed the full range of risks that a central bank’s balance sheet 
is subject to and, using a simple Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR), analysed the 
interplay between capitalisation, accounting rules and dividend distribution in order 
to determine a simple benchmark for central bank financial strength. He concluded 
that, in the long-run, central banks’ financial independence should be secure as along 
as demand for banknotes is maintained. However, in the short- and medium-term, 
he found that financial vulnerability could impact on a central bank’s effective 
independence unless adequate capitalisation is secured. Ernhagen, Vesterlund and 
Viotti (2002) provided some calculations regarding the minimum level of capital for 
the Riksbank, although they admit that it is impossible to provide a precise answer. 
 
Bini Smaghi and Gros (2000) constructed an index of central bank capitalisation as the 
ratio to total liabilities over the monetary base in percentage, whereby a value close 
to 100 indicated a balance sheet that is determined only by monetary policy 
operations. For 1999, the Bundesbank was identified as having the lowest 





other extreme with an index of 306.2. When compared with the US Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of Japan, the Eurosystem was significantly more capitalised, explained 
by the fact that at the inception of the Eurosystem, the EANCBs kept the assets and 
liabilities they had accumulated.  
 
More recently, Buiter and Rahbari (2012b) analyzed whether each of the EANCB was 
over or under capitalized by observing the loss absorbing capacity of each of the 
central bank and examined the distribution of the Eurosystem’s capital amongst the 
EANCBs. According to Buiter and Rahbari (2012b), since the Eurosystem capital is 
not distributed evenly across the EANCBs, their ability to respond to capital calls by 
the ECB is potentially limited. In this 2012 study by Buiter and Rahbari, the actual 
reserves (consisting of capital and reserves, revaluation accounts and provisions) are 
compared with those predicted by applying the ECB capital share of each EANCB to 
the consolidated Eurosystem financial buffer. Buiter and Rahbari (2012b) concluded 
that in 2010, AT, FR, IT, NE, PT and to a lesser degree DE were over capitalised while 
BE, CY, FI, GR, IE, LU, MT, SK, SI and ES were under capitalised. Based on this study, 
Chapter 4 replicates the same exercise but considers the 2006-2016 time span rather 
than one point in time, providing an analysis of how capitalization of the EANCBs 
varied across time. 
 
The empirical calculations on this matter concern the construction of a benchmark 
indicator that sheds light on the degree of capitalization of one central bank relative 
to another rather than determining the optimal level of central bank capital. Indeed, 
to my knowledge, none of the existing literature presented a conclusive empirical 
investigation of the optimal level of central bank capital.  
 
2.1.4 The Central Bank’s Balance Sheet and the Response to the Recent 
Financial Crisis 
 
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, central banks operated in uncharted waters, 





impinged on their balance sheet as these fall under the broader category of balance 
sheet policies, whereby the central bank uses its balance sheet to affect asset prices 
and financial conditions beyond the short-term interest rates. Indeed, as Caruana 
(2011) puts it ‘one of the lessons of the recent crisis is that more attention must be paid 
to balance sheets than was the case before the crisis’.  
 
The strand of literature studying the balance sheet policies and the resulting 
quantitative and qualitative changes to the balance sheet has grown rapidly over a 
short time span. The balance sheet of “main” central banks expanded through 
quantitative easing for commercial banks while their quality deteriorated as the 
requirements for collateral were reduced. Various studies such as Nagel (2012) and 
Sibert (2014) amongst others reviewed the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve, 
the ECB and the Bank of England after the crisis began in 2007. Other authors, namely 
Bagus and Howden (2009) and Bagus and Schiml (2009) identified the substantial 
deterioration of the balance sheets of “main” central banks and the growing exposure 
to risk. These studies reveal that during the crisis period changes in central banks’ 
balance sheets impacted the quality of money. 
 
Various other contributions to the empirical literature related to the unconventional 
monetary policies adopted since the outbreak of the financial crisis examined the 
effects and transmission channels of quantitative easing programmes particularly 
focusing on the impact of purchases on the available supply of specific assets to the 
private sector - the portfolio rebalancing channel (Joyce et al, 2011; ECB, 2017b). The 
literature has also examined the role of announcements regarding future bond 
purchases and their effect on market participant expectations - the signalling channel 
(Cecioni, Ferrero and Secchi, 2011). Other related literature investigates the effects of 
the unconventional monetary policy measures on macroeconomic variables (refer to 
Lenza, Pill and Reichlin, 2010; Giannone et al, 2011; Peersman, 2011b) and the impact 
on the slope and level of the yield curve (see for instance Joyce et al, 2010). Despite 





investigations presented in this thesis and therefore a detailed review of this literature 
falls beyond the scope of this Chapter.  
 
2.1.5 The Role of Central Banks’ Balance Sheets in Signalling Risk 
 
The design of central bank balance sheets can also be viewed as a determinant of the 
type of risk exposure of central banks (Pattipeilohy, 2016). This became even more 
important as the non-standard monetary policy measures adopted as a response to 
the financial crisis have had a substantial impact on the risk exposures of central 
banks.  
 
As Donnery et al, (2017) explained, the more relevant form of interest rate risk for the 
Eurosystem relates to a potential mismatch in the sensitivity of the Eurosystem’s 
assets and liabilities to changes in short term interest rates. Under the Asset Purchase 
Programme (APP), the central bank acquired fixed income bonds at a time of 
relatively low interest rates. Meanwhile, most of the Eurosystem’s liabilities are 
primarily deposit based with a variable rate. In other words, while a large amount of 
assets entail securities purchased at very low yields, a significant portion of central 
bank liabilities are linked to policy rates which are expected to rise in the future. These 
issues have been discussed in detail in the literature. Af Jochnick (2015) identified 
how some of these issues have affected the Sveriges Riksbank, also noting that central 
banks that have bought large volumes of bonds with long maturities will come under 
similar pressure. Floden (2016) also noted that the Riksbank will incur losses on bonds 
purchased as yields continued to move lower. Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch 
(2013) identified similar issues in the context of the US Federal Reserve’s holdings of 
securities under the quantitative easing programme. They identified a potential 
increase in interest income risk as short-term interest rates rise and consequently 
increases the funding cost of its securities portfolio. In this vein, Cukierman (2013) 
remarked that the risk taken by the Fed appeared to be higher than that of the ECB, 






A number of EANCBs have also identified the growing risks on their balance sheets 
and have taken steps to mitigate these risks. Weidmann (2017) explicitly highlighted 
the growing maturity mismatch on the Bundesbank balance sheet. Other EANCBs 
highlighted their exposure to increasing risk in their Annual Reports. De 
Nederlandsche Bank, in its 2015 Annual Report, states that quantitative easing has 
resulted in greater balance sheet risks. In its 2016 Annual Report, the Central Bank of 
Ireland has also identified increased risks in the course of its regular risk assessment 
of its growing balance sheet. Consequently, most of these EANCBs introduced an 
additional risk provision in compliance with ECB accounting guidelines. Various 
authors such as Ingram (2011) and Stella and Lonnberg (2008) supported this use of 
risk provisions by central banks, the former noting that it enables the ECB to reduce 
the potential volatility in its distributable annual profits.  
 
2.1.6 The Composition of Central Banks’ Balance Sheets 
 
The financial crisis brought with it a change in the perspective towards central bank 
balance sheets as well as in their relevance to macroeconomic developments. Prior to 
the crisis, many macroeconomic models, notably the standard New Keynesian 
framework as summarized by, for example, Eggertson and Woodford (2003), 
considered the composition of central bank balance sheet as irrelevant for monetary 
policy purposes. According to this strand of thought, the composition of the balance 
sheet is only relevant as signaling information on the central bank’s reaction function. 
Subsequently, the recent unconventional monetary policy measures by central banks 
instigated an interest in the literature analyzing the conditions under which central 
bank balance sheet measures invoke portfolio rebalancing effects (Greenwood and 
Vayanos, 2008, Vayanos and Vila, 2009). In this regard, a number of studies assessed 
the relevance of portfolio rebalancing effects by examining the effects of balance sheet 
policies on term and risk premia (Gagnon et al, 2011; Joyce et al, 2011; Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2014). Often, however, these studies, which comprise theoretical models 
analyzing unconventional monetary policy, did not take into account other 





comprehensive theoretical framework presented by Curdia and Woodford (2011) that 
studied the effects of innovations on central bank balance sheet composition along 
multiple dimensions. However, as noted by Pattipeilohy (2016), being a closed-
economy model, the analysis by Curdia and Woodford was rather restrictive. 
 
In the midst of the recent financial crisis, when interest in the central bank balance 
sheet was slowly gaining ground, Bagus and Howden (2009) emphasized the 
importance of the analysis of a central bank’s balance sheet for the evaluation of the 
quality of the currency it backs. They argued that it is possible that the total of assets 
on the balance sheet do not change while the composition of the balance sheet may 
deteriorate substantially, causing inflationary pressures. This brought along a new 
strand of literature that does not focus merely on size metrics but on the composition 
of the balance sheet. In this regard, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010) distinguished 
between quantitative and qualitative easing. Quantitative easing refers to an 
alternative approach to policy that give rise to an expansion of the central bank 
balance sheet, which does not alter the composition of the asset side of the balance 
sheet. In contrast, in case of qualitative easing, the overall size of the central bank 
balance sheet is unchanged, but the composition of asset holdings is changed and risk 
is enhanced. Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010) concluded that prior to the Lehman 
failure, only a change in the composition of the asset side of the “main” central banks’ 
balance sheet was registered. Subsequently, elements of both quantitative and 
qualitative easing were employed registering both changes in the composition and an 
overall expansion of the balance sheet (Lenza, Pill and Reichlin, 2010). Similarly, 
Farmer (2013) argued that both qualitative and quantitative easing policies were used 
in the recent crisis and both were, in his view, successful.  
 
Against this background, unsurprisingly, the branch of literature that studies the 
effects of changes in central bank balance sheet composition is still at its infancy. 
Following this new perspective, new literature perceiving the size and composition 
of a central bank balance sheet as an indicator of the aggressiveness of the policy 





explicitly used the size and composition of the balance sheet to characterise monetary 
policy strategies. These studies, mostly covering “main” central banks in advanced 
and emerging economies, are reviewed in Chapter 6. Since to my knowledge, none of 
these studies cover a system of central banks such as the Euro Area, Chapter 6 aims 
to address this gap in the literature.  
 
2.1.7 The Central Banks’ Balance Sheets: the Fed, the Eurosystem and the 
Bank of England 
 
The balance sheet of a central bank provides detailed information about how it uses 
its monetary policy instruments and how monetary policy is implemented. Indeed, 
the composition and the size of the balance sheets of “main” central banks such as the 
Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Eurosystem and the Bank of England have been 
significantly affected by the variety of monetary policy measures implemented over 
the course of the financial crisis. Through a comparison of the balance sheets of these 
“main” central banks, various authors discussed the similarities of and the differences 
between the central banks’ responses to the crisis and their implications on their 
balance sheet. 
 
Looking at the balance sheets of the Fed, the Eurosystem and the Bank of England 
(BoE), Sibert (2014) observed that over the course of the liquidity crisis (August 2007 
– June 2008) the size of the balance sheets were only slightly changed though their 
composition changed. In contrast, during the solvency crisis (July 2008 – April 2010), 
these balance sheets expanded both in terms of size and composition. Subsequently, 
over the sovereign debt crisis (May 2010 – Spring 2014), while the balance sheets of 
the Fed and the BoE expanded markedly, the expansion of the balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem was only temporary. A similar description of developments in the 
balance sheets of the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve up to August 2009 was 






Gros (2012) also highlighted the increase in the size of the central bank’s balance 
sheets of the Eurosystem and the Fed and noted their similar magnitudes. However, 
he warns that a simple comparison between the size of the balance sheets or their 
increase is inappropriate - instead arguing that one qualitative difference between the 
Eurosystem and the Fed is more important than the balance sheet size. While loans 
to banks by the Fed were very low, the Eurosystem lent huge amounts to weak banks 
with no access to market funding. In this vein, Santor (2013) observed that while 
purchases of government debt constituted the bulk of most central banks’ balance 
sheets, Long-Term Refinancing Operations represented most of the increases in the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet at least for the first half of the crisis period. While the 
Federal Reserve engaged in Quantitative Easing (QE), the ECB opted for credit easing 
and touched upon QE only towards the end of the crises in 2015. These had diverging 
implications on their respective balance sheets. For example, as discussed in Chapter 
6, the ECB’s ‘enhanced credit support’ programme which involved primarily bank-
based non-standard measures, expanded the Eurosystem balance sheet through an 
increase in domestic private sector debt on its asset side. By contrast, the Bank of 
England and the Fed undertook large-scale asset purchases predominantly from non-
bank counterparties, increasing their domestic public sector debt on their asset side 
of the balance sheet. 
 
Various other authors have also analysed the developments of the balance sheet of 
the Eurosystem3 and the Fed in light of the recent economic turmoil (Cecchetti, 2009; 
Bagus and Schiml, 2009; Hamilton, 2009). In this vein, Bagus and Howden (2009) also 
looked at balance sheet developments of the Eurosystem and the Fed. They noted that 
as the balance sheet expanded and its composition changed, the average quality of 
the assets deteriorated on average. Moreover, by focusing on non-numerical 
regulatory measures that affected the balance sheet such as changes in terms, 
collateral, counterparties and transparency, they concluded that the Eurosystem’s 
 
3 These analysis concern only developments in the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet as published 
by the ECB. Chapter 4 investigates developments in a new definition of the Eurosystem whereby intra-





balance sheet appeared to be in a poorer shape than the Fed’s, on account of 
broadened collateral and a declining equity ratio. 
 
Similarly, Rodriguez and Carrasco (2014) also examined developments in the 
Eurosystem’s and the Fed’s balance sheets noting that since the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, while the Fed and the BoE expanded their balance sheet sharply, the 
expansion in the Eurosystem’s balance sheet was only moderate at the beginning, 
increasing steadily over time. Interestingly, Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010) attributed 
this to the fact that the Eurosystem’s balance sheet was already higher than the 
balance sheet of the Fed and the BoE in terms of its share to GDP. Lenza, Pill and 
Reichlin (2010) also argued that initially the ECB addressed the crisis through changes 
in the structure of the assets of the balance sheet rather than its expansion by engaging 
in operations with their regular counterparties. Cour-Thimann and Winkler (2012) 
provided another reason for the delay in the expansion of the Eurosystem’s balance 
sheet, being the fact that before the mid-2010, the stronger effects of the crisis 
appeared to take place in the US and the UK. Despite these explanations, from the 
beginning of the crisis until the end of 2012, the Eurosystem’s and the Fed’s balance 
sheets almost tripled. Subsequently, by mid-2014, the Eurosystem’s balance sheet has 
shrunk by half as money markets regained their role as the principal market for bank 
funds, consequently lowering the demand for central bank money. 
 
Other articles/academic papers focused specifically on how monetary policy 
implementation and liquidity provision during the financial crisis have affected the 
size and composition of the Bank of England’s balance sheet. In particular, Cross, 
Fisher and Weeken (2010) concluded that the large expansion of the BoE’s balance 
sheet reflected an expansion of both the BoE’s liquidity insurance operations as well 









2.2 The Balance Sheets of EANCBs: Related Literature 
 
As noted earlier, most of the existing literature focuses on the balance sheets of 
“main” central banks such as the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve, the Bank of 
England and the Bank of Japan, amongst others. Only a sparse literature focuses on 
specific components of the EANCBs’ balance sheets namely, the importance of 
transfers between EANCBs and the treatment of banknotes in circulation and 
reserves. While this literature is reviewed below, it emerges that one gap in the 
literature relates to the relationship between the EANCBs, the ECB and the 
Eurosystem from a balance sheet perspective. This is the motivation of the studies 
presented in this thesis. 
 
2.2.1 Target2  
 
The most significant change in the balance sheets of EANCBs has been associated 
with Target2 (T2) transfers. Target2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer system) is the real-time gross settlement system for euro-
denominated payments which mainly settles operations of monetary policy and 
money market operations. Thus, any transaction conducted across borders in the 
EMU is processed via the Target2 system. These transfers and their implications for 
central bank balance sheets provoked a significant outpouring of opinion pieces and 
academic articles.  
 
A number of contributions, such as by Sinn and Wollmershäuser (2011) and Cour-
Thimann (2013), emphasized the relationship between Target2 balances and current 
account deficits. The former, in particular, argued that increased Target2 balances 
have effectively financed current account deficits in the periphery countries over the 
crucial years of the crisis. In the same vein, Sinn (2011a), labelled the increase in these 
balances as a ‘secret bailout’ of the Euro Area’s periphery and has characterized the 
system as playing a key role in enabling these economies to run large current account 





authors such as Whelan (2017). Indeed, in contrast, Whelan (2017) argued that Target 
balances resulted from the interaction of a common monetary policy with the freedom 
of movement of capital. Whelan (2017) associated the increase in T2 balances prior to 
2012, to the deposit flight from the Euro Area hard-hit countries and the ECB’s agreed 
full-allotment policy. 
 
Other authors4 also contributed to the literature on Target2. For example, Timmer 
(2014) investigated the determinants of the changes in Target2 balances while Moro 
(2015) analyzed the accumulation of Target2 imbalances and the fragmentation of the 
European financial system along national borders. Moreover, Bindseil and König 
(2012) explained the relationship between T2 positions and the monetary base.  
 
Another strand of literature on this matter compares Target2 mechanism with the 
Federal Reserve Interdistrict Settlement Account (ISA). According to the Federal 
Reserve Accounting Manual (pp 136 – 138), the ISA balances should be settled every 
year in April and netted via transfer of gold certificates between reserve banks. In 
contrast, there is no settlement mechanism in the Eurosystem. However, there is an 
ongoing debate in the literature on whether the rules of the accounting manual have 
been followed as the New York Fed accumulated a large positive ISA account while 
the Richmond and San Francesco Fed have accumulated a negative ISA account 
(Bijlsma and Lukkezen, 2012). In contrasting the Eurosystem with the Federal Reserve 
System, Sinn (2011a; 2011b) proposed the annual settlement of Target balances on the 
grounds that this is the approach adopted by the Federal Reserve Banks. However, 
Whelan (2011) presented contrasting views arguing that Federal Reserve Banks have 
no fiscal connection with the states that they serve. A number of reforms to the 
Target2 payments system were also put forward by authors such as Sinn (2011). In 
particular, he proposed the setting of a cap on Target2 accounts but was argued 
against by Whelan (2011) who interpreted this proposal as the end of the Euro as a 
single currency. 
 
4 Other contributions to the literature on Target2 include Jobst et al, (2012), Auer (2012), Cecioni and 





As reviewed above, the literature attempts to answer a series of questions related to 
Target2: What do the increasing claims of the EANCBs represent? Are they 
subsidized loans by a group of EANCBs to other Euro Area countries? Or are they 
simply a consequence of the complex mechanics related to the construction of the 
Eurosystem and how it implements monetary operations? The existing literature that 
attempts to answer questions related to Target2 is vast and the above is not meant to 
present an exhaustive review. Nevertheless, since Target2 is an important element in 
the analysis presented in Chapter 4, a concise review of the literature on this item is 
presented there. 
 
2.2.2 Euro Banknotes 
 
One particular component on the EANCBs’ balance sheets that attracted some 
attention in the literature is the ‘Banknotes in Circulation’, being the most important 
liability item. Krsnakova and Oberleithner (2012) described the innovative manner in 
which banknotes in circulation are presented to allocate them adequately across the 
balance sheets of the Eurosystem central banks, requiring regular accounting 
adjustments of the circulating banknotes. In brief, the ECB should, as a rule, report 
eight per cent of total banknotes in circulation in its balance sheet. The remaining 92 
per cent are to be presented in the balance sheets of the EANCBs in proportion to their 
paid-up shares in the ECB capital. The latter constitute the Banknote Allocation Key. 
The various EANCBs regularly report to the ECB how many banknotes they have put 
into and taken out of circulation. The difference between the net amounts of 
banknotes put into circulation by the individual EANCBs and the amounts of 
banknotes allocated to them (on the basis of the Banknote Allocation Key) give rise to 
intra-Eurosystem balances. In the same vein, Handig and Holzfeind (2007), based on 
the balance sheet of the Austrian central bank over the first five years since the cash 
changeover, concluded that all relevant aspects of the Eurosystem’s banknote 









Up until recently, most of the research on QE has generally paid little attention to the 
role of reserve dynamics within the banking system and some have assumed that the 
system passively absorbs additional reserves generated by asset purchases. However, 
in 2019, in a study of the Central Bank of Ireland, Whelan et al, focused on the 
expansion in reserve accounts on the liability side of the Eurosystem balance sheet, 
which mirrors the purchase of financial assets that drive the expansion of the asset 
side of the balance sheet. Whelan and Ellen (2019) describes the evolution of central 
bank reserves in the Euro Area in recent years, noting that the build-up in reserves 
since the financial crisis has not occurred uniformly across countries, varying both in 
terms of magnitude and dynamics.  Moreover, in line with investigation in Chapter 
6, Whelan and Ellen (2019) observe that there are large discrepancies across countries 
between APP purchases by the EANCBs and the build-up of reserves by banks in 
those countries. In this context, Baldo et al, (2017) highlighted that the likely receipts 
of liquidity inflows directly related to Eurosystem purchases are concentrated in 
specific countries such as France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg. Using bank-
level data, Whelan and Ellen (2019) also found that banks appear to be primarily 
managing reserves through debt security purchases and seems likely to have had an 
effect on European bond yields that is distinct from the portfolio rebalancing effect.  
 
2.3 Synthesis and Gaps 
 
2.3.1 Synthesis of the Literature 
 
Chapter 1 posited that the balance sheet of a central bank has a crucial role in the 
setting of monetary policy and that it offers an additional purpose in the case of a 
system of central banks. The balance sheets of central banks within a monetary union 
were identified as the tool to define the system as a whole and to divulge information 
on the relationships between the central banks operating within the system as well as 





literature related to the former point while the literature related to the latter is found 
to be very scarce. The following salient points emerge: 
 
i. Central bank balance sheets serve a very different purpose to commercial 
bank balance sheets. Whereas in the commercial sector balance sheets 
serve the purely commercial function of channeling funds from savers to 
borrowers, central bank balance sheets serve an important policy function 
through the provision of central bank money to the economy. 
 
ii. A central bank’s balance sheet is a source of information about the 
financial strength of the central bank - the financial buffers are one of the 
main components of the balance sheet. Although over the last few years, 
this subject attracted increasing attention, there is still no consensus on the 
optimal measure of the central bank’s capital.  
 
iii. Through balance sheet policies, in the wake of the recent financial crisis, 
the central banks used their balance sheets to affect asset prices and 
financial conditions – as their conventional monetary policy tool was no 
longer feasible. This led to the design of the central bank’s balance sheet 
to be identified as a determinant of the type of risk exposure of central 
banks. 
 
iv. Size metrics do not provide a complete picture of the effects of the financial 
crisis on the central bank’s balance sheet. In addition to quantitative 
easing, qualitative easing was also employed during the crisis by “main” 
central banks, highlighting the importance that should be attached to the 
structure and composition of the central bank balance sheets. 
 
2.3.2 Gaps Addressed by this Thesis  
 
This review has shed light on some core findings from research to date on the topic 





have been analyses of central bank balance sheets as early as Hayek, 1925 (cited in 
Bagus and Schiml, 2009), overall, the analysis of central bank balance sheets has been 
neglected and has never stood in the centre of the analysis of monetary policies. Since 
the turmoil of the financial crisis, though slowly, this is changing. The analysis of 
central bank’s balance sheet is becoming a new field of the analysis of monetary 
policy. Despite this, however, the role of the balance sheet of national central banks 
operating within a system of central banks remain highly neglected and a number of 
questions remain to be answered: 
 
1. Firstly, the size of the Eurosystem’s ‘parent’ central bank is assumed to be 
equivalent to the balance sheet of the Eurosystem. However, a new measure 
of the Eurosystem can be the tool that facilitates further investigation on the 
relationship between the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem. In this 
context, the position of the EANCBs vis-à-vis the ECB has been overlooked 
and it seems particularly opportune to examine whether they operate on 
autopilot as branches of the ECB. It is interesting also to examine how the 
relationship between EANCBs and the ECB compares with the relationship 
between the District Banks and the Federal Reserve.  
 
2. Secondly, the debate on determining an optimal level of capital, as outlined in 
the earlier literature review, has not reached a consensus yet. In the context of 
the Eurosystem, a more fundamental – as yet unanswered – question concerns 
the distribution of the capital amongst the EANCBs and how this changed 
during the financial crisis period, if at all.  
 
3. Thirdly, despite the recent prominence given to the composition of the balance 
sheets, the composition of the EANCBs’ balance sheets remains to be 
investigated. This will shed light on the interlinkages between each EANCB 
and the structure of the Eurosystem as a whole. 
 
The following Chapter presents a new dataset comprising of all the balance sheets of 





manuscripts presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 positioned to address these gaps in the 
literature. The first study examines the dataset and identifies the relationship between 
the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem by taking various balance sheet aspects. 
The second study presents an econometric investigation of the link between the 
EANCBs and the ECB. The third study examines the evolution of the composition of 







The Balance Sheets of Euro Area National 
Central Banks: A New Dataset 
 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to conduct balance sheet analysis applied to the 
Euro Area National Central Banks in order to reveal the relationships between these 
EANCBs, the ECB, and the Eurosystem. This Chapter presents a new dataset 
necessary to conduct this analysis. 
 
This Chapter compiles a new historical dataset of the balance sheets of all the nineteen 
individual EANCBs and the ECB spanning over the 2006 to 2016 period. This dataset 
provides the basis for the computation of a new balance sheet of the Eurosystem - a 
detailed set of disaggregated accounts of the Eurosystem - presented in Chapter 4 and 
analysed in the three main studies in this thesis. Moreover, the wealth of detailed 
information contained in this dataset may also be of use to other researchers.  
 
The later part of this Chapter also documents necessary adjustments to the data 
including adjustments related to the Capital Key as well as to particular balance sheet 






3.1 The Balance Sheets of the National Central Banks 
 
3.1.1 Data Source and Frequency 
 
The new dataset comprises of a comprehensive record of the balance sheets of the 
individual EANCBs and the ECB. The dataset is very detailed such that each balance 
sheet consists of eleven main items on the assets side and fifteen main items on the 
liabilities side complemented by nineteen sub-items.  
 
The only published information about the composition by country of the Eurosystem 
assets and liabilities is the scattered dispersed information published by the 
individual EANCBs in their annual financial accounts. This implies that the 
information for this dataset could only be accessed by delving into individual 
EANCBs’ end-of-year financial accounts published in their Annual Reports. Indeed, 
prior to 2016, the ECB used to publish only the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet 
and not a disaggregation for each EANCB.  
 
In a bid to strengthen the Eurosystem’s accountability and transparency, as from July 
2016, the Governing Council of the ECB decided to publish monthly breakdowns 
showing how the ECB and the EANCB balance sheets contribute to the Eurosystem 
statistical balance sheet. However, this differs from a simple amalgamation of all the 
nineteen individual EANCBs and the ECB since it includes a consolidation 
adjustment. This will be the subject matter discussed in Chapter 4, which produces 
an alternative set of Eurosystem financial statements at the end of each year between 
2006 and 2016 computed as the amalgamation of the EANCBs and the ECB and 
therefore distinct from those published by the ECB.  
 
Despite that the collection of data from individual EANCBs’ annual reports remains 
a tedious exercise, this was not barred by measurement problems and lack of 
transparency. On the other hand, collection of data was facilitated by consistency in 





accounting rules as set out in the relevant ECB guidelines5. Moreover, the 
harmonization of accounting rules allow the individual data of the EANCBs and the 
ECB to be aggregated in a meaningful way and ensure valid cross-section analysis.  
 
The complete dataset (Tables I – XX) is presented in Appendix 3.1 and includes 
detailed data on the components of the assets and liabilities sides of the balance sheet 
of each EANCB and the ECB for the 2006-2016 period.  
 
Frequency of the Data 
 
This new dataset is presented on an annual (end-of-year) basis since data at a higher 
frequency (quarterly or monthly) do not cover the entire panel of EANCBs under 
study. Monthly data covering the entire 2006-2016 period are available for some 
central banks such as for BE, CY, DE, EL, FL, IE, IT, NE, LT, LV, MT and SI. For other 
EANCBs, however, data is only published on a quarterly or annual basis. As the ECB 
started publishing a disaggregated financial statement of the Eurosystem on a 
monthly basis as from July 2016, data are available on a monthly frequency for the 
entire panel of the EANCBs only for the period July 2016 – December 2016 (December 
2016 being the end point of the period under analysis). 
  
Monthly or quarterly data provide further information and are preferred than annual 
frequency. Although, very often one is able to reach the same general conclusions 
when yearly data is used, movements in the balance sheet size that are captured by 
looking at the monthly data are unnoticed when using yearly data (refer to Figure 3.1 





5 Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of the ECB of 3 November 2016 on the legal framework for accounting and 







3.1.2 Adjustments to the Data 
 
Whilst conducting the analysis presented in the following Chapters, some 
adjustments to the data were necessary for a more accurate study. For ease of 
reference, these adjustments are documented below. The first adjustment relates to 
the apportionment of the ECB amongst the EANCBs while the second adjustment 
relates to the Capital Key. In contrast with the ECB position, this latter adjustment 
accentuates the importance of the fully paid-up capital rather than the subscribed 
capital (in line with both business practice and the literature). The third adjustment 
relates to banknotes in circulation and is necessary due to the accounting treatment 
of this item in the balance sheets of the EANCBs. 
 
3.1.2.1 Apportioning the ECB amongst the EANCBs 
 
Table 3.1 presents the total assets/liabilities for the nineteen EANCBs and the ECB as 
published in their Annual Reports. However, since very often the analysis presented 
in this thesis focuses only on the EANCBs and exclude the ECB (such as when 
investigating relationships with the Capital Key in Chapters 4 and 5), it becomes 
necessary to apportion the ECB across the nineteen EANCBs. This implies that the 
level of total assets/liabilities for each EANCB is adjusted to include the 




















Figure 3.1 Bundesbank Total 


























assume a portion of the ECB’s assets (as ECB part-owners). This apportionment is 
carried out in line with the share of each EANCB in the ECB capital. As in Table 3.2, 
the adjusted total assets/liabilities for each EANCB is therefore larger than the level 
published in their respective Annual Reports.  
 
3.1.2.2 The Capital Key 
 
The analysis in Chapter 4 primarily questions whether, during the recent financial 
crisis, EANCBs acted on auto-pilot, expanding their balance sheets in line with their 
share of the capital of the ECB. Since such an investigation makes use of the capital 
shares of the EANCBs, this sub-section documents a detailed description of the 
necessary adjustments to the official Capital Key published by the ECB. 
 
The European Monetary Union is constructed such that the National Central Banks 
are the owners of the ECB – the ECB’s own capital is subscribed6 by the National 
Central Banks. The National Central Banks that form part of the Eurosystem pay up 
their capital share in full. In contrast, non-Euro Area NCBs are required to contribute 
only to the operational costs incurred by the ECB in relation to their participation in 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and therefore pay up a small 
percentage of their share in the ECB’s subscribed capital7.  
 
Each EANCB owns a notional share of this ECB’s subscribed capital, which is given 
formulaically by its “capital key”: an equal weighting of the respective country’s 
share in the total population and GDP of the EU. But as a measure of the true shares 
in the equity of ECB, the officially published “capital key” is a fiction, given the gap 
between subscribed and paid-up capital (refer to Appendix 3.2 and 3.3). (The official 
capital key represents the notional share of each EANCB in a counterfactual world  
 
 
6 The ECB’s subscribed capital is automatically increased when a new Member State joins the EU and its 
National Central Bank joins the ESCB.  
7 When a non-Euro Area NCB joins the Eurosystem, the respective National Central Bank pays up the 






Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks and the ECB
Table 3.1 Total Assets/Liabilities of the EANCBs and the ECB 
€bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  53.4 61.9 83.8 71.6 79.8 99.3 109.4 97.5 92.8 107.0 122.6 
Belgium 82.8 112.4 153.2 101.5 74.7 127.7 109.8 77.8 75.5 89.0 131.2 
Cyprus   10.7 13.5 11.9 15.2 15.1 14.3 11.7 12.0 13.8 
Estonia      3.1 4.3 4.3 6.0 6.7 6.8 
Finland 19.8 22.8 30.0 35.6 46.0 98.1 101.2 49.7 47.7 57.4 79.5 
France 232.2 360.7 553.0 506.1 481.6 709.3 731.8 550.0 577.7 710.4 845.4 
Germany 373.5 483.7 612.6 588.0 671.3 837.6 1,025.3 801.0 770.8 1,012.0 1,393.0 
Greece 34.9 42.7 70.9 86.6 138.6 168.4 159.8 109.5 103.2 163.5 142.4 
Ireland  40.3 53.5 116.1 124.9 204.5 176.2 137.5 108.1 81.3 77.2 82.8 
Italy 218.6 244.4 267.4 301.3 333.0 539.0 610.0 554.4 530.6 587.4 773.7 
Latvia         8.0 11.1 14.8 
Lithuania          11.3 14.5 
Luxembourg 52.4 59.0 100.6 77.0 79.7 127.2 120.4 118.6 117.1 159.0 200.9 
Malta   2.7 3.2 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 4.3 4.5 5.5 
Netherlands 67.2 102.1 114.6 131.2 133.4 266.6 254.4 158.5 140.2 210.4 290.3 
Portugal 32.7 38.7 50.7 62.5 99.7 109.8 119.4 111.6 105.6 116.9 137.7 
Slovakia    25.4 25.5 27.2 24.7 22.1 23.1 23.1 27.9 
Slovenia  8.4 9.3 10.0 8.6 10.2 12.6 10.8 10.9 10.3 12.7 
Spain 137.8 175.2 209.0 218.0 202.6 355.6 549.7 381.0 359.3 444.9 577.0 







Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks 
Table 3.2 Adjusted Total Assets/Liabilities of the EANCBs 
ECB apportioned amongst EANCBs as per Capital Key 
€bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  56.5 65.6 94.9 75.5 84.3 105.8 115.1 102.3 98.0 114.1 132.3 
Belgium 86.5 116.8 166.8 106.3 80.4 135.7 116.9 83.9 82.1 98.0 143.5 
Cyprus   11.4 13.7 12.2 15.6 15.5 14.6 12.1 12.6 14.6 
Estonia      3.7 4.8 4.7 6.5 7.4 7.7 
Finland 21.7 25.1 36.9 38.1 48.9 102.3 104.9 52.8 51.0 62.0 85.7 
France 254.2 386.8 632.3 534.2 514.9 756.2 773.9 585.4 615.3 762.1 915.7 
Germany 404.8 520.9 725.6 625.5 715.6 900.1 1,081.4 848.0 818.5 1,077.6 1,482.2 
Greece 37.7 46.0 80.9 90.5 143.2 174.9 165.6 114.4 108.5 170.9 152.5 
Ireland  41.6 55.1 121.0 127.1 207.1 179.9 140.8 110.9 84.4 81.5 88.5 
Italy 237.9 267.1 336.4 326.0 362.2 580.2 647.0 585.6 563.2 632.3 834.7 
Latvia         8.8 12.1 16.2 
Lithuania          12.8 16.5 
Luxembourg 52.7 59.3 101.5 77.4 80.1 127.8 120.9 119.0 117.6 159.7 201.9 
Malta   3.1 3.4 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 4.5 4.7 5.9 
Netherlands 73.1 109.2 136.1 139.1 142.8 279.7 266.2 168.5 150.8 225.0 310.2 
Portugal 35.4 41.8 60.1 66.0 103.9 115.5 124.6 116.0 110.2 123.3 146.4 
Slovakia    26.8 27.1 29.5 26.8 23.8 25.1 25.9 31.7 
Slovenia  8.9 11.1 10.6 9.3 11.3 13.6 11.6 11.8 11.5 14.4 




where all EU countries had adopted the Euro.) In the analysis that makes use of the 
Capital Key, therefore, the shares of fully paid-up capital are, instead, considered as 
the true capital shares of each EANCB in the ECB. A further minor adjustment is then 
carried out so that when the non-Euro Area NCBs are excluded, the capital shares of 
the Eurosystem members (based on the paid-up capital) are rebased to sum to 100 per 
cent. The resultant shares are referred to as the ‘Adjusted Capital Key (ACK)’, 
presented in Table 3.5.  
 
The ECB publishes the share of each EANCB in the ECB’s subscribed capital – the 
official capital key (Table 3.3) and the subscribed and fully paid-up capital of each 
EANCB in absolute terms (Appendix 3.2 and 3.3). Based on this, this study computes 
the true capital share of each EANCB which reflects the distribution of the fully paid-
up capital (Table 3.4) rather than the fictional subscribed capital. Moreover, given that 
the studies carried out in this thesis focus on the Euro Area NCBs, the capital shares 
are rebased to eliminate the non-Euro Area NCBs (Table 3.5) as explained earlier. As 
an example of the above adjustments, in 2016, while the Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
official “capital key” was 18.0 per cent, its share of paid-up capital was 25.2 per cent. 
When the non-Euro Area countries are excluded, this share is then minimally 
adjusted upwards to 25.6 per cent.  
 
This approach towards the Capital Key is not new in the literature; in particular, 
studies8  by the central bank of Austria that make use of the Capital Key take a similar 
approach and calculates the Adjusted Capital Key for specific years. Since the studies 
in this thesis cover the 2006-2016 period, however, the Adjusted Capital Key is 
computed for the entire period in question.  
 
 
8 Such studies include Handig  and Holzfeind (2007); Jobst, Handig and Schneeberger (2012) and 









Table 3.3 Subscribed Capital Shares of the ECB – The Capital Key 
Euro Area and Non-Euro Area NCBs 








Euro Area NCBs 
AT 2.0800 2.0159 2.0159 1.9417 1.9417 1.9370 1.9631 1.9631 
BE 2.5502 2.4708 2.4708 2.4256 2.4256 2.4176 2.4778 2.4778 
CY   0.1249 0.1369 0.1369 0.1333 0.1513 0.1513 
EE     0.1790 0.1780 0.1928 0.1928 
FI 1.2887 1.2448 1.2448 1.2539 1.2539 1.2456 1.2564 1.2564 
FR 14.8712 14.3875 14.3875 14.2212 14.2212 14.1342 14.1792 14.1792 
DE 21.1364 20.5211 20.5211 18.9373 18.9373 18.7603 17.9973 17.9973 
GR 1.8974 1.8168 1.8168 1.9649 1.9649 1.9483 2.0332 2.0332 
IE 0.9219 0.8885 0.8885 1.1107 1.1107 1.1111 1.1607 1.1607 
IT 13.0516 12.5297 12.5297 12.4966 12.4966 12.4570 12.3108 12.3108 
LV       0.2821 0.2821 
LT        0.4132 
LU 0.1568 0.1575 0.1575 0.1747 0.1747 0.1739 0.2030 0.2030 
MT   0.0622 0.0632 0.0632 0.0635 0.0648 0.0648 
NL 3.9955 3.8937 3.8937 3.9882 3.9882 3.9663 4.0035 4.0035 
PT 1.7653 1.7137 1.7137 1.7504 1.7504 1.7636 1.7434 1.7434 
SK    0.6934 0.6934 0.6881 0.7725 0.7725 
SI  0.3194 0.3194 0.3288 0.3288 0.3270 0.3455 0.3455 
ES 7.7758 7.5498 7.5498 8.3040 8.3040 8.2533 8.8409 8.8409 
 71.4908 69.5092 69.6963 69.7915 69.9705 69.5581 69.9783 70.3915 
 
Non-Euro Area NCBs 
BG  0.8833 0.8833 0.8686 0.8686 0.8644 0.8590 0.8590 
HR      0.5945 0.6023 0.6023 
CY 0.1300 0.1249       
CZ 1.4584 1.3880 1.3880 1.4472 1.4472 1.4539 1.6075 1.6075 
DK 1.5663 1.5138 1.5138 1.4835 1.4835 1.4754 1.4873 1.4873 
EE 0.1784 0.1703 0.1703 0.1790     
HU 1.3884 1.3141 1.3141 1.3856 1.3856 1.3740 1.3798 1.3798 
LV 0.2978 0.2813 0.2813 0.2837 0.2837 0.2742   
LT 0.4425 0.4178 0.4178 0.4256 0.4256 0.4093 0.4132  
MT 0.0647 0.0622       
PL 5.1380 4.8748 4.8748 4.8954 4.8954 4.8581 5.1230 5.1230 
RO  2.5188 2.5188 2.4645 2.4645 2.4449 2.6024 2.6024 
SK 0.7147 0.6765 0.6765      
SI 0.3345        
SE 2.4133 2.3313 2.3313 2.2582 2.2582 2.2612 2.2729 2.2729 
UK 14.3822 13.9337 13.9337 14.5172 14.5172 14.4320 13.6743 13.6743 
 28.5092 30.4908 30.3037 30.2085 30.0295 30.4419 30.0217 29.6085 
         











Table 3.4 Fully Paid-Up Capital Shares of the ECB 
Euro Area and Non-Euro Area NCBs 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Euro Area NCBs  
AT 2.830 2.814 2.807 2.700 2.718 2.723 2.731 2.740 2.761 2.746 2.746 
BE 3.470 3.449 3.440 3.373 3.396 3.402 3.412 3.420 3.485 3.465 3.465 
CY   0.174 0.190 0.192 0.192 0.193 0.189 0.213 0.212 0.212 
EE      0.251 0.252 0.252 0.271 0.270 0.270 
FI 1.754 1.738 1.733 1.744 1.755 1.759 1.764 1.762 1.767 1.757 1.757 
FR 20.237 20.082 20.033 19.778 19.909 19.945 20.003 19.992 19.942 19.831 19.831 
DE 28.762 28.643 28.574 26.336 26.511 26.559 26.636 26.535 25.311 25.170 25.170 
GR 2.582 2.536 2.530 2.733 2.751 2.756 2.764 2.756 2.860 2.844 2.844 
IE 1.255 1.240 1.237 1.545 1.555 1.558 1.562 1.572 1.632 1.623 1.623 
IT 17.760 17.489 17.447 17.379 17.494 17.526 17.577 17.620 17.314 17.218 17.218 
LV         0.400 0.395 0.395 
LT          0.578 0.578 
LU 0.213 0.220 0.219 0.243 0.245 0.245  0.246 0.246 0.286 0.284 0.284 
MT   0.087 0.088 0.089 0.089  0.089 0.090 0.091 0.091 0.091 
NL 5.437 5.435  5.422 5.546 5.583 5.593  5.610 5.610 5.631 5.599 5.599 
PT 2.402 2.392 2.386 2.434 2.450 2.455  2.462 2.495 2.452 2.438 2.438 
SK    0.964 0.971 0.973  0.975 0.973 1.086 1.080 1.080 
SI  0.446 0.445 0.457 0.460 0.461  0.463 0.463 0.486 0.483 0.483 
ES 10.581 10.538 10.513 11.548 11.625 11.646 11.680 11.674 12.434 12.365 12.365 
 97.284 97.021 97.046 97.059 97.702 98.131 98.416 98.385 98.417 98.447 98.447 
 
Non-Euro Area NCBs 
BG  0.086 0.086 0.085 0.066 0.054 0.046 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.045 
HR        0.032 0.032 0.032 0.032 
CY 0.012 0.012          
CZ 0.139 0.136 0.135 0.141 0.110 0.090 0.076 0.077 0.085 0.084 0.084 
DK 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.144 0.113 0.092 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 
EE 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.014       
HU 0.132 0.128 0.128 0.135 0.105 0.086 0.073 0.073 0.073 0.072 0.072 
LV 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.028 0.022 0.018 0.015 0.015    
LT 0.042 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.032 0.027 0.022 0.022 0.022   
MT 0.006 0.006          
PL 0.489 0.476 0.475 0.477 0.372 0.305 0.258 0.258 0.270 0.269 0.269 
RO  0.246 0.246 0.240 0.187 0.153 0.130 0.130 0.137 0.137 0.137 
SK 0.068 0.067 0.066         
SI 0.032           
SE 0.230 0.228 0.227 0.220 0.172 0.141 0.119 0.120 0.120 0.119 0.119 
UK 1.370 1.361 1.358 1.413 1.104 0.903 0.766 0.766 0.721 0.717 0.717 
 2.716 2.979 2.954 2.941 2.298 1.869 1.584 1.615 1.583  1.553  1.553 
            






^The ACK is computed such that the fully paid-up capital shares of the EANCBs sum to 100 per cent.  
Source: Annual Reports of National Central Banks and own computation 
 
Another detail concerning the data for the subscribed and fully paid-up capital shares 
worth mentioning is the fact that the shares of the individual NCBs in the key for 
subscription to the ECB’s capital are recalculated by the ECB every five years and 
whenever there is a change in the composition of the EU or the Euro Area. Since the 
start of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union on 1 January 1999, the capital 
key has changed seven times. A five-yearly update was made on 1 January 2004, on 
1 January 2009, on 1 January 2014 and on 1 January 2019. Additional changes were 
made on 1 May 2004 (when the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU), on 1 January 2007 
(when Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU) and on 1 July 2013 (when Croatia joined 
the EU). The entry of NCBs into the Euro Area also affects the Capital Key. Indeed, 
when Slovenia (2007), Cyprus (2008), Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), 
Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015) joined the Euro area, the total capital key weight 
of the Euro Area NCBs in the ECB’s overall capital increased, whereas the total capital 
key weight of the non-Euro Area NCBs decreased.  
Table 3.5 Adjusted Capital Key (ACK)^ 
Euro Area NCBs 
 2006 2007 2008 2009-2010 2011-2012 2013 (Jul) 2014 2015-2016 
AT 2.9095 2.9002 2.8924 2.7821 2.7750 2.7847 2.8053 2.7888 
BE 3.5672 3.5546 3.5451 3.4755 3.4666 3.4757 3.5408 3.5200 
CY   0.1792 0.1962 0.1957 0.1916 0.2162 0.2149 
EE     0.2558 0.2559 0.2755 0.2739 
FI 1.8026 1.7908 1.7860  1.7966 1.7920 1.7907 1.7954 1.7849 
FR 20.8016 20.6987 20.6431  20.3767 20.3246 20.3200 20.2623 20.1433 
DE 29.5652 29.5229 29.4436  27.1341 27.0647 26.9707 25.7184 25.5674 
GR 2.6540 2.6138 2.6067  2.8154 2.8082 2.8010 2.9055 2.8884 
IE 1.2895 1.2782 1.2748  1.5915 1.5874 1.5974 1.6587 1.6489 
IT 18.2563 18.0260 17.9776 17.9056 17.8598 17.9088 17.5923 17.4890 
LV       0.4031 0.4008 
LT        0.5870 
LU 0.2193 0.2266 0.2260 0.2503 0.2497 0.2500 0.2901 0.2884 
MT   0.0892 0.0906 0.0903 0.0913 0.0926 0.0921 
NL 5.5888 5.6017 5.5867 5.7144 5.6998 5.7021 5.7211 5.6875 
PT 2.4693 2.4654 2.4588 2.5080 2.5016 2.5354 2.4913 2.4767 
SK    0.9935 0.9910 0.9892 1.1039 1.0974 
SI  0.4595 0.4583 0.4711 0.4699 0.4701 0.4937 0.4908 





In 2010, the decision by the ECB9 to increase its subscribed capital led to changes in 
the fully paid-up capital shares in 2010 as well as in 2011 and 2012, when the Euro 
Area NCBs paid the second and third instalment respectively. This change did not 
alter the official subscribed Capital Key. This explains the reason why in the above 
tables the subscribed capital shares do not change necessarily in tandem with the 
shares of the fully paid-up capital.  
 
3.1.2.3 Intra-Eurosystem Transactions 
 
One of the main items on the EANCB’s balance sheet is the Intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities. This item has attracted particular attention in the literature over the 
recent years as it sheds light on what was actually happening within the Euro Area 
from an economic and financial perspective. Given its economic relevance, this item 
also features prominently in the studies in this thesis. 
 
For the 2006-2016 period, data on intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities and their sub-
components (apart from Target2) were collected from the balance sheets of the 
EANCBs published annually in their financial statements. In most of the EANCBs 
balance sheets, data on Target2 (T2) balances are recorded under ‘Other 
claims/liabilities on the Eurosystem’ and do not feature as a separate item. Therefore, 
data on T2 balances were collected from the dataset published by the ECB since 2008 
and by the ‘Euro Crisis Monitor’ of the Institute for Empirical Economic Research at 
the University of Osnabrueck (see Steiankamp and Westermann, 2012) for the 
remaining years. 
 
The components of the intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities relate to the participating 
interest of the EANCBs in the ECB, claims arising from the transfer of foreign reserves  
  
 
9 Decision (EU) 2011/20 of the ECB of 13 December 2010 on the increase of the European Central Bank’s 






Table 3.6 EANCB’s Participating Interest in the ECB10 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria   116   117   117  112   144  177  209  212  222   222  222 
Belgium  143  144   144   140   180   221  261  264  287  287  287 
Cyprus     23  27  29  31  34  32  39   39  39 
Estonia      80  83  83  89  89  89 
Finland 74  73  73  78  99  120  141  141   144  144  144 
France 835  836  836  825  1,062  1,299  1,536  1,535  1,545  1,545  1,545 
Germany 1,183  1,196  1,196  1,091  1,407  1,722   2,038  2,031  1,948  1,948  1,948 
Greece 393  390  390  435  468  501  534  531  565  565  565 
Ireland  57  57  57  121  139  158  176  179  199   199  199 
Italy 726  722  722  736  945  1,153  1,361  1,377  1,333  1,333  1,333 
Latvia         115 115 115 
Lithuania          207  207 
Luxembourg 10 11 11 16  19  22  25  25  36  36  36 
Malta     11  12  13   14  15   15  16   16  16 
Netherlands 230  235  235  269   336   402  469   469  482   482  482 
Portugal 100  101  101  114  144  173  202  213   204   204  204 
Slovakia        194   206   217   229  229   263   263  263 
Slovenia   55  55  58   64  69   75  75  82  82  82 
Spain 433   438   438   663   802  940   1,079   1,078  1,313  1,313  1,313 
            
Total EANCBs 4,300   4,374   4,409  4,892   6,056 7,298   8,465   8,490  8,881  9,088  9,088 
Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks
 
10 This item reflects the EANCBs respective contribution towards the greater part of the paid-up capital of the ECB. This item is not related to any form of interest paid to the 






Table 3.7 Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria   1,157   1,161  1,161  1,119  1,119   1,119   1,119  1,123   1,138   1,138  1,138 
Belgium 1,419  1,423  1,423  1,397  1,397  1,397   1,397   1,401  1,436  1,436  1,436 
Cyprus   72   79   79   79  79  77  88  88  88 
Estonia      103   103  103  112  112  112 
Finland  717  717  717   722  722  722  722  722  728  728  728 
France  8,476  8,569  8,577  8,283  8,263  8,281  8,255  8,230  8,229  8,221  8,218 
Germany 11,762  11,821  11,821  10,909  10,909  10,909  10,909  10,872  10,430   10,430  10,430 
Greece 1,056  1,047  1,047  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,132  1,129  1,178   1,178  1,178 
Ireland   513   512  512  640  640  640  640  644  673   673  673 
Italy 7,263  7,218   7,218   7,199   7,199   7,199   7,199  7,219   7,134   7,134  7,134 
Latvia         163 163 163 
Lithuania          239  239 
Luxembourg  87   91  91  101  101   101   101   101   118  118  118 
Malta      36   36   36   36   36  37  38  38  38 
Netherlands  2,223  2,243  2,243  2,297   2,297  2,297  2,297   2,299  2,320  2,320  2,320 
Portugal 982  987  987   1,008   1,008   1,008  1,008   1,022  1,010  1,010  1,010 
Slovakia       399   399   399  399  399   448   448  448 
Slovenia    184   184   189  189   189   189  190  200   200  200 
Spain  4,327  4,349  4,349  4,784  4,784  4,784  4,784  4,783  5,123  5,123  5,123 
Total EANCBs  39,983  40,322  40,438   40,294  40,274  40,395  40,369  40,350   40,565  40,797  40,797 






Table 3.8 Net Claims/Liabilities Arising from Balances of Target2 Accounts 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  -21,160 -20,301 -37,168 -19,630 -27,467 -34,591 -38,212 -40,249 -30,811 -29,147 -31,182 
Belgium -41,921 -61,663 -104,233 -42,520 -13,859 -52,845 -38,161 -15,495 -12,373 -7,748 -18,583 
Cyprus   -6,542 -7,122 -6,441 -7,908 -7,468 -7,343 -2,678 2,380 5,865 
Estonia      648 1,741 1,836 3,191 2,761 924 
Finland 1,157 4,403 4,114 4,426 19,686 66,008 60,725 26,362 14,915 20,144 22,031 
France  -11,935 -117,684 -62,008 -28,349 -79,629 -73,899 -34,100 -30,900 -29,242 -13,803 
Germany 5,399 71,046 115,295 177,723 325,556 463,134 655,670 510,201 460,846 584,210 754,263 
Greece -8,184 -10,797 -35,348 -49,036 -87,088 -104,750 -98,355 -51,116 -49,319 -94,387 -72,257 
Ireland  -2,545 -595 -44,364 -53,519 -145,185 -120,434 -79,259 -55,117 -22,745 -3,037 -952 
Italy 22,856 35,804 23,452 55,276 3,699 -191,379 -255,102 -229,128 -208,945 -248,859 -356,559 
Latvia         -797 -1,312 -5,292 
Lithuania          240 -3,590 
Luxembourg 5,327 18,428 42,225 52,618 68,043 109,547 106,286 103,793 105,238 147,571 187,381 
Malta   -667 -814 -1,225 -422 -201 -672 -1,927 -922 1,019 
Netherlands 9,931 -21,949 -18,786 15,429 40,500 152,783 120,772 46,115 19,412 54,727 87,000 
Portugal -6,601 -6,206 -18,952 -23,436 -59,912 -60,923 -66,025 -59,565 -54,591 -61,687 -71,588 
Slovakia    -14,521 -13,311 -13,622 877 2,687 2,241 461 -5,119 
Slovenia  -3,490 -3,556 -3,334 -2,092 -2,728 -4,409 -1,024 2,386 240 -1,248 
Spain 25,075 -3,238 -34,921 -41,034 -50,864 -174,826 -336,831 -213,382 -189,718 -254,115 -328,075 
ECB 3,546 17,241 234,096 3,971 -22,370 42,159 -2,197 -6,721 -23,639 -83,756 -159,741 
Total Claims (T2) 73,290 146,922 419,182 309,443 457,484 834,279 946,071 690,994 608,228 812,735 1,058,483 
Total Liabilities (T2) -80,411 -140,174 -422,222 -316,974 -458,165 -844,057 -1,000,121 -713,913 -628,443 -814,220 -1,067,991 




to the ECB11, claims/liabilities arising from balances of Target2 accounts and 
claims/liabilities related to the allocation of Euro banknotes within the Eurosystem. 
The former component – the participating interest of the EANCBs in the ECB merits 
some clarification. The EANCBs contribute to the greater part of the ECB’s paid-up 
capital. This is disclosed under ‘Capital and Reserves’ on the liability side of the ECB’s 
balance sheet and offset against the ‘Participating interest in the ECB’ shown by each 
EANCB as an intra-Eurosystem claim. This item is not related to any form of interest 
paid to the NCBs by the ECB. The term ‘participating interest’ refers to the interest of 
the EANCBs to participate in the ESCB by subscribing to the capital of the ECB. The 
other two components of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities are discussed at length 
in the following Chapters of this thesis. 
 
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 present the data for the first three components for each of the 
EANCB over the 2006-2016 period. The latter component is dealt with in the following 
sub-section since it requires specific adjustments to the data.  
 
3.1.2.4 Allocation of Euro Banknotes12  
 
Euro banknotes issued by EANCBs are indistinguishable, as they do not carry a mark 
identifying the EANCB that issued them. Thus, the method used in the Eurosystem 
to account for cross-border banknote flows is to allocate each EANCB a share of the 
total Euro banknote issue outstanding at any time, on the basis of the Banknote 
Allocation Key13. This allocated value of Euro banknotes in circulation is reported as 
‘Item 1’ on the liabilities side of the balance sheet of each EANCB.  
 
The difference between the value of Euro banknotes allocated to the individual 
EANCBs (in accordance with the Banknote Allocation Key) and the banknotes the 
 
11 At the beginning of 1999, the EANCBs transferred foreign reserve assets (15 per cent gold and 85 per 
cent in foreign currency) to the ECB in accordance with Article 30 of the Statute of the ESCB. These claims 
are denominated in Euro at a value fixed at the time of their transfer.  
12 Guideline (EU) 2016/2249 of the ECB of 3 November 2016 (ECB/2016/34), OJ L 347, 20.12.2016, p. 3. 
13 The weight of each EANCB’s banknote allocation key is the same as its ‘capital key’ multiplied by 92 
per cent, the remaining 8 per cent being allocated to the ECB. For example, the Bundesbank has a capital 




central bank actually puts into and withdraws from circulation gives rise to intra-
Eurosystem claims or liabilities14 (featuring in the EANCBs’ balance sheet as Item 9.3 
on the assets side or Item 9.2 on the liabilities side). Thus, the actual amount of Euro 
banknotes issued by a particular EANCB (Column 3, Table 3.9) is computed by 
summing up the allocation of Euro banknotes of that EANCB (Column 1, Table 3.9) 
and the intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities related to Euro banknotes (Column 2, 
Table 3.9).  
 
As an example of this calculation, at the end of 2011, while the amount of banknotes 
in circulation reported in the balance sheet of the central bank of Ireland stood at €13.0 
billion, it had issued €15.4 billion more banknotes than its allocation. In fact, the actual 
amount of banknotes issued by the central bank of Ireland is calculated at €28.4  
billion. In the case of Austria and, more recently, in the case of Portugal, when 
calculated as above, it resulted that more banknotes have been taken out of circulation 
than put into circulation (indicated by a negative figure for the actual banknotes in 
circulation). Details pertaining to this calculation as at the end of each year over the 
2006-2016 period are presented in Table 3.9. For a detailed description of the balance 
sheet presentation of Euro banknotes refer to Handig and Holzfeind (2007) and Jobst 
et al, (2012).  
 
Data for the claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (Column 2, Table 3.9) are used particularly in the analysis presented in 
Chapter 4, whereby an investigation is carried out to identify whether a relationship 
exists between this intra-Eurosystem adjustment and the Capital Key. 
  
For the purposes of the analysis presented in Chapter 6, it was considered more 
appropriate to use the actual amount of Euro banknotes (compiled as explained above 
and presented in Column 3, Table 3.9) rather than the banknotes in circulation as 
published in the Annual Report of each EANCB (on the liabilities side of their balance 
 
14 A net liability related to the allocation of Euro banknotes within the Eurosystem arise when banknotes 
actually put into and withdrawn from circulation exceed the value of Euro banknotes allocated to the 




sheet). Therefore, for a more meaningful analysis, the balance sheet of each EANCB 
is adjusted such that the ‘statutory’ banknotes in circulation calculated according to 
the Banknote Allocation Key is replaced by the actual amount calculated as explained 
above. This implies that the totals of each balance sheet are also recalculated (a more 
detailed explanation is presented in Chapter 6).  
 
3.2 Concluding Remarks 
 
While this dataset is the cornerstone of the analysis in this thesis and is therefore 
intended to lay the groundwork for my own investigations, it also provides a detailed 
breakdown of the balance sheets of all NCBs within the Eurosystem, which offers 
scope for use in a wide range of other empirical investigations. This dataset is 





Table 3.9 Developments in Banknotes in Circulation: 2006-2016 
























































Austria 16.8 -15.7 1.1 18.1 -18.7 -0.6 20.3 -13.6 6.7 20.6 -16.9 3.7 21.5 24.9 -3.4 22.7 -32.8 -10.1 
Belgium 20.6 -22.2 -1.6 22.1 -23.9 -1.8 24.9 -22.8 2.1 25.8 -18.7 7.1 26.8 -18.5 8.4 28.3 -16.4 12.0 
Cyprus       1.3 -0.1 1.2 1.5 -0.1 1.3 1.5 -0.3 1.2 1.6 -0.6 1.0 
Estonia                2.1 -1.5 0.6 
Finland 10.4 -3.9 6.5 11.1 -3.7 7.4 12.5 -4.2 8.4 13.3 -3.9 9.4 13.9 -3.4 10.5 14.7 -3.5 11.2 
France 120.2 -63.5 56.8 128.9 -67.3 61.5 144.9 -75.6 69.3 151.2 -74.8 76.4 157.4 -76.5 80.9 166.2 -77.6 88.6 
Germany 170.9 84.3 255.2 183.8 99.5 283.3 206.6 121.8 328.4 201.3 146.8 348.1 209.6 157.1 366.7 221.3 170.5 391.8 
Greece  15.3 1.6 16.9 16.3 2.4 18.7 18.3 2.5 20.8 20.9 0.1 21.0 21.7 7.9 29.7 23.0 18.4 41.4 
Ireland 7.5 9.4 16.8 8.0 12.3 20.3 8.9 14.4 23.3 11.8 13.7 25.5 12.3 15.0 27.3 13.0 15.4 28.4 
Italy 105.5 14.2 119.7 112.2 16.2 128.5 126.2 13.3 139.5 132.8 10.4 143.2 138.3 7.1 145.4 146.0 7.6 153.6 
Lithuania                   
Latvia                   
Luxembourg 1.3 39.8 41.1 1.4 44.8 46.2 1.6 51.0 52.6 1.9 58.7 60.6 1.9 65.0 66.9 2.0 70.0 72.0 
Malta       0.7 -0.1 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.1 0.9 
Netherlands 32.3 -8.5 23.8 34.9 -11.3 23.6 39.2 -15.4 23.8 42.4 -19.9 22.5 44.1 -22.9 21.2 46.6 -27.3 19.3 
Portugal 14.3 -9.8 4.5 15.3 -12.3 3.0 17.3 -15.7 1.6 18.6 -17.9 0.7 19.4 -19.0 0.3 20.5 -21.8 -1.4 
Slovakia          7.5 -2.8 4.6 7.7 -1.7 5.9 8.1 -0.9 7.2 
Slovenia    2.9 -2.3 0.6 3.2 -2.4 0.8 3.5 -2.5 1.0 3.6 -2.5 1.2 3.8 -2.5 1.4 
Spain 62.9 24.1 87.0 67.6 17.9 85.5 76.0 7.1 83.1 88.3 -7.7 80.6 91.9 -15.4 76.6 97.0 26.5 70.6 
ECB 50.3 -50.3 - 54.1 -54.1 - 61.0 -61.0 - 64.5 -64.5 - 67.2 -67.2 - 71.1 -71.1 - 
Eurosystem 628.2 - 628.2 676.7 - 676.7 762.9 - 762.9 806.5 - 806.5 839.7 - 839.7 888.7 - 888.7 





Table 3.9 (cont.) Developments in Banknotes in Circulation: 2006-2016 















































Austria 23.3 -42.0 -18.7 24.5 -42.2 -17.7 26.2 -28.7 -2.4 27.8 -28.2 -0.4 28.9 -29.0 -0.1 
Belgium 29.1 -13.7 15.4 30.6 -12.6 18.0 33.1 -12.7 20.4 35.1 -11.8 23.2 36.5 -9.7 26.8 
Cyprus 1.6 -0.9 0.8 1.7 0.5 2.2 2.0 0.2 2.2 2.1 -0.4 1.7 2.2 -1.1 1.1 
Estonia 2.1 -1.4 0.7 2.3 -1.4 0.8 2.6 -1.7 0.9 2.7 -1.7 1.1 2.8 -1.6 1.2 
Finland 15.0 -3.2 11.8 15.8 -3.5 12.2 16.8 -4.0 12.8 17.8 -4.1 13.7 18.5 -3.9 14.6 
France 170.6 -74.8 95.8 178.8 -76.8 101.9 189.5 -81.2 108.3 200.8 -88.0 112.8 208.7 -88.9 119.8 
Germany 227.2 200.3 427.5 237.3 224.3 461.5 240.5 267.9 508.4 254.8 297.8 552.6 264.9 327.3 592.2 
Greece  23.6 14.5 38.0 24.6 10.8 35.5 27.2 5.2 32.4 28.8 19.6 48.4 29.9 13.3 43.2 
Ireland 13.3 15.9 29.3 14.1 16.5 30.5 15.5 16.0 31.5 16.4 16.3 32.7 17.1 16.9 34.0 
Italy 149.9 -3.6 146.3 157.5 -12.9 144.7 164.5 -22.4 142.2 174.3 -32.3 142.0 181.2 -35.3 146.0 
Lithuania          6.0 -3.8 2.2 6.1 3.6 2.5 
Latvia       3.8 -3.1 0.7 4.0 -3.5 0.5 4.2 -3.9 0.2 
Luxembourg 2.1 74.3 76.4 2.2 85.3 87.5 2.7 90.8 93.5 2.9 92.6 95.5 3.0 93.6 96.6 
Malta 0.8 0.1 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.1 1.0 1.0 0.1 1.0 
 Netherlands 47.9 -30.6 17.3 50.2 -34.3 15.8 53.5 -39.9 13.6 56.7 -44.7 12.0 58.9 -47.4 11.5 
Portugal 21.0 -25.0 -4.0 22.3 -28.2 -5.9 23.3 -31.9 -8.6 24.7 -35.1 -10.4 25.7 -37.6 -12.0 
Slovakia 8.3 -0.2 8.2 8.7 0.1 8.7 10.3 -1.0 9.4 10.9 -0.9 10.1 11.4 -0.5 10.9 
Slovenia 3.9 -2.6 1.4 4.1 -2.0 2.2 4.6 -2.1 2.5 4.9 -1.4 3.5 5.1 -0.7 4.4 
Spain 99.6 -34.2 65.4 104.4 -47.2 57.1 118.2 -70.3 47.9 125.2 -83.7 41.5 130.1 -98.0 32.2 
ECB 73.0 -73.0 - 76.5 -76.5 - 81.3 -81.3 - 86.7 -86.7 - 90.1 -90.1 - 
Eurosystem 912.6 - 912.6 956.2 - 956.2 1,016.6 - 1,016.6 1,083.5 - 1,083.5 1,126.2 - 1,126.2 






The True Size of the Eurosystem: New 
Insights from the Euro Area National 
Central Banks’ Balance Sheets 
 
 
How big is the ECB? According to the official data, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
represents only a very small fraction (one-tenth) of the reported balance sheet of the 
Euro Area system of National Central Banks (EANCBs), known as the Eurosystem. 
This Chapter argues that the effective size of the central institution of the Eurosystem, 
which is termed the “Mega-ECB”, is significantly higher, and has grown even faster, 
than the reported balance sheet of the Eurosystem as a whole. The analysis in this 
Chapter points to strong evidence that most EANCBs (especially those of the larger 
countries) effectively act on autopilot as branches of this central institution. 
 
The argument that the reported balance sheet of the Eurosystem understates the size 
of a greater institution because it nets off intra-Eurosystem balances is not new (see 
for example Whelan, 2012a and Tornell, 2012a). But the magnitude of this 
understatement has not as yet been quantified. This analysis starts by carrying out 
the quantification – the balance sheets of all the EANCBs are amalgamated into a new 
total for the Eurosystem referred to as the ‘Eurosystem Total Assets’ (ESTA). 
Subsequently, the relationships between the balance sheet of the entire system and 
those of the EANCBs are examined. It is the nature of this relationship that leads to 





This, however, presents a paradox. If evidence leads to advocating that most EANCBs 
act on autopilot, then their behaviour can be considered similar to branches of a 
greater entity – the “Mega-ECB”. But, being branches of a greater entity allows for 
consolidation, thus, challenging the premise that the central institution of the 
Eurosystem is greater than the ECB. While this Chapter provides evidence of the 
EANCBs being branches of a greater entity, this paradox remains unresolved. Having 
identified this paradox, however, it poses a rather new question - only touched upon 
by a related issue raised by Buiter (2015) though in a different context - about the 
current structure of the Eurosystem: should the Eurosystem be turned into a 
conventional central bank with one single legal entity (the “Mega-ECB”) and nineteen 
branches (the current EANCBs)? And who runs the “Mega-ECB”? 
 
Based on the dataset presented in Chapter 3, this Chapter aggregates the EANCBs 
balance sheets to produce a new gross balance sheet of total Eurosystem assets (ESTA) 
that, in contrast to the official balance sheet data published by the ECB, does not net 
the intra-Eurosystem balances. This total has a number of key features: 
• It is (unsurprisingly) distinctly larger, and has grown more rapidly than the 
official published figure. 
• This alternative measure reveals a strong systematic relationship with the 
balance sheets of EANCBs, which suggests that these more or less run on 
autopilot: expanding their balance sheets closely in line with shares in the 
(ostensibly tiny) paid-up equity in the ECB. This relationship is much less 
evident in official published figures for the Eurosystem. 
• Over the period for which data are presented, the lending behaviour of the 
“Mega-ECB” appears to have been driven primarily by the borrowing needs 
of the distressed countries of the EU’s southern periphery. 
• A strong relationship is also revealed between the alternative measure of the 
Eurosystem balance sheet and the loss absorption capacity of each EANCB 
implying that, despite some evidence of over and undercapitalization, to a 
large extent, the financial strength of EANCB is closely in line with their share 




• The participation of the EANCBs in the purchase programmes of the ECB is 
also closely in line with their capital share. This is of interest since these 
purchase programmes account for a significantly high amount on the asset 
side of the balance sheet.  
• The lack of autonomy of the EANCBs relative to the ECB is unsurprisingly 
more noticeable than that of the Federal District Banks vis-à-vis the Federal 
Reserve. 
• These relationships lead one to view this alternative measure as the balance 
sheet of the “Mega-ECB” – a near-monolithic entity, whose balance sheet 
dwarfs that of the actual ECB. 
 
The first part of this Chapter compiles a gross balance sheet of the Eurosystem 
through a simple amalgamation of all the nineteen individual EANCBs and the ECB 
– a detailed set of disaggregated accounts of the Eurosystem. This balance sheet is 
compared with the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB – a set of 
consolidated accounts of the Eurosystem. The new data show that the balance sheet 
of the Eurosystem as compiled in this way was significantly larger than that 
published by the ECB over the crisis period. This is because the ECB eliminates 
particular items on the balance sheet of the EANCBs, mainly related to intra-
Eurosystem transactions, as part of the consolidation process and therefore these do 
not feature in the Eurosystem balance sheet.  
 
Based on the data presented here, this Chapter then compares the distribution of total 
assets amongst the EANCBs and the distribution of the paid-up ECB capital. It shows 
that, for most EANCBs, their shares in the (tiny) capital of the ECB, to a very good 
approximation, drive their shares of total assets. In other words, the EANCBs appear 
to expand their balance sheet on auto-pilot, in line with their share of the capital of 
the ECB. This predictive power is striking, particularly as the paid-up capital of the 
ECB accounts for a mere 0.1 per cent of total assets. On this tiny fulcrum, the ECB 
achieves effective control of a massively larger balance sheet: thus this is referred to 




stronger for the large EANCBs while smaller EANCBs illustrate at least some degree 
of autonomy.  
 
This Chapter also shows that if one examines the relationship between EANCB 
balance sheets and the published balance sheet of the Eurosystem, the relationship is 
distinctly weaker15. Nor indeed should this weaker relationship be surprising, since, 
as is also documented, the behaviour of intra-Eurosystem balances varies very 
substantially between countries.  
 
This Chapter also examines some of the details of intra-Eurosystem transactions, as 
revealed by EANCB balance sheets. In particular, focus is set on the emerging pattern 
of lending and borrowing between countries as well as the relation between the 
different type of intra-transactions and the capital shares of the EANCBs.  
 
This Chapter also provides further evidence to support the premise that EANCBs act 
on auto-pilot. Evidence points towards a strong relationship between the Loss 
Absorption Capacity16 (as a measure of financial strength) of each EANCBs and their 
respective capital key. Participation by the EANCBs in the ECB’s purchase 
programmes as part of the non-standard measures is also found to be closely in line 
with their shares in the ECB’s capital. 
 
Finally, a comparison is made with the Federal Reserve System, highlighting the 
relatively weaker degree of autonomy of the EANCBs, relative to the ECB, when 




15 An econometric investigation of this relationship is carried out in Chapter 5. 
16 Buiter (2012a, 2015) defines the Loss Absorption Capacity as the sum of capital and reserves, the 
Revaluation Accounts and Provisions. He also presents two other more prudent measures for Loss 




4.1. The Paradox of the ”Mega-ECB” 
 
Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, despite their somewhat different focus, 
there has been a rapid ballooning of central banks’ balance sheets: at their respective 
peaks, the Bank of England’s balance sheet had grown by 398 per cent (Nov 2012), the 
Eurosystem’s (as defined by the ECB) had grown by 196 per cent (Dec 2017); and the 
Fed’s had grown by 421 per cent (Jan 2015). As explained earlier, in the existing 
literature on the central bank’s balance sheet, such as in Borio and Disyatat (2009), 
Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010) and Pattipeilohy (2016), more attention has been paid 
to the published Eurosystem balance sheet in general than to the individual balance 
sheets of the EANCBs. A simple explanation for this may be the fact that, up till 2016, 
no detailed information was provided about the composition by country of the 
Eurosystem assets and liabilities besides the scattered dispersed information 
published by the individual EANCBs in their annual financial accounts. Indeed, by 
utilizing the new dataset in Chapter 3, this Chapter goes back to the original EANCBs’ 
balance sheets, because only by looking at a breakdown of how the individual 
EANCBs and the ECB contribute to the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet can 
one reveal important aspects of the Eurosystem balance sheet developments that 
otherwise remain concealed.  
 
Having collated the data for each of the EANCBs’ published balance sheets over the 
period 2006-2016, each of which includes data on intra-Eurosystem claims, one can 
aggregate to produce a new gross balance sheet of total Eurosystem assets. The 
summation of the total assets of all EANCBs and the ECB is referred to as ‘Eurosystem 
Total Assets’, in short, ESTA.  
 
The official data published by the ECB differ from ESTA since they include a 
consolidation adjustment that nets out the intra-Eurosystem transactions. Indeed, 
Eurosystem total assets as published by the ECB are (unsurprisingly) significantly 
lower than the total derived by summing the assets of all the EANCBs and the ECB 




Determining the ‘true size’ of the Eurosystem is paradoxical. The consolidation of the 
EANCBs (and the ECB) balance sheets to derive the Eurosystem balance sheet as 
published by the ECB has an interesting implication – by reporting the consolidated 
balance sheets of the EANCBs netting out the intra-Eurosystem transactions, the ECB 
is treating EANCBs as branches of a greater entity. However, this, in turn implies a 
paradox – the Paradox of the “Mega-ECB”. While, through the consolidation process, 
the ECB is regarding the EANCBs as branches of a greater institution – the “Mega-
ECB” -  in its operations, the ECB, acts as if they still exist as separate entities, in which 
case consolidation is not appropriate. 
 
 
^Total assets as published by the ECB in the Annual Consolidated Balance Sheet of the Eurosystem, 
which comprises assets and liabilities of the Euro Area NCBs and the ECB after netting out claims and 
liabilities between Eurosystem central banks. 
*Eurosystem Total Assets (ESTA) are calculated as the summation of the total assets of each EANCBs 
and the ECB as published in the financial statements of the respective Annual Reports (including claims 
and liabilities between Eurosystem central banks). 
Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks and the ECB and own compilation 




Published by the ECB^ 
Alternative Measure: 
ESTA* 
2006 1,150.0 1,451.4 
2007 1,507.9 1,891.5 
2008 2,075.1 2,768.7 
2009 1,903.0 2,494.4 
2010 2,002.0 2,758.0 
2011 2,733.3 3,905.0 
2012 2,962.7 4,296.1 
2013 2,273.3 3,347.0 
2014 2,208.2 3,251.3 
2015 2,780.5 4,070.7 




The paradoxical effect is also present when one advocates the ESTA definition. If the 
EANCBs are considered as separate entities (in line with the treatment by the ECB), 
then their accounts should not be consolidated leading to the new alternative measure 
– ESTA – to be the ‘true size’ of the Eurosystem balance sheet. However, if evidence 
can be gathered that the EANCBs act as local branches, leading one to posit the 
existence of a greater institution of the Eurosystem (greater than the ECB), then 
consolidation is defensible. But, in this case, does this “Mega-ECB” exist? While this 
paradox is not resolved yet, it is still intriguing to examine the relationship between 
the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem. This leads to identify interesting 
observations that contribute towards partly solving the puzzle but also pose further 
questions. 
 
4.2 Eurosystem Total Assets (ESTA): an Alternative Measure 
 
Despite the paradox discussed earlier, this alternative measure of the Eurosystem 
balance sheet merits further investigation. Figure 4.1 compares Eurosystem Total 
Assets (ESTA) as compiled in this Chapter with the Eurosystem Total Assets as 
published by the ECB over the 2006-2016 period. Unsurprisingly, aggregation of the 
individual balance sheets of the EANCBs results in a much larger total than that 
published by the ECB since the latter nets out intra-Eurosystem transactions. From a 
geographical distribution point of view, between 2006 and 2012, the ESTA almost 
tripled (in nominal terms), with the central bank of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the Netherlands jointly contributing towards three-quarters of this expansion. In 
contrast, the ECB itself contributed to less than 4 per cent of the expansion of the 
ESTA. 
 
The ESTA measure of the Eurosystem balance sheet also grew more rapidly, by 231 
per cent (Dec 2007-Dec 2017) compared to the growth of 196 per cent in the official 





















Figure 4.1 Eurosystem Total Assets vs ECB Published Figures
Total Assets (ESTA)*
TA published by ECB**
* sum of EANCB's (and ECB's) Assets





















2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
%€bn
ESTA (Euro bns) TA as published by ECB (Euro bns)
intra-ES Claims (Euro bns) ESTA -TA(as per ECB) as % of ESTA (rhs)
Intra ES Claims % of ESTA (rhs)
secondary axis
*sum of EANCBs' (and ECB's) Assets **consolidated balance sheets as reported by the ECB
Note: The line 'ESTA-TA (as per ECB) as % of ESTA' is not visible (except in 2008) since it lies
exactly on the line 'Intra-ES Claims % of ESTA'. This is the result of the fact that ESTA differs from the
Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB by the netting of the intra-Eurosystem transactions.





two measures has expanded during almost the whole sample period, and is 
essentially entirely accounted for by intra-Eurosystem claims17. 
 
The logic of this difference was noted in Whelan (2012a): ‘Target2 intra-Eurosystem 
balances disappear from the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet, so the sum of all 
NCB balance sheets is greater than the Eurosystem balance sheet’; however the data 
have not until now been collated to allow a direct comparison between the two 
measures. 
 
Also evident from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is the fact that, while there is no doubt that the 
Eurosystem balance sheet expanded rapidly since 2007, the inclusion of intra-
Eurosystem balances as a balance sheet item in the Eurosystem balance sheet (as 
compiled here) reveals a growing proportional gap between the two definitions of 





17 The percentage gap between the two definitions of total assets registered a steady increase except for 
2009 and 2016, when the gap was slightly lower than that noted in the previous year. In all years except 







AT BE FI FR DE GR IE IT LU NL PT ES ECB
Figure 4.3 Share of EANCB's Total Assets in ESTA*







*share in ESTA defined as the sum of EANCBs' (and ECB's) Assets
NCBs of Cyprus, Estonia, Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia, Latvia and Lithuania do not feature in this figure 




Figure 4.3 shows the share of each EANCB in the Eurosystem balance sheet (defined 
by ESTA). The striking stability of these shares, especially for the larger EANCBs is 
investigated further in Section 4.4.   
Tornell (2012) provides a motivation for further analysis of ESTA. Notwithstanding 
that the Eurosystem balance sheet grew with a similar magnitude to that of other 
“main” central banks such as the Bank of England and the Fed18, as Tornell (2012a) 
puts it: ‘this aggregate number, however, masks a huge cross-country asymmetry: 
central bank domestic credit to private banks in the Eurozone periphery has increased 
massively’. Indeed, as illustrated in Figure 4.4, the domestic credit of EANCBs for 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain increased eight-fold from 2006 to 2012. This 
domestic credit creation has been financed by borrowing from other Euro Area NCBs 
facilitated by the Target2 mechanism – the leading European platform for processing 
large-value payments (see sub-Section 4.6.1 for a detailed description). Figure 4.4 
shows a notable similarity between the increase in the EANCB domestic credit and 
Target2 liabilities19. Therefore, Tornell (2013) states that ‘in order to analyse Eurozone 
dynamics, Target2 balances must be added as a new item in the standard textbook 
central bank’s balance sheet’: 
 
Table 4.2 Stylized Balance Sheet of a National Central Bank in the 
Eurozone 
ASSETS LIABILITIES 
Credit to Domestic Agents Money Balances 
Gold and Reserves 
Target2 Liabilities 
Target2 Claims 
Source: Tornell (2013) 
 
It is possible to ‘unmask’ this asymmetric behaviour only by digging deeper into the 
aggregate number.  
 
 
18 Such an expansion is even more accentuated if one follows the ESTA definition presented here. 
19 Target2 liabilities are defined by Tornell (2013) as: ‘automatic loans from the Eurosystem to a national 





Appendix 4.1 presents the Eurosystem statistical balance sheet defined as ESTA 
between 2006 and 2016. As noted in Chapter 3, while some EANCBs publish their 
balance sheets on a monthly basis, other EANCBs publish their balance sheets on a 
quarterly or annual basis. Unless data are available for all the EANCBs on a monthly 
or quarterly basis, ESTA cannot be estimated at higher than annual frequency. The 
ECB started publishing a disaggregated Eurosystem balance sheet by country only 
since July 2016, and therefore, monthly data for the entire panel of EANCBs are 
available only for the last six months of the period under analysis (that is, July 2016 
to December 2016). Consequently, ESTA, which is defined as the summation of all 
Total Assets, can be estimated for the period under analysis (Jan 2006 to Dec 2016) 
only on an annual basis.  
 
The next sub-Section presents a comparison of ESTA and the ECB published data. 
Subsequently, Section 4.3 examines the ‘Gross’ approach that produces ESTA in 
relation to the current accounting conventions for group of companies and the public 
sector. 
 
Despite the unresolved paradox discussed above, the alternative definition – ESTA – 







2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Domestic Credit T2 Liabilities
€bn
*negative positions on the balance sheets of the EANCBs vis-a-vis the ECB as the central counterparty
GIIPS: Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain





4.4 observes the relationship between the share of total assets of each EANCB to the 
ESTA and their shares in the ECB’s paid-up capital. Subsequently, the relationship 
between the EANCBs’ balance sheets and the published balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem is also investigated. 
 
 4.2.1 The Difference between ESTA and the ECB Published Data 
 
Prior to conducting further analysis on the basis of ESTA, this sub-Section presents a 
comparison of ESTA and the data published by the ECB. As explained earlier, the 
official data published by the ECB defines the Eurosystem as the total of the balance 
sheets of all the EANCBs and the ECB after including consolidation adjustments, the 
latter mainly pertaining to the netting of intra-Eurosystem transactions. In contrast, 
the alternative measure of the Eurosystem (ESTA) - a gross balance sheet of total 
Eurosystem - does not net intra-Eurosystem transactions but is a simple 
amalgamation of all the nineteen individual EANCBs and the ECB.  
 
 
Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks and the ECB and own compilation 
 











Ratio of ECB 
published data to 
ESTA 
(3) 
2006 1,150.0 1,451.4 0.7924 
2007 1,507.9 1,891.5 0.7972 
2008 2,075.1 2,768.7 0.7495 
2009 1,903.0 2,494.4 0.7629 
2010 2,002.0 2,758.0 0.7260 
2011 2,733.3 3,905.0 0.6999 
2012 2,962.7 4,296.1 0.6896 
2013 2,273.3 3,347.0 0.6792 
2014 2,208.2 3,251.3 0.6792 
2015 2,780.5 4,070.7 0.6831 




Column 1 of  Table 4.3 presents the Eurosystem total assets/liabilities as published by 
the ECB while Column 2 presents the Eurosystem total assets/liabilities calculated as 
the summation of the total assets of each EANCBs and the ECB as published in the 
respective financial statements in their Annual Reports, including claims and 
liabilities between Eurosystem central banks. The third column presents the ratio of 
the data published by the ECB to that in line with ESTA definition. It is evident that, 
over time, the difference between the two definitions widened with total assets as 
defined by the ECB, accounting for a smaller percentage of ESTA definition. In fact, 
whereas in 2006 total assets as published by the ECB were 80 per cent of ESTA, they 




The ratio of Total Assets as defined by the ECB to ESTA followed a generally 
downward trend, highlighting the increasing important role of the main difference 
between these two definitions - the netting of intra-Eurosystem transactions, which 
as shown in Figure 4.5, increased over the crisis period as a ratio to ESTA. Indeed, 
intra-Eurosystem transactions increased their share in total assets (ESTA), from 
around 20 per cent in the beginning of the crisis to 30 per cent in 2016, in turn leading 



















2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Figure 4.5 The Difference between ESTA and ECB Published Data





The main sub-component of these intra-Eurosystem balances is the net claims and 
liabilities of the Euro Area NCBs vis-à-vis the ECB as the central counterpart, known 
as Target2. As evident in Figure 4.12, this sub-component became even more 
prominent during the period of the crisis. Thus, when analyzing the difference 
between the balance sheet as published by the ECB and the alternative definition – 
ESTA - it is appropriate to focus on Target2. Indeed, by analyzing developments in 
Target2, one can shed light about the dynamics of the ratio between the two 
definitions of the balance sheet. Target2 is the subject matter discussed in other 
Sections of this Chapter namely Sections 4.6, 4.7, 4.8 and Section 4.9.  
 
4.3 A Comparison of the Consolidated ECB Approach, the Alternative 
‘Aggregation’ or ‘Gross’ Approach and the Current Accounting Practices for a 
Group of Companies and the Public Sector 
 
As discussed earlier, an alternative approach to define the Eurosystem balance sheet 
is through the summation of the Euro Area National Central Banks’ balance sheet 
(referred to as ESTA). While the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB 
nets out (consolidates) claims by one of its constituent central bank against another, 
the summation of these individual balance sheets presents the ‘gross’ position of the 
Eurosystem. 
 
The ECB methodology of netting out all claims and liabilities between EANCBs, 
including the ECB, has the purpose of eliminating transactions that are not reflected 
in the accounts if the Eurosystem were a single entity unifying 19 central banks. In 
contrast, measuring the ‘gross’ position of the Eurosystem (the ESTA definition) 
serves a different purpose. The latter facilitates the understanding of the increasing 
role that developments in intra-Eurosystem transactions had in the expansions of the 
Eurosystem balance sheet during the recent financial crisis. These transactions served 
as a guide to identify the risks and the financial strain of Euro Area central banks that 





While the ‘gross’ definition might be a better measure in terms of understanding the 
activity (particularly lending activity) that took place between the National Central 
Banks, its scope is to complement rather than to replace the Eurosystem balance sheet 
that nets out transactions between them (as published by the ECB). It is therefore, 
recommended that the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB is 
complemented by the presentation of the balance sheets of the nineteen Euro Area 
central banks (including their transactions with other national central banks) as well 
as the aggregation of these individual balance sheets into an alternative Eurosystem 
balance sheet. The latter becomes more relevant as the EANCBs are not officially 
branches of the “Mega-ECB” – a term used earlier to refer to the effective size of the 
central institution of the Eurosystem – and therefore consolidation is not appropriate.  
 
At this juncture, it is interesting to compare the alternative treatment of intra-
Eurosystem claims introduced in this thesis (the ‘gross’ approach) with the current 
accounting convention for treating intra-divisional claims and liabilities in a group of 
companies (sub-Section 4. 3.1) or in the public sector (sub-Section 4.3.2).  
 
4.3.1 A Comparison of the ECB Approach, the ‘Gross’ Approach and the  
Current Accounting Practices for a Group of Companies 
 
At the outset, it is important to note that such a comparison is not simple since the 
balance sheet of a central bank is different from the balance sheet of a corporation or 
group of companies. In particular, in the case of a central bank, besides reporting to 
meet the accountability requirements vis-à-vis the public and the stakeholders, 
reporting is also necessary to provide financial information for operational purposes 
such as the conduct of monetary policy. Nevertheless, supplementing the netting of 
intra-Eurosystem transactions with a ‘gross’ approach is similar to the standard 
practice for treating intra-divisional claims and liabilities in a corporation whereby 





According to the current accounting practice, in case of a group of companies 
whereby a parent company controls one or more subsidiary companies, the financial 
statements are presented as those of a single economic entity. It is for this reason that 
the preparation and presentation of consolidated financial statements requires 
entities to consolidate entities it controls, eliminating intra-group transactions and 
balances in the process. These consolidated accounts are appropriate since the 
subsidiary companies are owned by the parent company. However, besides 
consolidated accounts, groups also prepare individual accounts for the parent 
company and for each subsidiary. This is particularly the case with listed companies 
where the parent companies are obligated to a dual reporting – one at individual 
level, the other at group level.   
 
In a group of companies, these different sets of accounts are used for different 
purposes. The consolidated accounts combine all the information from the 
subsidiaries under the parent’s control. In contrast, the individual accounts show the 
position and the performance of each individual company. This is analogous to the 
Eurosystem. The consolidated balance sheet for the Eurosystem combines the 
positions of all central banks after adjusting for internal transactions while the 
individual balance sheets of the EANCBs show the performance of each individual 
central bank (including any intra-transactions).  
 
According to the current standard accounting practice, the type of reporting, that is 
segmented or consolidated reporting, is chosen depending on the scope of the 
accounts. Thus, segmented reporting is very often used in the management of each 
subsidiary and for comparison between subsidiaries while the consolidated financial 
statements are used to compare the performance of the group over time. Similarly, 
the individual balance sheets of the NCBs (including intra-Eurosystem transactions) 
are used to analyze the situations related to that specific Euro Area national central 
bank while the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet is used for analysis across time 





In the case of a group of companies, consolidated accounts (parent and subsidiaries 
collectively) and/or segmented financial statements (parent and subsidiary accounts 
side-by-side) are reported. In the case of the Eurosystem central bank, there is also 
scope for publishing a non-consolidated or ‘gross’ balance sheet particularly during 
the financial crisis. From an economic point of view, it is considered valid to sum up 
the balance sheets of all EANCBs without allowing one individual NCB to net against 
the other. This will, for example, provide information on the actual need for 
borrowing by group of countries such as the periphery countries. In similar ways, 
aggregating the segments in line with the approach introduced in this thesis – the 
‘gross’ balance sheet approach – might also be revealing when applied in case of 
group of companies. In particular, although it is not standard practice for group of 
companies to publish their balance sheets in line with the ‘gross’ approach introduced 
here, comparing the consolidated balance sheet with the ‘gross’ balance sheet may 
serve as a risk metric.  
 
4.3.2 A Comparison of the Consolidated ECB Approach, the ‘Gross’ 
Approach and the Current Accounting Practices for the Public Sector  
 
Another important comparison is that between the ‘gross’ approach adopted through 
the aggregation of the individual EANCBs balance sheets (ESTA) and the conventions 
applied in the case of public sector accounting. There is ample literature (such as 
Grossi, Mori and Bardelli, 2014; Santis, Grossi and Bisogno, 2018) advocating the fact 
that while Consolidated Financial Statements in the public sector represent useful 
financial tools to improve transparency and accountability toward internal and 
external users, this consolidated view is only a part of the information needed in order 
to offer the citizens and other stakeholders a clear view of a local government’s 
impact.  
 
Consolidated Financial Statements have been successfully introduced in a number of 
countries like the UK, Canada, USA, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden both at the 




instrument for governments that deal with a large number of publicly-owned 
companies, because it presents a clear picture of the current economic status of the 
public corporate group.  
 
On its own, this consolidated view does not allow to have segmented information, 
covering specific areas and policies of intervention for which it is appropriate to 
separately report financial information. (International Public Sector Accounting 
Standards (IPSAS) 18). This is even more important for local governments which tend 
to delegate a big part of their service production to decentralized entities, such as 
corporations, private contractors, and public and private partnerships.  
 
There is strong empirical evidence that the adoption of consolidated and segmented 
reporting,  particularly for local government, allows one to have both an overall view 
of the financial and economic performance of a public group seen as a whole and an 
analytical view in order to make appropriate strategic and operational decisions. 
Segmented reporting disaggregates consolidated information over economic sub-
units and give a complete picture of the functions of the local authority. 
Disaggregated information helps the determination of factors influencing 
performance and the evaluation of the sustainability of the group in the medium-long 
term.  
 
Considering the UK public sector, the UK produces segmental reporting – presenting 
the financial statements for the central government, the local government and public 
corporations individually. In contrast, the Whole of Government Accounts (WGA) 
published annually by the HM Treasury, consolidates the audited accounts of over 
8,000 organisations across the public sector – including central and local government 
and public corporations such as the Bank of England – in order to produce a 
comprehensive, accounts-based picture of the financial position of the UK public 
sector. An entity’s accounts will be consolidated into those of the parent Department 
and then into the WGA. Similarly, Gilts held by public sector entities are eliminated 




for the Eurosystem as while the UK produces segmental reporting for different tiers 
of government, which are then aggregated into the WGA, the EANCBs publish their 
balance sheets individually and are aggregated into the Eurosystem balance sheet 
published by the ECB. However, there is one distinct point worth mentioning. The 
process of consolidating the Bank of England into the public sector accounts as 
described earlier is a valid one since the Bank of England is wholly owned by the 
British government. In the case of the Eurosystem, each individual EANCB is owned 
by the government of its respective country. Indeed, evidence presented in Chapters 
4 and 5 suggest that the EANCBs act as individual entities as arms of their respective 
government in borrowing activity. On this basis, consolidation appears 
inappropriate.  
 
As discussed earlier, in the case of a group of companies, the current accounting 
conventions require the reporting of consolidated financial statements (where intra-
transactions are netted-out) supplemented by segment reporting. In this regard, there 
are clear advantages for releasing financial statements that eliminate intra-
transactions. Reporting finances of a group of companies on a consolidated basis 
(including netting-out) help stakeholders to gather a clear idea of the financial health 
of the total enterprise. On the other hand, there are disadvantages with netting-out. 
The aggregate view provided by consolidated accounts that net-out transactions 
between entities within the same group gives only a part of the information needed 
for assessing the performance of each entity. In turn, this also contributes towards 
less informed judgements about the enterprise as a whole. Moreover, netting out does 
not allow for keeping each entity or department responsible for their activities and 
operations.  
 
In the case of a system of central banks like the Eurosystem, a consolidated balance 
sheet (as published by the ECB) also provides ease of understanding and analysis of 
the Eurosystem as a whole.  On the other hand, consolidated financial statements that 
net-out transactions between central banks may mask particular performance of 




financial health of the Eurosystem. Since during the consolidation process activity 
between central banks disappears, consolidated financial statements can give users a 
misguided sense of financial stability in the absence of ‘gross’ information. This 
disadvantage of netting-out was more accentuated when the large amount of funds 
transferred between EANCBs as a symptom of the financial crisis (through Target2) 
was obscured by the process of netting-out intra-transactions and therefore not 
revealed in the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB. 
 
In order to address this disadvantage, it is therefore recommended that in the case of 
a system of central banks such as the Eurosystem, apart from releasing the 
consolidated balance sheet of the Eurosystem as published by the ECB and the 
individual EANCBs’ balance sheets, a financial statement that combines the 
individual balance sheets but does not net-out intra-transactions is also provided. 
 
A further crucial argument for not netting out is provided in the remainder of this 
Chapter, and the econometric results of Chapter 5, which show that the ‘gross’ 
measure has superior predictive power in explaining EANCB’s behavior. 
 
4.4 Are Euro Area National Central Banks on Auto-Pilot? The Predictive Power of 
the ECB’s Capital in Determining the Size of their Balance Sheets 
 
As discussed earlier, if it is determined that EANCBs act as branches of a greater 
entity, then it will be more appropriate to consolidate the balance sheets of the 
individual EANCBs when computing the balance sheet for the entire system. 
Notwithstanding this, in practice, the ECB undertakes the consolidation process even 
though it treats the EANCBs as separate entities. Against this background, this 
Section conducts an analysis to determine whether the EANCBs act on auto-pilot by 
comparing the contribution of each EANCB towards Eurosystem total assets as 





Similar to any financially independent institution with its own legal personality, the 
financial endowment of the ECB is provided by its shareholders. However, the 
financial arrangements of the ECB are unique. Unlike any other central bank, the 
ECB’s shareholders are the NCBs of all EU member states20, with each NCB owning a 
share of the ECB’s equity. In other words, pursuant to Article 28 of the ESCB Statute, 
the NCBs are the sole subscribers to and holders of the capital of the ECB21. The NCB’s 
share of the ECB’s subscribed capital is determined by the ‘Capital Key’. Data 
pertaining to the Capital Key as officially published by the ECB and the necessary 
adjustments to compute the ‘Adjusted Capital Key’ – which is considered the true 
capital share of each EANCB which reflects the distribution of the fully paid-up 
capital rather than the fictional subscribed capital – are presented in Chapter 3.  
 
Since the ESTA includes the summation of the total assets of all EANCBs as well as 
the total assets of the ECB, the latter was apportioned across the nineteen EANCBs in 
order to eliminate the ECB. This implies that the level of total assets for each EANCB 
was adjusted to include the apportionment of the ECB’s assets. The adjusted total 
assets for each EANCB are therefore larger than the level published in their respective 
Annual Reports. This apportionment was necessary so that when the ECB is not 
included in the analysis the nineteen EANCBs assume a portion of the ECB’s assets 
(as ECB part-owners) in order to reach the same level of ESTA. Details concerning 
this adjustment and the adjusted data for each EANCB are presented in Chapter 3. 
 
According to the framework set by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and 
the ECB, very few components of the EANCBs’ balance sheets are distributed 
amongst the central banks of the Euro Area members in line with their respective ECB 
capital key22. Indeed, for most of the components there is no formal regulation 
indicating the proportions in which the EANCBs contribute towards the Eurosystem 
 
20 In turn, these NCBs are fully or substantially owned by their respective governments.   
21 The Eurosystem NCBs are required to pay up their subscribed capital in full while the non-Euro Area 
NCBs pay up only a minimal percentage (3.75%) of their subscribed capital as a contribution to the 
operational costs of the ECB. 
22 The ECB’s capital key is the mechanism for regulating the contribution of the ECB’s foreign reserve 
assets, the allocation of its profits and losses, the allocation of the Eurosystem’s monetary income and 




total assets. If a relationship exists between the composition by country of Eurosystem 
total assets and the adjusted shares of the EANCBs in the ECB capital, it implies that 
the ECB capital, despite its relative small size, has the power to determine the size of 
the EANCBs balance sheet. In other words, the ECB’s capital base, despite its 
miniscule size, has very strong predictive power. Notwithstanding its fundamental 
implications, literature on this issue, so far, remains rather scarce. Ingram (2011) hints 
on this subject matter in his contribution to the book The Capital Needs of Central Banks: 
‘it may be that (NCBs) balance sheet contents will gradually tend towards 
harmonization; their components will tend to be distributed across the Eurosystem’s 
consolidated balance sheet more in line with their capital key shares’. This is, in fact, 
the subject matter investigated in this Section.  
 
Figure 4.6 and Table 4.4 compare the shares of total assets of each EANCB to the total 
assets of the Eurosystem (ESTA) to the Adjusted Capital Key; while Figure 4.7 plots 
the actual and implied total assets for each EANCB separately (refer to Appendix 4.2 
for detailed data).   
 
The key features revealed by Table 4.4 and Figures 4.6 and 4.7 are: 
• For most EANCBs, the Adjusted Capital Key is close to the share of total 
assets (ESTA). 
• This relationship is distinctly stronger for the larger EANCBs. 
• Even when the level of the share differs from the Adjusted Capital Key (as, 
most strikingly, for Luxembourg), the growth rates of most EANCB’s assets 
still track the growth rate of ESTA quite closely. 
 
Table 4.4 shows that if the ratio of actual total assets of each EANCB to total assets of 
the Eurosystem (ESTA) is compared with the Adjusted Capital Key of each EANCB 
(implied shares of total assets), the differences are mostly quite small and stable. In 
the case of EANCBs such as France, Germany, Netherlands and Austria the 
discrepancy between the actual share of ESTA and the adjusted share of the ECB 






Table 4.4 The Actual Share of ESTA and the Adjusted Capital Key (ACK) 
  
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AT Actual Share of ESTA         
3.89 3.47 3.43 3.02 3.06 2.71 2.68 3.06 3.01 2.80 2.53 
ACK 
CK^ 
2.91 2.90 2.89 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.81 2.79 2.79 
BE Actual Share of ESTA         
5.96 6.18 6.03 4.26 2.91 3.48 2.72 2.51 2.52 2.41 2.75 
ACK 3.57 3.55 3.55 3.48 3.48 3.47 3.47 3.48 3.54 3.52 3.52 
CY Actual Share of ESTA 
    0.41 0.55 0.44 0.40 0.36 0.44 0.37 0.31 0.28 
ACK     0.18 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.21 
EE Actual Share of ESTA 
     0.09 0.11 0.14 0.20 0.18 0.15 
ACK      0.26 0.26 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 
FI Actual Share of ESTA         
1.50 1.33 1.33 1.53 1.77 2.62 2.44 1.58 1.57 1.52 1.64 
ACK 1.80 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.80 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.78 1.78 
FR Actual Share of ESTA         
17.51 20.45 22.84 21.41 18.67 19.36 18.01 17.49 18.92 18.72 17.54 
ACK 20.80 20.70 20.64 20.38 20.38 20.32 20.32 20.32 20.26 20.14 20.14 
DE Actual Share of ESTA         
27.89 27.54 26.21 25.08 25.95 23.05 25.17 25.34 25.17 26.47 28.39 
ACK  29.57 29.52 29.44 27.13 27.13 27.06 27.06 26.97 25.72 25.57 25.57 
GR Actual Share of ESTA         
2.60 2.43 2.92 3.63 5.19 4.48 3.85 3.42 3.34 4.20 2.92 
ACK 2.65 2.61 2.61 2.82 2.82 2.81 2.81 2.80 2.91 2.89 2.89 
IE Actual Share of ESTA         
2.87 2.92 4.37 5.10 7.51 4.61 3.28 3.31 2.60 2.00 1.70 
ACK 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.59 1.60 1.66 1.65 1.65 
IT Actual Share of ESTA         
16.39 14.12 12.15 13.07 13.13 14.86 15.06 17.50 17.32 15.54 15.99 
ACK 18.26 18.03 17.98 17.91 17.91 17.86 17.86 17.91 17.59 17.49 17.49 
LU  Actual Share of ESTA         
3.63 3.13 3.67 3.10 2.91 3.27 2.82 3.56 3.62 3.92 3.87 
ACK  0.22 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.29 
MT 
Actual Share of ESTA          0.11 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.11 
ACK   0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
NL Actual Share of ESTA         
5.04 5.77 4.91 5.58 5.18 7.16 6.20 5.03 4.64 5.53 5.94 
ACK 5.59 5.60 5.59 5.71 5.71 5.70 5.70 5.70 5.72 5.69 5.69 
PT Actual Share of ESTA         
2.44 2.21 2.17 2.65 3.77 2.96 2.90 3.47 3.39 3.03 2.80 
ACK 2.47 2.47 2.46 2.51 2.51 2.50 2.50 2.54 2.49 2.48 2.48 
SK Actual Share of ESTA             1.07 0.98 0.75 0.62 0.71 0.77 0.64 0.61 
ACK       0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.10 1.10 1.10 
SI Actual Share of ESTA 
 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.28 0.28 
ACK  0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.49 
ES  Actual Share of ESTA         10.29 9.99 9.05 9.40 8.05 9.81 13.37 12.00 11.77 11.72 11.89 
ACK 10.88 10.86 10.83 11.90 11.90 11.87 11.87 11.87 12.63 12.56 12.56 





 Figure 4.6 Actual Total Assets (ESTA) vs Implied Total Assets for each EANCB* 
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case of the central banks of Portugal, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Italy and Finland, the 
two ratios widened for the first few years of the crisis but got closer again over the 
more recent years as the crisis subsided. Luxembourg stands out as an outlier – while 
the actual share of ESTA stood around 3.5, the adjusted share of ECB capital for 
Luxembourg was around a quarter of a percentage point, over the 2006-2016 period. 
 
It is evident from Figures 4.6 and 4.7 that the correlation between EANCB shares of 
ESTA and the Adjusted Capital Key is distinctly higher for the larger EANCBs. This 
implies that as the balance sheet of the Eurosystem defined as ESTA expands, the 
relatively large EANCBs expand in line. In contrast, the smaller is the EANCB the 
weaker is the correlation between the ratio of total assets and the respective Adjusted 
Capital Key. For instance, as the central banks of Germany, France and Italy are the 
largest three ECB owners, Figure 4.6 shows that their level of total assets follow the  
level implied by the capital key very closely. The behaviour of the relatively large 
EANCBs being distinct from that of the relatively small EANCBs may be explained 







1 - Share of TA to ESTA 1 - Adjusted Capital Key
*shares of EANCBs' Total Assets to ESTA (sum of EANCBs' and ECB's Total Assets)
**shares of EANCBs in the ECB paid-up capital rebased after exclusion of non-EA NCBs
Each EANCB line consists of eleven data points representing each year between 2006 and 2016











the other hand, as the behaviour of the relatively small EANCBs will not lead to any 
material consequence on the ‘greater institution’ they can act more like free riders. 
The more significant deviations by the relatively smaller EANCBs between their 
actual total assets and that implied by the Adjusted Capital Key may indicate some 
level of autonomy in their behaviour which is not evident in case of the larger 
EANCBs.  
 
It is clear that a close, albeit not perfect, relationship exists between the share of total 
assets of the EANCBs to ESTA and their adjusted share of the ECB capital in case of 
nearly all the EANCBs.23 This result is even more striking since the paid-up capital of 
the ECB constitutes an extremely small proportion of the ESTA24, a mere 0.1 per cent. 
This implies that the activities of the EANCBs are driven by their adjusted share of 
the ECB capital; shedding doubt on whether EANCBs have any discretion to 
determine the size of their own balance sheets.  
 
The conclusion from this relationship is that to a quite good approximation the 
EANCBs are effectively operating on auto-pilot: expanding their balance sheets in 
line with the total balance sheet of what is therefore referred to as the “Mega-ECB”. 
Observing that the EANCBs act on auto-pilot leads one to consider the EANCBs as 
branches of a ‘greater entity’ in which case their balance sheets should be 
consolidated into one balance sheet of the greater entity - bringing us back to the 






23 This result is strongly supported by econometric investigations presented in Chapter 5.  
24 The total balance sheet size of the ECB stood at €349.0 billion at the end of 2016, implying a ratio of 
paid-in capital (as of end-2016) to total assets of 2 per cent. In turn, the total assets of the ECB constitute 




4.5 The Predictive Power of the ECB’s Capital in Determining the Size of the 
EANCBs’ Balance Sheets when intra-Eurosystem Transactions are Eliminated - the 
Weaker Link  
 
This Section investigates whether a relationship exists between the capital key and 
the distribution of the Eurosystem total assets among the EANCBs when the intra-
Eurosystem transactions are eliminated in the process of consolidating total assets for 
the Eurosystem25 as published by the ECB. 
 
As identified earlier, a relationship exists between the contribution of each EANCB 
towards Total Assets of the Eurosystem (ESTA) and their respective adjusted share 
in the ECB capital. In this Section, a similar investigation is carried out to determine 
whether such a relationship remains evident when intra-Eurosystem balances are not 
taken into account. In other words, a comparison is made between the share of 
consolidated Total Assets as published by the ECB after deducting intra-Eurosystem 
claims for each EANCB26 and the respective Adjusted Capital key. An examination 
of such a relationship is only possible on the basis of the collection of the dataset 
described in Chapter 3, since, prior to 2016, the ECB used to publish only the 
consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet and not a disaggregation for each EANCB.  
 
As discussed in the previous Sections, the difference between the Eurosystem Total 
Assets published by the ECB and that calculated by summing up all the balance 
sheets of the EANCBs and the ECB is entirely accounted for by intra-Eurosystem 
claims. This latter item comprised around 21 per cent of total assets in 2006 but grew 
up to 31 per cent by 2016 (Figure 4.2), which also explains the widening in the 




25 All claims and liabilities between Eurosystem central banks, including the ECB, are netted out and are 
not presented at all in any of the Eurosystem’s consolidated financial statements published by the ECB. 
26 Based on the definitions explained earlier, the summation of Total Assets less intra-Eurosystem claims 
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Based on the same methodology as that applied in Section 4.4, a comparison is made 
between the actual total assets less intra-Eurosystem claims of each EANCB with 
those predicted by applying the adjusted capital share of each EANCB to the ESTA 
less intra-Eurosystem claims27 for the 2006-2016 period. Therefore, in contrast to the 
earlier analysis, the intra-Eurosystem balances are here consolidated.  
 
As evident in Figure 4.8, the shares of actual total assets less intra-ES claims and the 
Adjusted Capital Key for each EANCB are close or get closer over time in most of the 
cases. This observation is similar to that made earlier in the case of TA (including 
intra-ES claims). However, it is noteworthy, that in the case of Germany, Greece and 
Italy, the divergence between their share of actual total assets excluding intra-ES  
claims and their respective capital key widens over time. In the case of Germany, the 
share of total assets (excl. intra-ES claims) fails to sustain the level recorded prior to 
the crisis, which was relatively close to the Germany’s adjusted share of ECB capital. 
In contrast, in 2016, in the case of Italy and Greece, the share of their assets (excl. intra-
ES claims) exceeded their respective adjusted share in the ECB capital (see Figure 4.8 
and Figure 4.9).  
 
27 Based on the methodology applied earlier, the ESTA less intra-Eurosystem claims is calculated as the 
summation of total assets of all EANCBs plus an apportionment of the ECB Total Assets less the 



















1 - Share of published Total Assets 2 - Shares of ESTA 2 - Adjusted Capital Key
Figure 4.9  Shares of published Total Assets and Shares of ESTA vs 
Adjusted Capital Key, 2006-2016




At this juncture, it is interesting to analyse how the exclusion of intra-ES claims from 
total assets affects the closeness of the share of total assets to the adjusted share of the 
ECB capital. If one were, therefore, to compare the observations presented in Section 
4.4 to those presented here, it is evident that, with some exceptions, total assets 
including intra-ES claims follow the adjusted share of the ECB capital markedly more 
closely than when intra-ES claims are excluded. Most noticeable is the case of 
Germany. As the central bank of Germany’s total assets accounted for 28.4 per cent 
of ESTA in 2016, the bank’s adjusted share of the ECB capital stood at close to 25.6 
per cent. However, when intra-ES claims are excluded, the share of total assets 
declined to 16.5 per cent in 2015 and 18.9 per cent in 2016. That is, as shown below, 
the Bundesbank very sharply increased its lending to other EANCBs. This implies 
that the central bank of Germany sustained a share of total assets in line with its 
Adjusted Capital Key but this relationship is disguised when intra-ES claims are 
consolidated. In contrast, a minimal level of intra-ES claims on the balance sheet of 
the central bank of Greece explain the fact that, by 2016, the share of total assets 
exceeded the Adjusted Capital Key for Greece when intra-ES claims are excluded.   
 
Based on the above observations, one can conclude that, the underlying relationship 
identified earlier is disguised when intra-ES claims are consolidated (that is, in line 
with the ECB’s definition of the Eurosystem). 
 
4.6 The Predictive Power of the ECB’s Capital in Determining the Size of the sub-
Components of Intra-Eurosystem Claims/Liabilities of EANCBs 
 
Having described how the summation of all the EANCBs and the ECB balance sheet 
(the ESTA) differs from the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB, this 
Section focuses on the impact of intra-Eurosystem transactions on the balance sheet 
of individual EANCBs28. As noted in Chapter 2, most of the literature discusses only 
one particular sub-component of these intra-Eurosystem balances, namely Target2. 
 
28 As this Section focuses on the balance sheets of the EANCBs as published in their Annual Reports, the 




Nevertheless, as considerable balances may arise in the other sub-components, an 
investigation of all the main sub-components of these intra-Eurosystem balances is 
carried out in sub-Section 4.6.2. Such investigation examines whether the distribution 
of these main sub-components amongst the EANCBs follow the share of the ECB’s 
capital held by each EANCB. Data pertaining to the intra-Eurosystem balances as 
well as to their sub-components are described and presented in Chapter 3. 
 
4.6.1 An Anatomy of Intra-Eurosystem Transactions 
 
As discussed earlier, the balance sheet item ‘intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities’ do 
not feature in the Eurosystem consolidated balance sheet published by the ECB. 
However, this item appears on the EANCBs’ balance sheets and is therefore included 
in the Eurosystem balance sheet compiled in this Chapter as the aggregation of the 
EANCB’s balance sheets. For this reason, the sum of all the EANCBs’ balance sheets 
is greater than the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB. This 
observation, which was also noticed by Whelan (2012a), is evident graphically in 
Figure 4.1 above which compares the ESTA (the sum of the EANCBs balance sheets) 
and the consolidated Total Assets – as published by the ECB. 
 
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, the size of the EANCBs’ balance 
sheets has changed substantially. A closer look at the EANCB’s balance sheets reveals 
the role that developments in the intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities had in these 
balance sheet expansions. In particular, the size of the balance sheet of the 
Bundesbank (as measured by total assets), which represents around one quarter of 
the total Eurosystem balance sheet, more than tripled between the end of 2006 and 
the end of 2016. A closer look at the balance sheet reveals that around ninety per cent 
of this expansion was attributed to the intra-Eurosystem claims by the Bundesbank. 
Similarly, the size of the balance sheet of the central bank of Netherlands more than 
quadrupled over the same period, with half of this expansion reflecting increases in 




The counterpart of these developments on the Bundesbank’s and the Netherlands 
central bank’s balance sheets are the periphery’s intra-Eurosystem liabilities. Indeed, 
a large increase in intra-Eurosystem liabilities financed almost three quarters of the 
expansion on the balance sheet of Greece, which more than quadrupled during the 
2006-2016 period. Similarly, the balance sheets of the central bank of Italy tripled 
while that of Portugal and Spain quadrupled, financed by a robust expansion in their 
intra-Eurosystem liabilities.   
 
For ten of the Eurosystem’s NCBs, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities are the largest 
item on the balance sheets either on the asset side or on the liabilities side. By the end 
of 2016, this balance sheet item totalled more than one and a half trillion euros in 
aggregate claims or aggregate liabilities, equivalent to roughly 14 per cent of Euro 
Area GDP, more than quadrupling since 2006. Figure 4.10 shows that the intra-
Eurosystem claims of both Germany and the Netherlands’ central banks comprised 
around half of their balance sheet over the past recent years, or around twenty per 
cent of their GDP at the end of 2016. On the liabilities side, it shows that the intra-
Eurosystem liabilities were around half the size of the balance sheets of the central 
banks of Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain at the same point in time. 
 
Figure 4.10 also shows that each EANCB balance sheet includes an intra-Eurosystem 
balance on the asset side as well as an intra-Eurosystem balance on the liability side. 
However, typically, an EANCB has either mostly intra-Eurosystem claims or mostly 
intra-Eurosystem liabilities. Figure 4.11 shows the net intra-Eurosystem balance 
(intra-Eurosystem claims less intra-Eurosystem liabilities) which is equivalent to the 
netting-out of the top panel of Figure 4.10 with the corresponding bottom panel. For 
most EANCBs, the net intra-Eurosystem balance remains significant when compared 
to their respective total assets. The balance sheets of the central banks of Germany,  
Finland and the Netherlands reveal a net intra-Eurosystem balance (claims) 
equivalent to more than one quarter of their balance sheets. On the other hand, net 









Italy, Spain and Ireland (approaching 100 per cent of GDP at its peak). It is 
noteworthy, however, that Ireland’s net intra-Eurosystem liabilities peaked very 
early (in 2010) while Greece’s grew over a longer timeframe to 2015.  
 
The offsetting of intra-Eurosystem claims and intra-Eurosystem liabilities may 
conceal important interpretations of developments in intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities. Moreover, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities are made up of more 
than one component and therefore, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities may 
materialize due to different reasons. This implies that an investigation of the sub-
components of the intra-Eurosystem balances merits consideration and is therefore 
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Figure 4.11 Net Intra-Eurosystem Balances* 
  
 
4.6.2 The Relation between the Share of the Main Components of the Intra-
Eurosystem Balances and the EANCBs’ Share in the ECB Capital 
 
The focus has, thus far, been on total intra-Eurosystem balances. In this sub-Section, 
the composition of these balances is examined in more detail. Intra-ES balances 
comprise: 
i) the participating interest of the EANCB in the ECB29  
ii) the EANCB’s euro-denominated claims arising from the transfer of 
foreign exchange reserves to the ECB  
 
29 This sub-component of intra-Eurosystem claims, which is shown on each of the EANCBs’ balance 
sheet, reflects their respective contribution towards the greater part of the paid-up capital of the ECB. 
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iii) claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes within the 
Eurosystem (net)30 and  
iv) claims/liabilities arising from balances of TARGET2 accounts. 
 
While the first two sub-components – participating interest in the ECB31 and transfer 
of foreign reserves32 are recorded as an asset on the EANCBs’ balance sheet, the other 
two sub-components – adjustment of banknotes in circulation and Target2 balances 
– appear on either the asset side or the liabilities side of the EANCBs’ balance sheet. 
This has two important implications:  
 
First, as highlighted earlier, the fact that a sub-component/s of intra-Eurosystem 
balances may appear on either the asset side or the liabilities side implies that looking 
merely at the net intra-Eurosystem claims or net intra-Eurosystems liabilities 
disguises distinctly different patterns in the components listed above. In particular, 
for Belgium, Italy, Portugal and Spain significant intra-Eurosystem claims partly 
offset intra-Eurosystem liabilities. In contrast, France’s, Germany’s and 
Luxembourg’s intra-Eurosystem claims were diluted by intra-Eurosystem liabilities; 
while in the case of Austria intra-Eurosystem claims were almost equal to intra-
Eurosystem liabilities, resulting in a minimal net intra-Eurosystem position (see 
Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11). In sum, gross and net intra-Eurosystem balances are 
strongly, but imperfectly, correlated.  
 
Second, the reasons why intra-Eurosystem claims and intra-Eurosystem liabilities 
arise and fluctuate can vary extensively amongst EANCBs. As noted earlier, most of 
the existing literature consider only Target2 as the main reason for raising intra-
Eurosystem claims/liabilities while, in contrast, the literature considering the other 
 
30 The adjustment of banknotes in circulation represents the difference between the banknotes physically 
issued by a given EANCB and the share of all circulating euro banknotes that has been assigned to that 
EANCB according to a specific key. Details pertaining to this adjustment are presented in Chapter 3. 
31 This balance sheet item mainly comprise the share of each EANCB in the capital of the ECB – the 
capital key. Details pertaining to this item are presented in Chapter 3. 
32 This item, which is recorded on the asset side of the EANCBs balance sheet, reflects transfers of foreign 
exchange reserves to the ECB. An equivalent amount is recorded as an intra-Eurosystem liability on the 




sub-components is scarce. This makes it even more relevant to investigate the sub-
components to understand the core reasons for developments in the intra-
Eurosystem balances. 
 
Figure 4.12 shows that the adjustment of banknotes in circulation and Target2 
positions comprise the two main sub-components of total intra-Eurosystem 
balances.33 The share of net claims/liabilities related to the adjustment of banknotes 
in circulation decreased as net T2 claims/liabilities became more prominent.  
 
As noted earlier, intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities for different EANCBs may be 
very similar, but for fundamentally different reasons. Jobst, Handig and Holzfeind 
(2012) provide examples relevant to this point – while Greece built-up intra-
Eurosystem liabilities by raising negative Target2 balances, Germany recorded intra-
Eurosystem liabilities prior to 2007 in the form of a liability arising from the 
adjustment of banknotes in circulation. (The latter is discussed further below.) 
 
Figure 4.12 Components of Intra-Eurosystem Balances (percentage shares) 
  
 
33 The two panels of Figure 4.12 are virtually identical but differ slightly due to small statistical 
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Moreover, Jobst, Handig and Holzfeind (2012) draws on the case of Austria to 
highlight that intra-Eurosystem positions may reflect other intra-flows such as the 
adjustments of euro banknotes in circulation. This emphasises the point that looking 
at the other sub-components is a pre-requisite not only to understand the source of 
intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities but also for a correct interpretation of Target2 
balances. 
 
Looking at the data for these sub-components by country (see Figure 4.14 and Figure 
4.15), one can draw on various other examples similar to the ones highlighted by 
Jobst, Handig and Holzfeind (2012) mentioned earlier. For instance, while France 
recorded net intra-ES claims on the basis of claims related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes, Luxembourg built-up intra-ES claims through positive T2 balances. 
Meanwhile, intra-ES claims recorded on the balance sheet of the central bank of 
Netherlands reflects both claims related to the adjustment of banknotes in circulation 
as well as net T2 claims. Similarly, on the liabilities side, net Eurosystem balances for 
France consist entirely of T2 liabilities while for Luxembourg net Eurosystem 
balances reflected liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes.  
 
Accounting for more than one-third of Eurosystem total assets, the importance of 
intra-Eurosystem claims as an item on the EANCBs balance sheet is certain. 
Moreover, the role of intra-Eurosystem balances as a means to disguise the 
relationship between total assets and the capital key cannot be ignored. It is therefore 
interesting to investigate the relationship between the main sub-components of intra-
Eurosystem claims/liabilities34 and the Adjusted Capital Key.  
 
One of the main sub-components of intra-Eurosystem balances constitute the net 
claims and liabilities of the Euro Area NCBs vis-à-vis the ECB as the central 
counterpart. These arise through cross-border payments settled in central bank 
money of the respective national banking sectors or the EANCBs themselves and are 
 
34The participating interest in the ECB and the EANCB’s euro-denominated claims arising from the 
transfer of foreign reserves to the ECB together accounted for a less than 1 per cent of total assets in 2016 




executed through the common euro area payment platform known as Target2. 
Through Target2, EANCBs can borrow from or lend to other EANCBs35.  
 
Prior to the start of the financial crisis in 2007, T2 balances were small in magnitude 
and mostly reflected differences in payment habits across countries. Since the onset 
of the crisis in mid-2007, however, T2 balances have become more pronounced. 
Indeed, balances of most countries increased significantly and peaked in 2012, 
declining slowly thereafter before peaking again in 2016. For instance, the T2 balance 
of the central bank of Germany reached a peak of €754 billion at the end of 2016, 
roughly equivalent to 25 per cent of Germany’s annual GDP. The central bank of Italy, 
which had net T2 claims of €23 billion in 2008, had a net T2 liabilities of €357 billion 
by the end of 2016. Similarly, the central bank of Spain’s T2 liabilities reached €328 
billion at the end of 2016 from a surplus of €25 billion in 2008 (Figure 4.13). The 
renewed widening of T2 imbalances since 2015 is linked to the implementation of the 
ECB Asset Purchase Programme36 (Castillo and Varela, 2017). Though in a slightly 
different context, these developments are discussed further in Chapter 6.  
 
Although as noted earlier, EANCBs can borrow from or lend to other EANCBs, no 
bilateral data is available in this regard. Data on the balances of Target2 accounts 
arising from the stock of claims or liabilities for each EANCB, as described above and 
presented in Figure 4.13, on aggregate, show the extent to which one EANCB is 
lending or borrowing from the other EANCBs. However, no information is disclosed 
as to the identity of the institutions borrowing from, for example, Germany or lending 




35A Target claim on a EANCBs balance sheet means that overall there has been a net inflow of euro 
payments to that country’s banking system; in case of a Target liability, a net outflow has taken place. 
36 According to the ECB, the Bundesbank and the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the 
implementation of the APP cause a direct impact on T2 balances as it could involve cross-border 
payment by the purchasing EANCB as securities could be bought from a range of counterparties. On 
the other hand, the central bank of the Netherlands attaches the renewed rise in the T2 balances to the 
sustained fragmentation and risk perceptions within the Euro Area. There is an ongoing debate on this 





A controversial debate in the literature evolved on the likely causes and consequences 
of this sharp increase in Target2 balances. While some maintain that the high balances 
pose a problem (Sinn and Wollmershauser, 2011), others interpret them as merely a 
by-product of the banking and sovereign debt crisis (Buiter et al, 2011; Auer, 2012 and 
Jobst, 2009). Most literature points towards the premise that T2 balances reflect the 
high strains in the financial markets (De Grauwe and Ji, 2012) while others consider 
Target2 balances as a consequence of current account imbalances (Sinn and 
Wollmershaeuser, 2011). 
 
The fact that T2 balances became highly negative for EANCBs in countries 
experiencing financial strain like Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain and highly 
positive in countries where payments were inflowing like Germany37, contributed 
towards an escalated debate. In this context, a common viewpoint on T2 balances has 
been that they represent a ‘bailout’ for the periphery countries and interpret the 
accumulation of balances by the German central bank as ‘lending funds to strapped 
governments’ (Tornell and Westermann, 2011). In contrast, others oppose this view 
and interpret T2 balances as a side effect of monetary policy decisions rather than as 
 
37 For an explanation of the main reason of the dramatic increase in the T2 liabilities of most peripheral 
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a bailout requested by national governments (Whelan, 2013). This latter view is 
supported by the ECB (2015) who declared that T2 balances ‘do not provide a 
complete picture of the net financial flows between countries’.  
 
Being one of the main forms of lending38 during the Eurozone crisis, another branch 
of literature on this subject examined the relationship between T2 liabilities and 
developments in the sovereign bond market. De Grauwe and Ji (2012) observed both 
graphically and through a regression strategy, that, for the period after 2008, high 
government bond yields were associated with large T2 liabilities, and low 
government bond yields with large T2 claims. Similarly, Steinkamp and Westermann 
(2012) observe a close relationship between lending (80 per cent of which is made up 
of T2 balances) and the interest rate spread (as well as bond prices) in the recent 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe. This link between the spreads39 and T2 balances may 
be explained by the notion that sovereign bondholders sell bonds of distressed 
countries pushing up their government bond yields and buy bonds of countries they 
trust lowering the bond yields. In turn, distressed countries are associated with 
relatively high T2 imbalances while safer countries are characterised by T2 claims. 
The relationship between T2 and sovereign bond yield spreads is discussed further 
in the following Section. 
 
The same methodology presented earlier is applied to identify whether a relationship 
exists between the share of T2 claims/liabilities (for each EANCB) to total T2 
claims/liabilities and the respective Adjusted Capital Key40. As displayed in Figure 
4.14, at the end of 2016, a large positive German claim accounted for over 70 per cent 
of total T2 claims while its share in ECB capital stood at a much lower 26 per cent. 
Similarly, the aggregate T2 balance for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain accounts for  
 
38 T2 is considered lending by the markets because it is collateralized to a large extent by the country 
government bonds (see Steinkamp and Westermann (2012), Sinn and Wollmershauser (2011)). 
39 Spreads are usually defined as the differences between 10-year government bond rates of a country 
and that of German government bond. 
40 In cases when an EANCB records T2 claims (rather than T2 liabilities), the share is calculated as a ratio 
of the summation on T2 claims (taking into account only EANCBs with T2 claims). Similarly, when an 
EANCB records T2 liabilities, the share is calculated as a ratio of total T2 liabilities (ignoring EANCBs 





around 80 per cent of the total net T2 liabilities of EANCBs. However, these countries 
together own only a quarter of the ECB capital. This is suggestive of the conclusion 
that no relationship exists between the share of net T2 claims/liabilities to total T2 
claims/liabilities and the share of ECB capital for each EANCB. 
 
The other main sub-component of intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities relate to the 
allocation of euro banknotes in circulation and account for around one-third of total 
intra-ES claims/liabilities of the Eurosystem. Euro banknotes are issued by all Euro 
Area NCBs. However, for accounting purposes, the ECB reports 8 per cent of total 
banknotes in circulation in its own balance sheet while the remaining 92 per cent are 
presented in the balance sheets of the EANCBs in proportion to their paid-up shares 
in the capital of the ECB (the banknote allocation key). Thus, the difference between 
the net amounts of banknotes put into circulation by the individual EANCBs and the 
amounts of banknotes allocated to them (on the basis of the banknote allocation key) 
gives rise to intra-Eurosystem claims or liabilities. If the share of net value of 
banknotes put into circulation by an EANCB is higher than its share based on the 
banknote allocation key, that EANCB reports a corresponding net liability arising 
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Figure 4.14 Shares of T2 Claims/Liabilities vs Adjusted Capital Key 
2006-2016




EANCB issues fewer banknotes than that, it accumulates a net claim41. This procedure 
and the data pertaining to net claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes within the Eurosystem for each EANCB is presented in Chapter 3.  
 
During the 2006-2016 period, the Bundesbank recorded an increasing share of net 
liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes42. In fact, for Germany, this share 
increased from 50 per cent in 2006 to around 70 per cent by 2016. Meanwhile, France, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain recorded increasing net claims related to the 
allocation of euro banknotes.  
 
Being the world’s number one country in the use of cash (Weidmann, 2016), it is not 
surprising that the central bank of Germany not only reported an intra-ES liability 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes, but the share of this balance sheet item to 
the total for all EANCBs (70 per cent in 2016) significantly exceeded Germany’s share 
of the ECB capital (26 per cent). This implies that the banknotes in circulation in 
Germany were significantly higher than the amount allocated on the basis of the 
banknote allocation key. Jobst et al, (2012) distinguish two main reasons why this 
may take place – international travel and foreign exchange trading services. Though 
this merits further investigation, these channels seem to be plausible reasons for the 
relatively high level of banknotes in circulation, which led to a share of net liabilities 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes significantly exceeding the share of the 
ECB capital in Germany. Note issues in Greece and Ireland are also higher than their 
allocation, in the latter case also leading to a net liability that exceeds the Irish share 
of the ECB capital (Figure 4.15).  
 
Also noteworthy is the fact that although the central bank of Luxembourg owns a 
mere 0.3 per cent of the ECB capital, it holds 21 per cent (2016) of total net liabilities 
related to the allocation of euro banknotes therefore putting a substantially high level  
 
41These procedures are set out in ‘Decision of the European Central Bank on the issue of euro banknotes’ 
(ECB/2010/29); Official Journal of the European Union L35, 9 February 2011, page 26. 
42Total liabilities related to the allocation of euro banknotes is calculated as the summation of the net 







of banknotes in circulation. Though this is quite difficult to attribute to one particular 
explanation, one reason may be the large number of residents of neighbouring 
countries who work, and may withdraw cash, in Luxembourg. The Netherlands, 
Austria and Portugal place a lower amount of euro banknotes in circulation than their 
allocation, resulting in net claims on their central bank’s balance sheets. Together, 
they account for one quarter of the total net claims related to euro banknotes despite 
that they hold only less than ten per cent of the ECB capital. The central bank of 
France issued a significantly lower amount of euro banknotes than allocated 
particularly in the early years of the financial crisis.  
 
To conclude, the share of net claims/liabilities related to the allocation of euro 
banknotes seem to be uncorrelated with the EANCBs adjusted capital share. The 
existent literature identified a number of channels that may be responsible for the 
migration of banknotes issued by each EANCB. The EANCBs do not have control of 
this movement of currency since the issuance of euro banknotes is entirely demand-
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*Malta is not included since net claims related to the allocation of euro banknotes were minimal.




Greece and Ireland or underuse their allocation such as Spain and Portugal. 
Irrespective of whether the EANCBs under or overutilise their allocation of euro 
banknotes (leading to either net claims or net liabilities related to euro banknotes in 
circulation), it seems that there is no relation between the magnitude at which they 
diverge from their allocation and their share of ECB capital (see Figure 4.15).  
 
Having discussed the alternative measure of the Eurosystem balance sheet (ESTA), 
the following Sections examine the drivers of expansions in ESTA as compared to 
growth in the Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB. In particular, 
Section 4.7 observes how credit spreads drive T2 and hence ESTA. Subsequently, the 
extent to which macroeconomic considerations and country-specific debt crisis 
triggered the expansions in ESTA and in the ECB published balance sheet is discussed 
in Section 4.8 and Section 4.9. 
 
4.7 ESTA, Target2 and the Sovereign Bond Yield Spreads 
 
Developments in Target2 varied amongst EANCBs. In particular, Target2 liabilities 
for central banks of periphery countries like Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal peaked 
at some point in 2012 – around the time of Draghi’s ‘whatever it takes speech’. 
Thereafter, in Italy, Spain and Portugal, T2 balances followed a downward trend up 
until 2015 before embarking on an upward path to a level exceeding that in 2012. 
Ireland’s T2 liabilities reached an earlier peak towards the end of 2010 but declined 
consistently thereafter. Meanwhile, Germany registered a parallel rise in intra-
Eurosystem claims because of the crisis of confidence that reduced the volume of 
credit transfers to foreign institutions in crisis-hit countries to a trickle while banks 
domiciled in Germany continued to attract substantial flows from abroad. 
 
As noted earlier, evidence documented by authors such as De Grauwe and Ji (2012) 
and Steinkamp and Westermann (2012) points towards the relationship between T2 
liabilities and developments in the sovereign bond market – particularly the 




between low government bond yields and large T2 claims in the recent sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe. As Target 2 accounts for the bulk of the difference between the 
ECB definition of Eurosystem and ESTA, it is intriguing to see whether these intra-
Eurosystem flows tend to follow or lead spikes in the relevant interest rates on the 
bonds.  
 
As the recent financial crisis unfolded and international investors became 
increasingly concerned with the sustainability of government debt, long-term 
government bond spreads relative to Germany have spiraled up for some Euro Area 
countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain (Figure 4.16) despite the 
reforms undertaken both at the Eurozone and national levels. In particular, during 
the 2008-2012 period, their spread vis-à-vis Germany widened to unprecedented 
levels since the introduction of the Euro in 1999. Only at the end of 2012, the surge in 














Figure 4.16 Evolution of the 10-year Sovereign Bond Spreads 
vis-a-vis Germany 
Italy Ireland Spain (rhs) Portugal Greece (rhs)
bps




The surge of the sovereign spread of some Euro Area countries since 2008 has 
reflected both countries’ fiscal positions and macroeconomic fundamentals, and more 
general factors such as liquidity risk, international risk aversion, negative market 
sentiments or contagion effects. The literature reports a number of different channels 
through which non-standard monetary policy measures may have affected 
government bond spreads43. 
 
As depicted in Figure 4.17, T2 and the yield spreads moved closely together during 
the first years of the crisis44. In fact, while Target2 heightened in 2011-2012 for the five 
hard-hit countries namely Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (as described 
earlier), the respective yield spreads of these countries vis-à-vis Germany also 
reached a peak. In other words, the imbalances start to appear when the spreads 
between the two bonds widens, starting from June 2011. Indeed, various authors such 
as Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012) and Cecchetti et al, (2012) noted that this pile up of 
T2 liabilities by these countries coincided with increasing bond yield spreads with 
the German bund and capital flight to core Eurozone countries.  
 
As the spreads started to narrow for the GIIPS, T2 also began to decrease towards 
lower levels (Greece did not participate in the PSPP).  In Ireland and Greece, T2 and 
the spreads moved closely together as the increase in T2 balances was reversed. 
Indeed, by 2019, T2 balances turned positive while the spreads were eliminated. In 
the case of Italy, Spain and Portugal despite that the spreads followed a similar 
downward path,  T2 balances illustrate permanent effects as these have been growing 
again since March 2015, on account of the purchase of public debt of their respective 
treasuries in international markets under the PSPP leading to corresponding rising 
T2 imbalances45. 
 
43 Contributors to this literature include Falagiarda and Reitz (2015). 
44 Steinkamp and Westermann (2012) found evidence of Granger causality in the causal relationship 
between lending defined as Target 2 liabilities and rescue packages and bond price changes. 
45 While this is considered as the official version about T2 imbalances, various authors such as Febrero 
E and Alvarez I (2019) argue that the NCBs purchased a large volume of public debt from residents, 
whose sale proceeds have then been transferred abroad, either to purchase international assets or to 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































In sum, EANCB purchases of claims on other EANCB, which are evident in ESTA but 
not in the ECB published accounts (Target 2 imbalances) are triggered by sufficiently 
alarming spikes in Greek and other sovereign debt spreads. However, in the case of 
Italy and Spain there is a disconnect between Target balances and the risk premium.  
 
4.8 Expansions in ESTA, ECB Published Data and Monetary Loosening 
 
Similar to the Bank of England, the task of the ECB is primarily to preserve price 
stability with an inflation rate below but close to 2 per cent. Subject to this condition, 
monetary policy must support balanced growth and full employment. The 
conventional monetary policy instrument to achieve the goal of price stability is the 
level of short-term interest rates (ECB, 2011). However, as the short-term policy rate 
reached near zero, this conventional means of effecting monetary ease was no longer 
feasible. As the normal monetary policy tool of lowering the short-term interest rate 
was constrained, the real interest rate, while negative, was still too high for the 
economy to quickly return to full employment and equilibrium, leading the economy 
to high unemployment. As Bernanke and Reinhart (2014) showed, one of the 
strategies to stimulate the economy involves increasing the size of the central bank’s 
balance sheet beyond the level needed to set the short-term policy rate at zero. 
Indeed, the general macroeconomic situation and weak inflation dynamics in the 
Euro Area necessitated quantitative easing in the Euro Area.   
 
Inflation in the Euro Area has been below the inflation target of the ECB for several 
years (except 2011 and 2012). Indeed, a prolonged decline in Euro Area inflation 
started in 2013, remaining close to zero three years later. The extent of this inflation 
shortfall has parallels with the size of the Eurosystem balance sheet expansion. As 
evident in Figure 4.18, as from 2014, the persistent gap between inflation and its target 
was accompanied by an expansion of the central bank balance sheet, ESTA, as defined 
in the thesis. This trend of low inflation and widening of the gap to the central bank 
target has prompted the ECB to resort to unconventional measures including the 




Eurosystem balance sheet. Indeed, the increasing risk that the ECB’s inflation target 
continue to be missed and the much-needed boost to the economy called for the 
return to the anti-deflation asset-buying programme.  
 
As inflation reached historically low levels in 2014, the Governing Council of the 
European Central Bank (ECB) decided to act boldly to counteract the risk of a too low 
inflation for a prolonged period and launched an expanded asset purchase 
programme. The asset purchase programmes, which aimed to address the medium-
term risks to price stability, were extended to reach slightly below 30 per cent of total 
central bank assets by 2016 (refer to Chapter 6). Indeed, in January 2015, the ECB 
announced a massive expansion of its asset purchase programme to supplement the 
ECB’s Asset-Backed Securities and Covered Bonds Purchase Progammes originally 
launched in September 2014. During a press conference in January 2015, Draghi 
declared that ‘the adoption of further balance sheet measures has become warranted 
to achieve our price stability objective, given that the key ECB interest rates have 
reached their lower bound’. This confirms that the weak inflation dynamics at that 
time triggered the balance sheet expansions. 
 
In sum, as the gap between inflation and the ECB target reached almost 2 percentage 
points in 2015 and 2016, the Eurosystem balance sheet registered the most significant 
expansions triggered by the loosening of monetary policy through the asset purchase 
programmes. It is also pertinent to note however, that while a relationship can be 
identified between the inflation gap and the Total Assets as published by the ECB 
(refer to Figure 4.18) reflecting QE, the rise in ESTA relative to the ECB definition of 
Total Assets is mainly driven by T2 balances which reflect individual countries rather 
than driven by the Euro Area as a whole as discussed in various Sections of this 
Chapter. 
 
A deteriorated economic activity and the persistence of low inflation prompted 
expansions in the balance sheets of other central banks besides the Eurosystem, such 




rate climbed to 8.7 per cent by March 2009, the Fed responded by announcing the 
buying of long-term Treasury securities and engaging in further purchases of 
government-sponsored enterprise debt and mortgage-backed securities, in turn 
expanding its balance sheet. Subsequently, as economic conditions continued to 
deteriorate, a second round of the Large-Scale Asset Purchases program was 
announced, intended to support the recovery and help ensure that inflation, over 
time, was at a level consistent with the Fed’s mandate. As argued by Pasaogullari M. 
(2015), the Large-Scale Asset Purchase Programme was designed to support real 
economic activity and to offset disinflationary pressures, in turn triggering balance 
sheet expansions. The Bank of England has also injected money into the economy to 
boost nominal spending and inflation in order to meet the inflation target in the 
medium term.  
 
To sum up, as growth was low and inflation dynamics were weak, the signs of 
demand weakness were overwhelmingly pointing to the need for stimulating 
monetary policies. It emerges clearly that this monetary loosening necessitated by a 
quickly worsening economic environment triggered, at least partly, the expansion of 
the Eurosystem balance sheet. Put differently, the balance sheet became a tool clearly  
aimed at boosting output and inflation. However, over the more recent period, the 
effectiveness of the ECB’s monetary policy to address the weak inflation dynamics 
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Figure 4.18 Eurosystem Balance Sheet (ESTA), ECB Published 
Balance Sheet and Inflation Gap to the Target 
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poses a dilemma for the central bank attempting to phase out unconventional 
monetary policies and returning its balance sheet to normalization. In sum, ECB QE 
and the resultant expansions in the overall balance sheet are triggered by a 
combination of the zero lower bound and the perceived need for monetary loosening, 
as indicated by sub-target inflation forecasts and weak GDP. 
 
4.9 Expansions in ESTA, ECB Published Data and Country-Specific Debt Crises 
 
The Eurosystem balance sheet as published by the ECB nets out intra-transactions 
between EANCBs. As depicted in Figure 4.19 and Figure 4.20, a cursory look at the 
evolution of the Eurosystem Total Assets (ECB definition) and GDP growth indicates 
that macroeconomic developments exerted some influence on the evolution of the 
balance sheet (excluding the intra-transactions).  
 
ESTA balance sheet expansions not included in the ECB balance sheets mainly reflect 
developments in Target2. This source of indirect funding appears to be related to a 
certain reluctance of European institutions in setting up a ‘lender of last resort’ 
mechanism in order to provide Member States in need with financial support. 
 
From an empirical perspective, the literature has expressed various positions on the 
determinants of T2 balances. In particular, statistical analysis by Cecioni and 
Ferrero(2012) showed a correlation between T2 imbalances and balance-of-payments 
financial account imbalances. In contrast, the econometric analysis by De Grauwe and 
Ji (2012) highlighted the negative and significant impact of government bonds’ yields 
on the T2 imbalances.  
 
As shown in Figure 4.21 for Italy and Spain, T2 imbalances increased in two waves. 
The first of these took place as the magnitude of T2 imbalances grew sharply after the 
outbreak of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2010 which triggered capital flight 






Netherlands and Luxembourg. The second one has taken place from March 2015 
onwards, with the same actors playing similar roles. This renewed surge in T2 
balances since 2015 coincides with the beginning of the ECB’s outright purchase of 
Euro Area government bonds under the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) 
in March 2015.  
 
As noted earlier, in mid-2011, Italy and Spain began to pile up T2 liabilities, 
coinciding with increasing bond yield spreads with the German bund and capital 
flight to core Euro Area countries. Although the symptoms were rather similar, each 
country had its own problems. The troubles in Spain escalated as GDP and 
employment plummeted, and non-performing loans rose causing serious problems 
for banks. The implementation of expansive fiscal policies and the provision of 
financial assistance to banks helped the situation but led to a deficit of nearly 11 per 
cent of GDP in 2009, and a doubling of the public debt ratio. Conversely, the problem 
in Italy was a combination of an already high public debt coupled with a long decade 
of very low economic growth. The second Greek sovereign debt crisis, in 2011, which 
proved clearly that a sovereign state could default, was the ignition mechanism that 
unleashed a sudden stop and a capital reversal that was reflected in large T2 
imbalances. The increase in T2 imbalances only came to a halt in mid-2012 following 















Figure 4.19 Growth in Eurosystem 
Total Assets (ECB defintion) and 
GDP Growth





















Figure 4.20 Eurosystem Total Assets 
(ECB definition) and GDP 





impaired economies through the Outright Monetary Transactions. This was also 
reflected in receding risk premium on the Eurozone financial markets. The financial 
assistance to the Spanish government by the European Stability Mechanism in mid-
2012, to recapitalize some impaired banks, also contributed to the fall of T2 
imbalances. Target2 imbalances started to grow again in March 2015 after the launch 
of the ECB’s Quantitative Easing. 
 
In sum, during the Euro Area crisis, T2 has been one of the key forms of lending. As 
the sovereign debt crisis heightened and public debt ratios increased particularly in 
Italy and Spain, borrowing from other central banks through Target2 imbalances 
became an indirect form of funding and a last resort.  
 
In Greece and Ireland, the T2 liabilities accumulated rapidly in the months preceding 
the request for financial support to European institutions and the launch of the 
economic and financial adjustment programmes, in May and December of 2010, 
respectively. As a result of capital flight, the Target2 debt of the Bank of Greece had 
reached around €80 billion by May 2010. In May 2010, Greece began to receive 
tranches of official loans under the first bailout programme from the EU and the IMF, 
which arrested the rise of Greece’s T2 debts. When the government of Greece receives 
a tranche of a loan (May, September, December 2010; March, July 2011), this capital 
inflow causes an equal reduction in the T2 liability of the Bank of Greece. The ECB’s  
promise to purchase government debts in late 2012 set the T2 balances on a 
downward path as private funds returned, responding to reduced fears of sovereign 
defaults. From September 2014 to June 2015, T2 balances for Greece rose again as a 
result of capital outflows but followed a downward trend thereafter.  
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.21, over the period as a whole, sustained increases in the 
debt of Italy and Portugal were almost entirely funded by T2, and largely so in Spain. 
There is, however, a distinct contrast with the case of Greece and Ireland. In the latter 
cases, while the rise in their debt was initially funded by T2, it was not at all over the 
































































































































































































































































































































































































appear to have been driven by interest rate spikes (refer to Section 4.7), but 
movements in the debt to GDP ratio also reflected write-offs in 2012. In Ireland’s case 
the rise in the debt to GDP ratio has been reversed to a significant extent, avoiding 
the need for T2 funding. But, overall, the massive accumulation of T2 imbalances and 
the resultant expansion in the Eurosystem balance sheet defined as ESTA appears to 
have been triggered by country-specific factors. 
 
4.10 Are Euro Area National Central Banks on Auto-Pilot? The Predictive Power of 
the ECB’s Capital in Determining their Loss Absorption Capacity 
 
Section 4.4 above investigated the predictive power of the ECB’s capital in 
determining the size of the balance sheets of the EANCBs and concluded that, 
particularly for relatively large EANCBs, the predictive power of the ECB’s capital is 
strong. This implies that the EANCBs (with exception of the smaller EANCBs) 
operate on auto-pilot – branches of the “Mega-ECB”. This Section again investigates 
the behaviour of EANCBs as branches of a greater entity by taking a different aspect 
and questions whether the ECB’s capital is powerful enough to determine the 
financial strength of each EANCB. In other words, the following analysis determines 
whether the financial strength of the Eurosystem is distributed across the nineteen 
EANCBs in line with their share in the ECB’s capital.  
 
This Section looks at one particular aspect of the distribution of the financial strength 
of the Eurosystem across the nineteen EANCBs - the Conventional Loss Absorption 
Capacity (CLAC), defined by Buiter and Rahbari (2012b) as Capital and Reserves in 
addition to two other loss-absorbing items on the Eurosystem balance sheet – 
Revaluation Accounts and Provisions. These items accumulate when profits are 
transferred to reserves and in case of balances in the revaluation account arising from 
unrealised gains on assets and liabilities, including gold, foreign currency, securities 
and other assets. The actual capital and reserves, revaluation accounts and provisions 
are compared to those predicted by applying the ECB capital share of an EANCB to 




predicted by the share of the ECB capital, then it implies that the EANCB acts as if it 
is a branch of a greater entity in terms of its financial strength. 
 
At the end of 2016, the CLAC of the Eurosystem amounted to €602 billion, almost 
tripling from €213 billion in 2006. Revaluation accounts, which consist of unrealized 
gains on the Eurosystem’s holdings of gold, foreign exchange and other investments 
accounted for two-thirds of the CLAC. In June 2016, the ECB started publishing a 
breakdown of the distribution of the Eurosystem’s capital and reserves and 
revaluation accounts but data prior to that date were only published by the 
individual EANCBs in their own Annual Reports. Data concerning provisions do not 
feature in the disaggregated financial statements published by the ECB but are only 
available through the EANCBs accounts.  Following the treatment of CLAC by Buiter 
(2015), Appendix 4.4 presents data for the three measures of the CLAC over the 2006-
2016 period:  
 
(i) a narrow measure of CLAC consisting solely of Capital and Reserves  
(ii) a relatively prudent measure of CLAC consisting of Capital and 
Reserves plus Provisions and  
(iii) the most generous measure of the total CLAC being the sum of Capital 
and Reserves, the Revaluation Accounts and Provisions.  
 
It is pertinent to acknowledge that, as noted in Buiter and Rahbari (2012a; 2012b) none 
of these three measures of the CLAC is likely to understate the true loss absorption 
capacity since they omit an important off-balance sheet asset of a central bank, 
namely the present discounted value of current and future seigniorage. As explained 
by Buiter (2015), for the EANCBs this off-balance sheet asset is defined as its capital 
key weighted share of the present discounted value of the future seigniorage of the 
consolidated Eurosystem. Given that the purpose of the investigation in this Section 
is to determine the extent to which the financial strength of each EANCB is ruled by 
its share in the ECB capital (the capital key), such omission is presumed to have no 




nears zero and seigniorage revenues become negligible, omitting the present 
discounted value of the current and future seigniorage becomes immaterial. 
 
Starting from the most narrow measure of CLAC, if actual capital and reserves are 
compared with those predicted by applying the ECB capital share of an EANCB to 
the Eurosystem capital and reserves figure, the difference can be quite large (refer to 
Table 4.5). Looking at one point in time – 2016 – for the central banks of Germany, 
Greece, Portugal and Spain, the capital implied by multiplying the EANCB’s capital 
share in the ECB by Eurosystem capital and reserves overestimates actual capital; by 
a factor of four and five in the case of Greece and Germany respectively and by a 
factor of seven in the case of Spain. In contrast, in the case of Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and the Netherlands, the implied capital 
shares substantially underestimated the actual shares of these EANCB’s capital and 
reserves in those of the Eurosystem. In the case of Ireland and France, the actual 
capital and reserve were almost twice as large as those implied by its capital share. In 
sum, it is observed that, based on this methodology, while some central banks are 
significantly overcapitalised (France, Ireland, and to a lesser extent Austria, Belgium, 
Cyprus, Finland, Italy, Slovenia and the Netherlands), others were highly 
undercapitalised (Germany, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain). This implies that 
the distribution of the ECB’s capital is not strong in determining the financial strength 
of the EANCBs and, in this respect, they act more like separate entities. Over the 
period 2006-2016, the discrepancy between the actual and implied capital and 
reserves widened for half of the EANCBs, narrowing for four of the EANCBs and 
remaining relatively stable for six of the other EANCBs. 
 
When the revaluation accounts are included, based on the 2016, for the largest five 
EANCBs (DE, FR, IT, ES, NL) the actual capital and reserves plus balances on 
revaluation accounts get closer to the amounts implied by their shares in the ECB’s 
capital (refer to Table 4.6). Considering the most generous measure of CLAC, with  






actual measure of CLAC moved even closer to that implied by the distribution of the 
ECB’s capital (refer to Table 4.7). Indeed, except for Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain, the ratios of actual to implied CLAC (including revaluation accounts and 
provisions) range between 0.7 and 1.5 (1 implying actual and implied figures are 
equal). It can thus be concluded that while some element of over and 
undercapitalization is evident amongst the EANCBs, to a large extent, the 
distribution of the ECB’s capital influences the financial strength of the EANCBs 
when considering the broadest measure of CLAC. This is clearly evident in Figure 
4.22 where the distance between the lines for each EANCB captures the divergence 
between the actual and implied capital and reserves, revaluation accounts and 
provisions. This conclusion is in line with that reached when assessing the power of 
the ECB’s capital in determining the size of the EANCBs’ balance sheets and is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the EANCBs are branches of a “Mega-ECB”. 
 
This conclusion, however, draws us to another paradox. As the amount of capital a 
central bank should have, depends amongst other factors, on the status of 
institutional relations with the government (Stella, 1997), it can be argued that both 
the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England do not, strictly speaking, need Loss 
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Figure 4.22 Shares of Capital and Reserves, Revaluation Accounts plus Provisions
vs Adjusted Capital Key, 2006-2016






Source: own computation 
Table 4.5 Capital and Reserves 
Ratio of Implied and Actual Capital and Reserves 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  0.39 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.61 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.67 0.69 0.69 
Belgium 0.97 0.98 1.06 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.76 0.73 0.73 0.70 0.68 
Cyprus   2.07 1.99 1.53 1.25 1.26 1.10 1.01 0.90 0.84 
Estonia      0.69 0.68 0.65 0.69 0.69 0.67 
Finland 0.63 0.64 0.69 0.57 0.75 0.73 0.73 0.71 0.72 0.74 0.74 
France 1.04 0.95 0.72 1.09 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.59 
Germany 3.30 3.60 4.21 3.50 4.93 4.99 5.14 5.26 5.17 5.34 4.89 
Greece 2.22 2.06 2.35 2.25 3.14 3.18 3.27 3.35 3.58 3.70 3.77 
Ireland  0.66 0.67 0.69 0.67 0.84 0.77 0.72 0.64 0.62 0.52 0.49 
Italy 0.61 0.63 0.66 0.57 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 
Latvia         0.85 0.93 0.94 
Lithuania          1.47 1.46 
Luxembourg 0.76 0.82 0.94 0.92 1.25 1.25 1.28 1.31 1.55 1.58 1.60 
Malta   0.27 0.23 0.31 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
Netherlands 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.52 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.71 0.73 0.75 0.76 
Portugal 1.25 1.30 1.43 1.22 1.65 1.81 2.06 1.97 1.96 2.05 2.12 
Slovakia    1.79 2.52 2.55 2.63 2.70 3.10 3.20 3.26 
Slovenia  0.35 0.44 0.42 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.58 0.58 





Source: own computation 
Table 4.6 Capital and Reserves plus Revaluation Accounts 
Ratio of Implied and Actual Capital and Reserves plus Revaluation Accounts 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  0.71 0.79 0.83 0.8 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.95 1.02 1.00 
Belgium 1.20 1.20 1.24 1.21 1.27 1.29 1.27 1.14 1.24 1.25 1.27 
Cyprus     1.14 1.29 1.39 1.37 1.37 1.25 1.42 1.44 1.44 
Estonia           3.54 3.46 2.34 2.80 2.90 3.01 
Finland 1.36 1.46 1.27 1.38 1.71 1.72 1.82 1.61 1.61 1.52 1.61 
France 1.13 1.05 0.97 1.06 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.87 
Germany 1.03 1.02 1.07 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.99 1.04 1.02 1.04 1.02 
Greece 3.58 3.13 3.16 2.94 2.92 2.81 2.79 3.16 3.25 3.35 3.19 
Ireland  1.98 2.12 2.02 2.61 3.44 3.52 3.26 1.01 0.58 0.53 0.57 
Italy 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.78 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Latvia                 3.64 4.00 4.43 
Lithuania                   4.33 4.51 
Luxembourg 2.03 2.37 2.18 1.44 2.2 2.91 2.38 2.66 3.35 3.78 3.96 
Malta     0.91 0.96 1.37 1.48 1.42 1.01 1.15 1.16 1.23 
Netherlands 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.96 0.97 
Portugal 1.09 1.00 1.01 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.91 1.01 0.99 1.06 1.01 
Slovakia       4.31 4.65 4.29 3.18 3.77 5.44 6.24 6.14 
Slovenia   1.17 1.33 1.50 2.01 2.3 2.36 1.81 2.15 2.20 2.33 





Source: own computation 
Table 4.7 Capital and Reserves, Revaluation Accounts plus Provisions 
Ratio of Implied and Actual Capital and Reserves, Revaluation Accounts plus Provisions 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  0.63 0.67 0.73 0.68 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.84 
Belgium 1.22 1.22 1.26 1.38 1.41 1.44 1.46 1.40 1.49 1.51 1.53 
Cyprus   0.95 1.05 1.16 1.15 1.00 1.01 1.03 1.21 1.26 
Estonia      3.98 3.86 2.74 3.17 3.26 3.15 
Finland 0.76 0.89 0.93 0.98 1.17 1.21 1.20 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.07 
France 1.33 1.21 1.11 1.19 0.93 0.96 0.99 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.04 
Germany 1.12 1.10 1.14 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.00 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.05 
Greece 2.38 2.18 2.14 1.98 2.06 1.74 1.44 1.26 1.41 1.41 1.45 
Ireland  2.35 2.47 2.27 2.93 3.77 3.45 3.21 1.16 0.68 0.62 0.67 
Italy 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.73 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.79 
Latvia         4.36 4.81 5.32 
Lithuania          4.81 4.66 
Luxembourg 0.71 0.82 1.32 0.87 1.19 1.35 1.13 0.80 0.96 0.97 1.04 
Malta   1.05 1.09 1.52 1.66 1.58 1.17 1.26 1.22 1.24 
Netherlands 0.75 0.76 0.82 0.84 0.97 1.00 1.03 1.02 1.10 1.13 1.13 
Portugal 0.86 0.84 0.88 0.81 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.90 
Slovakia    4.95 5.17 4.79 3.14 3.50 4.08 4.08 4.31 
Slovenia  1.32 1.46 1.54 1.96 2.25 2.05 1.55 1.83 1.86 1.96 
Spain 2.45 2.55 2.49 2.74 3.36 3.19 3.08 2.63 2.46 2.20 2.11 




owned by a single sovereign government. As such, their liabilities are essentially 
guaranteed by their national governments. In contrast, arguably, as the “Mega-ECB” 
is effectively owned by the Euro Area national governments each for a proportionate 
share according to its EANCBs’ ECB capital key, it becomes more complex to rely on 
national governments and therefore the “Mega-ECB” needs more Loss Absorption 
Capacity. 
4.11 Are Euro Area National Central Banks on Auto-Pilot? The Predictive Power of 
the ECB’s Capital in Determining the Distribution of the Non-Standard Measures  
Having established a strong relationship between the share of the ECB’s capital and 
the relative size of the balance sheet of each EANCBs, it is interesting to investigate 
whether a similar relationship exists concerning the distribution amongst the 
EANCBs of the purchase programmes launched by the ECB during the recent period 
of financial distress. This investigation is merited particularly as these purchase 
programmes, which are recorded under the balance sheet item ‘Securities of Euro 
Area Residents’, were the fastest growing item on the Eurosystem balance sheet – 
expanding by a factor of 25 by 2016.  
In the course of the crisis, the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) has acted 
several times to support the financially distressed EU Member States and banking 
systems by purchasing debt instruments including sovereign and public sector 
bonds, covered bonds, asset backed securities and corporate sector bonds under a 
number of different purchase programmes. In 2009, the Governing Council of the 
ECB initiated the first Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP1) - a programme 
to purchase covered bonds with the aim to promote the decline in money market 
term rates, to ease the funding conditions of banks and enterprises, to encourage 
credit institutions to maintain and expand their lending to clients, and to improve 
liquidity in the segment of the market. In November 2011, a second Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme (CBPP2) was initiated, followed by a third Covered Bond 
Purchase Programme (CBPP3) set up in October 2014. The objective of this later 




and bringing the inflation rate closer to the intended target. In 2010, the EANCBs 
started purchasing securities in the context of the Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) to address the severe tensions in certain market segments. In 2014, the 
Governing Council of the ECB decided to implement an Asset-Backed Securities 
Purchase Programme (ABSPP) while in 2015, the Governing Council adopted a 
decision on a secondary markets Public Sector Asset Purchase Programme (PSPP). 
This was complemented by the Decision of the European Central Bank of 1 June 2016 
on the implementation of the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP). As the 
SMP was terminated, a framework referred to as The Expanded Asset Purchase 
Programme (EAPP) (or Asset Purchase Programme – APP) grouped four elements: 
The Third Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP3); The Asset-Backed Securities 
Purchase Programme (ABSPP); the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and 
the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP).  
Figure 4.23 compares the share in the total holdings under the purchase programmes 
by each EANCB with their respective share in the ECB capital. It is clearly evident 
that for most of the EANCBs, their holdings of securities under the purchase 
programmes closely follow their Adjusted Capital Key. Only the relatively small 
EANCBs (EE, LU, MT, SI, SK) purchased a lower amount of securities than that 
dictated by their capital share, on account of lower purchases under the CBPP (refer 
to Figure 4.24). It is also interesting to note that in the case of Portugal, Greece and 
Ireland, in 2010 and 2011, they held a higher amount of securities then that implied 
by their capital share in terms of holdings under the SMP (Figure 4.24) but this 
discrepancy fell back over the following years. This is unsurprising since these 
EANCBs were three of the five issuers of securities under this programme and 
therefore were inclined to hold a relatively high level of securities issued within their 
jurisdiction. In the case of the PSPP, most EANCBs purchased an amount slightly  
lower than that implied by their capital share. On the other hand, France and Spain 
were the only two EANCBs whose level of securities held under the PSPP exceed that 

















Figure 4.23 Shares of Total Purchase Programmes vs Adjusted Capital Key
2010-2016
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Figure 4.24 Shares of SMP, PSPP, CBPP and CSPP vs Adjusted Capital Key
2010-2016






For most of the EANCBs, their share of holdings of securities under the ECB’s 
purchase programmes is close to their Adjusted Capital Key. Reconciling this 
conclusion with that reached earlier, one notes that as these asset purchases became 
increasingly large (constituting almost 30 per cent of total assets in 2016), the close 
relationship between the participation of each EANCB in these Programmes and their 
respective ACK contributed to the strong relationship between the share of ESTA and 
the ACK for each EANCB identified earlier. Indeed, this relationship between asset 
purchases and ACK was even stronger than that observed between the share of the 
remaining assets on the EANCBs’ balance sheets (particularly the intra-Eurosystem 
claims) to ESTA and the ACK. In sum, as the EANCBs implemented the non-standard 
measures related to the ECB purchase programmes in line with their ACK, they 
reinforced their systematic behaviour of acting as branches of the “Mega-ECB”. 
 
4.12 The Federal Reserve Banks and the EANCBs: Do They also Operate on Auto-
Pilot?  
 
Different investigations carried out in earlier Sections of this Chapter point towards 
the premise that the EANCBs act as branches of a greater institution, with their 
balance sheet size, their financial strength, as well as their participation in the non-
standard measures of the ECB, to a good approximation, following their share in the 
ECB capital.  Put differently, there is evidence of striking predictive power of the ECB 
capital. In light of this, after contrasting the institutional framework of the 
Eurosystem with that of the Federal Reserve System, this Section investigates 
whether there is any evidence of similar systematic relationship with the balance 
sheets of the Federal Reserve Banks. 
 
The institutional arrangements of the Eurosystem resemble those of the Federal 
Reserve System (FRS) in many ways. The ECB has, in principle, a role similar to that 
of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. A crucial difference, however, is that, 
while the various EANCBs play a role similar to that of the regional Federal Reserve 




own balance sheet. As described earlier, the ECB’s shareholders are the NCBs of all 
EU member states, with each EANCB owning a share of the ECB’s equity determined 
by the ‘capital key’. In contrast, the Federal Reserve Banks each raise their capital 
through payments by banks that are members of the FRS46. Each member is required 
by law to become a shareholder and subscribe to shares of its district Reserve Bank 
in an amount equal to 6 per cent of its own capital and surplus47. Thus, the 
stakeholders of Federal Reserve Banks are privately owned banks (national banks 
and state-chartered banks). This contrasts with EANCBs who are owned by the 
governments of Euro Area member states. Moreover, while the share of the ECB 
capital owned by each EANCB depends on the population and the size of the 
economy (vis-à-vis the economy of the EA), the capital of the District Banks depends 
on the wealth of the member banks.  
 
The analysis on the Federal Reserve System is carried out on the basis of the total 
assets of the Federal Reserve System - the twelve Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) – 
spanning over the 2006-2016 period (giving 132 observations). The total assets for the 
FRB are published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in the 
H.4.1 statistical release, "Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository 
Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks". The actual total 
assets for each District Bank are compared with the implied total assets calculated by 
distributing the total assets for the entire system amongst all the FRBs in line with 
their capital share. This is the same methodology adopted in the case of the 
Eurosystem in Section 4.4.  
 
Due to the institutional differences between the Eurosystem and the Federal Reserve, 
(notably the fact that the ECB has its own balance sheet but the Federal Reserve Board 
of Governors does not), in the case of the Eurosystem the distribution of total assets 
 
46 Most commercial banks in the United States are not members of the Federal Reserve System, but the 
total value of all the banking assets of member banks is substantially larger than the total value of the 
banking assets of non-members. 
47 Of this amount, half must be paid to the Federal Reserve and half remains subject to call by the Board 
of Governors. When a member’s capital or surplus changes, its holdings of Reserve Bank stock must be 




was compared with the distribution of the ECB capital amongst the EANCBs (rather 
than the capital which each EANCB holds on its balance sheet). In the case of the 
Federal Reserve, the distribution of total assets amongst FRBs is compared with the 
distribution of the total capital of the Federal Reserve System (the summation of the 
capital which each FRB holds on its balance sheet). Despite acknowledging this 
difference, it is noteworthy that while the ECB capital accounts for a very tiny amount 
of the total balance sheet of the Eurosystem (0.1 per cent of ESTA), the total capital 
held by the FRBs is also a very small fraction (0.7 per cent) of the total Federal Reserve 
System balance sheet.  
 
Another point relevant to the analysis carried out in this Section is the fact that while 
in the case of the Eurosystem the analysis was based on ESTA – the gross total assets 
defined as total assets including intra-Eurosystem transactions – in the case of the 
Federal Reserve, there is no distinction between gross and net total assets in this 
regard. This reflects another institutional contrasting feature of the two systems 
which was briefly discussed in Chapter 2 - while Target2 provisions do not contain a 
settlement mechanism between individual central banks, the system of Interdistrict 
Settlement Accounts (ISA) allow for settling the transfer of book money for economic 
agents between different Fed districts in the U.S. 
 
Except for the case of the Federal Reserve District Bank of Atlanta (with a share of 6% 
of total assets) and to a lesser extent that of San Francisco (with a share of 15% of total 
assets), there is a relatively weak relationship between shares of FRB to Fed Total 
Assets and their share in Federal Reserve System capital. This implies that the capital 
of the FRB, which depends on the size and the strength of the banking sector in that 
district, had relatively weak explanatory power vis-à-vis the distribution of the total 
assets of the entire Federal Reserve System over the crisis period. 
 
The graphical presentations of the Actual Total Assets and Implied Total Assets 





System indicate that there is a much stronger relationship in the case of the former. 
Over the 2006-2016 period, the EANCBs expanded their balance sheets more closely 
in line with shares in the paid-up equity in the ECB while a similar relationship is less 
evident in the case of the Federal Reserve Banks. This sharp contrast is also evident 
when comparing Figure 4.27 concerning the Federal Reserve Banks with Figure 4.6 
above showing the EANCBs relationships. 
 
In sum, there is a relatively weak relationship between the size of the Federal Reserve 
Banks’ balance sheet and their contribution to the total capital of the Federal Reserve 
System. This supports the notion that the Federal Reserve System is not a unified 
institution, but an amalgamation of twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks (Koning, 
2012). This is in stark contrast with the Eurosystem, whereby the stronger 
relationship between the size of the EANCBs’ balance sheets and their share of paid-
up capital of the ECB suggests that the EANCBs are branches of a unified institution 
(the “Mega-ECB”).  
 
While historically one gets the impression that there is less autonomy between the 
Federal Reserve Banks and the Federal Reserve System, this weaker relationship 
between the size of the Federal Reserve Banks’ balance sheets and their share in total 
capital is striking. However, this result may be influenced by the institutional 
differences between the two systems outlined earlier which, to a certain extent, may 
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In particular, in the case of the Eurosystem the distribution of total assets was 
compared with the distribution of the ECB capital amongst the EANCBs while in the 
case of the Federal Reserve (since the Federal Reserve Board of Governors does not 
have a balance sheet) it was compared with the capital which each FRB holds on its 
balance sheet. This methodology of conducting the comparison can be improved if 
one considers the capital that each EANCB holds on its balance sheet rather than its 
share of the ECB’s capital. However, as discussed in Chapter 7, this is left for future 
research. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that, one does not expect that this 
improvement in the methodology will make considerable difference in the results. 
This can be deduced by a quick look at Figure 4.22, which shows that, at least for most 
EANCBs, the share of capital they hold on their balance sheet is significantly in line 
with their share in the ECB capital. The comparison of the two systems presented 
here may have also been influenced by the institutional difference concerning the 
Target2 balances and the Interdistrict Settlement Account discussed earlier.   
  
4.13 Concluding Remarks 
 
Based on a new dataset presented earlier, an alternative balance sheet of the 
















Figure 4.27 Shares of Total Assets vs Shares of Total Capital
Federal Reserve System, 2006-2016
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the ECB’s balance sheets. This balance sheet for the Eurosystem is significantly larger 
than that published by the ECB. It is a balance sheet for a notional “Mega-ECB” – an 
institution that is larger than the Eurosystem – that considers intra-Eurosystem 
claims/liabilities of each EANCB as contributing to the asset/liabilities side of its 
balance sheet.  
 
It was argued, firstly, that if evidence is found that the individual EANCBs operate 
on auto-pilot as branches of a greater institution (referred to as the “Mega-ECB” 
which is equivalent to the amalgamation of all the EANCBs and the ECB), then one 
is right to advocate the consolidation process which the ECB undertakes in coming 
up with the Eurosystem balance sheet. This, however, leaves one with an unresolved 
paradox as the greater institution, by definition, necessitates the EANCBs to be 
amalgamated rather than consolidated. 
 
In light of this paradoxical issue, based on the dataset in Chapter 3, the goal of this 
Chapter was to investigate the relationship between the ECB and the EANCBs in 
order to determine any possible evidence of distinctive power by the ECB over the 
EANCBs. Being the main discrepancy between the balance sheet presented here and 
that published by the ECB, the intra-Eurosystem transactions were the subject matter 
dealt with in the second part of this Chapter.  
 
It was shown, firstly, that a correlation exists between the share of total assets of each 
EANCB to ESTA (total assets for the “Mega-ECB”) and their respective Adjusted 
Capital Key. Moreover, it was evident that in case of the relatively larger EANCBs, 
the correlation between their share of total assets and their Adjusted Capital Key is 
even stronger. On the other hand, for smaller EANCBs, some degree of autonomy 
was detected as the correlation between the share of total assets and their capital key 
is weaker. It was also shown that, over the period under investigation, in cases where 
total assets of an EANCB were below the level determined by the capital key, total 




This Chapter also investigated the relationship between the share of total assets of 
each EANCB and their respective Adjusted Capital Key when intra-Eurosystem 
transactions are consolidated – in line with the Eurosystem balance sheet published 
by the ECB. It is shown that for some of the larger EANCBs, when intra-ES claims are 
excluded from their balance sheet (in line with the ECB methodology) the correlation 
between their share of total assets and their Adjusted Capital Key is weaker than that 
observed when intra-ES transactions are not consolidated (as in this Chapter). It is  
shown that this weaker correlation reflects the fact that no correlation is observed 
between the share of each sub-component of intra-Eurosystem transactions for each 
EANCB and the respective ACK.  
 
Other investigations were carried out which reinforce the premise that the EANCBs 
operate on auto-pilot. It was shown that the ECB has distinctive power over the 
EANCBs both in terms of their financial strength (defined as the loss absorption 
capacity) as well as regarding their participation in the purchase programmes 
launched by the ECB in response to the crisis. A comparison with the Federal Reserve 
System also supports these conclusions since the relationship between the share of 
total assets of each EANCBs and their respective ACK is stronger than that observed 
in the case of the FRBs.  
 
Based on the dataset in Chapter 3, the investigations carried out in this Chapter draws 
a number of conclusions as summarized below. During the financial crisis, peripheral 
Euro Area countries were more hard-hit and needed to borrow, in turn weakening 
the sustainability of their debt and increasing their long-term government bond 
spreads. This surge of the sovereign spread which limited access to bond markets or 
reflected closing down of access to these markets, further accentuated the borrowing 
needs of these Euro Area countries. Faced with a lack of an overall official lender of 
last resort, these countries turned to Target2 borrowing via their NCBs, causing ESTA 
to rise relative to the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB. This Target2 





Investigations in this Chapter have shown that this counterpart lending appears to 
have been carried out through an ‘auto-pilot’ mechanism – all the Euro Area 
countries had to take their share of “Mega-ECB” lending according to a rule which 
was identified here but never officially announced. In this way, the borrowing by 
those countries experiencing financial strain drove the lending by the other Euro Area 
countries. But, this lending was not directly driven by any bilateral process of 
lending. The rise in ESTA – the alternative measure of the Eurosystem balance sheet 
taking a ‘gross’ approach – is all that is required to explain the expansions in the 
EANCBs balance sheets. There is, therefore, evidence for systematic behaviour by the 
“Mega-ECB”, operating not through the ECB’s own direct actions, but by treating the 
EANCBs as branches that needed to satisfy the aggregate need for lending, generated 
by countries mostly hit by the crisis.  
 
This also accentuates the case for taking up a ‘gross’ approach rather than looking at 
the net balance sheet. While the EANCBs acted on auto-pilot, as part of the “Mega-
ECB”, in their lending activities, this was not the case for their borrowings, which 
were clearly driven by the needs of their respective national governments. In a way, 
therefore, given the “auto-pilot” lending identified, the causal factor for the balance 
sheet expansion as published by the ECB was effectively the borrowing needs of these 
distressed governments. This remains obscured if only the consolidated balance sheet 
is considered, treating the “Mega-ECB” as if it were a monolithic institution in both 
lending and borrowing.   
 
If one concludes that the “Mega-ECB” exits, then a follow-on question is: do EANCBs 
still really exist? According to investigations in this Chapter, as lending institutions 
the answer is negative – they simply do what the “Mega-ECB” dictates. But, as 
borrowing institutions, the answer is clearly in the affirmative – they borrow on 
behalf of their respective national governments. This is detected only if one adopts 








The Size of the Eurosystem and its 




The Eurosystem is composed of nineteen National Central Banks (EANCBs) and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Each EANCB is a separate legal entity and publishes 
its own balance sheet. The ECB has also its own balance sheet. As discussed in the 
previous Chapter, consolidating the balance sheets of all the EANCBs gives a much 
higher balance sheet than that reported by the ECB since the latter nets off intra-
Eurosystem balances. Indeed, at the end of 2016, ECB’s total assets amounted to €5.2 
trillion compared to the total Eurosystem assets as published by the ECB of €3.7 
trillion.  
 
The previous Chapter had already documented that the reported balance sheet of the 
Eurosystem is smaller than that defined as the aggregation of all EANCBs (and the 
ECB) and examined whether there is any link between the share ownership of the 
ECB by the EANCB and their respective balance sheet. This Chapter conducts an 





• A correlation exists between the share of total assets of each EANCB to 
Eurosystem total assets (derived as the amalgamation of the EANCB’s balance 
sheets) and their respective capital key48. 
• In cases where total assets of an EANCB are below the level determined by 
the capital key, total assets increased over time. 
• When intra-Eurosystem claims are excluded from the EANCB’s balance sheet 
(in line with the ECB’s methodology), the correlation between their share of 
total assets and their Adjusted Capital Key is weaker than that observed when 
intra-Eurosystem transactions are not consolidated. 
 
The contribution of this Chapter is therefore twofold. First, to my knowledge no 
investigation of the link between the EANCB and the ECB has taken place from a 
balance sheet perspective. This is the first study to estimate dynamic models that 
determine the rate at which EANCBs adjust their total assets towards the level that 
reflects their share in the ECB. Secondly, it provides insights into the behavior of 
EANCBs with respect to their balance sheet and to what degree this is implicitly 
controlled by the ECB.  
 
A dynamic heterogeneous panel model using alternative pooled estimators is 
estimated using country-specific yearly data on central bank total assets from 2006 to 
2016. The econometric results will be shown to be strongly supportive of the visual 
evidence previously discussed in Chapter 4, of the role of ESTA and, of the Adjusted 
Capital Key. It will also be seen that the relationship is weaker when intra-
Eurosystem claims are consolidated (in line with the ECB methodology).  
 
Caveats to this study remain. In particular, the dataset is short and limits the 
application of sophisticated econometrics. Moreover, the panel which covers the 19 
Euro Area countries over the eleven-year period between 2006 and 2016 is an 
unbalanced one given that countries joined the Euro Area at different points in time. 
 
48 The formula by which each EANCB’s notional share of the ECB’s subscribed capital is determined: an 




Considering a balanced panel implies having even fewer observations. Moreover, 
data is marked by outliers particularly Luxembourg.  
 
The rest of the Chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1, describes the dataset and 
summarize its key features. Section 5.2 investigates the estimation framework, 
considering an Autoregressive Distributed Lag Model, an Error Correction Model 
and a Partial Adjustment Model as candidate dynamic model specifications. Section 
5.3 presents the methodological framework that allows one to consider different 
degrees of heterogeneity, namely, the Mean Group Estimator, Pooled OLS estimator 
and the Fixed Effects estimator. Section 5.4 presents the empirical findings of a set of 
models followed by a discussion on the most appropriate dynamic model and degree 
of heterogeneity. Section 5.5 provides an econometric analysis of the relationship 
between the EANCBs’ balance sheets net of intra-Eurosystem claims and their 





As explained earlier, the aim of this Chapter is to investigate whether actual total 
assets of each EANCB are in any way influenced by the share of the ECB capital held 
by each respective EANCB. This investigation is based on a dataset of the balance 
sheets of all the nineteen individual EANCBs and the ECB, spanning over the 2006 to 
2016 period presented in Chapter 3.  
 
A quick look at a balance sheet of any EANCB as published in its Annual Report 
immediately reveals that one of its components on the asset side of the balance sheet 
is intra-Eurosystem balances49. This implies that a simple amalgamation of the 
balance sheets of the nineteen EANCBs gives a gross Eurosystem balance sheet that 
does not net off these intra-Eurosystem transactions. As a result, as noted by Whelan 
 




(2012), the sum of all EANCB balance sheets is greater than the Eurosystem balance 
sheet as published by the ECB.  
 
The econometric investigation is carried out on the basis of the actual total assets for 
each EANCB and a parallel estimate of total assets for each EANCB that completely 
reflects the fully paid-up capital share of the respective EANCB as explained in 
Chapter 4. In other words, this estimate of total assets for each EANCB was calculated 
by distributing the total Eurosystem assets (defined as the summation of all the 
EANCB balance sheets) amongst all the EANCBs in line with their capital share (refer 
to the formula on the next page). This resultant level of total assets for each EANCB 
is referred to as the ‘Implied Total Assets’ (ITA) and is produced in Table 5.1. The 
closer the actual total assets are to the ‘Implied Total Assets’ the stronger the link 
between the ECB and the EANCBs.  
 
As described earlier, the level of Implied Total Assets indicates what would have 
been the level of total assets were one to assume that the size of the balance sheet of 
each EANCB fully reflects its capital share within the Eurosystem. For this reason, 
the capital share is key in determining the Implied Total Assets. As explained earlier 
in Chapter 3, the shares of fully paid-up capital are treated as the true capital shares 
of each EANCB in the ECB rather than the official ‘Capital Key’. This is because the 
latter merely gives the notional share of the ECB’s subscribed capital, which in 
particular cases, varies substantially from the share of fully paid-up capital. 
  
As explained earlier, the Actual Total Assets (ATA) of each EANCB (Table 5.1 
Column 5) as published in the financial statements of their respective Annual Reports 
sums up to ESTA. The Implied Total Assets (ITA) (Table 5.1 Column 6) reflect the 
distribution of ESTA among EANCB according to the capital share of the respective 
EANCB. The level of Actual Total Assets (ATA) and Implied Total Assets (ITA) 
therefore are defined as:  
𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡   




Table 5.1 Summary Table of the Dataset as at the end of 2016 
EANCB 
(1) 
Year in which 
Member States 
joined the 






















Percentage Shares € billions 
Austria AT 1999 2.53 2.79 132.3 145.6 
Belgium BE 1999 2.75 3.52 143.5 183.8 
Cyprus CY 2008 0.28 0.21 14.6 11.2 
Estonia EE 2011 0.15 0.27 7.7 14.3 
Finland FI 1999 1.64 1.78 85.7 93.2 
France FR 1999 17.54 20.14 915.7 1,051.7 
Germany DE 1999 28.39 25.57 1,482.2 1,334.9 
Greece GR 2001 2.92 2.89 152.5 150.8 
Ireland IE 1999 1.70 1.65 88.5 86.1 
Italy IT 1999 15.99 17.49 834.7 913.1 
Luxembourg LU 1999 3.87 0.29 201.9 15.1 
Malta MT 2008 0.11 0.09 5.9 4.8 
Netherlands NL 1999 5.94 5.69 310.2 297.0 
Portugal PT 1999 2.80 2.48 146.4 129.3 
Slovakia SK 2009 0.61 1.10 31.7 57.3 
Slovenia SI 2007 0.28 0.49 14.4 25.6 
Lithuania LT 2015 0.32 0.59 16.5 30.6 
Latvia LV 2014 0.31 0.40 16.2 20.9 
Spain ES 1999 11.89 12.56 620.8 655.8 
Source: Annual Reports of the EANCBs and the ECB 
 
Table 5.2 provides summary statistics for Actual and Implied Total Assets for the 
entire panel and a balanced panel. At the start of the period under analysis – 2006 – 
the Euro Area consisted of 12 countries. These are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. 
Subsequently, other Member States joined the Euro Area at different points in time. 
 
At the end of the period under analysis – 2016 – together with the twelve countries, 
which were already in the Euro Area in 2006, the entire panel includes Cyprus, 
 
50 On 1st January 2002, Euro-denominated bank notes and coins were introduced as legal tender in the 
twelve countries participating in the Economic Monetary Union, but the original members’ exchange 
rates were immutably locked in 1999. 
51 The adjusted capital share is computed as the shares of fully paid-up capital rebased to sum to 100 per 
cent. 
52 Total Assets as published in the financial statements of the respective Annual Reports of the EANCBs. 




Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia who joined the Euro Area 
after 2006. Therefore, the entire panel is an unbalanced panel consisting of nineteen 
Euro Area Member States. 
 
This study considers only the balanced panel, which, as detailed earlier, consists of 
the countries that joined the Euro Area prior to 2006. Since the other seven countries 
joined the Euro Area at a later point in time, they have a lot of missing data on total 
assets and therefore do not provide enough observations for a proper econometric 
analysis. Being an outlier54, Luxembourg was also excluded from the balanced panel 
even though it formed part of the Euro Area in 2006. This implies that this analysis 
consists of a cross-section of eleven countries over an eleven-year period between 
2006 and 2016.  
 
In terms of both the Actual Total Assets (as published in the EANCB’s Annual 
Reports) and the Implied Total Assets (computed to reflect the adjusted capital share), 
the entire and the balanced panels differ. Indeed, the means of both the actual and 
implied total assets in the entire panel were around 70 per cent of that in the balanced 
panel. This reflects the fact that countries who joined after 2006 and, are therefore 
excluded from the balanced panel, push down the mean of the entire panel since their 
 








Entire Panel55       
Actual Total Assets (€bn) 19 179 198.1 259.5 3.1 1,482.2 
Implied Total Assets (€bn) 19 179 198.1 280.2 2.3 1,334.9 
       
Balanced Panel (2006-2016)56       
Actual Total Assets (€bn) 11 121 278.1 281.2 21.7 1,482.2 
Implied Total Assets (€bn) 11 121 286.2 303.7 18.7 1,334.9 
 
 
54 Details about why Luxembourg is considered as an outlier are discussed below.  
55 Entire Panel: AT, BE, CY, EE, FI, FR, DE, GR, IE, IT, LU, MT, NL, PT, SK, SI, LT, LV, ES 




balance sheet is relatively lean. One notes that, when the entire sample is considered, 
the mean for the Actual Total Assets is equal to that for the Implied Total Assets. This 
emerges from the fact that, as explained earlier, the Implied Total Assets are 
computed by imposing a different distribution of the same sum of Actual Total Assets 
amongst the Member States. 
 
As shown in Table 5.2, the balanced panel, with a standard deviation of €281.2bn and 
€303.7bn for Actual and Implied Total Assets respectively, was more dispersed than 
the entire sample, with a standard deviation of €259.5bn and €280.2bn respectively. 
The distributions of Actual and Implied Total Assets are both highly skewed. 
Skewness is even more intense in the case of the entire panel with a minimum of 
€3.1bn (€2.3bn for Implied Total Assets) for Malta as compared to a minimum of 
€21.7bn for Finland (€18.7bn for Implied Total Assets for Ireland) in the case of the 
balanced panel. The maximum Actual Total Assets was €1,482bn (€1,335bn for 
Implied Total Assets) for Germany in both balanced and entire panels.  
 
Figure 5.1 shows a distinct clear-cut bivariate relationship between Actual Total 
Assets and Implied Total Assets across the cross-section of 18 out of the 19 countries 
(with one outlier – Luxembourg- which is discussed further below).  The striking 
thing about this chart is not just that the great majority of points lie close to a line with 
unit slope (implying a unit elasticity), it is that they lie extremely close to a line with 
unit slope and zero intercept: ie, Implied Total Assets predict the absolute level of 
actual assets, as well as their changes. This is striking because, given the definition of 
Implied Total Assets, the only source of cross-country variation allowed for in this 
relationship is the Adjusted Capital Key. The econometric results discussed below 







The only exception to this relationship is the high Actual Total Assets of Luxembourg, 
(which in 2016 even surpassed total assets of countries like Portugal, Greece, Belgium 
and Austria) which significantly exceeded the level implied by its mere share of ECB 
capital (0.3 per cent in 2016). In the early years of the crisis, huge Target2 balances, 
(accounting for 93 per cent of its total assets) contributed to Luxembourg’s relatively 
high total assets, on account of private capital that had fled to Luxembourg as a safer 
market. More recently, one of the biggest increase of Target2 balances has, 
unsurprisingly, been recorded by Luxembourg (reaching about one-fifth of 
Germany’s balances although its economy is about 200 times smaller), being home to 
subsidiaries of banks from outside the Euro Area and also being one of the countries 
with the largest international holders of Italian and Spanish bonds. Since it is an 
outlier, Luxembourg was excluded from the balanced panel used for the analysis 
here. In this regard, Appendix 5.1 shows that if Luxembourg was to be included in 
the panel of countries under analysis, there will be only a minimal impact on the 
results although the models will fit less well. 
 
The upper panel in Figure 5.2 shows that for the majority of countries, the deviations 
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Assets are divergent from their respective capital share only in the case of countries 
like Cyprus, Greece and Ireland. Late joiners to the Euro Area such as Slovakia and 
Slovenia show some deviation from the Implied Total Assets. The two countries that 
together contribute for slightly less than half of the ECB capital – France and Germany 
– show almost no deviation at all between Actual and Implied Total Assets. This 
observation is econometrically confirmed in the following Sections. The upper panel 
of Figure 5.2 also shows how the deviations between Actual and Implied Total Assets 
varied overtime. The largest deviations are noticed in the three years between 2010 
and 2012 but by 2016 Actual Total Assets seem to be closely moving in line with 
Implied Total Assets.  
 
Looking at Figure 5.1, one may easily suspect that the relationship between Actual 
Total Assets and Implied Total Assets is spurious. However, in the lower panel in 
Figure 5.2, which illustrates the relationship between the Change in Log Actual Total 
Assets and the Change in Log Implied Total Assets57, a strong correlation is clearly 
noted for most of the countries. Indeed, correlation is above 0.8 for countries like 
Austria, Belgium, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain and 
between 0.7 and 0.8 for Luxembourg, Slovenia and Slovakia. Only Ireland, Portugal 
and Greece have a moderate correlation of between 0.6 and 0.7 while weak correlation 
is noticed only for Cyprus, Estonia and Malta.  
 
This close relationship between Actual and Implied Total Assets evident for most of 
the Euro Area countries, which is later also confirmed through econometric analysis, 
is weakened if the intra-Eurosystem transactions are consolidated in the balance sheet 
in line with the ECB methodology. This is discussed later in Section 5.5, which 
includes both a graphical and an econometric analysis and concludes that 
consolidating intra-Eurosystem transactions from the balance sheets of EANCBs 
conceal the strong relationship between the size of the balance sheet of each EANCB 
and its respective capital share which is otherwise revealed. 
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1 - ∆Log ITA
1 - ∆Log ATA






























































































































































































AT BE CY EE FI FR DE EL IE IT MT NL PT SK SL ES
Figure 5.2 Actual Total Assets vs Implied Total Assets 




























5.2. Econometric Framework 
 
The following Section investigates the estimation framework that is appropriate to 
capture the relationship between Actual Total Assets and Implied Total Assets. The 
simple dynamic model considered is:  
 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛿1𝑖(𝐿)𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (1) 
 
𝑖 = 1, 2, … . . 𝑁,    𝑡 = 1, 2, … . . 𝑇 
where 𝑎𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of Actual Total Assets as published in the Annual Reports 
of the EANCB, 𝑏𝑖𝑡 is the logarithm of Implied Total Assets for each EANCB 
(computed to reflect the respective share of the fully paid-up capital of each EA 
Member States) and 𝐿 is the lag operator. It is assumed that both variables are 𝐼(1) 
and cointegrate, making 𝑢𝑖𝑡 an 𝐼(0) process for all countries 𝑖. 
 
The level of Implied Total Assets 𝐵𝑖𝑡 (for each EANCB over the time-period under 
consideration) is defined as: 
 
𝐵𝑖𝑡 = 𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 𝑇𝐴𝑡 (2) 
 
where 𝐴𝐶𝐾𝑖𝑡 is the Adjusted Capital Share for each EANCB over time and 𝑇𝐴𝑡 is the 
level of total assets for the Eurosystem (defined as the accumulation of the total assets 
of the 19 EANCBs and the ECB).  
 
At this juncture, there are two dimensions to consider: 
(i) the form of the dynamic equation and 
(ii) the degree of homogeneity of coefficients. 
The former, which involves the selection of model specification, is discussed here, 






5.2.1 Error Correction Model 
 
Considering a heterogeneous Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) form and 
assuming a parsimonious one-year lag structure58, the unrestricted dynamic panel 
specification can be written as: 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
It is stable (i.e. it will converge to its equilibrium) if −1 <  𝛿3𝑖  < 1, and then has a 
long-run solution: 
𝑎𝑖𝑡
∗ =  
𝜇𝑖
1 −  𝛿3𝑖
+ 
𝛿1𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑖
1 −  𝛿3𝑖
𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 
 
where 𝑎𝑡
∗ is the target or long-run equilibrium value for 𝑎𝑡 to which it would tend in 
the absence of further shocks to 𝑏𝑡 and 𝑢𝑡. 
 
Equation (3) can be reparameterized in error correction form as: 
 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 =  𝜇𝑖 +   𝛿1𝑖(𝑏𝑖𝑡 −  𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1) + (𝛿1𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑖)𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛿3𝑖 − 1)𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (4) 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝜆𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡    (5)59 
 





Rearranging equation (5) gives: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖(𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡    (6) 
 
58 A one-year lag structure is assumed since additional lags imply loss of observations from an already 
short panel – an 11-year panel. In addition, econometrics points towards a very short optimal lag order, 
if at all. 
59 In order to easily deduce equation (5), equation (4) may be written as:  





There are a number of interesting restricted special cases. Firstly, a restricted case 
nested in a unit long-run coefficient model is considered:  
 
 𝛿1𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑖 +  𝛿3𝑖 = 1 
 
This restricted model can be written as: 
  
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖 ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆𝑖 (𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (7) 
 
This is equivalent to imposing (𝛿1𝑖 + 𝛿2𝑖) =  𝜆𝑖 in equation (4) or 𝜃𝑖 = 1 in equation 
(6). For a long-run relationship to exist, the error correction coefficient 𝜆𝑖 ≠ 0 is 
required. The closer 𝜆𝑖  is to 1 the closer the share of total assets approach the capital 
share60.  
 
Another version of the ECM presented in equation (7) is that which restricts both the 
short-run and long-run coefficients to equal 1 (indicating ATA proportional to ITA) 
as in equation (8) below: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (8) 
 
If the intercept is also set to zero: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (9) 
 
Equation (9) implies that the long-run ratio of Actual Assets to Implied Assets equal 
to one.  
 
In terms of adjustment to a long-run target: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆1∆𝑎𝑖𝑡
∗ +  𝜆2(𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (10) 
 




where the long-run target or equilibrium assets 𝑎𝑖𝑡 
∗ are estimated with an equation 
incorporating EANCB’s Implied Total Assets, 𝑏𝑖𝑡 (as calculated above):  
 
𝑎𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡  (11) 
 
𝜆1 and 𝜆2in equation (10) are adjustment coefficients which measure how Actual 
Total Assets, 𝑎𝑖𝑡, adjust to changes in the target and deviations from the target. This 
is a form of an Error Correction Model or Equilibrium Correction Model. The 
dependent variable changes in response to changes in the target and to the error - the 
deviation of the actual from the equilibrium in the previous period: (𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1).  
 
Employing an Error Correction Model (ECM) representation as in equation (6), (7), 
(8) and (9) above, offers the advantage that we can readily distinguish short-run from 
long-run behavior. Moreover, this model specification allows one to investigate the 
error correction term and deduce the speed of adjustment of the share of total assets 
to the long-run equilibrium defined by the capital share.  
 
5.2.2 Partial Adjustment Model  
 
An alternative parameterization, which nests the partial adjustment model, is also 
considered. The partial adjustment model provides one way of capturing the lagged 
adjustment of Actual to Implied Total Assets.  
 
The Partial Adjustment Model is a special version of the ECM presented in equation 
(10) above where 𝜆 =  𝜆1 =  𝜆2. 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜆𝑖(𝑎𝑖𝑡
∗ − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (12) 
 
The observed change in total assets ∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 is a function of the gap between the target 
level of assets and (observed) total assets (𝑎𝑖𝑡 
∗ −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) in the previous period. This 




magnitude of the SOA indicates how quickly EANCB’s balance sheets move towards 
the target size. In addition, an error term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, captures idiosyncratic shocks during 
the adjustment. 
 
The Partial Adjustment Model is a special case of the Error Correction Model – it 
includes the same variables but it imposes the restriction that 𝛿2 = 0. 
 
Substituting equation (11) into equation (12) and restricting 𝛿2 to zero gives: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖(𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (13) 
 
𝜆𝑖 gives the proportion of the difference between the target level 𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 (as in equation 
11 above) and actual assets in the previous period – the speed of adjustment.  
 
The estimation equation regressing the change in log assets on implied assets and 
lagged actual assets is written as: 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (14) 61 
 
Equation (14) is the most restrictive model. If 𝜃𝑖 =  𝜆𝑖 = 1 and 𝛼𝑖 = 0 then, 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 . 
 
The early development of this modelling of time series data is highly associated with 
Sargan-Hendry, two main protagonists of econometric modelling. The above models 
are estimated in Section 5.4 on the basis of the methodological framework discussed 
in the following section that allows to vary the degree of heterogeneity of the 
coefficients.  
 
61 Taking equation (3) 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛿3𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 and restricting 𝛿2 to zero gives: 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿3𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Since 𝛼𝑖  = 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖 = 1 −  𝛿3𝑖 then 𝛿3𝑖 = 1 −  𝜆𝑖: 
𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 + (1 −  𝜆)𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Allowing 𝜃𝑖𝜆𝑖 = 𝛿1 as above:  





5.3 Methodological Framework 
 
In this Section, the most appropriate dynamic panel data methods to estimate the 
above equations are discussed. These different methods allow for the possibility of 
varying the degree of homogeneity imposed on the coefficients, which as noted 
earlier, is an important dimension in this study.  
 
There are two procedures commonly used in analyzing panel data. At one extreme, 
one can estimate separate equations for each country and examine the distribution of 
the estimated coefficients across the countries. Of particular interest is the mean of 
the estimates, which Pesaran and Smith (1995) call the Mean Group (MG) estimator. 
At the other extreme is the approach that simply pools the data and ignores 
parameter heterogeneity, referred to as the Pooled OLS (POLS). Other intermediate 
estimators are the traditional pooled estimators such as the Fixed Effects (FE) 
estimator where the intercept is allowed to differ across countries (and across time-
period in the case of the two-way fixed effects estimator) while all other coefficients 
and error variances are constrained to be the same. Another approach – the random 
effects estimator – assumes that both the intercept and the slopes of regressors are the 
same across countries while estimating the error variance specific to countries. In 
terms of heterogeneity, this approach lies between the fixed effects estimator and 
POLS. Given that, in this Chapter, the pooled OLS is chosen over the fixed effects 
estimator, there remains no scope in presenting the random effects estimator. 
 
The main panel estimators considered in this analysis are the following: 
• The Pesaran and Smith (1995) Mean Group Estimator (MG):  
This approach allows for heterogeneity in the slopes by estimating 
individually (OLS) the equation: 
 
ARDL: 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  




















𝑖=1 −  𝛿1)
2.  
 
This approach is also applied to estimate the ECM equations 7, 8 and 9 above 
and the PAM equation 14 above.  
 
This MG estimator produces consistent estimates of the average of the 
parameters, however, it does not take account of the fact that certain 
parameters may be the same across groups (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 
 
• One-Way Fixed Effects: In order to control for omitted variable bias, the one-
way fixed effects estimator allows intercepts to differ across countries but 
constrains the slopes to be the same:  
 
ARDL: 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (15) 
 
• Two-Way Fixed Effects: The two-way fixed effects estimator constrains slopes 
to be the same but allows intercepts to vary freely both over country and year.  
 
ARDL: 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑡  +  𝛿1𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (16) 
 
• Pooled OLS (POLS): The Pooled OLS approach allows all parameters to be 
homogeneous including the intercept and ignores parameter heterogeneity. 
The pooled OLS gives the within and between variation equal weight and 
uses least squares on: 
  
𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛿1𝑏𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿2𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (17)  
(imposing homogeneity on eq. 3 above) 
 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 +  𝜆(𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (18) 




∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (19) 
(imposing homogeneity on eq. 9 above) 
 
As in equation (9) above, 𝜆 = 1 in equation (19) implies that there is full-adjustment 
immediately. 
 
At this juncture, two main potential biases of applying pooled estimation procedures 
to a dynamic heterogeneous panel model are pointed out. In the first case, 
particularly for small T, the estimates from the FE estimator will suffer from dynamic 
panel bias because of the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the 
error term, by virtue of its correlation with the time-invariant component of the error 
term (Nickell, 1981). As a result, the FE estimator will be inconsistent and exhibits 
downward bias. The second problem of introducing dynamics into a panel data 
model is the potential bias induced by heterogeneity of the cross section units. As 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) pointed out, under slope heterogeneity, estimated 
coefficients are affected by a heterogeneity bias even for large 𝑁 and 𝑇. In a model in 
which the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is constrained to be equal 
across all cross-section units, there could be significant bias introduced if, in fact, the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variable are not constant across the cross-
section. This renders an upward bias, which is distinct from the fixed effects Nickell 
bias noted above. In our case of pooled estimators, the downward lagged dependent 
variable bias highlighted in the first case may, to some extent, offset the upward 
heterogeneity bias, but as Pesaran and Smith (1997) explain, in empirical applications 
it is difficult to judge the relative effects of the two biases in the sample. 
 
5.4. The Estimated Models and Results  
 
As noted earlier, this econometric analysis considers two dimensions: the form of 
dynamic equations to be estimated and the degree of homogeneity imposed on the 
coefficients. The first dimension was discussed in Section 5.2, which presented the 




Models of PAM form. Subsequently, Section 5.3 considered the various dynamic 
panel data methods that may be employed in view of the second dimension 
concerning the homogeneity of the coefficients. This Section presents the estimation 
results62 on the basis of the discussions so far.  
 
This Section is organized as follows: Firstly, a description of the ten models estimated 
is presented. These models, which are of the ARDL, ECM or PAM form, are grouped 
according to the assumed degree of homogeneity of the coefficients and the 
corresponding dynamic panel estimation method employed. Secondly, the estimated 
coefficients for each model are presented. A discussion on the choice of the most 
appropriate model and its implications conclude this Section. 
 
5.4.1 Description of the Estimated Models 
 
Table 5.3 presents a description of the estimated Models. The first five models allow 
for heterogeneous coefficients. These Models are estimated by regressing separate 
equations for each country, allowing the possibility to derive the Mean Group 
Estimator suggested by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Model 6 allows for homogeneous 
slopes but heterogeneous intercepts while Model 7 also allows for time-effects, 
common shocks which effect all countries. The former is a One-Way Fixed Effects 
Model while the latter is a Two-Way Fixed Effects Model. Models 8, 9 and 10 restrict 
all parameters to be homogeneous including the intercept. More specifically, Model 
9 imposes homogeneity on the ECM with short and long-run effects of unity while 
Model 10 also sets the intercept to zero. Since these three models impose 





62 As mentioned in Section 5.1, this econometric analysis considers only the countries that joined the 
Euro Area prior to 2006 (excluding Luxembourg). This reflects the fact that very few observations are 
available for the rest of the countries that joined the Euro Area during the period under observation 




Table 5.3 Description of the Estimated Models 
Assumption 1: Heterogeneous Coefficients – Mean Group Estimator 
Model 1 
(eq. 3) 
ARDL 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝛿1𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑖𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 
Rewritten as: 
∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝛿1𝑖∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 + (𝛿1𝑖 +  𝛿2𝑖)𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 + (𝛿3𝑖 −




the log of 𝑎𝑖𝑡 as a 
function of the 
log of 𝑏𝑖𝑡.  
Model 2 
(eq. 7) 















ECM ∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 −  ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝜆𝑖(𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 −  𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1) +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 Restricts LR and 
SR coefficients to 
unity and 
intercept to zero 
Model 5 
(eq. 14) 
PAM ∆𝑎𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖𝜃𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 Restricts  𝛿2= 0  
Assumption 2: Heterogeneous intercept and homogeneous slopes  - Fixed Effects 
Model 6 
(eq. 15) 




ARDL 𝑎𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0𝑖 + 𝛼1𝑡  + 𝛿1𝑏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛿2𝑏𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛿3𝑎𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝑢𝑖𝑡 
Two-way Fixed 
Effects 
Assumption 3: Homogeneous Coefficients – Pooled OLS 
Model 8 
(eq. 17) 




(eq. 18)  


















5.4.2 Estimation Results 
 
5.4.2.1 Heterogeneous Coefficients – The Mean Group Estimator 
The first five models allow for heterogeneous coefficients but impose different 
restrictions on the coefficients. In order to allow for different intercepts and slopes for 
each country, eleven country-specific regressions are estimated in case of each of the 
first five models. As explained earlier, the approach applied here is that put forward 
by Pesaran and Smith (1995) – the MG estimator – which produces an unweighted 
average of the coefficients: results for Models 1 to 5 are presented in Table 5.4.  
 
Table 5.4 Mean Group Estimators for Model 1 to Model 5 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
?̂? 0.6782 0.9038 -0.0105 0.0259 -0.0073 0.0188   0.7222 1.2709 
𝛿1̂ 0.9879** 0.1107 1.0373** 0.0948       
𝛿2̂ -0.5225** 0.1283         
𝛿3̂ 0.4700** 0.1091         
𝜆?̂?         0.7519** 0.1429 
?̂?   0.3671** 0.0795 0.4267** 0.0764 0.3231** 0.0680 0.8178** 0.0788 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1516 0.1611 0.1635 0.1609 0.1713 
?̅?2 0.9735 0.6263 0.0461 0.0759 0.5776 
BIC 0.4338 0.2400 -0.0670 -0.4510 0.3626 
Akaike -0.6463 -0.5701 -0.6071 -0.7211 -0.4475 
Asterisks indicate significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
The Mean Group estimates for Model 1 show very rapid adjustment. In the ECM 
models, all three models show extremely rapid adjustment in differences, but with 
statistically significant adjustment to any divergence from equilibrium: Mean Group 
Estimates of the adjustment coefficient (and its standard error) are ?̂?,𝑀𝐺 =  0.37 
(0.0795) in case of Model 2, ?̂?,𝑀𝐺 =  0.43  (0.0764) in case of Model 3 and ?̂?,𝑀𝐺 =  0.32 





Note that R-bar-squared values are not comparable across models, due to the 
different specifications of the dependent variable. But based on both Information 
Criteria, the most restricted model, Model 4 actually performs best.  
 
Model 5 is a Partial Adjustment Model and restricts 𝛿2= 0. This differs from the 
previous Error Correction Models (Models 2, 3 and 4) since while the ECM imposes 
a long-run coefficient of one (and a short-run coefficient of one in case of Models 3 
and 4), the PAM doesn’t. The implied estimates of the speed of adjustment in the 
PAM are notably different from those reported in the ECM cases. Whereas, in case of 
the three ECM versions considered, the speed of adjustment ranges between 32 per 
cent and 43 per cent (based on the MG estimator), in the case of the PAM, the speed 
of adjustment is 82 per cent. However, this model clearly fits less well, and based on 
the Information Criteria, the ECM model with restrictions on the long-run and short-
run coefficients (Model 4) clearly outperforms the PAM (Model 5). 
 
The Mean Group Estimates in Table 5.4 summarise results by taking averages across 
individual countries. Tables 5.5 to 5.9 show results for the underlying heterogeneous 
coefficients in the different models. These results need to be interpreted with caution 
for two reasons. First, with just 11 time series observations, individual country 
equations have very low degrees of freedom, hence coefficients are typically poorly 
estimated, and hence many coefficients are not significantly different from zero at 
even notional significance levels. But, second, the underlying time series are most 
likely non-stationary, so that conventional tests of significance are not, in any case, 











Table 5.5 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) Specification 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟏: 𝒂𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝒐𝒊 +  𝜹𝟏𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕 +  𝜹𝟐𝒊𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜹𝟑𝒊𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝒖𝒊𝒕 
















































































































Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (SE) which are the output of estimating individual regressions for each 
country using Ordinary Least Squares. 




Table 5.6 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) Specification 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟐: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎𝒊 +  𝜹𝟏𝒊∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 + 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 −  𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 


























































































Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (SE) which are the output of estimating individual regressions for each 
country using Ordinary Least Squares. 




Table 5.7 Country-Specific Estimates based on ECM Specification 
Model 3: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎𝒊 + 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 




























































Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (SE) which are the output of estimating individual regressions for each 
country using Ordinary Least Squares.  
Asterisks indicate notional significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
 
Table 5.8 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) Specification 
Model 4: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 = 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 −  𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 




































Figures in parenthesis are standard errors (SE) which are the output of estimating individual regressions for each 
country using Ordinary Least Squares.  




Table 5.9 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) Specification 
Model 5: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟏𝒊 +  𝝀𝒊𝜽𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕 −  𝝀𝒊𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝒖𝒊𝒕 














































































Asterisks indicate notional significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
This sub-Section has considered five models that allow of heterogeneous coefficients 
amongst countries. The next sub-Section focuses on two models that allow for some 
heterogeneous coefficients while some degree of homogeneity is imposed. 
 
5.4.2.2 Heterogeneous Intercept and Homogeneous Slopes – Fixed 
Effects Model 
 
The One-Way Fixed Effects Model defined in Model 6 assumes the same slopes and 
constant variance across countries but allows for differences in intercepts. This 
implies that since a country specific effect is time invariant and considered as part of 
the intercept, it is allowed to be correlated with other regressors. Another ARDL 
model is the two-way fixed effects model which constrains slopes to be the same but 
allows intercepts to vary freely both over country and year (Model 7). Both of these 
two models estimate the speed of adjustment around 28 per cent (refer to Table 5.10). 
However, Model 6 (country fixed effects), and Model 7 (both country and time fixed 




next Section, are outperformed in terms of both goodness-of-fit and model selection 




Table 5.10 Fixed Effects Estimators: Model 6 and Model 7 
 
Model 6 
One-way Fixed Effects 
Model 7 
Two-way Fixed Effects 
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛿1̂ 0.9982** 0.0941 0.5928 0.7084 
𝛿2̂ -0.7881** 0.1122 -1.2396 0.6518 
𝛿3̂ 0.7212** 0.0757 0.7092** 0.0784 
𝛼0̂   11.2769 5.1823 
   FE (cross) FE (period) 
𝛼0̂ – AT 0.7644 0.6086 -0.640289 2 -0.604245 
𝛼0̂ – BE 0.7255 0.6201 -0.488608 3 -0.279762 
𝛼0̂ – FI 0.7371 0.5844 -1.061439 4 -0.118407 
𝛼0̂ – FR 0.9004 0.7131 1.214992 5 -0.073845 
𝛼0̂ – DE 0.9318 0.7282 1.499544 6 0.098778 
𝛼0̂ – GR 0.8455 0.6089 -0.567607 7 0.252096 
𝛼0̂ – IE 0.9002 0.5823 -1.030180 8 0.195231 
𝛼0̂ – IT 0.8534 0.7058 1.050254 9 0.050737 
𝛼0̂ – NL 0.8294 0.6455 0.032982 10 0.144140 
𝛼0̂ – PT 0.8200 0.6024 -0.689632 11 0.335277 
𝛼0̂ – ES 0.8431 0.6844 0.679983   
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1620 0.1629 
?̅?2 0.9698 0.9694 
BIC -0.3403 -0.0434 
Akaike -0.6840 -0.6081 







5.4.2.3 Homogeneous Coefficients – Pooled Ordinary Least Squares  
 
The third estimation technique considered is the Pooled Oordinary Least Squares 
(POLS) – a pooled linear regression that assumes a constant intercept and slopes 
across countries and time, which significantly increases degrees of freedom. Model 8 
imposes homogeneity on the unrestricted model (Model 1); but is also a restricted 
version of Models 6 and 7, with fixed effects. Model 9 imposes homogeneity on the 
ECM version that restricts both the long-run and the short-run coefficients to unity 
while Model 10 is also homogeneous but more restrictive then Model 9 since it 
imposes the intercept to equal zero.   
 
A key feature of pooled estimation is that all heterogeneity across the cross section is 
restricted to be driven solely by cross-country differences in the Capital Key, which 
in turn feeds into estimates of Implied Assets. Yet, as Table 5.11 shows, remarkably 
this restriction actually results in both improved goodness-of-fit and is preferred by 
model selection criteria.  
  
Table 5.11 Pooled OLS Estimators: Model 8 to Model 10 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛼0̂ 0.2142 0.2064 -0.0005 0.0157   
𝛿1̂ 1.0489** 0.0818     
𝛿2̂ -0.8937** 0.0941     
𝛿3̂ 0.8265** 0.0507     
?̂?   0.1464** 0.0444 0.1467** 0.0431 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1604 0.1603 0.1596 
?̅?2 0.9704 0.0831 0.0915 
BIC -0.6885 -0.7564 -0.7991 
Akaike -0.7867 -0.8055 -0.8237 




As with the models summarized above in Table 5.4, it should be noted that the change 
in the dependent variable means that R-bar-squared values are not comparable 
between Model 8 and Models 9 and 10; however, equation standard errors (the 
standard deviation of sample prediction errors) are directly comparable both within 
the Table, and in comparisons with previous Tables. This comparison shows, first, 
that Model 8, which is a restricted version of Models 6 and 7, as shown in Table 5.10, 
actually fits somewhat better – implying that both time and country fixed effects are 
jointly insignificant; and, second, that comparing Models within Table 5.11, the 
simplest model, Model 10, is preferred. Thus, there is no evidence of any statistically 
significant variation in the behavior of different countries that is not explained by 
differences in their Adjusted Capital Keys. 
 
While all Models in Table 5.11 imply that the relationship between log changes 
dominates short-run behavior, there is also clear evidence of some adjustment to 
deviations from the long-run relationship. In both Model 9 and Model 10, λ is 
statistically different from zero and different from 1 implying that the null hypothesis 
of 𝜆 = 0 and 𝜆 = 1 are both rejected. For Model 9 and Model 10 the speed of 
adjustment is 15 per cent (slightly lower than the 17 per cent for Model 8).  Comparing 
these results with Table 5.4, the implied speed of adjustment in these homogeneous 
Models is slower than the average response of 32 per cent, as captured by the Mean 
Group Estimates for the equivalent heterogeneous Model (Model 4), reflecting very 
rapid estimated adjustment speeds of some individual countries shown in Table 5.8, 
which raise the mean response. However, as shown in the next Section, model 











5.4.3 Heterogeneity Testing and Model Selection 
 
In order to select amongst the ten models presented in this Chapter, two model 
selection criteria are considered: the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). The latter penalizes the number of 
parameters more than the AIC. 
 
Let 𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑗 be the maximized log-likelihood of model 𝑗 and 𝑘𝑗 the total number of 
parameters estimated in model 𝑗. The AIC chooses the model with the lowest value 
of:  
𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑗 =  −2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑗 −  𝑘𝑗) 
 
The BIC chooses the model with the lowest value of:  
 
𝐵𝐼𝐶𝑗 =  −2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑗 − 0.5𝑘𝑗𝑙𝑛𝑁) 
 
where 𝑁 is the number of observations. 
 
The AIC prefers the unrestricted model if 2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈𝑅 −  𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅) > 𝑘. In other words, the 
null hypothesis is rejected if 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑢 < 𝐴𝐼𝐶𝑅 . The BIC prefers the unrestricted model if 
2(𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑈 −  𝑀𝐿𝐿𝑅) > 𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝑁). 
 
As shown in Table 5.12, both criteria confirm that the most restricted homogeneous 
Model 10 is preferred. This implies that the preferred model has homogeneous 
coefficients, unit short and long-run coefficients on Implied Total Assets and partial 
adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.  
 
It might be argued that 𝑏𝑖𝑡 is endogenous and that this causes the coefficient estimates 
to be biased and inconsistent. However, in the preferred model – Model 10 – there is 
only one coefficient estimated, the speed of adjustment, so there is little scope for 




Table 5.12 Summary of Results – Model Selection 
 
Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) 
Schwarz Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) 
Assumption 1: Heterogeneous Coefficients 
Model 1  -0.6463 0.4338 
Model 2 -0.5701 0.2400 
Model 3 -0.6071 -0.0670 
Model 4 -0.7211 -0.4510 
Model 5 -0.4475 0.3626 
Assumption 2: Heterogeneous intercept and homogeneous slopes  
Model 6 -0.6840 -0.3403 
Model 7 -0.6081 -0.0434 
Assumption 3: Homogeneous Coefficients 
Model 8 -0.7867 -0.6885 
Model 9 -0.8055 -0.7564 
Model 10 -0.8237 -0.7991 
 
 
5.5 An Econometric Analysis of the Weaker Link: the Predictive Power of the ECB’s 
Capital in Determining the Size of the EANCBs’ Balance Sheets when intra-
Eurosystem Transactions are Eliminated 
 
As noted earlier, the individual balance sheets published by each EANCB do not 
consolidate the intra-Eurosystem transactions. In fact, this was identified as the main 
reason why the Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB differ from that 
estimated as an amalgamation of the balance sheets of all EANCBs (Chapter 4). It was 
also shown above that, overall, actual total assets closely model the level implied if 
each EANCB had to follow its share in the ECB capital and, if any deviations exist, 
these generally diminish over time. It is now interesting to see whether this strong 
result also holds if intra-Eurosystem transactions are consolidated in line with the 
definition pursued by the ECB in its publication of the Eurosystem balance sheet. For 
this purpose, this Section presents an econometric analysis of the relationship 
between the Adjusted Capital Key and Actual Total Assets for each EANCB less the 
respective intra-Eurosystem claims – in other words treating each EANCB balance 




by the ECB rather than the augmented Eurosystem balance sheet used in this Chapter 
so far. Thus, the Actual Total Assets (𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑛𝑒𝑡) of each EANCB (Table 5.13 Column 3) 
sums up to the Total Assets for the Eurosystem as published by the ECB and can 
therefore be expressed as: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑡
𝑛𝑒𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑒𝑡. 
 
Moreover, as explained earlier,  
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 
𝑛𝑒𝑡 =  𝐴𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝐸𝑆 𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠.  
The Implied Total Assets net of intra-Eurosystem claims (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑛𝑒𝑡) for each EANCB 
(Table 5.13 Column 4) reflect the distribution of ECB published Total Assets 






As noted earlier and illustrated in Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.3, Luxembourg is a far 
outlier with distinct characteristics. For this reason, Luxembourg is included in the 
graphical analysis throughout almost all of the thesis63 but excluded from both the 
econometric analysis in Section 5.4 as well as that in Section 5.5. In this regard, 
Appendix 5.1, which presents the econometric results if Luxembourg was to be 
included in the panel of countries under analysis, shows that similar results are 











Table 5.13 Summary Table of the Dataset:  
Consolidating Intra-Eurosystem Claims 


















Austria AT 132.3 32.8 99.5 102.1 
Belgium BE 143.5 14.6 128.9 128.9 
Cyprus CY 14.6 7.3 7.3 7.9 
Estonia EE 7.7 3.0 4.7 10.0 
Finland FI 85.7 28.2 57.5 65.4 
France FR 915.7 117.0 798.7 737.6 
Germany DE 1,482.2 790.0 692.3 936.3 
Greece EE 152.5 4.5 148.0 105.8 
Ireland IE 88.5 2.4 86.2 60.4 
Italy IT 834.7 59.5 775.2 640.4 
Luxembourg LU 201.9 187.6 14.3 10.6 
Malta MT 5.9 1.2 4.7 3.4 
Netherlands NL 310.2 141.9 168.3 208.3 
Portugal PT 146.4 41.2 105.2 90.7 
Slovakia SK 31.7 2.2 29.5 40.2 
Slovenia SI 14.4 1.4 13.0 18.0 
Lithuania LT 16.5 4.6 11.9 21.5 
Latvia LV 16.2 4.6 11.6 14.7 
Spain ES 620.8 115.7 505.1 459.9 
Source: Annual Reports of the EANCBs and the ECB and own calculations 
 
Table 5.13 presents an extract from the dataset used in the analysis conducted in this 
Section. In particular, this Table shows total assets for each EANCB (as in Table 5.1), 
intra-Eurosystem claims, total assets for each EANCB net of intra-ES claims and the 
Implied Total Assets net of intra-ES claims as at the end of 2016. The significance of 
the intra-Eurosystem claims (exceeding two-fifths of consolidated total assets) is 
particularly immediately evident from Table 5.13.  
 
 
64 ITA net of intra-ES claims (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑛𝑒𝑡) are defined as the Total Assets for the Eurosystem as published by the ECB 
(𝑇𝐴𝑛𝑒𝑡) distributed among the EANCBs according to their respective ACK (𝐼𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡





Figure 5.3 shows the relationship between Actual Total Assets and Implied Total 
Assets in the top panel and the corresponding relationship when intra-Eurosystem 
transactions are consolidated in the bottom panel. It is evidently clear that actual total 
assets are more divergent from Implied Total Assets when intra-ES claims are 
consolidated. In other words, in general, the share of actual total assets less intra-ES 
transactions of each EANCB move less in line with the capital share of each EANCB.  
 
The relationship between Actual Total Assets and Implied Total Assets is 
investigated by applying the same estimation framework and methodological 
framework that was applied in the previous Section. In other words, the ten Models 
described in Table 5.3 are estimated.  
 
The speed of adjustment estimated by Model 1 of 45 per cent is slightly lower than 
that resulting from the non-consolidated data. A similar result is obtained in the case 
of the PAM whereby the speed of adjustment is 73 per cent as compared to 82 per 
cent in the case of non-consolidated data. In the case of the other heterogeneous 
Models (Model 2, 3 and 4) the speed of adjustment is close in both investigations. 
 
Minimal difference is noted in the speed of adjustment estimated by the One-Way 
and Two-Way Fixed Effects Models (Model 6 and Model 7). The consolidated data 
adjusts distinctly more slowly in all the three Models with homogeneous coefficients. 
In particular, the consolidated data adjusts with a speed of adjustment of 11 per cent 
as compared to 17 per cent in case of Model 8 and with a speed of adjustment of 9 per 
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Table 5.14 Mean Group Estimators for Model 1 to Model 5 
Consolidating Intra-Eurosystem Claims 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
?̂? 0.2430 0.9934 0.0280 0.0399 0.0077 0.0362   0.2604 1.2536 
𝛿1̂ 0.9243** 0.1063 0.9653** 0.1100       
𝛿2̂ -0.4993* 0.1242         





   
𝜆?̂?         0.7008** 0.1230 
?̂?   0.3813 0.0712 0.4131** 0.0612 0.2700** 0.0742 0.7336** 0.0938 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1749 0.1822 0.1930 0.1855 0.1851 
?̅?2 0.9674 0.5337 0.4767 0.0527 0.0566 
BIC 0.7196 0.4860 0.6012 -0.1674 0.1808 
Akaike -0.3606 -0.3242 -0.2089 -0.4374 -0.3592 
Asterisks indicate significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
From this analysis, one can deduce that when the intra-Eurosystem transactions are 
consolidated, the Actual Total Assets take more time to adjust to the Implied Total 
Assets and therefore to revert to the levels as determined by the capital key. This 
implies that the balance sheet of each individual EANCB adjusts to reflect their capital 
share more quickly than revealed by simply looking at the consolidated data. This 
supports earlier conclusions that when the intra-Eurosystem transactions are 
consolidated, the rather strong link that is identified between the total assets of each 





Table 5.15 Fixed Effects Estimators: Model 6 and Model 7 
Consolidating Intra-Eurosystem Claims 
 
Model 6 
One-way Fixed Effects 
Model 7 
Two-way Fixed Effects 
  
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛿1̂ 0.9416** 0.1072 0.5026 0.8120 
𝛿2̂ -0.6955** 0.1204 -1.1385 0.7479 
𝛿3̂ 0.6806** 0.0744 0.7041** 0.0782 
𝛼0̂   10.9269 5.8615 
   FE (cross) FE (period) 
𝛼0̂ – AT 0.7992 0.7810 -0.6515 2 -0.4909 
𝛼0̂ – BE 0.8249 0.7960 -0.4392 3 -0.1901 
𝛼0̂ – FI 0.6518 0.7526 -1.1749 4 -0.0876 
𝛼0̂ – FR 1.0174 0.9199 1.2666 5 -0.0667 
𝛼0̂ – DE 0.8164 0.9427 1.3253 6 0.0457 
𝛼0̂ – GR 0.9948 0.7788 -0.4773 7 0.1964 
𝛼0̂ – IE 1.0774 0.7375 -0.9282 8 0.1380 
𝛼0̂ – IT 0.9713 0.9107 1.1065 9 -0.0032 
𝛼0̂ – NL 0.7717 0.8323 -0.0689 10 0.1231 
𝛼0̂ – PT 0.8693 0.7721 -0.6875 11 0.3354 
𝛼0̂ – ES 0.9507 0.8817 0.7291   
 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1815 0.1860 
?̅?2 0.9649 0.9631 
BIC -0.1133 0.2226 
Akaike -0.4570 -0.3420 
Asterisks indicate notional significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
Table 5.17 presents the two model selection criteria – AIC and BIC. In both cases, 
Model 10 – the most restricted model – is again the preferred model. This model was 
also the preferred model in the case of the previous analysis concerning the non-
consolidated data.  
 
Since the analysis in both Section 5.4 and 5.5 have the same dependent variable and 
the same number of observations, it is possible to compare the AIC and BIC of the 
two explanatory variables (Table 5.12 and Table 5.17). Model 10 estimated by the 
gross data (intra-Eurosystem transactions are not consolidated) gives the lowest AIC 
and BIC and therefore fits better than when using the consolidated data. It is also 
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striking that using the consolidated data, the goodness-of-fit of Model 8 (as captured 
the the equation standard error) worsens, rather than improves, compared to the 
fixed effects estimates of Models 6 and 7, implying that countries’ Adjusted Capital 
Keys do a less good job in capturing variation across the cross section. This is also 
clearly evident in the comparison shown in Figure 5.3. 
Table 5.16 Pooled OLS Estimators: Model 8 to Model 10 
Consolidating Intra-Eurosystem Claims 
 
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛼0̂ 0.1945 0.2199 0.0086 0.0179   
𝛿1̂ 0.9910** 0.0964     
𝛿2̂ -0.8987** 0.1010     
𝛿3̂ 0.8919** 0.0387     
?̂?   0.0964** 0.0360 0.0938** 0.0355 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1865 0.1854 0.1847 
?̅?2 0.9630 0.0536 0.0602 
BIC -0.3872 -0.4658 -0.5064 
Akaike -0.4854 -0.5149 -0.5310 
Asterisks indicate notional significance level on 2-tailed test: *=10%; **=5% 
 
Table 5.17 Summary of Results – Model Selection  
Consolidating Intra-Eurosystem Claims 
 
Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) 
Schwarz Bayesian Information 
Criterion (BIC) 
Assumption 1: Heterogeneous Coefficients 
Model 1  -0.3606 0.4338 
Model 2 -0.3242 0.2400 
Model 3 -0.2089 -0.0670 
Model 4 -0.4374 -0.4510 
Model 5 -0.3592 0.3626 
Assumption 2: Heterogeneous Intercept and Homogeneous Slopes  
Model 6 -0.4570 -0.3403 
Model 7 -0.3420 -0.0434 
Assumption 3: Homogeneous Coefficients 
Model 8 -0.4854 -0.6885 
Model 9 -0.5149 -0.7564 
Model 10 -0.5310 -0.7991 
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5.6. Concluding Remarks 
 
An econometric investigation of the correlation between the share of total assets of 
each EANCB to Eurosystem total assets and their respective Capital Key confirms the 
conclusions reached in the previous Chapter.  
 
By estimating a number of models that vary in their form and in the degree of 
homogeneity of the coefficients, it has been shown that the short and long-run 
elasticity of Actual Assets to Implied Assets is very close to one. The equation shows 
two sorts of adjustment. The short run adjustment coefficient β measures how the 
change in Actual Assets responds to change in the equilibrium value. The pooled 
results show that short run adjustment is very fast, not significantly different from 
one, with Actual Assets responding almost immediately to Implied Assets, though 
with some errors. The long run adjustment coefficient λ measures how fast these 
errors, the lagged differences between actual and equilibrium are removed. On 
average across countries this is quite slow at between 15 per cent per period (pooled 
estimate in Model 10) and 32 per cent (Mean Group Estimator in Model 4). While 
individual country parameters are imprecisely estimated – which is to be expected, 
given the very low degrees of freedom for individual country equations - differences 
between countries are not statistically significant (both country and time fixed effects 
are individually and collectively insignificant) and so pooled models work well.  Both 
goodness-of-fit and information criteria clearly prefer a pooled model with 
homogeneous coefficients to heterogeneous models.   
 
Chosen by the AIC and BIC selection criteria, the preferred model has homogeneous 
coefficients, unit short and long-run coefficients on ITA and partial adjustment to the 
long-run equilibrium both when defining the Eurosystem as ESTA (Section 5.4) as 
well as when using the data published by the ECB (Section 5.5). Amongst the 10 
Models estimated by these two sets of data, the preferred Model clearly fits better 




The striking feature of the results is that in the pooled Model the Adjusted Capital 
Key, feeding into Implied Total Assets estimates, is the sole explanatory factor of 
systematic cross-sectional variation, providing strong empirical support to the 
argument in Chapter 4 that Euro Area National Central Banks effectively act on auto-






The Transformation of the Euro Area 




The severity of the global financial crisis that began in 2007 challenged central banks 
to use both standard and non-standard measures to address the economic effects of 
the crisis and the sluggish recovery. As this brought about dramatic quantitative 
expansion of the balance sheets of “main” central banks such as the Eurosystem, the 
Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, the analysis of central bank balance sheets 
has gained ground. The events that unfolded during the financial crisis led to 
increasing recognition that, as emphasized by Bindseil (2004), ‘whenever a central 
bank transacts with the rest of the world – that is when it issues currency, conducts 
foreign exchange operations, invests its own funds, engages in emergency liquidity 
assistance, and, last but not least conducts monetary policy operations – all of these 
operations affect its balance sheet’.  
 
As monetary policy measures have been adapted to the institutional conditions, 
economic specifics and financing structure which characterize an economy, the 
design in balance sheet policies has differed substantially across central banks. In this 
regard, the literature is no longer limited to a discussion of developments in total 
assets of central banks but elaborates upon the compositional changes of central bank 
balance sheets. Indeed, recent events have shifted the interpretation of the stance of 
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monetary policy from one focused almost exclusively on changes in a policy interest 
rate, to one where the size and composition of central banks’ balance sheets is more 
relevant (Ademuyiwa, Siklos and St. Amand 2018).  
 
As it has been recognized that merely looking at the total size of the balance sheet 
does not reveal what was actually happening within the balance sheet of the central 
bank, the literature focusing on the composition of the central bank balance sheets 
has surged. However, with respect to the Euro Area, the focus has so far remained on 
the composition of the Eurosystem balance sheet in aggregate while no 
comprehensive analysis amongst the Euro Area NCBs has been attempted and 
therefore the implications of such an analysis remain widely neglected. This Chapter 
attempts to rectify this omission. 
 
To this effect, this study builds upon what has already been presented in earlier 
Chapters – an analysis of the individual NCBs that form the Eurosystem (EANCBs).  
At the same time, this Chapter is distinct from the previous ones in that it conducts a 
detailed comparative analysis of developments in both the size and the composition 
of the balance sheets of the EANCBs.  
 
The contribution of this Chapter is threefold. As this Chapter uses a unified 
framework presented by Pattipeilohy (2016) in his analysis of developments in 
central banks’ balance sheet composition, it presents a general summary of this 
framework and discusses why, as admitted by Pattipeilohy in his 2016 study, it is not 
designed for the EANCBs – it does not account for all the information on the balance 
sheets of central banks operating within a system. Secondly, this Chapter rectifies this 
by proposing an alternative framework and applies it for the EANCBs, revealing 
some interesting points. Thirdly, despite that Pattipeilohy’s Framework (PF) was 
earmarked for “main” central banks, this Chapter finds some validity in its 
application for the EANCBs. It serves to highlight some interesting insights on the 
gearing of domestic assets and liabilities on the EANCBs’ balance sheets towards 
different macroeconomic sectors (the banking and government sectors).  
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During the recent crisis, central bank actions differed with respect to their relative 
emphasis given to private versus public sector securities as well as to bank versus 
non-bank markets65. Against this background, the framework presented by 
Pattipeilohy (2016) (summarized in Table 6.1) classified the balance sheet items into 
holdings of foreign exchange and domestic assets, the latter being again sub-divided 
into private sector debt (G) and public sector debt (L). Foreign exchange reserves 
constitute assets denominated in foreign currency and assets issued by foreign 
counterparties. Concerning domestic assets, private sector debt (L) usually refers to 
loans to or debt securities issued by banks and other financial intermediaries. Central 
bank holdings of precious commodities such as gold are also included under this 
category. On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, the distinction is made between 
base money, that is, the provision of banknotes (Bn) and non-banknote central bank 
liabilities. Pattipeilohy’s Framework classified the latter by counterparty – liabilities 
to banks (Rs) and liabilities to the government (Rg). In sum, Pattipeilohy’s 
Framework (PF) structured the balance sheets of “main” central banks such as the 
Eurosystem, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, as presented in the upper 
part of Table 6.1, that is, consisting of FX, L and G on the assets side and Bn, Rs and 
Rg on the liabilities side.  
 
Source: Pattipeilohy C. (2016) for upper part and own insertions for lower part of the balance sheet 
 
65 For example, the Federal Reserve focused heavily on non-bank credit markets and on operations 
involving private sector securities. In contrast, the Bank of Engalnd has concentrated its Asset Purchase 
Facility entirely on purchases of government bonds while the ECB emphasised banking system liquidity, 
purchases of covered bonds and later sovereign bonds.  
66 Whereas in Pattipeilohy (2016) this category includes ‘Other Assets’, these are considered as a separate 
category in the application of the PF presented later on in this Chapter. 
Table 6.1 Simplified Euro Area National Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework (PF) 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign Exchange Reserves66 FX Banknotes in Circulation Bn 
Domestic Private Sector Debt L Liabilities to the Banking Sector Rs 
Domestic Public Sector Debt G Liabilities to Government Rg 
Intra-Eurosystem Claims ES_C Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities ES_L 
Other Assets OA Other Liabilities OL 
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One point which is crucial to the analysis that follows in this Chapter, is the fact that 
Pattipeilohy (2016) based the analysis for the Euro Area on the consolidated balance 
sheet of the Eurosystem, net of intra-Eurosystem positions (as published by the ECB). 
He documents his exclusion of information on the balance sheets of individual 
EANCBs and, while justifying this position on the grounds that they are jointly 
responsible for the implementation of the ECB’s single monetary policy, he hints that 
a method is to be found on how to classify intra-Eurosystem assets and liabilities but, 
as he puts it: ‘this is as yet rather unclear’. Because of this, the balance sheets of 
EANCBs are not treated exhaustively when applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to 
the EANCBs – Intra-Eurosystem Claims/Liabilities67 and other Assets/Liabilities are 
not included in the analysis. This point is reflected in the way the simplified balance 
sheet of EANCBs is presented in Table 6.1. While the upper part shows the items 
taken into account by the PF, the lower part is included here merely for the sake of 
presenting a complete balance sheet despite that these items were excluded from 
Pattipeilohy’s original analysis.  
 
Indeed, the above is the gap in the literature which this Chapter attempts to address 
when proposing a new alternative framework designed specifically for the EANCBs. 
 
Based on the categorization of assets and liabilities as in Table 6.1, the construction of 
balance sheet ratios and a set of rules underlying a classification scheme (refer to 
Section 6.2 and Appendix 6.1 for further details) Pattipeilohy (2016) classified central 
banks in terms of their asset holdings as being either Foreign Exchange Holders 
(FXH), Treasury Holders (TH) or Private Sector Lenders (PSL). Based on the 
composition of the liabilities side, central banks are categorized as being either Note 
Issuers (NI), Government’s Bankers (GB) or Bankers’ Bank (BB). In his 2016 study, 
which covers a panel of fourteen central banks from advanced economies and twenty 
from emerging market economies, Pattipeilohy (2016) documented a convergence in 
the balance sheet composition among advanced economies between 2007 and 2009, 
on the back of a fairly homogeneous response to the crisis driven by financial stability 
 
67 Detailed discussion on Intra-Eurosystem Claims/Liabilities is presented in Chapter 4.  
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concerns. Subsequently, however, this convergence was somewhat reversed as more 
diverse balance sheet policies were adopted, reflecting the diversified policy 
challenges faced by the advanced economies. Conversely, the composition of balance 
sheets of central banks in emerging market economies remained relatively 
unchanged over the same period. Pattipeilohy (2016) also observed that the size of 
the balance sheet expansion is not necessarily reflected in the extent to which the 
balance sheet composition changes. The scales in the Figure below are denoted in 
logarithms in order to ensure that a change in any variable leads to a similar shift in 
the graphs, irrespective of the starting value of the respective indicator. 
     
     
In the images above taken from Pattipeilohy’s 2016 study, with respect to the 
composition of the asset side of the balance sheet, central banks that are classified as 
Foreign Exchange Holders feature in the lower darker section of the charts, central 
banks classified as Treasuries Holder are plotted in the upper right segment while 
those classified as Private Sector Lenders feature in the upper left segment. On the 
liabilities side, the lower darker segment indicates central banks who are Note 
Issuers, the upper right segment plot central banks who are Government’s Bankers 
and the upper left segment represents central banks classified as Bankers’ Bankers.  
Before the crisis, the (consolidated) Eurosystem was an FX Holder in terms of asset 
composition and Bankers’ Banker in terms of liability composition. These diagrams 
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also show that in the midst of the financial crisis (2009 – 2011), the Eurosystem 
increased its holdings of domestic government bonds (eastward shift) coupled with 
a westward shift on grounds of the introduction of two very long-term refinancing 
operations in late 2010/early 2011. As of mid-2015, the Eurosystem has become a 
Treasuries Holder as the APP was skewed towards government bonds. In terms of 
changes in liability composition, the right hand panel shows that by mid-2015 the 
Eurosystem’s relative liability structure was similar to the one observed in 2007. 
Similar to the asset side, the APP also implied a significant shift in liability 
composition. 
 
As the global financial crisis unfolded, the operation of EANCBs within a system of 
central banks brought to the forefront an increasingly more important category of 
lending and borrowing by EANCBs – intra-Euro Area cross-border transactions 
(besides domestic and extra-Euro Area cross-border positions). Therefore, this 
Chapter proposes a new framework that includes new categorization of the central 
bank balance sheets items to examine the position of each EANCB vis-à-vis the rest 
of the central banks within the system.  
 
This new proposed framework and the computation of a set of balance sheet 
indicators summarizing EANCBs’ balance sheet configuration (building on the 
methodology in Pattipeilohy, 2016) reveals a number of interesting points: 
(i) The compositional changes in the EANCBs’ balance sheet have been at 
least somewhat predictable; during the financial crisis EANCBs in the 
‘core’ countries engaged more in lending activity and held larger cross-
border positions; EANCBs in ‘peripheral’ countries held predominantly 
domestic assets and were borrowing institutions issuing cross-border 
liabilities.  
(ii) Cross-border activity was more dominant during the years of intense 
financial crisis. 
(iii) Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (GIPS) held predominantly domestic 
asset positions throughout the period; other countries engaged in intense 
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cross-border activity during the worst years of the crisis but this lessened 
again as the crisis died out; 
(iv) While prior to the financial crisis, most EANCBs were Note Issuers, in the 
first few years of the crisis, most of them were holding both domestic and 
cross-border liabilities, though subsequently, most of their liabilities were 
predominantly cross-border positions. Over the latter years to 2016, there 
was a shift back towards issuing domestic liabilities.  
(v) The rather dramatic changes in the EANCBs’ balance sheet composition 
are hidden in the Eurosystem balance sheet.  
 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: Sub-Section 6.1.1 aims to put 
the analysis into the right context by first presenting a brief review of the literature 
that assesses the composition of central balance sheets by using different central bank 
balance sheet ratios. Sub-Section 6.1.2, briefly discusses the validation (or lack of it) 
of Pattipeilohy’s Framework for a system of central banks such as the Eurosystem, 
introduces the proposed alternative framework and discusses its application for 
EANCBs. (A detailed description of the methodology is presented in Appendix 6.1 
and 6.2). This sub-Section concludes with a further discussion on the implications of 
the new insights that emerge from the application of the proposed framework (sub-
Section 6.1.3). Having identified some validity in the application of Pattipeilohy’s 
Framework (PF) for the EANCBs, Section 6.2 discusses this and outlines a number of 
interesting insights.  
 
The remainder of this Chapter (Section 6.3) takes a closer look and presents further 
details on the extension to the existing dataset (presented in Chapter 3) that was 
necessary to conduct this analysis. This Section also discusses a number of caveats. 
Finally, Section 6.4 concludes.  
 
Appendix 6.1 to this Chapter presents the methodology adopted in applying both 
frameworks in further detail, documenting the meticulous work, which is involved 
in categorizing all the balance sheet items, computing the balance sheet ratios and 
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classifying the EANCBs according to a set typology (which is only broad-brushed in 
Chapter 6). Appendix 6.2 presents details on the differential classification of the Asset 
Purchase Programmes, which differs across EANCBs. Other Appendices to this 
Chapter present more details on the results (Appendices 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6). 
Appendices 6.7and 6.8 present the main categories of assets and liabilities for each 
EANCB as defined by the PF and the new proposed framework in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 
respectively. Appendix 6.9 presents all the items on the balance sheet of each EANCB 
grouped according to the categories defined in the new framework (Table 6.2). 
 
6.1 Central Bank Balance Sheet Ratios: the Literature and the Move to a New 
Proposed Framework 
 
6.1.1 Pattipeilohy’s Approach in a Broader Context 
 
As touched upon in Chapter 2, recent years have witnessed the emergence of a 
particular strand in the literature, which examines the compositional changes of 
central bank balance sheet policies, going beyond a qualitative discussion of recent 
policy measures. In the early years of the financial crisis, Stella (2009) introduced the 
idea of analyzing the transformation of the components of the central bank balance 
sheet beyond the headline number of total assets. Indeed, he analyzed the Federal 
Reserve balance sheet transformation over the 1951-2008 period suggesting 
alternative metrics to judge both the scope of the Fed’s role in the financial system as 
well as the exposure of its balance sheet to risk. Subsequently, in 2013, a more 
systematic approach in analyzing the composition of central bank balance sheets as 
an indicator of the aggressiveness of the policy efforts of the monetary authorities 
was put forward by Pattipeilohy (2013), making use of an indicator-based 
methodology. 
 
In his study, Pattipeilohy (2013) analyzed historical developments in the balance 
sheet of De Nederlandsche Bank over the 1990-1998 period. Immediately afterwards, 
in a further study Pattipeilohy et al (2013) analyzed balance sheet developments of 
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central banks of major advanced economies since the crisis. Pattipeilohy (2016) 
augmented the methodology employed in these two papers in another study 
whereby central bank balance sheet composition was summarized by four 
parameters (rather than the initial three). This latter study presented a first attempt 
to analyze changes in the overall central bank balance sheet configuration across a 
broad panel of central banks in a unified quantitative framework. This framework 
serves as the basis of the analysis in this Chapter and therefore, was synthesized 
briefly in the introduction to this Chapter. 
 
Very limited applications of Pattipeilohy’s Framework are found in the existing 
literature. Kondratenko and Kostadinoska-Miloseska (2017) applied this framework 
for six EU Member States based on data from the central banks’ balance sheets. They 
concluded that during the crisis, these countries modified their monetary policy 
framework leading to changes in both the size and structure of their balance sheets. 
Another preliminary study by Soederhuizen and Arnold (2017) applies Pattipeilohy’s 
Framework to the national central banks in the Euro Area and the Federal Reserve 
Banks. However, as discussed in the following sub-Section and in line with 
Pattipeilohy’s remarks, this framework does not account for all the information on 
the balance sheets of Euro Area national central banks. 
 
A more recent study by Kiss and Balog (2018) also presented an application of balance 
sheet ratios to examine the different policy implications of balance sheet expansion 
and the impact on currency stability. This paper used six balance sheet ratios68 to 
capture developments in balance sheets of seven non-Euro Area NCBs during the 
2006-2014 period. They pointed out that balance sheet ratios can be biased by the 
enormous foreign exchange reserves but their changes were still used to test the 




68 Equity-to-debt ratio, transparency ratio, defence ratio, lending-to-assets ratio, securities-to-assets ratio 
and asset expansion. 
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Ademuyiwa, Siklos and St. Amand (2018) also explored central bank balance sheet 
ratios and examined the challenges of interpreting the conduct of recent monetary 
policy for more than 30 central banks, five of which were in the Euro Area. Their 
paper presented a dataset of main balance sheet items mainly central bank total 
assets, central bank private sector and public sector assets and net worth. It concluded 
with a word of caution on the interpretation of changes in central bank balance sheets 
composition, emphasizing that their significance should not be exaggerated. Finally, 
Ademuyiwa, Siklos and St. Amand (2018) found that balance sheet expansions are 
associated with higher output volatility and that central bank’s ability to minimize 
inflation and output variability may have been impaired by efforts towards achieving 
the desired global financial stability conditions.  
 
Parallel to the above-mentioned studies, Bagus and Howden (2009) presented a 
standard set of tools to conduct a comparative analysis of the balance sheets of the 
Fed and the Eurosystem from the beginning of the crisis in June 2007 to March 2009. 
By observing a set of balance sheet ratios, they concluded that considering only 
quantitative issues (and ignoring regulatory changes), the Eurosystem has emerged 
marginally better throughout the first two years of the crisis than the Fed in terms of 
foreign exchange reserves and liquidity of its assets. In a more recent theoretical 
paper, they extended their earlier standard set of tools to analyze the central bank’s 
balance sheet (Bagus and Howden, 2016) consisting of strength, liquidity and equity 
ratios which are useful in the analysis of the financial stability of a central bank.  
 
As highlighted in Chapter 2, this Chapter contributes to this strand of literature by 
giving prominence to a rather neglected aspect being the composition of the 
EANCBs’ balance sheets and the interlinkages between them and the Eurosystem as 
a whole. The dataset presented in Chapter 3 (and extended here) plays a crucial role 
in this analysis since the application of the indicator-based methodology would not 




6.1.2 Moving from Pattipeilohy’s Framework to a New Proposed Framework 
– A Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
 
Why Depart from Pattipeilohy’s Framework? 
 
As briefly outlined earlier, Pattipeilohy’s Framework core concept is to break down 
the central bank balance sheet by taking a counterparty perspective, that is, by 
considering the extent to which central bank assets and liabilities are geared towards 
different macroeconomic sectors. In this case, except for foreign exchange reserves, 
all other assets are assumed to be ‘domestic’, usually referring to loans to or debt 
securities issued by banks and other financial intermediaries within the same 
jurisdiction. On the liabilities side, non-banknote central bank liabilities are classified 
by counterparty – liabilities to banks and liabilities to the government. 
 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework is designed for central banks whose assets involve either 
foreign exchange reserves (assets denominated in foreign currency and assets issued 
by foreign counterparties) or domestic assets and therefore any transactions between 
central banks fall under the category of foreign exchange reserves. In contrast, 
however, a national central bank which operates as part of the Eurosystem, engages 
in transactions with banks and governments in other Euro Area Member States 
(besides transactions with domestic banks and the local government and with 
counterparties outside the Euro Area). These transactions related to payments 
between one Euro Area national central bank and institutions/counterparties within 
another Euro Area Member State (referred to as cross-border payments) give rise to 
Intra-Eurosystem claims/liabilities, which are ignored in Pattipeilohy’s Framework.    
 
During the financial crisis, the importance of this distinction between local 
counterparties and counterparties outside the jurisdiction of the EANCB became 
even more accentuated as most of the Asset Purchase Programme (APP) involved the 
purchase by one EANCB of securities issued by institutions within other Euro Area 
Member States and therefore giving rise to intra-Euro Area cross-border positions. 
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Indeed, intra-Euro Area cross-border claims reached a high of 95 per cent of the total 
central bank balance sheet of Luxembourg (2015, 2016), 87 per cent of the balance 
sheet of the Finnish central bank (2011) and 75 per cent and 71 per cent of the central 
bank balance sheets of NL (2011) and DE (2013) respectively.  
 
In a nutshell, while Pattipeilohy’s Framework is valid for “main” central banks, the 
NCBs operating within the Eurosystem require a new framework that distinguishes 
between transactions involving EANCBs and other central banks/counterparties 
outside the system and transactions between EANCBs (operating within the same 
system). The following sub-Section describes this new proposed framework and the 
results that emerge following a diagnostic and graphical approach similar to that in 
Pattipeilohy’s 2016 study.  
 
The Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
 
The new alternative framework proposed in this Chapter, which I shall refer to as the 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB), distinguishes between 
balance sheet positions as follows: 
a) Domestic positions 
b) Intra-Euro Area cross-border positions and 
c) Extra-Euro Area cross-border positions. 
 
Put differently, the balance sheet positions of each EANCB that result from euro-
denominated transactions between that EANCB and institutions (banks and 
government) established within the same EA Member State are categorized as 
domestic positions. In other words, claims against local banks, non-financial 
residents and national governments are amalgamated into the category ‘Domestic 
Assets’. This was necessary for presentation purposes as the methodology used in the 
analysis does not allow for further sub-categorization and follows the precedent set 
by Pattipeilohy’s Framework. Meanwhile, balance sheet positions resulting from 
Euro-denominated transactions between a particular EANCB and institutions 
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established outside that EA Member State (but within the Euro Area) are categorized 
as intra-Euro Area cross-border positions. For simplification, it is assumed that no 
Euro-denominated transactions take place between EANCBs and institutions 
established in jurisdictions outside the Euro Area (therefore extra-Euro Area cross 
border positions are assumed zero). While published data by the Central Banks do 
not provide enough information, such assumption is considered plausible. Balances 
that are not considered as either Foreign Assets, Domestic Assets or Intra-Euro Area 
cross border positions amounted to a mere 5 per cent of total Eurosystem assets in 
2016. Thus, Extra-Euro Area cross-border positions, which are assumed to be zero in 
this analysis, by definition, do not exceed 5 per cent of total Eurosystem assets. Table 
6.2 presents a simplified balance sheet structured to reflect the above specificities of 
the national central banks operating within a system of central banks.  
Source: own compilation 
 
As explained earlier, apart from foreign exchange reserves (AFX), assets on the central 
bank balance sheet are categorized as either involving transactions with institutions 
within the same jurisdiction (referred to as Domestic Assets ADOM) or transactions 
with institutions in other Euro Area Member States (referred to as intra-Euro Area 
Cross-Border Assets ACB). In this way, this alternative framework distinguishes 
between whether an EANCB provides liquidity to the local banking sector and the 
national government or to the banking sector and the governments of other Euro 
Area Member States. This issue becomes crucial since, as already highlighted in 
previous Chapters, a number of EANCBs played a significant role in contributing 
towards the survival of other EANCBs within the ‘periphery’ countries during the  
 
Table 6.2 Simplified Euro Area National Central Bank Balance Sheet  
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets Liabilities 
Foreign Exchange Reserves AFX Banknotes in Circulation LB 
Domestic Assets ADOM Liabilities to domestic institutions LDOM  
Cross-Border Assets ACB Cross-Border Liabilities LCB 
Other Assets AO Equity Eq 
  Other Liabilities LO 
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Source: Pattipeilohy (2016) and own compilation 
*These categories are defined in Table 6.1 for PF and in Table 6.2 for FEANCB. 
#The classification of these programmes/securities as either ADOM or ACB is discussed in Appendix 6.2. 
**This reference number relates to the balance sheet format given in Annex VIII to Guideline (EU) 
2016/2249 (ECB/2016/34), OJ L 347, 20.12.2016, p. 3. 
NA = Not Applicable; 
  
Table 6.3 Detailed Euro Area National Central Bank Balance Sheet Based on 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework and the  
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financial crisis. This alternative framework allows for capturing evidence on this 
point, and therefore provides a new perspective compared to analysis which focuses 
solely on the whole Eurosystem.  
 
With respect to the FEANCB, Table 6.3 illustrates how each item on the balance sheets 
of EANCBs fits into the broad categories presented in Table 6.2. Table 6.3 (first and 
fifth column) also depicts the categorization of all the balance sheet items into the 
broad categories defined in Pattipeilohy’s Framework in Table 6.1 presented earlier. 
This categorization according to Pattipeilohy’s Framework is discussed in Appendix 
6.1. 
 
The Asset Side of the EANCBs’ Balance Sheets 
 
As explained earlier, the asset side is divided into three main groups – Foreign 
Exchange Reserves (AFX), Domestic Assets (ADOM) and Cross-Border positions (ACB)  
(the latter category including intra-Eurosystem balances) – and a fourth category 
‘Other Assets’ which is excluded from this analysis. The summation of these 
categories add up to ESTA as shown in the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 6.1, 
defined in previous Chapters of this thesis. ADOM pertains to debt of domestic 
institutions (banks and government) while ACB consists of debt issued by institutions 
in other Euro Area Member States69. It is pertinent to note that the classification of 
most of the purchase programmes being either domestic assets or intra-Euro Area 
cross-border assets varies from one EANCB to another. Only the PSPP is classified as 
domestic assets for all EANCBs. Details about how these purchase programmes are 
classified for each EANCB are explained in Appendix 6.2.  
 
The FEANCB, which is the basis of Figure 6.1, captures the three main categories 
mentioned above and therefore includes intra-Eurosystem transactions (under the 
category Cross-Border Positions). Therefore, Figure 6.1 relates to ESTA definition and 
 
69 Both ADOM and ACB are assumed to be Euro Denominated Assets. 
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excludes only the minor category ‘Other Assets’ from the analysis. This contrasts with 
the PF as explained in the following Section.  
 
A set of balance sheet indicators is computed enabling the assessment of relative 
changes in balance sheet composition through time as well as relative differences 
between EANCBs. These are summarized in Figure 6.1. The following is only a broad-
brush description of this set of balance sheet ratios and a corresponding classification 
scheme, while further details about the methodology employed are presented in 
Appendix 6.1. 
 
The indicator (ACB + ADOM)/AFX is constructed to determine whether the assets side of 
the balance sheet is predominately dominated by foreign reserves. When the ratio 
(ACB + ADOM)/AFX is less than 1, EANCBs are classified as Foreign Exchange Holders 
(FXH) and depicted in the lower green segment of the charts in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. If 
more than half of the assets are euro-denominated, then a distinction is made between 
domestic and cross-border assets by constructing the ratio ACB/ADOM. If (ACB + ADOM) 
exceeds AFX and ACB/ADOM is less than 1, EANCBs are classified as Domestic Assets 
Holders (DAH) and plotted in the upper left segment (yellow). If, on the other hand, 
the ratio ACB/ADOM is greater than 1, EANCBs are classified as Intra-Eurosystem 
Lenders (IEL) and plotted in the upper right segment (orange) of the charts in Figure 
6.1 and 6.2. These national central banks are predominantly holders of Intra-Euro 
Area cross-border assets. Appendix 6.3 displays these classifications for all EANCBs 
in tabular form.  
 
From Figure 6.170, it is clear that ‘periphery’ countries like PT, ES, CY71, GR, IT and IE 
started out as Domestic Asset Holders and remained as such throughout the period, 




70 Outliers do not feature in the charts in the following Figures. Details on this matter is presented in 
Appendix 6.10. 
71 Except for 2016 when it became an IEL.  
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Figure 6.1 Composition of EANCBs’ Assets by Central Bank - FEANCB  
  
Note: The scales in all the Figures in this Chapter (except Figure 6.5) are denoted in logarithms in order to ensure that 
a change in any variable leads to a similar shift in the graphs, irrespective of the starting value of the respective 












































































































































































































































































































AFX = Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
ACB = Cross-Border Assets 




cope with deposit flight (with a corresponding increase in Target2 on the liabilities 
side). In parallel, this gave rise to additional intra-Eurosystem assets on the balance 
sheet of ‘core’ countries like DE. As a result, central banks like DE and to a lesser 
extent NL, despite starting as Domestic Asset Holders, shifted eastward implying a 
more dominant hold of cross-border assets. More recently, the largest QE programme 
the PSPP – contributed to an increase in the holdings of domestic assets across all 
EANCBs but particularly DE, FR, IT and ES. Correspondingly, these events also 
affected the liabilities side of their balance sheet as discussed in the following sub-
Section. 
 
Figure 6.2 clearly illustrates that none of the EANCBs was predominantly holding 
foreign exchange reserves over the 2006-2016 period, except for France in 200672 and 
Latvia in 2014 when it joined the Euro Area. In the case of the latter, foreign exchange 
reserves were dominant in 2014, probably as they transitioned from a currency board 
to a common currency. Subsequently, in 2015 and 2016, this effect was offset as their 
cross-border assets superseded the foreign component of their balance sheet (which 
remained relatively stable) reflecting purchases under the SMP in 2015 and 2016. 
Prior to the crisis and over its first few years, most EANCBs held domestic assets, 
primarily as the Eurosystem adopted a Fixed Rate Full Allotment (FRFA) policy 
whereby liquidity was supplied to domestic counterparties in line with their demand 
(subject to the provision of eligible collateral). This was followed in 2011 by a series 
of Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO). However, this coincided with the 
accumulation of Target2 by some EANCBs such as DE and NL, leading EANCBs to 
cluster into two groups - Domestic Asset Holders and Intra-Eurosystem Lenders. 
Unsurprisingly, as the PSPP limited EANCBs to purchase their own country’s 
sovereign bonds, in 2016, most EANCBs again held mostly domestic assets (with the 




72This is on account of relatively low lending to credit-institutions related to monetary policy operations 
which are classified under domestic assets and which significantly increased over the following years.  
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Looking at the Eurosystem as a whole, the Eurosystem balance sheet73 does not reveal 
the different positions held by the individual EANCBs and the type-switching 
occurring as a result of the ECB’s non-standard monetary policy measures. The 
Eurosystem balance sheet classified all the EANCBs as being Domestic Asset Holders 
where “Domestic” has to be interpreted as “anywhere in the Eurosystem”. In line 
with the conclusions reached in previous Chapters, the Eurosystem keeps hidden the 
fact that some EANCBs engaged in substantial intra-Euro Area transactions, which 
were crucial for banking sectors in ‘peripherial’ economies to survive the turmoil of 
the crisis. 
 
The Liabilities Side of the EANCBs’ Balance Sheets 
 
Summarized in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, as defined in Table 6.2 earlier, liabilities on the 
EANCBs’ balance sheets are sub-divided into Banknotes in Circulation (LB), Liabilities 
to Domestic Institutions (LDOM) and Cross-Border Liabilities (LCB). Based on these 
three groups of liabilities, two balance sheet ratios are calculated: (LCB + LDOM)/LB and 
(LCB-LDOM)/(LCB + LDOM)74. If total reserves at the EANCB are less than Banknotes in 
Circulation (LCB + LDOM)/LB < 1, then that EANCB is classified as being Note Issuer 
(NI) and found in the lower green segment of the charts in Figure 6.3 and 6.4. In 
contrast, if banknotes are less than total reserves, more than half of which are 
associated with domestic activity, then that EANCB is classified as Banker for 
Domestic Counterparties (BDM)75 and plotted in the upper left segment (yellow) of 
the corresponding charts. On the other hand, if more than half of the reserves are 
related to cross-border activity, then that EANCB is classified as Intra-Eurosystem 
Borrower (IEB)76 (plotted in the upper right segment (orange) of the charts). 
 
 
73The methodology employed here makes use of balance sheet ratios involving domestic assets and intra-
Euro Area cross-border assets. In light of this and given that the Eurosystem balance sheet as published 
by the ECB consolidates all intra-Euro Area transactions, it is only feasible to analyse the Eurosystem if 
defined according to the definition described in Chapter 4 – that is, measured as the amalgamation of all 
the EANCBs and the ECB – referred to earlier as ESTA. 
74 When (LCB-LDOM)/(LCB + LDOM) = 0, LDOM = LCB; 
75 If (LCB + LDOM)/LB > 1 and (LCB – LDOM) / (LCB + LDOM) < 0 than LCB < LDOM. 




It is pertinent to note that the three categories of liabilities – LB, LDOM and LCB – do not 
cover all the items on the balance sheet (as evident from Table 6.3). One other main 
category – Equity – is not included in this analysis. The non-exhaustive classification 
employed here follow the same approach in Pattipeilohy’s 2016 study. This does not 
have an impact on the results of this investigation, since this category is smaller than 
at least one of the other categories, LB, LCB and LDOM for all EANCBs across the entire 
period under review.  
 
Despite that in 2006, prior to the financial crisis, most EANCBs were Note Issuers, 
only DE and LU remained Note Issuers for almost the entire period under 
consideration. This classification is based on the banknotes in circulation as compiled 
and presented in Chapter 3 – using the actual amount of Euro banknotes rather than 
the banknotes in circulation featuring as a liability item on the EANCBs’ balance 
sheet. A description of this adjustment is also summarized in Section 6.3. As the crisis 
unfolded, more EANCBs were switching to Intra-Eurosystem Borrowers. This 
reflected the increasing importance of transfers between EA Member States during 
the crisis period. Subsequently, there was a shift back towards issuing domestic 
liabilities in 2015 and 2016. Detailed central banks’ classifications concerning the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet are presented in Appendix 6.4. 
 
As explained earlier, an EANCB is classified as issuing predominantly domestic 
liabilities if, in general terms, reserves exceed Target2 liabilities (assuming that the 
EANCB has relatively lower banknotes in circulation). The build-up in reserves did 
not occur uniformly across countries. Particular increases are noted by DE, FR and 
NL as the increasing possibility of bank runs gave rise to a movement of deposits 
away from high-debt countries towards countries considered as ‘core’ of the Euro 
Area. Meanwhile, the ‘periphery’ countries like IT, PT, ES and GR held 
predominantly cross-border positions as they accumulated Target2 liabilities 





































































































































































































































































































































(LCB - LDOM)/(LCB + LDOM)
LB = Banknotes; LDOM = Liabilities to Domestic Counterparties; LCB = Cross-Border Liabilities 
^Data for Portugal for 2011-2016 do not feature here because (LCB+LDOM)/Bn is negative. Bn is negative 
because more banknotes have been taken out of circulation than put into circulation. (Refer to Chapter 3 
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Target2 liabilities by the ‘periphery’ countries was also a result of these EANCBs 
acquiring sovereign bonds from investors outside their own countries requiringcross-
border transfers (ECB 2017a). In addition, Whelan (2017) argued that, in the case of 
Spain and Italy, Target2 liabilities also accumulated as these EANCBs purchased 
bonds from Spanish and Italian residents, who have then reallocated their money into 
foreign assets (portfolio rebalancing). These factors are reflected in an eastward shift 
in the graphs for the ‘periphery’ countries (Figure 6.3).  
  
To sum up, in terms of the EANCB’s balance sheet configuration, this analysis reveals 
that:  
(i) Unsurprisingly, during the recent financial crisis, EANCBs in the ‘core’ 
countries engaged more in lending activity and held larger cross-border 
positions while those in ‘peripheral’ countries held predominantly 
domestic assets and were borrowing institutions engaging in larger cross-
border liabilities. 
(ii) Cross-border activity was more dominant during the years of intense 
financial crisis. 
(iii) As the financial crisis subsided, there was a shift back towards issuing 
domestic liabilities. 
(iv) The rather dramatic changes in the composition of EANCBs’ balance 
sheets is not revealed by the Eurosystem balance sheet.   
 
Further Analysis of the Results – The Framework for Euro Area National 
Central Banks (FEANCB) 
 
The following summarizes how the main events that unfolded during the crisis 
affected the composition of EANCBs’ balance sheets, clustering them in two main 
groups: the ‘core’ and the ‘periphery’. 
 
In the early years of the crisis, the loss of funding for banks in countries such as 




from their central banks in a bid to avoid damaging their solvency. This expanded 
the balance sheet of these EANCBs as they took on new domestic assets in terms of 
lending to credit institutions. As from 2015, quantitative easing had a similar effect – 
increasing their domestic assets (upper panel of Figure 6.5). Both of these operations 
are reflected in increased Target2 liabilities of the GIPS central banks. For example, 
when Spanish banks experienced deposit flight (to German banks), they increased 
their lendings from the central bank of Spain. In turn, the central bank of Spain 
engaged in lending activity to the Spanish banks while also incurring an intra-
Eurosystem liabilitiy to the ECB. In the case of QE, as the central bank of Spain 
purchased Spanish government bonds, it increased its intra-Eurosystem liabilities to 
the ECB.    
 
In the context of severe market stress, the provision of liquidity via refinancing 
operations flowed from vulnerable to less-vulnerable countries giving rise to 
increased reserves (domestic liabilities) in particular on the balance sheets of the 
central banks of Germany, the Netherlands and France (DNF) and heightened T2 
claims as the DNF central banks acquired a claim on the GIPS central banks (cross-
border assets – lower panel of Figure 6.5).   
 
The application of the new alternative framework designed for the NCBs operating 
within the Euro Area reveals that the balance sheet composition differs across 
national central banks. More interesting is the fact that the balance sheet configuration 
depends on the ability of the central bank’s country to withstand the repercussions of 
the financial crisis. More specifically, as evident in the previous Figure, EANCBs in 
the ‘core’ countries held cross-border asset positions and issued domestic liabilities. 
Meanwhile, EANCBs in the ‘periphery’ countries held domestic asset positions and 
issued cross-border liabilities. This is in line with the accumulation of Target 












^Domestic Assets mainly consist of lending to credit institutions and PSPP.  
*Cross-Border Assets consist of T2 claims (excluding claims related to euro banknotes). 
 
Lenders while the GIPS built up the largest Target2 liabilities – classifying as Intra-
Eurosystem Borrowers. This also confirms that the transfers between EANCBs should 
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6.2 The Application of Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the EANCBs 
 
Having investigated EANCBs through the newly designed framework (FEANCB) 
that specifically cater for the three types of transactions EANCBs engage in, it is 
interesting to look at the same EANCBs from a different perspective. By applying 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework (PF), the different types of domestic assets are put in the 
limelight even if at the expense of completely ignoring intra-Eurosystem transactions. 
This is the scope of this second part of this Chapter.  
 
As explained earlier, the Pattipeilohy’s Framework was designed for central banks 
which operate their own monetary policy framework (referred to here as “main” 
central banks) and therefore transactions either give rise to domestic assets/liabilities 
in cases when only institutions within the same jurisdiction are involved or give rise 
to foreign assets/liabilities in case of transaction with other central banks. In a system 
of central banks such as the Eurosystem, transactions between a national central bank 
and institutions within the same jurisdiction also involve domestic positions. 
However, national central banks operating within the system may also be involved 
with transactions with other EANCBs giving rise to intra cross-border positions. This 
possibility, which does not rise in case of “main” central banks, necessitated the 
proposing of a new framework – the FEANCB – which, as dealt with in the previous 
Section, includes a new category – the intra-Euro Area cross-border assets/liabilities 
(ACB/LCB). 
 
In light of this, it is easily evident that when applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to 
the EANCBs, a bold limitation emerges – intra-transactions are not taken into account 
(this explains why these are marked as Not Applicable in Table 6.3 column 1 and 5). 
Despite this limitation, however, there is still some validity in the application of PF 
for EANCBs. As the PF distinguishes between domestic private sector debt and 




banking sector and those related to the government on the liabilities side77, it allows 
for an investigation into the degree of heterogeneity in the composition of the 
EANCBs’ balance sheets with respect to these categories.  
 
As presented in Table 6.3, the first group of assets, FX, is similar in the two 
frameworks – with the only difference being the fact that in the FEANCB ‘Claims on 
non-Euro Residents in Euro’ are classified as cross-border assets rather than as foreign 
exchange reserves.  
 
When Pattipeilohy’s Framework is applied for the Euro Area central banks, the 
second group of assets is domestic assets, which is almost equivalent to the domestic 
assets category in FEANCB. The only discrepancy concerns the ECB’s Purchase 
Programmes as, in line with PF, all Programmes are considered as domestic assets, 
while in FEANCB (as documented earlier) some are classified as domestic while 
others are considered as cross-border positions depending on the specific EANCB.  
 
As explained earlier, the motivation to apply PF to EANCBs stems from its ability to 
distinguish between private and public sector assets. In fact, as defined in Table 6.1, 
domestic assets are sub-divided into domestic private (L) and domestic public debt 
(G). Thus, ‘Lending to EA Credit Institutions related to Monetary Policy Operations’ 
(item 5) is considered as being private sector debt, while ‘Claims on the Federal 
Government’ (item 8) and ‘Other Securities’ (item 7.2) are considered as public sector 
debt (G) (refer to Table 6.3).  
 
The Purchase Programmes, which are all considered as domestic assets, are also 
categorized between L and G. In particular, the Covered Bond Purchase Progamme 
(CBPP) is considered as domestic private sector debt (L) while the Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) features as domestic public sector debt (G). Besides the terminated 
Programmes, the analysis also includes the Asset Purchase Programmes (APP) that 
 
77 In fact, on the liabilities side, balance sheet items 2 and 3, which according to PF, constitute Rs and 




were introduced at a later point in time and therefore not featuring in Pattipeilohy’s 
2016 study. In particular, the Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP), which 
consisted of the purchase of corporate sector bonds, is included as lending to the 
domestic private sector (L). In contrast, the Public Sector Purchase Programme 
(PSPP), as the name entails, involved purchases of public sector securities and is, 
therefore, classified as domestic public sector lending (G). 
 
While the application of the PF to EANCBs do not treat their balance sheets 
exhaustively (leaving out one of their main items) it allows for a deeper investigation 
of domestic assets.  
 
The Asset Side of the EANCBs’ Balance Sheets in Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
 
As explained earlier, according to the PF, the assets are classified as being either 
Foreign Exchange Reserves, Domestic Private Sector Debt or Domestic Public Sector 
Debt. A fourth minor category is ‘Other Assets’. The intra-Eurosystem balances are 
not included in any of these categories of balance sheet items and therefore, the 
summation of these categories add up to the total Eurosystem assets/liabilities as 
published by the ECB.  
 
In line with PF, the first indicator on the assets side – (G + L)/FX – characterizes the 
assets side of the balance sheet as being either predominantly foreign or 
predominately domestic in nature. This indicator shows the extent to which monetary 
policy is tuned to the external environment. Moreover, central bank’s domestic asset 
portfolio is characterized as being either geared towards domestic government 
lending or domestic private lending by computing G/L, indicating the main domestic 
channel through which the EANCB implements ECB’s monetary policy. If a central 
bank has a larger amount of foreign exchange holdings on its balance sheet compared 
to its domestic asset holdings (FX > (G + L)), then this central bank is classified as a 
Foreign Exchange Holder (FXH). On the other hand, if a central bank has more 




characterized as a domestic lender – either Treasury Holder (TH) or Private Sector 
Lender (PSL). If domestic public lending by this central bank exceeds private sector 
lending (L), then the central bank is a Treasury Holder. In contrast, if the domestic 
private sector is a counterparty for more than half of the domestic assets, then the 
central bank is a Private Sector Lender. Intra-Eurosystem balances do not feature in 
any of these classifications.  
 
Figure 6.6 presents the composition of the EANCBs’ assets by central bank based on 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework, which, as explained earlier, does not include intra-
Eurosystem balances in the analysis and therefore relates to the ECB definition of total 
assets. This contrasts with Figure 6.1 which captures the classifications resulting from 
the FEANCBs and relates to ESTA definition. Moving to the right along the horizontal 
axis indicates an increasing reliance on domestic public assets (G > L) while shifting 
to the left indicates a dominance of domestic private sector lending (G< L). Moving 
upwards along the vertical axis indicates an increasing dominance of domestic assets 
vis-à-vis foreign assets ((G + L) > FX). Correspondingly, the lower green segment of 
the charts in Figures 6.6 and 6.7 implies that domestic debt exceeds foreign exchange 
reserves. The upper left yellow segment implies that private sector debt exceeds 
public sector debt while the upper right orange segment implies that public sector 
debt dominates. 
 
A quick look at Figure 6.6 shows that over the 2006-2016 period, the density of the 
observations in the graphs varied between central banks. In particular, the relative 
changes in the Bundesbank’s balance sheet have been most pronounced, on the basis 
of the methodology in this study. Indeed, several developments can be observed in 
terms of asset composition of the Bundesbank. In the 2006 – 2009 period, this central 
bank maintained a relatively high supply of liquidity to banks, starting out as a 
Private Sector Lender. Subsequently, in 2010 - 2011, an eastward shift is observed 
reflecting a fall in lending to credit institutions related to monetary policy coupled 






Figure 6.6 Composition of EANCBs’ Assets excluding Intra-Eurosystem Assets by    















































































































































































































































































































































































































latter, the Bundesbank is classified as an FX-Holder in terms of asset structure. The 
2012-2014 was a fairly stable period before a noticeable shift is observed in 2015 and 
2016. This shift refers to the participation in the PSPP, which implied a reclassification 
of the Bundesbank to a Treasuries Holder. 
 
Notable changes in balance sheet composition also occurred for Greece. Starting out 
as a Treasuries Holder on account of relatively significant claims on the general 
government, the central bank of Greece steadily increased its supply of liquidity to 
banks as the crisis unfolded. As a consequence, this central bank became a Private 
Sector Lender for most of the period under consideration. Over 2010 and 2011, Greece 
benefited from the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (classified as Other Assets) while 
lending to banks decreased significantly. As a result, the central bank of Greece’s 
holdings of domestic government bonds exceeded its private sector lending, 
displayed as a gradual eastward shift becoming again a Treasuries Holder by 2016.  
 
Despite that the relative changes in the balance sheets of the rest of the central banks 
have been less pronounced, some type-switching is still observed. In particular, in 
2011/2012 a westward shift is observed in most cases accept for CY and GR, reflecting 
the very long-term refinancing operations. On the other hand, an eastward shift is 
observed in all cases towards the end of the period under consideration, on account 
of the APP being skewed towards government bonds. Indeed, the central banks 
which were characterized as being either Private Sector Lenders or Foreign Exchange 
Folders in 2006 switched to being Treasury Holders by 2016 (with the exception of 
MT and LU).  
 
As illustrated in Figure 6.7, differences in national central bank asset holdings were 
more substantial prior to the crisis (2006) than during the years when recovery was 
underway. In other words, the composition of the asset side of the EANCBs balance 
sheet was relatively more heterogeneous in 2006 than in the following years to 2016. 
Indeed, in 2015 and 2016, a high degree of clustering is observed, implying a 




Figure 6.7 Composition of EANCB’s Assets excluding Intra-Eurosystem Assets:     
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In 2006, five EANCBs – NL, IT, FR, FL and PT – had their balance sheet assets 
dominated by foreign exchange reserves rather than domestic assets78, probably 
reflecting, to a large extent, the fact that they had managed their own exchange rate 
and accumulated large amounts of foreign exchange reserves prior to the launch of 
the monetary union (Nagel, 2012). The remaining seven EANCBs – DE, LU, BE, IE, 
AT, ES and GR relied more on domestic assets. Out of these EANCBs, the balance 
sheet of Spain and Greece had higher domestic public sector assets than domestic 
private sector assets. 
  
During the initial years of the crisis, as a result of the scarcer liquidity, the Eurosystem 
increased liquidity provision to banks and most EANCBs either sustained the earlier 
dominance of domestic assets on their balance sheet (primarily private sector assets) 
or experienced a shift towards this dominance such that by 2009, twelve EANCBs 
(out of 16) are classified as being Private Sector Lenders (PSL). 
 
Over the following three years to 2012, central banks in most jurisdictions increased 
their recourse to refinancing operations such that lending to Euro Area credit 
institutions – both MROs and LTROs – peaked for most EANCBs over the 2010-2012 
period. These heightened refinancing operations coupled with the participation of 
EANCBs in the CBPP were reflected in most EANCBs being classified as PSL at least 
at one point during these three years. On the other hand, the central banks of Greece 
and Cyprus registered lower domestic private sector assets as their lending to credit 
institutions declined while they received Emergency Liquidity Assistance (classified 
as Other Assets) and were therefore classified as being TH by 2012. As illustrated in 
Figure 6.7, the years 2010 to 2012 were characterized by considerable type-switching 
by EANCBs between PSL and TH. At the end of 2012, the EANCBs’ relative asset 
structure still illustrated some degree of heterogeneity (though still lower than the 
disparity noted in 2006), with ten EANCBs being PSLs, six being THs and only one 
EANCB considered as a Foreign Exchange Holder.  
 
78 As explained above intra-Eurosystem assets are not taken into account in the analysis since this is 





As from 2013, the EANCB’s asset structures became increasingly homogeneous. Over 
2013 and 2014, nine EANCBs (AT, BE, CY, EE, FI, FR, IE, NL and SI) saw their asset 
structure become more skewed towards domestic public sector assets, as recourse to 
refinancing operations started decreasing while their take up of SMP increased their 
holdings of government securities. At the same time, EANCBs such as GR, IT, PT and 
ES retained their preference towards domestic private sector assets since their high 
levels of refinancing operations and their participation in the CBPP was stronger than 
their uptake of securities. Subsequently, in 2015 and 2016, the participation of all the 
EANCBs in the largest-scale asset programme – the PSPP (amounting to €1.3 billion 
euros) - implied that by 2016 all EANCBs (except MT and LU) were Treasury Holders.  
 
To sum up, in terms of asset composition79, this analysis reveals that: 
a) In general, dissimilarity in asset composition appears large among EANCBs 
particularly up to 2012. 
b) Since 2013, the composition of the asset side of the EANCBs’ balance sheets 
became less diverse and by 2016, a high degree of homogeneity is observed in 
the asset structure of the EANCBs balance sheet – all EANCBs80 were 
classified as Treasury Holders.  
c) Almost all EANCBs81 have domestic asset holdings equal to or larger than 
foreign asset holdings and are thus classified as either Private Sector Lender 
or Treasuries Holder.  
d) The most significant changes occurred in the balance sheet configuration of 
the Bundesbank, which started out in 2006, holding almost solely domestic 
private sector assets (vis-à-vis public sector assets) and some dominance of 
foreign exchange reserves in the midst of the crisis but having the asset side 
of the balance sheet highly dominated by domestic public assets in 2015 and 
2016. 
e) In terms of typology, a considerable number of EANCBs switched type over 
the period under analysis. Quantitative easing had a significant impact on 
 
79 Refer to Appendix 6.5 for detailed classification results. 
80 Luxembourg and Malta are excluded from the analysis since they are either outliers or insignificant.  




EANCBs balance sheet composition. Since this was skewed towards 
government bonds, almost all of the EANCBs have become Treasury Holders 
by 2016. 
 
When applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the balance sheet of the Eurosystem as 
published by the ECB, one notes that the Eurosystem is classified as a PSL for nine 
consecutive years up to 2014, switching type in 2015 to being a Treasuries Holder. 
This contrasts with the significant type-switching observed in terms of asset 
composition of individual EANCBs. Up to 2014, while some EANCBs such as AT, BE, 
CY, FR, IE and NL increased their holdings of government securities, the engagement 
of other EANCBs such as GR, IT, PT and ES in longer-term refinancing operations 
dominated leading to the amalgamated balance sheet being classified as a PSL. 
Subsequently, in 2015, domestic public sector assets acquired by all EANCBs under 
the SMP and the PSPP (accounting for 22 per cent and 37 per cent of the total 
Eurosystem assets respectively) dominated, classifying the Eurosystem’s balance 
sheet (in line with the classification for all EANCBs) as Treasuries Holders. In light of 
these results, it is easy to conclude that the rather dramatic changes in the EANCBs 
balance sheet composition are hidden in the Eurosystem balance sheet, particularly 
for the period when the effects of the financial crisis were intense and the ECB was 
doing ‘whatever it takes’ to ameliorate hard hit Eurozone financial sectors and 
economies. This point had already emerged when applying the FEANCB – one 
cannot identify the changes in the EANCBs’ balance sheets composition by simply 
looking at the Eurosystem balance sheet. 
 
These results are unchanged when the Eurosystem is defined according to the 
definition presented in Chapter 4 – ESTA – since, as explained earlier, this framework 
do not account for intra-Eurosystem transactions. Again, this is one of the main 







The Liabilities Side of the EANCBs Balance Sheets in Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
 
On the liabilities side, the PF compares the category banknotes in circulation (Bn) to 
non-banknote liabilities, the latter consisting of liabilities to the banking sector (Rs) 
and liabilities to government (Rg), by constructing the indicator ((Rs + Rg)/Bn). The 
ratio Rg/Rs is also computed to distinguish between deposit liabilities begin geared 
towards the banking sector from those geared towards the domestic government. As 
explained earlier, any liability position held between central banks is not taken into 
account in PF.  
 
An eastward shift along the horizontal axis of the charts in Figure 6.8 and 6.9 implies 
an increase in liabilities to the banking sector as compared to the liabilities to the 
government (Rs>Rg). An upward shift along the vertical axis refers to an increasing 
dominance in the balance sheet of non-banknote liabilities as compared to banknotes 
in circulation (Rs + Rg)>Bn.   
 
Figure 6.8 illustrates developments in the balance sheet configuration of each EANCB 
over the 2006-2016 period. The density of the observations in the graphs varies 
between central banks – BE, CY, IE and IT experiencing limited changes in 
composition while DE, FR, GR and ES registering more pronounced shifts. As the 
Germans remain obsessed with cash (Weidmann, 2016), the Bundesbank was 
classified as a Note Issuer throughout the entire period under review, despite a 
comeback in deposits associated with the banking sector in 2015 and 2016 (reflected 
in horizontal shifts on the graph). Greece has also been classified as a Note Issuer, 
however, for different reasons – total deposits have been relatively low from the start, 
weakening even further in later years as deposit flight from the EA ‘periphery’ 
banking systems became more relevant, implying south-western shifts on the graph. 
 
Figure 6.9 clearly illustrates that differences amongst EANCBs in the composition of 




the asset side of the balance sheet discussed earlier. In the context of Pattipeilohy’s 
Framework, EANCBs are more heterogeneous in terms of liability composition.  
 
It is pertinent to note that, the relatively high degree of heterogeneity between the 
structures of the liabilities side of the EANCBs’ balance sheets does not always 
translate into different classifications of EANCBs. In fact, while large disparity 
between EANCBs exist, most EANCBs still fall within the same classification. For this 
reason, although looking at the classification of each EANCB for each year under 
review (as presented in Appendix 6.6) gives the impression of a relatively high 
homogeneity between EANCBs, Figures 6.8 and 6.9 illustrate otherwise.  
 
In 2006, the majority of EANCBs were classified as Note Issuers reflecting relatively 
high banknotes in circulation and low bank reserves (very limited excess reserves 
beyond the regulatory requirement). Thus, according to Nagel (2012), these EANCBs 
had a ‘lean’ balance sheet prior to the crisis. Only AT, BE, IE and PT were classified 
as Banker’s Bank reflecting relatively low banknotes in circulation (AT and BE) or an 
almost equal distribution between banknotes and reserves (IE and PT). 
 
Besides the four EANCBs which started out as Banker’s Banks in 2006, as the crisis 
unfolded, three other EANCBs (FI, FR, NL) switched type gradually to being a 
Banker’s Bank as bank demand for central bank liquidity increased during the 
sovereign debt crisis. The other EANCBs which joined the Euro Area after 2006 (CY, 
EE, MT and SI) were classified as Banker’s Banks for almost the entire period (with 
the exception of Slovakia, which was classified as a Note Issuer). The large levels of 
excess liquidity provided via the ECB’s non-standard measures such as the LTROs 
had a corresponding effect on the liabilities of central banks, as the recourse to the 
deposit facility by credit institutions has also increased significantly. Thus, by 2016, 
twelve (out of nineteen) EANCBs were classified as being Banker’s Banks, also 






Figure 6.8 Composition of EANCBs’ Liabilities excluding Intra-Eurosystem  


















































































































































































































































which led to an expansion of excess bank reserves. Meanwhile, seven EANCBs 
remained Note Issuers for all or most of the period under review. 
 
Only the central bank of Portugal switched type to being Government’s Bank in 2016 
relating to deposits from the Portuguese Treasury and Government Debt Agency 
with reference to the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism and the European 
Financial Stabilisation Facility.  
 
To sum up, in terms of the composition of EANCBs’ liabilities (refer to Appendix 6.6 
for detailed classification results), this study reveals that: 
a) EANCBs are more heterogeneous in terms of liability composition and remain 
so even when the effects of the financial crisis subsided. 
b) Despite that a higher degree of heterogeneity is observed amongst EANCBs, 
most EANCBs fall within the same classification - Bankers Bank - by 2016. 
c) ‘Periphery’ countries like GR, IT, ES and IE were classified as Note Issuers 
during the financial crisis period with relatively low recourse to the deposit 
facility and minimum reserves coupled with low government deposits. 
Germany was also classified as Note Issuer, which unsurprisingly, reflects 
high demand for banknotes.  
d) Type-switching was relatively low amongst EANCBs despite disparity in 
their balance sheet composition.  
 
Again, the heterogeneity observed amongst EANCBs in their balance sheet 
classification is not revealed by the Eurosystem balance sheet. In particular, the type-
switching towards being a Banker’s Bank is only evident in 2011 and 2012 by the 
Eurosystem balance sheet. Similar to what was observed in the case of the 
composition on the assets side of the balance sheet, looking at the Eurosystem balance 
sheet is not enough for a proper analysis of what goes on amongst the individual 





Figure 6.9 Composition of EANCB’s Liabilities excluding Intra-Eurosystem  










































































































































































































































































































































































































Despite that this analysis revealed interesting insights on the EANCBs, it is pertinent 
to emphasize again that applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the EANCBs have one 
important limitation - the balance sheets of the EANCBs are not treated exhaustively. 
In fact, transactions between EANCBs giving rise to intra-Eurosystem transactions 
are ignored in this analysis, thus accounting for only around 70 per cent of the total 
balance sheet (as defined by ESTA).  
 
6.3 Data Description 
 
The analysis presented in this Chapter requires more detailed data than the unique 
basic dataset described in Chapter 3. To this end, the basic dataset is enriched through 
the consideration of specific sub-items of the balance sheet for each EANCB. Data for 
these sub-items feature in Appendix 6.8. 
 
The investigation of observed compositional changes in the EANCBs’ balance sheets 
in this Chapter makes use of additional data pertaining to the following specific 
balance sheet sub-items: 
i) Covered Bond Purchase Programme  
ii) Corporate Sector Purchase Programme 
iii) Securities Market Programme 
iv) Public Sector Purchase Programme 
v) Liabilities to other Euro Area residents denominated in Euro pertaining 
to General Government (Item 4.1). 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Asset Purchase Programmes (items i – iv above) involved 
the purchase of both domestic and cross-border securities. Thus, data on each 
Programme were required in order to classify them accordingly. Such data were 
collected from the Annual Reports of the specific EANCBs, where they were either 
presented as sub-items in the balance sheets or in the notes to the accounts in their 
Annual Reports. Similarly to the basic dataset, this specific data were collected on an 




Through a quick look at Table 6.3 above, one notices that according to FEANCB the 
sub-item 4.1 is classified as domestic liabilties while sub-item 4.2 is included under 
the category ‘other liabilities’ and therefore it was necessary to collect data for each 
of these sub-components. Similarly to the data concerning the APPs, these data were 
accessed either from the EANCBs balance sheets or from the notes to the accounts in 
their Annual Reports.  
 
In the process of transporting EANCBs standardized data on their balance sheets as 
published in their Annual Reports to Table 6.3, one specific calculation concerning 
banknotes in circulation was necessary. As documented earlier in Chapter 3, the 
actual amount of banknotes in circulation was calculated by subtracting/adding up 
the amount of banknotes in circulation reported in the balance sheet of the EANCB 
(item 1 on the liabilities side) and the intra-Eurosystem claim/liabilities pertaining to 
the allocation of Euro banknotes (item 9.3 on the assets side or item 9.2 on the 
liabilities side). If a EANCB records a net intra-Eurosystem claim related to the 
allocation of Euro banknotes (on the asset side of the balance sheet), it implies that 
this EANCB puts less banknotes into circulation then the amount allocated to it 
(through the banknote allocation key). Thus, this intra-Eurosystem claim is deducted 
from the allocated banknotes in circulation (recorded as item 1 on the liabilities side). 
In such cases82, the total assets/liabilites on the balance sheet are therefore 
recalculated, leading to a smaller balance sheet. In fact, the total assets/liabilities of 
some EANCBs presented in the dataset in the Appendix to Chapter 3 differ from the 
totals presented in Appendix 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. 
 
For example, the total liabilities for 2016 for France amounted to €845.3 billion. Of this 
total, €208.7 billion pertain to the allocation of banknotes in circulation (item 1 on the 
liabilties side). However, France issued fewer banknotes than that and recorded 
claims related to the allocation of Euro banknotes amounting to €88.9 billion. Thus, 
 
82 This was the case for the following EANCBs throughout the 2006-2016 period: AT, BE, EE, FI, FR, LT, 
LV, NL, PT, SK and SI. Other EANCBs such as CY, IT and ES recorded intra-Eurosystem claims related 
to the allocation of Euro banknotes for only part of this period while DE, IE, GR, MT and LU recorded 





the latter amount was deducted from the former and the amount of banknotes in 
circulation featuring on the liabilities side of the balance sheet was revised 
downwards to €119.8 billion. Consequently, the total assets/liabilities were revised 




A number of caveats concerning this methodology are noteworthy. Firstly, 
transposing the actual EANCBs’ balance sheets (consisting of a total of 45 
components and sub-components) into simplified stylized balance sheets as in Table 
6.3 is not always clear. 
 
For example, while in his study, Pattipeilohy included ‘Other assets’ under the 
foreign exchange reserves category, it is considered as a separate category in 
FEANCB. Moreover, Pattipeilohy’s study takes a number of other assumptions in 
classifying balance sheet items into the different categories. In particular, despite that 
the SMP was designed as a purchase programme of public and private securities, it 
is categorized as being entirely domestic public debt with the central bank. 
Furthermore, the balance sheet item ‘Securities of euro-area residents denominated 
in euro’, other than the CBPP and CSPP, is assumed to entirely involve public sector 
lending. These assumptions may, in particular instances, seriously modify the 
classification of the EANCBs. 
 
As noted earlier, this methodological approach accounts for only monetary policy 
measures that affect the size of the balance sheets. Other measures of a regulatory 
nature, such as the non-standard measures adopted in the early phase of the financial 
crisis by the ECB, including the extended range of accepted collateral in the credit 
operations and the increased range of counterparties, are not captured by this 





This indicator-based methodology is subject to a number of somewhat arbitrary 
classification rules. In particular, the classification rules concerning the liabilities side 
applied in the analysis in this Chapter are slightly modified from those in 
Pattipeilohy’s study (refer to Appendix Table 6.1.1). However, such a modification 
exerts a minimal effect on the classification of the EANCBs.  
 
Other caveats concern the interpretation of the indicator-based classification scheme. 
A central bank is classified on the basis of quantitative rules (as in Appendix Table 
6.1.1 and Table 6.1.2). Thus, if for example foreign exchange reserves exceed domestic 
assets by one Euro than that central bank is considered as a Foreign Exchange Holder. 
On the other hand, if foreign exchange reserves are one Euro less than domestic 
assets, then that central bank is classified as either a Treasury Holder or a Private 
Sector Lender, again determined by which of these is the greater. These numerical 
rules are set arbitrary and may significantly affect the characterization of the 
EANCBs. Moreover, according to these classification schemes, EANCBs may exhibit 
characteristics of a particular type to different degrees. For example, a central bank 
may be classified as a Foreign Exchange Holder if its foreign reserves exceed domestic 
assets by a margin. However, a central bank whose foreign reserves exceed domestic 
assets significantly is also classified as a Foreign Exchange Holder. This methodology 
does not allow for distinguishing between these two EANCBs. As a result, the 
classification schemes should be interpreted with caution. However, as touched upon 
earlier, despite this limitation emerging from the use of classification rules, the charts 
that accompany this analysis, serve to, at least to some extent, address this issue by 
graphically showing the gap between EANCBs with the same classification. 
 
Despite these caveats, the application of these two frameworks for the EANCBs, as 
already discussed, uncover interesting insights on the balance sheets of the EANCBs 







6.4 Concluding Remarks  
 
Since the outbreak of the financial crisis, the Eurosystem adopted a number of non-
standard monetary policy measures that had an impact on the individual EANCBs’ 
balance sheets. The increased lending to Euro Area credit institutions in the early 
years of the crisis and the large-scale asset purchases conducted from 2015 onwards 
all led to significant effects on the EANCBs’ balance sheets. However, these effects 
were not necessarily the same. While the latter increased the size of the balance sheet, 
this was not the case for the former, rendering the size and the composition of asset 
holdings equally important for a comprehensive analysis of the central bank balance 
sheet.  
 
In contrast with balance sheet analysis for the business community, central bank 
balance sheet analysis is still in its infancy. A framework for analyzing central bank 
balance sheets has only been recently developed by Pattipeilohy (2016) to study 
“main” central banks in both advanced and emerging market economies. Similar to 
this framework, a new proposed framework is designed to take into account 
transactions that occur between central banks operating within a system such as the 
Eurosystem. This is the main contribution of this Chapter.  
 
As a number of EANCBs had their balance sheets predominantly characterized by 
cross-border positions, particularly during the years of intense financial crisis, the 
proposed framework – FEANCB –  segments the assets and liabilities into three main 
groups distinguishing between foreign exchange reserves, domestic assets and intra-
Eurosystem claims on the assets side and banknotes, reserves and intra-Eurosystem 
liabilities on the liabilities side. Based on the construction of a set of balance sheet 
ratios and classification rules, each EANCB was classified as either Foreign Exchange 
Holder, Domestic Assets Holder or Intra-Eurosystem Lender on the assets side and 
Note Issuer, Banker for Domestic Counterparties and Intra-Eurosystem Borrower in 





A number of interesting insights emerged with regard to the EANCBs’ balance sheets 
configuration. In particular, this Chapter revealed that EANCBs in countries whose 
financial sectors were in distress during the financial crisis provided liquidity to 
institutions in their own jurisdiction not only through normal monetary policy 
operations but also through their participation in the APP by buying securities issued 
by institutions residing in their own EA Member State. This is evident from their 
holdings of domestic assets. In supporting their banking sector, these EANCBs 
engaged in increased Target2 liabilities. On the other hand, EANCBs who could 
withstand the crisis and supported other EANCBs, experienced heightened reserves 
as deposits moved away from high-debt countries and, in turn, increased their 
Target2 assets.  
 
These compositional changes in the EANCBs’ balance sheets have been at least 
somewhat predictable; during the financial crisis EANCBs in the ‘core’ countries 
engaged more in lending activity and held larger cross-border asset positions; 
EANCBs in ‘peripheral’ countries held predominantly domestic assets and were 
borrowing institutions engaging in cross-border liabilities.  
 
Although this analysis does not cover a long period of time prior to the crisis but 
starts from 2006 or from the year of Euro adoption, one can easily deduce that there 
is some element of path-dependence affecting the composition of the balance sheets. 
For example, the pre-Euro history of Latvia, whose de facto monetary policy closely 
resembled a currency board – though formally the weakest arrangement among the 
Baltics – left its impact on its balance sheet composition post Euro adoption, being 
the only central bank classified as a foreign exchange holder in 2014.   
 
It has also been observed that the rather dramatic changes in the EANCBs’ balance 
sheet composition are hidden in the consolidated Eurosystem balance sheet 





Some validity was also identified in applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the 
EANCBs, notably stemming from the fact that this framework allows for particular 
focus on domestic assets distinguishing between those related to government and 
those related to the private sector. On the liabilities side, PF also allows for 
distinguishing whether central bank’s deposit liabilities are geared more towards the 
banking sector or the domestic government.    
 
Applying the Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the nineteen central banks reveals that in 
terms of typology, a considerable number of EANCBs switched type over the period 
under analysis, becoming Treasury Holders by 2016, as quantitative easing was 
skewed towards government bonds. While a significant degree of homogeneity was 
observed across EANCBs in terms of assets composition, EANCBs are more 
heterogeneous in terms of liability composition. As in the case of FEANCB, the 
Eurosystem balance sheet did not expose the changes in the composition of the 










Taking up the topic of the central bank balance sheets may sound arcane but as their 
unconventional use as a monetary policy tool became an increasingly common 
convention in the art of central banking, it was immediately recognized that more 
attention should be paid to central bank balance sheets than was the case prior to the 
crisis. The unprecedented scale and persistence of their worldwide expansion called 
for special attention. Indeed, recently there has been significant contribution in the 
literature on the understanding of the difficult and controversial issues related to the 
balance sheets of central banks now facing the central banking community.  
 
This thesis was motivated by the emergence of this new field of monetary policy 
analysis – the analysis of central banks’ balance sheets. However, despite that this 
field was rapidly gaining ground, analysis of balance sheets of national central banks 
operating within a system of central banks still received very little attention and the 
implications of such an analysis remained highly neglected. This is the niche to which 
this thesis contributes. 
 
Focusing specifically on the Eurosystem, this thesis contributes through the collection 
of a dataset as well as through investigations of the balance sheets of the  Euro Area 
National Central Banks, which in turn, lead to revealing insights on what was 
actually happening inside the Eurosystem – insights which remain unknown if one 
merely looks at the Eurosystem as a whole. On the basis of the dataset which contains 




questions are answered while others remain to be addressed through further 
research.  
 
Firstly, this thesis presents an alternative measure of the Eurosystem that serves to 
facilitate the investigation on the relationship between the national central banks 
within the Euro Area, the ECB and the Eurosystem. This new measure (ESTA), which 
is significantly larger than that published by the ECB, however, points towards a 
paradox – if evidence leads to advocating that most EANCBs act on autopilot, then 
their behaviour can be considered similar to branches of a greater entity. But, being 
branches of a greater entity allows for consolidation, thus, challenging the premise 
that the central institution of the Eurosystem is greater than the ECB. Though this 
paradox remain unresolved, this thesis presents evidence that the EANCBs are 
indeed effectively branches of a greater entity. In particular, it has been established 
that the size of the EANCBs’ balance sheets are, at least to some extent, determined 
by the size of their share in the ECB capital and this relationship is even stronger 
when the alternative definition of the Eurosystem is followed. The distinctive power 
of the ECB over the EANCBs has also been detected in terms of their financial 
strength as well as regarding their participation in the purchase programmes 
launched by the ECB in response to the crisis. A comparison with the Federal Reserve 
System also reveals weaker autonomy between the EANCBs and the ECB. In relation 
to these issues, this thesis concludes that the systematic behaviour of EANCBs is 
being disguised by the way the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is being published 
by the ECB. Moreover, the importance of publishing the EANCBs’ balance sheets on 
a higher frequency has also been brought to the forefront. It has been made clear that 
monthly or quarterly data provide further information than annual data, the latter 
obscuring important developments at times. Thus, it is recommended that all 
EANCBs are committed to publish their balance sheets on a monthly or at least 
quarterly basis. 
 
Further investigation on this matter revealed that the rise of ESTA above the ECB 




lack of an overall official lender of last resort for peripheral countries whose 
borrowing needs were heightened during the financial crisis and accentuated by an 
increase in spreads. It was also revealed that as T2 borrowings needed to be matched 
by T2 lending, this counterpart lending occurred through an auto-pilot mechanism 
whereby countries simply had to take their share of lending according to a rule 
identified in this thesis but never officially announced. As noted earlier, evidence was 
found of a systematic behaviour by the “Mega-ECB” operating by treating the 
EANCBs as branches that needed to satisfy the aggregate need for lending generated 
by the distressed countries. This thesis has identified lending via an auto-pilot 
mechanism while the casual factor for the balance sheet expansion was effectively the 
borrowing driven by the needs of the distressed governments. This remains 
unrevealed if the Eurosystem balance sheet is defined as the consolidated EANCBs 
balance sheets.  
 
Having discussed the alternative measure of the Eurosystem balance sheet (ESTA), 
the drivers of expansions in ESTA as compared to growth in the Eurosystem balance 
sheet as published by the ECB were examined. Overall, the rise of ESTA over the 
Eurosystem balance sheet published by the ECB was triggered by sufficiently 
alarming spikes in Greek and other sovereign debt spreads. Moreover, despite some 
exceptions with respect to Greece and Ireland, overall, country-specific financial 
tension in the sovereign debt market triggered the massive accumulation of T2 
imbalances and hence the expansion in the Eurosystem balance sheet. 
 
The relationships identified between the EANCBs, the ECB and the Eurosystem are 
also confirmed through an econometric analysis that estimated models determining 
the rate at which EANCBs adjust their size to the level that reflect their share in the 
ECB. It has been found that a one per cent increase in Implied Total Assets causes a 
one per cent increase in the Actual Total Assets. Moreover, over the long-run Actual 
Total Assets tend to move towards equilibrium. Amongst the ten models estimated, 
the preferred model has homogenous coefficients, unit short and long-run 




equilibrium. It has been shown that this preferred model fits better when the intra-
Eurosystem transactions are not consolidated.  
 
This thesis also conducts a detailed comparative analysis of developments in both the 
size and the composition of the balance sheets of the EANCBs. This analysis builds 
upon a unified framework presented by Pattipeilohy (2016) in his analysis of 
developments in central banks’ balance sheet composition. Since this framework was 
designed for “main” central banks and therefore does not include intra-transactions 
between central banks operating within a system, this thesis proposed a new 
framework through which the position of each EANCB vis-à-vis the rest of the 
national central banks could be examined. The application of this proposed 
framework revealed interesting insights concerning the central bank balance sheets 
configuration. Unsurprisingly, during the recent financial crisis, EANCBs in the core 
countries engaged more in lending activity and held larger cross-border positions 
while those in ‘peripheral’ countries held predominantly domestic assets and were 
borrowing institutions engaging in larger cross-border liabilities, in line with the 
accumulation of Target balances.  
 
Some validity was recognised in applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the EANCBs 
despite that these balance sheets are not treated exhaustively. This has revealed other 
interesting insights focusing particularly on the domestic part of the balance sheet. 
Starting with a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in the composition of the asset 
side of the EANCBs balance sheet up to 2012, all EANCBs were classified as holding 
mostly domestic government assets by 2016. The composition of the EANCBs’ 
balance sheets was more heterogeneous in terms of liability composition. Under both 
frameworks, it has also been observed that the rather dramatic changes in the 
EANCBs’ balance sheet composition are not revealed through the Eurosystem 
balance sheet in aggregate. This provides another justification as to why the EANCBs’ 





The literature (or rather lack of it) treats the Euro Area national central banks as if 
they do not matter. This thesis attempts to rectify this and demonstrates, in various 
ways, that they do matter. In sum, EANCBs balance sheets matter because they have 
the power to reveal facts that are obscured in the aggregate Eurosystem balance sheet 
– facts that may have important implications for individual national central banks as 
well as for the Eurosystem as a whole.  
 
While demonstrating the validity of Euro Area National Central Banks’ balance 
sheets, the analysis carried out in this thesis identified further gaps and posed new 
questions calling for future research. This may be facilitated by the use of the dataset 
contributed in this thesis.  
 
Having reached the conclusion that, to a large extent, the ECB’s capital is powerful 
enough to determine the financial strength of each EANCB poses a further question 
on which no consensus has, as yet, been reached in the literature. What determines 
the optimal level of central bank capital? And, in the context of this thesis, what is the 
optimal level of capital of each EANCB? In Chapter 4, the levels of capital (and 
reserves, revaluation accounts and provisions) of each EANCB were compared with 
the level of capital implied by their share in the ECB’s capital. But, while this focused 
on the distribution of the capital amongst EANCBs, the designing of a formula that 
determines the optimum level of capital for each EANCB is left for future research. 
 
Another interesting investigation which is left for future research, is to apply a 
slightly modified methodology in conducting the comparison between the systematic 
relationship identified between the EANCBs and the ECB and that between the FRB 
and the Federal Reserve System. In particular, the size of the EANCBs balance sheet 
is compared with the proportion of total capital that is held by each EANCB on its 
balance sheet rather than its share of the ECB’s capital. This would provide for a more 
accurate comparison despite that, as discussed in Chapter 4, the result is not expected 





Further research is also needed in the area concerning the typology of central banks. 
In Chapter 6, the starting point of the analysis on the composition of the balance 
sheets of national central banks was either 2006 (taken to represent a point in time 
prior to the crisis) or the date of adoption of the Euro in case of central banks that 
joined the Eurosystem after 2006. Given that prior to adopting the Euro, national 
central banks had divergent structures and central bank traditions, it would be 
interesting to go back in time and start the analysis from an earlier point in time. It is 
intriguing to determine the characteristics of the central banks prior to joining the 
Eurosystem and identify the extent to which they evolved from their pre-Euro 
positions. 
 
There is growing evidence of significant diminishing returns from asset purchases in 
both the UK and the US. Similarly, other studies concluded that lowering short-term 
interest rates and compressing credit spreads further from already-low levels are 
likely to produce diminishing economic benefits in the Euro Area. Against this 
background and in the context of the issues investigated in this thesis, it would be 
interesting to further examine whether surprise changes in the EANCBs balance 
sheets matter more than predicted ones.  
 
One peculiar facet closely related to the observed changes in the size and composition 
of central banks’ balance sheets (Chapter 6) is the evolution of central bank profits in 
the aftermath of the global financial crisis. It is interesting to investigate how the non-
standard monetary policy measures impacted on the profits of EANCBs. For 
example, as documented by Bibow (2018), the fact that the ECB embarked on 
quantitative easing only at a very late stage led to the absence of a significant boost 
in its seigniorage profits. As this juncture, it is interesting to question whether this 
would have been different if the Bundesbank did not engage in cross-border activities 
but matched its domestic liabilities with German debt. This investigation applied for 



















Appendices to Chapter 3 
 
 
Appendix 3.1: The Complete Dataset: 2006-2016 
 
Table I: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Austria 
 
Table II:  The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Belgium 
 
Table III: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Cyprus 
 
Table IV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Estonia 
 
Table V: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Finland 
 
Table VI:  The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of France 
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Table I: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Austria 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  4,481  5,115  5,595  6,899  9,501   10,954  11,353   7,843   8,892  8,761   9,885  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign Currency 
(FC) 
A2 5,204  7,192   6,342  5,597  7,147   8,446  9,216  8,963  11,607  11,637   12,210  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  286   298  487   2,322  2,566  3,027   3,231   3,146   2,886   2,828   3,049  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2 4,918  6,894   5,856  3,275  4,581  5,419  5,984  5,817   8,721  8,809   9,161  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3 1,621  1,215  13,286  173   85  4,544   1,026   695  829  1,221  1,940  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  604   987  1,634   1,596  2,685   2,040  1,532  1,858  2,041   1,489   1,246  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5 12,151  12,695  22,533  20,236  8,182  10,612  15,894  7,094  12,659   14,223   11,346  
      MRO A5.1  9,287  8,703  9,107   1,680   4,209   3,428  180  1,220  3,076   3,465   1,510  
      LTRO A5.2 2,864  3,991  13,408   18,556   3,488  7,184   15,714   5,874  9,583  10,658   9,836  
      FTRO A5.3 -  -  -  -   485  -  -  -   -   -  -  
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -  -   -  -  -   -  -  -  -  -  -  
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6 0  0   4,400   0   0  0  0  0   0   0   0  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7 3,277  4,633  5,443  10,012   16,403   18,753   16,775   16,862  16,404  29,701   46,192  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1 -   -  -  678   3,825  7,564  7,893   7,102  6,129   19,256  37,087  
     Other Securities A7.2 3,277  4,633  5,443  9,334  12,578  11,190  8,882  9,760   10,275  10,444  9,105  
Claims on the Government  A8 424   419  429  427   420  416  413   411  408   405  401  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9 16,951   19,964   14,838   18,146   26,182  34,095   43,284  43,507   30,023  29,594  30,318  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1 116   117   117   112  144  177   209  212   222   222   222  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of   
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2 1,157  1,161  1,161   1,119   1,119  1,119   1,119  1,123  1,138   1,138  1,138  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3 15,677  18,686  13,560  16,915  24,920   32,799  41,956  42,173   28,664   28,235  28,959  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  -     -     -     -    -  -     -     -     -     -     -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10 103  101   103   106  73  26  0   -  -  -   -  
Other Assets  A11 8,562  9,625  9,206  8,421   9,087  9,463  9,877  10,252  9,964   9,957   9,018  





Table I: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Austria (continued)       
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1  16,815   18,053   20,297   20,640   21,492   22,687   23,298   24,497   26,237   27,795   28,893  
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2  4,474   6,548   15,642   15,513   11,699   20,801   23,228   14,938   12,636   21,532   27,446  
     Current Accounts  L2.1  4,429   6,153   8,018   6,042   6,766   9,042   19,932   12,037   11,676   20,209   23,155  
     Deposit Facility L2.2  45   395   7,624   9,471   4,878   10,610   3,297   2,181   960   1,323   4,291  
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3  -     -     -     -     55   1,150   -     720   -     -     -    
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions 
in € 
L3  -     -     50   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4  6   17   81   65   69   44   287   309   2,689   6,602   11,500  
     General government L4.1  5   11   9   62   68   8   203   216   181   840   3,370  
     Other liabilities  L4.2  1   6   72   4   1   36   83   93   2,508   5,762   8,130  
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5  14   15   3   7   5   6   25   247   461   737   999  
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6  0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7  493   676   -     -     -     -     20   -     -     -     -    
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by the IMF L8  204   192   198   1,890   2,009   2,060   2,024   1,942   2,070   2,210   2,213  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9  21,160   25,402   35,662   19,584   27,496   34,614   39,897   39,148   30,083   29,147   31,138  
Items in Course of Settlement L10  -     25   31   25   1   1   -     0   -     0   -    
Other Liabilities L11  435   473   287   440   417   501   502   358   437   706   440  
Provisions L12  2,461   2,866   2,939   3,523   3,698   4,065   4,736   5,004   5,365   5,831   5,953  
Revaluation Accounts L13  3,176   3,529   4,474   5,757   8,690   10,366   11,125   6,806   8,595   8,125   9,662  
Capital and Reserves L14  4,126   4,133   4,142   4,149   4,166   4,185   4,198   4,217   4,229   4,246   4,294  
Profit for the Year L15 14 17 3 21 22 19 28 20 26 56 18 





Table II: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Belgium 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1 3,533 4,158  4,547  5,606  7,720  8,899  9,223  6,370  7,223  7,115  8,028  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2 6,621  6,997  6,663  11,080  12,409  13,927  14,022  13,109  13,826  15,050  14,411  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1 958  816  1,208  5,771  6,624  7,814  7,832  7,234  7,235  7,256  6,429  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
          External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2 5,663  6,181  5,455  5,310  5,786  6,113  6,189  5,875  6,592  7,794  7,982  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3 269  794  36,120  246  421  7,896  242  269  455  349  396  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4 346  187  344  507  582  773  663  555  563  419  805  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5 39,910  56,312  57,967  41,277  7,215  40,421  40,010  15,985  11,676  7,738  14,322  
      MRO A5.1 39,100  51,050  4,185  5,002  3,100  8,211  90  1,700  500  100  200  
      LTRO A5.2  810  5,262  52,050  36,275  4,115  17,965  39,920  14,285  10,335  7,638  14,122  
      FTRO A5.3 -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -  
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -   -  1,732   -   -  14,245  -  -  841  -  -  
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6 351  31  2,851  2,388  2,299  9,234  1,439  2  1  174  1,863  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7 4,479 5,109  15,176  15,305  19,088  23,396  22,962  21,369  21,484   38,212  72,989  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1  -   -  -  984   4,768   9,114   8,956  7,603   7,041   23,652   59,067  
     Other Securities A7.2  4,479   5,109   15,176  14,321   14,320   14,282   14,007  13,766   14,443   14,559   13,922  
Claims on the Government  A8 -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9 23,803  25,502  24,374  20,235  20,052  17,972  15,344  14,244  14,429  13,570  11,380  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1 143  144   144  140  180  221  261   264  287   287   287  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign  
     Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  1,419   1,423  1,423   1,397   1,397   1,397   1,397  1,401   1,436  1,436  1,436  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  22,241   23,935  22,807   18,698   18,475   16,354   13,686  12,579   12,706  11,847  9,657  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10 -  -   -   -  -  -   -   -  -  -   -  
Other Assets  A11 3,463  13,266  5,162  4,818  4,911  5,198  5,849  5,897  5,868  6,339  6,986  





Table II: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Belgium (continued)       
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 20,619 22,129 24,878 25,785 26,849 28,343 29,107 30,574 33,114 35,087 36,473 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 7,928 17,789 10,804 14,777 12,996 22,570 19,572 13,798 10,763 25,224 50,686 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 7,928 16,735 9,197 11,881 11,778 9,613 6,481 10,621 6,976 9,997 11,606 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 - 4 1,607 2,896 718 10,797 11,291 852 3,788 15,226 39,080 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 1,050 - - 500 2,160 1,800 2,325 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - 130 226 22 - - - - 173 139 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 60 55 85 116 131 540 568 268 286 244 328 
     General government L4.1 46 45 58 108 82 65 296 126 49 38 35 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 13 10 27 8 49 475 272 142 237 206 293 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 522 413 274 258 269 340 329 440 159 1,037 2,096 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - - - - 680 1,264 298 - - - - 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 705 1,564 2,530 2,207 1,657 1,740 1,107 - - 142 2,058 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 554 521 536 4,706 5,003 5,131 5,040 4,835 5,155 5,503 5,511 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 45,269 61,660 104,243 42,490 13,871 52,859 38,059 15,454 12,335 7,726 18,589 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 638 848 1,066 655 743 895 579 527 739 623 808 
Provisions L12 932 948 1,157 142 78 34 11 - - - - 
Revaluation Accounts L13 3,246 3,930 4,655 5,515 7,690 9,014 9,433 6,310 7,409 7,441 8,370 
Capital and Reserves L14 2,059 2,216 2,401 2,672 3,877 4,087 4,312 4,648 4,885 5,217 5,485 
Profit for the Year L15 244 283 445 1,912 832 899 1,337 947 680 550 638 




Table III: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Cyprus 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1   278  342  472  544  563  389  441  435  490  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2    428  541  374  391  343  278  352  75  470  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1   29  161  178  262  231  221  228  229   212  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
          External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2   398  380  196  130  113  57  123  146  259  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3   771  522   536  399  172  26  15  12  18  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4   69  -  -   -   -  -  5  5  5  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5   4,370  7,559  5,466  5,521  411  1,600  1,116  886  650  
      MRO A5.1    1,490  30  613  2,655  -  400  380  150   
      LTRO A5.2   2,880  7,529  4,853  2,807  411  1,200  736  736  650  
      FTRO A5.3   -  -   -   -  -  -  -   -   -  
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5   -  -   -   59  -  -   -   -  -  
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6   85  1  0  0  9,400  9,550  7,400  3,800  200  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7   2,446  2,473  2,917  2,485  1,634  881  856  2,226  3,629  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1   -  51  247  462  427  352  354  1,323  2,847  
     Other Securities A7.2    2,446   2,422   2,669   2,022   1,207  529  502   903   782  
Claims on the Government  A8   1,597   1,551   1,503   1,454   1,403   1,351  1,297  1,242  1,185  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9   203  260  419  662  976  109  127  2,902   7,074  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1   23  27  29  31  34  32  39  39  39  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign   
     Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2   72  79  79  79  79  77  88  88  88  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3   108  154  311  552  864  -  -  402  1,100  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A/Cs A9.4    -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,374   5,846  
Items in Course of Settlement A10   66  40  29  57  32  38  37  35  35  
Other Assets  A11   378  168  168  3,644  120  82  82  87  90  





Table III: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Cyprus (continued)      
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1   1,341 1,456 1,516 1,600 1,643 1,688 2,023 2,140 2,224 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 
  
1,292 3,101 2,289 3,173 3,984 2,773 4,131 7,210 9,037 
     Current Accounts  L2.1   1,292 1,237 1,192 1,572 1,903 1,008 1,995 5,109 6,673 
     Deposit Facility L2.2   1 1,864 1,097 1,226 1,840 925 2,136 2,101 2,364 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3   - - - 375 241 840 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4   - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5   - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3   - - - - - - 10 - 50 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4   458 453 279 930 260 967 1,250 987 815 
     General government L4.1   448 445 270 924 257 928 1,239 862 718 
     Other liabilities  L4.2   10 8 8 5 3 38 12 125 97 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5   107 115 103 87 29 14 9 21 23 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 
  
0 0 0 0 0 15 63 74 190 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7   - 44 - - - - - - - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8   21 145 154 158 155 149 158 169 169 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9   6,551 7,128 6,442 7,909 7,473 7,343 2,676 - - 
Items in Course of Settlement L10   72 46 30 58 32 38 37 35 35 
Other Liabilities L11   291 241 258 302 236 255 281 292 195 
Provisions L12   160 182 204 231 415 285 433 285 285 
Revaluation Accounts L13   326 370 478 549 567 382 441 425 474 
Capital and Reserves L14   62 64 117 145 148 170 216 249 272 
Profit for the Year L15   9 115 15 17 112 225  116 74 




Table IV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Estonia 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1       10   10   7   8   8   9  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2       152   216   220   352   372   323  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1       74   82   84   91   97   95  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2       78   134   136   261   275   228  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3       5   21   40   64   83   102  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4       2   3   2   0   1   12  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5       -     14   5   52   75   86  
      MRO A5.1       -     -     -     -     -     -    
      LTRO A5.2       -     14   5   52   75   86  
      FTRO A5.3       -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6       12   10   11   2   2   5  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7       544   565   497   445   1,495   3,399  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1       344   373   306   244   1,385   3,339  
     Other Securities A7.2       200   191   191   202   111   59  
Claims on the Government  A8       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9       2,333   3,398   3,451   5,060   4,647   2,758  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1       80   83   83   89   89   89  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign   
     Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2       103   103   103   112   112   112  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3       1,502   1,446   1,413   1,655   1,672   1,620  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A/Cs A9.4       648   1,766   1,852   3,205   2,774   938  
Items in Course of Settlement A10       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  A11       44   45   41   46   54   67  





Table IV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Estonia (continued)      
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1      2,141 2,149 2,252 2,577 2,730 2,838 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 
     
466 1,528 1,417 2,800 3,331 3,192 
     Current Accounts  L2.1      253 518 492 1,550 3,331 3,192 
     Deposit Facility L2.2      54 - 455 1,250 - - 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3      159 1,010 470 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4      - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5      - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3      - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4      9 10 12 9 12 18 
     General government L4.1      - - - - - 7 
     Other liabilities  L4.2      9 10 12 9 12 11 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5      0 0 0 0 0 5 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 
     
- - - - - 16 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7      - 19 - - - - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8      74 72 69 74 79 79 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9      - - - - - - 
Items in Course of Settlement L10      - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11      39 86 89 103 100 58 
Provisions L12      0 12 18 26 30 67 
Revaluation Accounts L13      10 14 10 23 11 19 
Capital and Reserves L14      341 358 384 402 414 437 
Profit for the Year L15      23 34 23 17 30 31 




Table V: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Finland 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  761   896   980   1,208   1,664   1,918   1,988   1,373   1,557   1,534   1,731  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  4,749   4,514   4,597   6,226   5,223   5,886   6,171   6,585   7,019   7,482   7,852  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  279   260   356   1,609  1815  1,967   2,097   1,955   1,913   1,890   2,048  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  4,470   4,254   4,241   4,617   3,408   3,919   4,074   4,630   5,106   5,592   5,804  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  1,061   1,394   2,577   1,120   712   628   404   297   360   417   648  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  368   394   581   845   1,662   1,946   1,970   1,347   1,044   1,443   1,803  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  1,025   230   2,600   2,710   50   2,311   3,681   2,475   722   690   6,728  
      MRO A5.1  500   30   350   20   -     10   -     -     15   -     -    
      LTRO A5.2  525   200   2,250   2,690   50   2,301   3,681   2,475   707   690   6,728  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  60   3   -     126   1   40   -     -     36   -     31  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  4,998   6,863   7,265   8,002   11,669   13,890   11,470   10,063   11,316   19,662   32,761  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy Purposes  A7.1  -     -     -     531   2,203   4,637   4,555   3,717   3,568   12,074   25,786  
     Other Securities A7.2  4,998   6,863   7,265   7,471   9,466   9,253   6,915   6,346   7,748   7,588   6,975  
Claims on the Government  A8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  5,886   7,465   10,161   14,280   23,921   70,335   74,381   26,539   24,583   25,096   26,609  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  74   73   73   78   99   120   141   141   144   144   144  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign   
     Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  717   717   717   722   722   722   722   722   728   728   728  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  3,938   3,724   4,174   3,945   3,414   3,485   3,248   3,522   3,962   4,103   3,879  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A/Cs A9.4  1,157   2,951   5,197   9,535   19,686   66,008   70,270   22,154   19,749   20,121   21,858  
Items in Course of Settlement A10  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  A11  933   1,048   1,254   1,130   1,090   1,171   1,115   1,052   1,082   1,088   1,341  





Table V: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Finland (continued)      
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 10,419 11,148 12,532 13,330 13,880 14,649 15,044 15,753 16,793 17,790 18,492 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 3,766 5,910 8,110 13,543 21,696 71,697 73,799 23,803 20,308 27,559 47,665 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 3,765 2,901 1,015 8,085 9,383 1,657 31,698 14,303 20,233 25,889 29,065 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 1 9 7,095 5,458 9,113 52,540 37,101 - 75 1,670 18,600 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 3,000 - - 3,200 17,500 5,000 9,500 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 - - 3,009 14 262 836 801 55 2 79 31 
     General government L4.1 - - 3,009 14 262 836 801 55 2 79 31 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 4 4 37 234 1,021 782 1,004 527 2 676 1,625 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - - - 248 - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 - 88 - 363 23 153 139 66 58 46 - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 163 153 158 1,295 1,377 1,412 1,387 1,330 1,418 1,514 1,516 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 - - - - 33 76 - - - - - 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 162 171 191 155 151 178 24 21 22 12 32 
Provisions L12 2,676 2,368 2,092 2,325 2,814 3,032 3,708 3,939 4,163 4,317 4,468 
Revaluation Accounts L13 762 854 1,622 1,703 2,274 2,806 2,609 1,556 2,304 2,762 2,982 
Capital and Reserves L14 1,596 1,704 1,864 2,015 2,175 2,262 2,332 2,442 2,501 2,514 2,562 
Profit for the Year L15 293 410 401 420 283 254 337 239 150 146 131 




Table VI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of France 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  42,210   47,557   49,802   60,006   82,640   95,282   98,751   68,217   77,343   76,211   85,993  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  30,410   25,304   23,716   36,953   46,340   40,720   48,708   37,069   40,949   50,091   55,309  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  1,804   1,448   2,323   13,136   14,732   17,604   18,119   17,023   17,198   17,292   16,071  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  28,606   23,856   21,393   23,817   31,608   23,116   30,589   20,046   23,751   32,799   39,238  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  7,396   14,040   65,593   13,954   11,940   44,609   8,072   14,212   16,108   18,951   12,057  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  2,303   2,257   5,793   2,940   6,901   10,113   6,539   6,363   3,226   4,376   3,778  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  13,695   71,055   134,463   120,984   34,984   129,336   181,933   74,250   76,054   89,303   70,730  
      MRO A5.1  12,037   24,751   16,750   1,980   11,955   6,098   7,611   11,875   11,691   7,362   117  
      LTRO A5.2  1,647   46,118  116,117   117,275   20,221   123,140  172,879   61,525   64,208   81,851   70,613  
      FTRO A5.3  -   -   -   -   2,800   -   -   -   -   -   -  
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -   -   1,106   1,244   -   -   -   -   -   -   -  
      Accrued Interest Receivable A5.6 11  186  490  485  8  98  1,443  850  155  90   
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  2,149   3,925   20,711   11,668   24,716   51,420   45,182   38,038   44,144   30,538   15,379  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  8,222   14,511   68,740   68,717   90,415   139,294   130,427   124,183   121,039   243,312   408,589  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy Purposes  A7.1  -   -   -   4,201   21,336   48,756   51,802   45,139   42,483   162,656   335,299  
     Other Securities A7.2  8,222   14,511   68,740   64,516   69,079   90,538   78,625   79,043   78,557   80,656   73,290  
Claims on the Government  A8  82   42   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  83,447   76,766   85,322   84,087   85,998   87,622   85,163   86,965   91,282   97,951   98,822  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  835   836   836   825   1,062   1,299   1,536   1,535   1,545   1,545   1,545  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign   
     Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  8,476   8,569   8,577   8,283   8,263   8,281   8,255   8,230   8,229   8,221   8,218  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  63,452   67,312   75,572   74,811   76,506   77,576   74,845   76,822   81,199   88,022   88,864  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A/Cs A9.4  10,684   49   337   168   167   467   527   378   309   164   195  
Items in Course of Settlement A10            
Other Assets  A11  42,248   105,252   98,879   106,743   97,692   110,854  127,007   100,710  107,593   99,631   94,705  





Table VI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of France (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 120,229  128,852  144,862  151,174  157,415  166,160  170,641  178,754  189,498  200,781   208,710  
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2  26,378   73,698   90,843   61,076   44,643  171,001  189,832  106,980  109,955  219,802   328,789  
     Current Accounts  L2.1  26,377   49,266   67,693   34,314   32,911   53,163  104,368   68,174   95,753  133,034  181,597  
     Deposit Facility L2.2 - - 23,150 26,762 10,982 51,262 84,570 28,217 14,202 86,768 147,192 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 23,000 - - 750 66,576 894 10,589 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 1 1,432 - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3  18   40   139   62   1,688   1,874   926   20   15   10   3,953  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4  4,498   4,290   17,112   25,083   5,504   13,151   10,135   7,617   6,612   19,878   23,288  
     General government L4.1  235   309   13,045   19,005   1,487   8,937   4,883   3,266   2,438   13,869   13,882  
     Other liabilities  L4.2  4,263   3,981   4,067   6,078   4,017   4,214   5,252   4,351   4,174   6,009   9,406  
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5  8,175   10,737   21,566   22,375   20,042   18,699   35,593   28,067   28,472   15,039   36,447  
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6  7,580   11,874   8,356   9,801   12,264   8,901   5,863   3,154   1,170   933   976  
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8  1,241   1,167   1,195   11,037   11,734   12,030   11,815   11,335   12,085   12,900   12,922  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9  -     12,035  117,880   62,077   28,363   77,515   54,850   16,195   17,020   29,315   14,123  
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 29,009 73,598 93,912 104,020 93,653 122,826 129,901 108,905 109,818 103,942 95,703 
Provisions L12 577 675 1,984 1,663 1,221 1,015 932 924 927 898 916 
Revaluation Accounts L13 21,633 27,558 31,978 42,892 67,961 81,709 85,050 52,037 65,335 68,438 79,246 
Capital and Reserves L14 11,212 13,292 20,453 12,059 34,366 32,697 32,890 33,487 34,607 36,100 36,539 
Profit for the Year L15  1,246   2,317   2,460   2,473   2,559   1,570   3,146   2,441   2,066   2,228   3,522  




Table VII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Germany 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  53,114   62,433   68,194   83,939   115,403   132,874   137,513   94,876   107,475   105,792   119,253  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  31,651   30,112   30,990   41,603   46,697   51,729   51,118   48,878   51,270   53,740   56,512  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  3,011   2,418   3,285   15,969   18,740   22,296   22,344   20,798   20,624   20,317   21,519  
     Balances with Banks & Security    
     Investments External Loans and Other   
     External Assets 
A2.2  28,640   27,694   27,705   25,634   27,957   29,433   28,774   28,080   30,646   33,423   34,993  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  -   7,051   63,263   4,412   -   18,128   3,341   125   -   -   1,788  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  300   300   300   300   -   -   -   -   -   -   438  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  256,348   267,955   277,424   223,610   103,076   55,796   73,093   52,055   65,572   58,096   65,474  
      MRO A5.1  173,940   133,095   75,291   53,605   68,376   8,635   2,855   38,162   32,544   9,127   1,807  
      LTRO A5.2  82,329   134,769   201,383   170,004   33,460   47,112   69,651   13,771   32,944   48,630   63,518  
      FTRO A5.3  -   -   -   -   1,240   -   -   -   -   -   -  
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  79   91   750   1   -   49   587   122   84   339   149  
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  3,049   13,077   22,031   7,136   9,610   8,464   1,442   4,691   2,011   3,540   3,025  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  -   -   -   13,168   36,145   71,867   67,487   55,844   50,224   172,275   357,700  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy   A7.1  -   -   -   7,892   30,899   66,981   67,487   55,844   50,224   172,275   357,700  
     Other Securities A7.2  -   -   -   5,276   5,246   4,886   -   -   -   -   -  
Claims on the Government  A8  4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  18,273   83,950   128,554   189,706   337,851   475,894   667,895   523,370   473,007   596,929   766,912  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  1,183   1,196   1,196   1,091   1,407   1,722   2,038   2,031   1,948   1,948   1,948  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of    
     Foreign  Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  11,762   11,821   11,821   10,909   10,909   10,909   10,909   10,872   10,430   10,430   10,430  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € BN A9.3  -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -   -  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2   A9.4  5,328   70,933  115,537   177,706   325,535   463,263   654,948   510,467   460,629   584,551   754,534  
Items in Course of Settlement A10  1   4   2   2   1   3   2   3   1  1 1 
Other Assets  A11  6,360   14,351   17,362   19,729   18,036   18,447   18,977   16,753   16,842   17,159   17,471  






Table VII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Germany (continued)      
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 170,881 183,781 206,620 201,304 209,615 221,264 227,231 237,258 240,518 254,844 264,907 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit 
Institutions re. Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
L2 47,956 109,513 166,939 112,163 146,432 228,872 299,962 141,459 90,195 208,741 411,350 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 47,913 64,032 100,678 76,665 71,407 76,408 129,607 83,877 81,176 155,149 284,948 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 43 4,931 66,261 35,498 38,536 66,069 40,470 10,712 9,019 53,584 126,402 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 40,550 - - 36,489 86,395 129,885 46,870 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - 8 - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. € L3 - - - - - - - - - - 466 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 405 448 816 10,350 929 5,501 39,929 10,466 9,870 71,889 105,829 
     General government L4.1 36 43 170 9,987 173 745 11,870 2,013 1,940 11,647 32,458 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 369 405 646 363 756 4,756 28,059 8,453 7,930 60,242 73,371 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 3,746 14,045 9,226 9,124 14,460 46,552 83,284 52,047 12,262 27,179 117,016 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 3 4 18,401 36 15 7 3 1,830 34 35 4 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 1,061 1,951 2,540 - 159 - 76 37 788 571 1,218 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 1,382 1,300 1,338 13,127 13,955 14,311 14,058 13,486 14,380 15,349 15,371 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 84,334 99,498 121,759 146,806 157,105 170,489 200,308 224,251 267,914 297,786 327,262 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 4 5 4 6 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 
Other Liabilities L11 3,255 3,610 3,540 2,639 2,886 3,545 3,317 3,305 2,739 2,058 2,092 
Provisions L12 5,370 5,190 7,011 6,562 7,996 12,046 18,898 19,221 19,696 19,608 21,879 
Revaluation Accounts L13 45,933 55,044 63,108 76,778 110,502 129,411 132,577 88,080 104,491 105,720 119,658 
Capital and Reserves L14 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,564 
Profit for the Year L15 4,205 4,285 6,261 4,147 2,206 643 664 4,591 2,954 3,189 399 




Table VIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Greece 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1 2,211 2,617 2,925 3,633 5,005 5,770 5,985 4,145 4,721 4,656 5,262 
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2 486 439 302 1,108 1,010 982 993 1,059 1,571 2,046 2,579 
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1 126 83 139 948 909 942 926 890 948 636 737 
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2 360 356 163 161 101 40 67 169 623 1,410 1,841 
Claims on EA residents in FC A3 553 700 2,474 282 284 1,019 344 324 600 613 205 
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4 649 1,002 831 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5 4,795 8,727 38,355 49,655 97,669 76,160 19,347 63,226 56,039 38,599 22,953 
      MRO A5.1 3,083 6,759 22,765 2,355 18,023 15,178 17,402 61,781 47,149 26,570 15,430 
      LTRO A5.2 1,712 1,968 15,584 47,300 78,383 60,942 1,945 1,385 8,890 12,000 7,500 
      FTRO A5.3 - - - - 1,263 - - - - - - 
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5 - - 6 - - 40 - 60 - 29 23 
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6 942 232 77 73 73 52,009 101,851 9,791 1 68,915 43,665 
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7 6,298 10,519 14,529 20,668 23,861 21,149 20,783 21,364 31,057 39,764 57,197 
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1 - - - 674 4,898 7,766 6,965 6,070 5,786 20,711 42,484 
     Other Securities A7.2 6,298 10,519 14,529 19,994 18,963 13,383 13,818 15,294 25,270 19,053 14,713 
Claims on the Government  A8 8,745 8,232 7,778 7,294 6,867 6,660 6,170 5,658 5,249 4,844 6,353 
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9 1,454 1,444 1,483 1,598 1,600 1,633 1,814 1,743 1,774 1,782 1,854 
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1 393 390 390 435 468 501 534 531 565 565 565 
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2 1,056 1,047 1,047 1,132 1,132 1,132 1,132 1,129 1,178 1,178 1,178 
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4 5 7 46 31 - - 148 82 31 39 111 
Items in Course of Settlement A10 2 3 1 2 0 0 2 2 - - - 
Other Assets  A11 8,790 8,746 2,167 2,280 2,272 3,054 2,490 2,185 2,146 2,294 2,316 




^The profit and loss account for the year has been reclassified as per Annual Report published by the Central Bank of Greece. 
Table VIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Greece (continued)     
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 15,338 16,270 18,291 20,886 21,748 22,958 23,577 24,641 27,172 28,792 29,929 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 4,530 7,108 7,794 8,008 10,528 4,703 2,169 1,959 3,076 1,387 907 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 4,527 6,603 4,931 4,616 3,303 2,506 1,369 749 2,926 1,259 877 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 3 5 2,863 3,392 7,165 1,180 410 1,150 150 - - 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 500 - - 60 - - - - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - 1,017 389 60 - 128 31 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 22 33 - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 913 1,216 1,598 1,381 2,339 5,553 7,191 7,986 4,378 5,085 9,527 
     General government L4.1 894 1,159 1,521 1,333 782 3,838 5,721 6,943 3,521 3,749 8,270 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 19 56 77 48 1,558 1,715 1,470 1,043 857 1,336 1,257 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 852 839 804 720 766 1,042 1,008 990 1,438 1,228 2,461 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 84 81 103 73 22 16 32 77 302 646 752 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 112 102 79 85 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 118 111 114 852 905 928 912 875 933 - - 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 9,752 13,196 37,833 49,122 95,055 123,245 112,815 61,955 54,502 113,977 85,571 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 55 44 26 26 23 15 3 2 3 1 1 
Other Liabilities L11 779 747 729 765 787 1,160 792 1,168 706 1,310 1,227 
Provisions L12 1,052 1,174 1,507 1,953 2,385 3,951 6,213 6,652 6,789 7,199 7,477 
Revaluation Accounts L13 651 965 1,249 1,917 3,264 4,050 4,250 2,376 3,043 3,072 3,716 
Capital and Reserves L14 667 775 794 805 815 815 815 816 815 815 815 
Profit for the Year^ L15 - - - - - - - - - - - 




Table IX: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Ireland 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1 93 110 120 148 204 235 244 168 191 188 212 
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2 566 522 587 1,346 1,382 1,081 1,051 1,019 1,270 1,836 3,191 
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1 172 128 188 989 1,008 1,061 1,049 1,016 1,085 1,158 1,858 
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2 394 394 399 357 374 20 3 3 185 678 1,333 
Claims on EA residents in FC A3 59 446 5,063 119 141 1,174 496 - - - - 
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4 3,243 1,553 1,274 1,234 883 1,231 1,229 1,515 2,127 2,813 2,653 
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5 27,044 39,449 93,412 92,858 132,010 107,236 70,936 39,046 20,700 10,735 7,418 
      MRO A5.1 10,822 12,140 44,431 8,425 63,655 30,520 7,850 4,545 4,050 2,300 - 
      LTRO A5.2 16,222 27,309 48,981 84,433 56,025 76,286 63,086 34,501 16,650 8,435 7,418 
      FTRO A5.3 - - - - 12,330 - - - - - - 
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5 - - - - - 430 - - - - - 
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6 1,060 429 114 636 514 42,849 40,426 562 351 373 160 
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7 7,137 9,884 14,222 14,922 18,236 20,731 21,264 63,817 55,096 59,631 67,255 
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1 - - - 532 3,003 4,790 4,363 3,307 3,396 11,103 22,434 
     Other Securities A7.2 7,137 9,884 14,222 14,391 15,233 15,941 16,901 60,510 51,700 48,527 44,821 
Claims on the Government  A8 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9 570 569 585 796 779 808 886 857 895 885 890 
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1 57 57 57 121 139 158 176 179 199 199 199 
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of   
      Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2 513 512 512 640 640 640 640 644 673 673 673 
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2  A9.4 - - 17 36 - 10 70 33 23 14 18 
Items in Course of Settlement A10 47 7 4 3 3 13 14 23 0 0 - 
Other Assets  A11 433 561 750 12,834 50,337 888 941 1,104 678 775 1,005 





Table IX: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Ireland (continued)   
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 7,454 7,957 8,947 11,806 12,293 12,978 13,328 14,051 15,512 16,436 17,085 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 12,915 21,839 19,447 14,908 11,414 6,029 3,518 3,243 4,055 10,018 19,225 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 12,910 10,820 8,535 8,248 8,264 3,734 1,798 1,980 3,066 5,287 13,509 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 5 3,019 10,912 6,660 3,150 2,295 1,720 1,263 988 4,730 5,716 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 8,000 - - - - - - - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 5,463 8,025 25,817 26,263 15,890 15,574 19,639 10,264 6,814 13,720 10,407 
     General government L4.1 5,463 8,025 25,817 26,260 15,888 15,572 19,636 10,261 6,811 13,718 10,404 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 0 0 - - 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 9 2 7 7 10 23 22 17 1 76 1 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - - - - - 0 0 - 0 0 0 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 100 - - - - - - - - - - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 - 94 96 844 897 920 904 867 925 987 988 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 11,933 12,896 58,739 67,234 160,181 135,870 95,200 71,593 38,767 19,289 17,832 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 1,212 1,454 1,442 2,046 1,814 2,339 2,013 1,995 2,661 2,387 2,430 
Provisions L12 12 7 77 52 36 318 417 380 280 190 333 
Revaluation Accounts L13 58 88 242 205 230 303 335 3,262 9,611 10,819 10,887 
Capital and Reserves L14 1,097 1,165 1,316 1,531 1,723 1,893 2,110 2,437 2,681 3,313 3,599 
Profit for the Year L15 - - - - - - - - - - - 




Table X: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Italy 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  38,050   44,793   48,995   60,410   83,197   95,924   99,417   68,677   77,865   76,718   86,558  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  19,483   19,276   26,647   31,782   35,724   38,016   38,283   36,834   39,269   43,202   42,498  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1 1,442 1,164 1,790 8,380 9,463 12,225 12,700 11,888 11,831 11,567 10,163 
     Balances with Banks & Security  
    Investments 
    External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2 18,041 18,112 24,857 23,402 26,261 25,791 25,583 24,946 27,438 31,635 32,334 
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  6,857   5,052   6,952   1,658   2,065   2,896   2,903   886   1,241   1,213   1,288  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  -     1   9   11   6   99   629   1,405   1,516   1,521   1,554  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  20,957   28,070   50,344   27,156   47,635   209,995   271,784   235,869   194,522   158,276   204,238  
      MRO A5.1  20,568   22,222   12,980   1,945   16,558   49,389   3,488   22,160   25,743   18,728   16,050  
      LTRO A5.2  388   5,848   36,976   25,193   31,013   160,606   268,296   213,709   168,779   139,548  188,188  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     65   -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     383   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  10   10   154   359   2,954   2,655   1,540   9,030   4,959   101   35  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  1,977   -     41,228   50,709   84,404   114,273   116,431   111,530   117,615   207,682  327,388  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
    Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     5,015   18,079   43,056   44,525   37,572   35,486   121,508  245,221  
     Other Securities A7.2  1,977   -     41,228   45,694   66,326   71,217   71,906   73,958   82,129   86,174   82,167  
Claims on the Government  A8  18,252   18,098   17,946   17,794   17,642   17,458   14,620   14,484   14,349   14,215   14,081  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  30,845   43,744   31,392   63,211   11,843   8,352   12,165   21,464   30,834   40,763   43,721  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  726   722   722   736   945   1,153   1,361   1,377   1,333   1,333   1,333  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of   
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  7,263   7,218   7,218   7,199   7,199   7,199   7,199   7,219   7,134   7,134   7,134  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € BN A9.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     3,605   12,867   22,368   32,296   35,254  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2  A9.4  22,856   35,804   23,452   55,276   3,699   -     -     -     -     -    - 
Items in Course of Settlement A10  8   1   2   3   6   14   8   13   4   11   19  
Other Assets  A11  82,118   85,330   43,762   48,163   47,485   49,297   52,194   54,216   48,450   43,701   52,293  





Table X: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Italy (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 105,519 112,213 126,159 132,840 138,324 146,010 149,948 157,541 164,527 174,324 181,208 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 17,159 42,623 35,441 34,313 22,740 33,878 27,665 20,789 15,436 24,138 71,984 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 17,157 35,071 28,435 26,283 20,226 19,762 24,593 18,392 15,058 22,600 69,957 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 2 2 6,966 8,030 2,515 12,336 3,040 2,377 378 1,538 1,997 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 7,550 - - - 1,780 32 20 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - 41 - - - - - - - 30 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - - - - - 8 - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 22,964 9,881 19,413 31,027 42,518 23,739 34,496 33,888 13,928 7,709 15,649 
     General government L4.1 22,945 9,716 19,413 31,027 42,488 23,529 33,802 27,117 7,859 4,821 9,780 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 19 166 0 0 29 210 694 6,771 6,069 2,888 5,870 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 88 88 201 312 2,949 2,692 1,000 555 24 23 2,565 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - 0 411 419 623 549 378 402 387 373 304 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 866 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 802 754 776 7,159 7,610 7,804 7,666 7,354 7,841 8,370 8,382 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 14,209 16,245 13,313 10,358 7,093 198,453 253,799 228,382 208,576 248,547 355,667 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 29 26 51 16 31 41 40 27 27 30 37 
Other Liabilities L11 2,246 2,286 2,644 2,292 1,949 1,709 1,653 1,335 1,457 1,545 2,095 
Provisions L12 14,323 12,887 15,342 15,802 16,913 18,223 21,317 23,359 24,923 26,518 29,629 
Revaluation Accounts L13 23,446 29,976 33,880 44,968 70,206 83,004 86,900 54,191 66,201 67,981 78,118 
Capital and Reserves L14 16,771 17,300 19,622 20,079 21,149 21,745 22,607 23,538 24,297 25,046 25,346 
Profit for the Year L15 134 95 175 1,669 852 1,129 2,501 3,035 2,998 2,797 2,686 




Table XI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Latvia 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1          211   208   234  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2          2,441   2,950   3,092  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1          144   154   154  
     Balances with Banks & Security Investments 
          External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2          2,297   2,796   2,938  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3          486   541   359  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4          215   169   145  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5          86   264   257  
      MRO A5.1          -     -     -    
      LTRO A5.2          86   264   257  
      FTRO A5.3          -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5          -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6          4   2   9  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7          1,095   3,015   6,320  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1          -     1,808   4,357  
     Other Securities A7.2          1,095   1,207   1,962  
Claims on the Government  A8          -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9          3,393   3,803   4,196  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1          115   115   115  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2          163   163   163  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € BN A9.3          3,115   3,495   3,903  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2  A9.4          -     29   15  
Items in Course of Settlement A10          -     -     
Other Assets  A11          92   166   161  





Table XI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Latvia (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1         3,849 3,992 4,150 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2         2,423 4,784 4,191 
     Current Accounts  L2.1         2,073 4,784 4,191 
     Deposit Facility L2.2         350 - - 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3         - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4         - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5         - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3         1 9 1 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4         127 146 212 
     General government L4.1         51 38 47 
     Other liabilities  L4.2         76 108 166 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5         24 9 18 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6         145 155 160 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7         - 0 - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8         - - - 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9         797 1,312 5,292 
Items in Course of Settlement L10         - - - 
Other Liabilities L11         180 259 295 
Provisions L12         - - - 
Revaluation Accounts L13         - - - 
Capital and Reserves L14         479 451 453 
Profit for the Year L15         - - - 




Table XII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Lithuania 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1           182   206  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2           2,379   2,736  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1           175   175  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2           2,204   2,561  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3           116   137  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4           317   71  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5           346   303  
      MRO A5.1           -     -    
      LTRO A5.2           346   303  
      FTRO A5.3           -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5           -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6           0   0  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7           3,424   6,837  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy 
     Purposes  
A7.1           2,508   6,340  
     Other Securities A7.2           916   497  
Claims on the Government  A8           -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9           4,490   4,057  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1           207   207  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
      Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2           239   239  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € BN A9.3           3,751   3,556  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4           292   54  
Items in Course of Settlement A10           -     -    
Other Assets  A11           77   117  





Table XII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Lithuania (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1          5,960 6,082 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2          2,842 2,481 
     Current Accounts  L2.1          2,842 2,481 
     Deposit Facility L2.2          - - 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3          - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4          - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5          - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3          26 - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4          1,273 691 
     General government L4.1          1,273 690 
     Other liabilities  L4.2          0 1 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5          1 21 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6          192 373 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7          52 46 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8          175 175 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9          - 3,590 
Items in Course of Settlement L10          3 1 
Other Liabilities L11          126 218 
Provisions L12          50 106 
Revaluation Accounts L13          193 224 
Capital and Reserves L14          418 429 
Profit for the Year L15          22 27 




Table XIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Luxembourg 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  36   42   45   55   76   88   91   63   72   70   79  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  164   97   239   506   560   695   660   687   639   638   843  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  47   34   55   321   358   555   546   502   484   464   662  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  117   63   185   184   201   140   114   185   155   174   181  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  37   1,306   10,826   71   95   3,635   1,564   1,311   2,103   1,564   1,337  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  1,301   1,254   2,235   1,601   1,560   2,045   1,299   1,026   1,529   1,300   806  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  41,511   32,915   40,080   15,156   2,769   5,199   5,675   5,819   3,357   3,657   4,907  
      MRO A5.1  32,668   24,126   23,466   1,953   1,126   1,849   770   4,629   1,300   610   800  
      LTRO A5.2  8,843   8,789   16,615   13,203   1,643   3,350   4,905   1,190   2,057   3,047   4,107  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  0   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     0   -     0  
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  1   731   580   1,010   1,014   1,121   1,327   2,600   431   11   320  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  2,350   2,085   3,728   3,910   4,004   4,194   3,437   2,954   3,270   3,494   4,654  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
    Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     45   431   643   580   484   491   1,592   3,544  
     Other Securities A7.2  2,350   2,085   3,728   3,865   3,573   3,550   2,856   2,470   2,779   1,902   1,110  
Claims on the Government  A8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  5,315   18,399   42,168   52,573   68,000   109,438   105,883   103,670   105,220   147,672  187,320  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  10   11   11   16   19   22   25   25   36   36   36  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  87   91   91   101   101   101   101   101   118   118   118  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € BN A9.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    - 
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  5,218   18,298   42,067   52,456   67,881   109,316   105,757   103,545   105,066   147,518   187,166  
Items in Course of Settlement A10  0   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     0  
Other Assets  A11  1,731   2,180   743   2,166   1,642   792   485   430   478   552  584 





Table XIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Luxembourg (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 1,269 1,414 1,587 1,859 1,936 2,039 2,094 2,199 2,714 2,877 2,990 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 9,742 10,780 45,532 13,489 9,642 51,223 38,479 24,565 16,664 57,237 97,433 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 9,742 10,780 16,514 7,986 6,436 10,844 18,367 11,580 12,781 35,596 60,290 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 - - 29,018 5,502 2,986 37,036 18,090 7,850 3,883 21,641 37,143 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - - - - 220 3,343 2,022 5,135 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 473 434 387 344 348 702 623 576 2,418 2,424 2,758 
     General government L4.1 473 434 387 344 348 502 553 576 579 559 843 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 - - - 0 0 200 70 0 1,839 1,865 1,915 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 32 82 1,012 1,174 1,230 1,398 1,672 2,749 527 260 716 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 0 0 - - 22 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 38 296 58 74 75 188 1,546 1,366 2,109 1,568 1,336 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 19 18 19 268 285 293 287 276 294 314 314 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 39,812 44,786 51,035 58,701 64,975 69,995 74,257 85,327 90,777 92,618 93,600 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 13 0 0 0 0 2 - - 0 - 0 
Other Liabilities L11 387 525 514 190 210 358 181 119 34 49 36 
Provisions L12 461 471 242 449 516 591 752 1,041 1,184 1,266 1,300 
Revaluation Accounts L13 31 31 84 319 298 233 342 152 186 154 173 
Capital and Reserves L14 161 168 172 175 182 184 185 187 188 190 192 
Profit for the Year L15 7 4 3 7 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 




Table XIV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Malta 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1   4  5   4   10   13   13   5   4   3  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2   251  375   399   387   512   419   519   528   647  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1   57  141   147   162   162   158   155   151   151  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2   194  234   252   225   350   261   364   377   496  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3   435  238   251   277   224   138   106   158   182  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4   260  96   105   182   383   607   837   946   983  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5   454  1,253   1,075   498   378   200   411   115   55  
      MRO A5.1   164  319   384   141   -     6   7   -     -    
      LTRO A5.2   290  934   686   357   378   194   405   115   55  
      FTRO A5.3   0  -     5   -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5   0  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6   164  1   1   15   0   15   0   1   10  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7   475  626   1,056   1,368   1,305   1,436   1,400   1,477   1,628  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
    Purposes  
A7.1   0  -     119   165   128   90   67   335   739  
     Other Securities A7.2   475  626   937   1,203   1,177   1,345   1,333   1,143   890  
Claims on the Government  A8   0  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9   47  48   49   50   51   52   53   53   1,072  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1   11  12   13   14   15   15   16   16   16  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of Foreign 
      Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2   36  36   36   36   36   37   38   38   38  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3   0  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2  A9.4   0  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10   5  5   7   14   6   6   6   9   11  
Other Assets  A11   626  597   698   756   730   725   989   1,215   945  





Table XIV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Malta (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1   693 673 701 738 757 803 864 921 957 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2   483 585 501 1,101 1,474 1,144 499 1,457 2,917 
     Current Accounts  L2.1   474 448 470 432 253 327 257 408 571 
     Deposit Facility L2.2   9 137 31 669 621 147 242 1,049 2,346 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3   0 - - - 600 670 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4   0 - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5   0 0 - 1 - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3   0 - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4   366 398 411 439 297 340 342 343 750 
     General government L4.1   362 393 390 421 247 300 297 271 654 
     Other liabilities  L4.2   4 5 21 18 50 40 45 72 96 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5   80 87 97 87 85 2 3 0 0 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6   34 72 97 123 152 61 50 157 155 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7   0 0 0 - 0 0 - - - 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8   12 104 110 113 111 107 114 121 122 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9   721 909 1,330 558 291 709 1,930 973 77 
Items in Course of Settlement L10   0 - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11   43 98 68 61 54 50 94 75 62 
Provisions L12   5 4 2 1 12 20 35 50 70 
Revaluation Accounts L13   8 17 12 14 18 10 19 12 20 
Capital and Reserves L14   234 253 266 282 301 314 328 345 356 
Profit for the Year L15   42 46 48 42 52 50 48 50 50 




Table XV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Netherlands 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  9,947   11,353   12,239   15,090   20,782   23,961   24,834   17,155   19,450   19,164   21,622  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  8,081   6,625   8,190   12,445   13,802   15,973   16,414   16,198   16,119   15,993   12,872  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  1,278   1,203   1,815   6,746   7,544   8,948   8,867   8,216   8,140   8,042   7,235  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  6,803   5,422   6,375   5,699   6,258   7,025   7,547   7,982   7,979   7,951   5,637  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  877   2,493   14,152   1,329   668   364   152   -     401   231   672  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  481   643   98   95   28   126   185   243   248   359   1,013  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  11,089   45,961   34,815   37,596   2,569   3,380   24,511   8,814   10,782   13,000   16,552  
      MRO A5.1  9,656   27,445   1,200   629   1,654   190   32   -     160   315   20  
      LTRO A5.2  1,424   18,516   33,615   36,966   915   3,190   24,479   8,814   10,622   12,685   16,532  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  3,425   4,397   5,345   1,612   4,295   4,628   -     100   251   240   302  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  4,775   8,611   12,258   13,683   17,450   28,050   26,563   30,176   28,252   56,527   97,100  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     1,632   7,442   14,826   14,778   13,041   11,093   39,517   77,891  
     Other Securities A7.2  4,775   8,611   12,258   12,051   10,008   13,224   11,785   17,135   17,159   17,010   19,209  
Claims on the Government  A8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  20,892   13,759   17,863   37,802   65,789   182,457   153,195   82,791   62,157   102,139  136,801  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  230   235   235   269   336   402   469   469   482   482   482  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  2,223   2,243   2,243   2,297   2,297   2,297   2,297   2,299   2,320   2,320   2,320  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  8,508   11,281   15,385   19,919   22,939   27,278   30,569   34,314   39,907   44,729   47,449  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  9,931   -     -     15,317   40,217  152,480  119,860   45,709   19,448   54,608   86,550  
Items in Course of Settlement A10  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  A11  7,639   8,265   9,654   11,587   8,029   7,637   8,538   3,051   2,577   2,783   3,392  





Table XV: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Netherlands (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 32,301 34,871 39,203 42,397 44,147 46,600 47,856 50,161 53,505 56,690 58,929 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 13,662 21,528 29,372 57,902 50,000 175,606 158,038 73,938 49,943 114,399 170,959 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 13,197 20,293 15,636 17,511 17,783 16,126 87,593 37,866 44,418 98,260 143,171 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 465 235 13,736 40,391 12,867 131,036 14,370 9,157 5,525 16,139 27,788 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 1,000 - - 19,350 28,444 56,075 26,915 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - - - - - - - - 145 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 33 31 72 93 154 166 134 965 1,862 1,360 1,898 
     General government L4.1 11 4 24 26 99 5 7 47 192 85 1,366 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 22 27 48 67 55 161 127 918 1,670 1,275 532 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 2,909 4,165 6,222 2,218 4,863 6,171 5,873 1,774 587 4,062 21,172 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 1,296 566 - - - - - 315 - - 107 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 605 570 586 5,265 5,597 5,740 5,638 5,409 5,767 6,156 6,165 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 - 21,949 18,814 - - - - - - - - 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 595 501 463 1,010 893 1,101 4,726 116 595 348 618 
Provisions L12 171 173 457 306 149 73 32 15 22 516 1,016 
Revaluation Accounts L13 9,169 10,659 12,110 14,941 20,365 23,413 24,284 16,846 19,135 18,804 21,347 
Capital and Reserves L14 6,465 7,094 7,315 7,106 7,244 7,707 7,811 7,811 7,870 7,918 7,927 
Profit for the Year L15  -     -     -     -     -     -    -    1,178 951 183 43 




Table XVI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Portugal 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  5,937   6,989   7,644   9,425   12,979   14,964   15,509   10,714   12,147   11,968   13,503  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  1,548   842   931   1,670   2,732   1,524   1,663   2,013   3,997   5,832   10,374  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  176   146   207   1,141   1,232   1,263   1,242   1,190   1,234   1,274   1,276  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  1,371   696   725   529   1,500   261   422   823   2,763   4,558   9,098  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  795   638   7   0   553   332   449   345   351   188   383  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  2,092   4,044   635   1,694   1,864   694   512   562   354   418   388  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  161   2,464   10,210   16,061   40,899   46,001   52,784   47,864   31,191   26,161   22,372  
      MRO A5.1  95   957   5,045   606   17,060   6,976   3,523   5,050   7,750   8,553   1,339  
      LTRO A5.2  66   1,507   5,165   15,410   22,975   39,025   49,261   42,694   23,441   17,608   21,033  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     840   -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     -     45   25   -     -     120   -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  1   0   1   1   0   0   58   44   59   33   28  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  6,583   5,331   8,544   8,091   13,556   15,925   14,816   14,019   17,883   29,372   45,418  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     648   4,161   7,269   6,984   6,031   5,272   16,690   32,254  
     Other Securities A7.2  6,583   5,331   8,544   7,443   9,395   8,656   7,832   7,988   12,612   12,682   13,165  
Claims on the Government  A8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  10,842   13,406   16,838   19,130   20,195   23,019   26,347   29,471   33,172   36,315   38,945  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  100   101   101   114   144   173   202   213   204   204   204  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  982   987   987   1,008   1,008   1,008   1,008   1,022   1,010   1,010   1,010  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  9,755   12,305   15,679   17,945   19,043   21,821   25,025   28,198   31,920   35,080   37,636  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  5   13   70   62   -     17   111   38   38   21   95  
Items in Course of Settlement A10  4   0   6   6   2   0   0   3   0   0   0  
Other Assets  A11  4,781   4,956   5,860   6,447   6,969   7,308   7,268   6,558   6,454   6,612   6,307  





Table XVI: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Portugal (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 14,270 15,346 17,254 18,608 19,376 20,452 21,003 22,303 23,299 24,686 25,661 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit 
Institutions re. Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
L2 5,049 9,266 5,402 8,771 4,921 5,691 8,136 8,218 3,589 7,712 5,649 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 5,046 6,116 4,832 4,536 1,861 3,284 3,846 2,667 3,589 7,703 5,498 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 3 - 570 4,235 3,051 2,406 4,290 5,535 - 6 150 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 3,150 - - - - - - - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 - - - - 10 1  16 - 4 0 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 25 - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 1 1 1 2 1 4,869 5,484 7,629 7,989 6,630 13,011 
     General government L4.1 0 0 0 2 1 4,743 5,223 7,629 7,830 5,593 11,845 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 1 1 1 0 0 126 260 0 159 1,037 1,165 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 75 8 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 - - - - - - - - - - 3,398 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 61 57 59 878 933 957 940 902 962 1,026 1,028 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 6,601 6,206 18,953 23,436 59,921 60,964 66,026 59,565 54,638 61,705 71,588 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11 377 394 480 360 444 516 355 385 341 303 426 
Provisions L12 2,063 1,984 2,157 2,400 2,519 2,947 3,199 3,322 3,567 4,047 4,247 
Revaluation Accounts L13 2,935 3,971 4,788 6,479 10,055 12,061 12,657 7,758 9,637 9,296 11,027 
Capital and Reserves L14 1,100 1,155 1,230 1,330 1,381 1,278 1,156 1,256 1,282 1,261 1,244 
Profit for the Year L15 188 282 349 254 198 31 449 253 304 233 441 




Table XVII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Slovakia 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1     781   1,075   1,240   1,285   888   1,006   992   1,119  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2     486   538   652   622   671   1,819   1,653   1,885  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1     446   501   605   608   630   609   570  424 
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2     40   36   47   14   41   1,210   1,083  1,461 
Claims on EA residents in FC A3     106   112   268   122   36   103   186   273  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4     2,450   2,911   3,090   2,583   2,931   3,905   3,324   2,187  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5     2,063   1,005   1,264   1,942   329   570   661   761  
      MRO A5.1     -     -     -     -     27   185   20   25  
      LTRO A5.2     2,063   1,005   1,264   1,942   302   385   641   736  
      FTRO A5.3     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    - 
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5     -     -     -     -     -     0   -    - 
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6     100   49   43   40   33   56   28   23  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7     10,196   11,039   12,548   9,752   7,727   6,161   8,816   15,080  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1     268   1,394   2,416   2,211   1,670   1,358   6,383  13,739 
     Other Securities A7.2     9,928   9,645   10,132   7,541   6,057   4,802   2,433  1,341 
Claims on the Government  A8     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    - 
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9     3,429   2,333   1,476   1,762   3,378   3,973   2,111   1,226  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1     194   206   217   229   229   263   263   263  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2     399   399   399   399   399   448   448   448  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3     2,836   1,728   859   155   -     966   879   515  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4     -     -     -     978   2,750   2,297   521  - 
Items in Course of Settlement A10     -     -     0   -     -     -     -    - 
Other Assets  A11     5,784   6,420   6,608   6,595   6,083   5,480   5,330   5,315  





Table XVII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Slovakia (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1    7,481 7,675 8,100 8,318 8,701 10,323 10,937 11,369 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2    1,198 715 646 691 1,285 752 1,496 1,877 
     Current Accounts  L2.1    521 601 217 634 1,096 652 1,456 1,737 
     Deposit Facility L2.2    677 90 429 56 6 100 40 140 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3    - 25 - - 183 - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4    - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5    - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3    39 1,050 329 5,635 2,960 4,601 4,768 2,788 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4    66 111 160 2,791 2,918 1,229 271 998 
     General government L4.1    0 0 1 2,607 2,723 1,001 0 744 
     Other liabilities  L4.2    66 111 159 184 195 227 271 253 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5    370 278 1,494 3,519 3,059 2,943 1,838 1,571 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6    79 86 90 90 116 397 1,011 913 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7    57 62 65 65 63 261 468 860 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8    371 394 404 397 381 406 433 434 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9    14,500 13,306 13,600 - 76 - - 5,042 
Items in Course of Settlement L10    - - - - - - - - 
Other Liabilities L11    503 896 1,169 1,172 778 659 417 338 
Provisions L12    5 5 8 257 305 525 665 638 
Revaluation Accounts L13    298 544 765 1,210 588 519 434 537 
Capital and Reserves L14    358 358 358 358 358 358 358 358 
Profit for the Year L15    71 - - 199 490 102 5 147 




Table XVIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Slovenia 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1   58   64   78   108   125   129   89   101   100   112  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2   657   618   672   692   641   592   578   734   685   591  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1   26   42   262   315   388   388   369   392   367   361  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2   632   576   411   376   253   204   209   343   318   231  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3   498   262   245   259   246   269   209   139   220   260  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4   1,083   1,140   878   768   786   782   784   1,022   1,059   1,217  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5   156   1,198   2,115   602   1,740   3,982   3,337   1,098   901   714  
      MRO A5.1   80   134   1   53   53   125   -     -     -     15  
      LTRO A5.2   76   2,114   1,064   539   1,687   3,857   3,337   1,098   901   699  
      FTRO A5.3   -     -     -     10   -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6   972   636   20   95   289   49   379   230   51   201  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7   2,103   2,442   2,942   3,096   3,444   3,774   2,995   2,552   4,999   8,274  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
     Purposes  
A7.1   -     -     85   669   1,165   1,098   727   677   2,979   6,469  
     Other Securities A7.2   2,103   2,442   2,857   2,428   2,279   1,676   2,269   1,875   2,021   1,804  
Claims on the Government  A8   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9   2,576   2,637   2,752   2,728   2,736   2,839   2,216   4,774   1,948   956  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1   55   55   58   64   69   75   75   82   82   82  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2   184   184   189   189   189   189   190   200   200   200  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3   2,335   2,398   2,505   2,474   2,477   2,575   1,951   2,088   1,407   673  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4   2   -     -     -     -     -     -     2,404   259   -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  A11   257   329   285   214   211   227   226   204   291   340  





Table XVIII: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Slovenia (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1        2,900        3,215       3,496        3,640       3,843        3,947        4,136       4,615       4,892       5,085  
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit 
Institutions re. Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
L2           356           984       1,220           882       1,126        1,320        2,068        1,434       1,627       2,249  
     Current Accounts  L2.1           335           403           415           442           393        1,313        1,464        1,434        1,627        2,249  
     Deposit Facility L2.2            16           582           805           305           602               7                -                  -                -                -    
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3               5              -                -             135           130                -             605                -                -                -    
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4               -                  -                -                  -                -                  -                  -                  -                -                -    
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5                -                  -                -                  -                -                  -                  -                  -                -                -    
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3             53            10             14           14             15            18            14              8               4               3  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4         392         309          300          288          890      1,039      1,756      2,847       1,743       2,018  
     General government L4.1           341          268           271           270           872        1,023        1,714        2,718        1,730        1,949  
     Other liabilities  L4.2            51            42             29             18             18             16             42          129             13             69  
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5             70            33             16            33             21            12            15           10             16             20  
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6             66            72             69            76             71            75            73            94             60             78  
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7                 -                   -                -                  -                -                  -                  -                  -                -                -    
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8            27             28          235          250          256           252           241           257          275          275  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9       3,491       3,556       3,334       2,093       2,728       4,409        1,024                -                -         1,223  
Items in Course of Settlement L10                -                  -                -                  -                -                  -                  -                  -                -                -    
Other Liabilities L11           158           202          190           113          108           109             96           114          155          147  
Provisions L12             30             62          119           144          149           330           402           409          423          457  
Revaluation Accounts L13             18          101          167           188          163           156             69           116          122          151  
Capital and Reserves L14           800           752          724           802          831           844           866           874          882          903  
Profit for the Year L15                -                  -            104             38             17           132             50             75             54             57  




Table XIX: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Spain 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  6,467   5,145   5,627   6,938   9,555   11,017   11,418   7,888   8,943   8,811   9,941  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  3,856   7,498   8,379   12,307   14,040   25,020   26,593   25,612   32,296   40,577   49,834  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  674   590   868   4,119   4,782   5,804   5,908   5,593   5,434   5,205   5,423  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  3,181   6,909   7,511   8,188   9,258   19,216   20,685   20,019   26,862   35,372   44,411  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  1,177   2,579   8,941   0   0   4,251   2,577   2,175   2,800   3,858   4,934  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  913   4,974   2,929   1,015   907   844   813   402   307   306   -    
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  21,866   71,374   92,577   90,088   61,550   168,196   361,087   195,170   143,889   135,353  146,006  
      MRO A5.1  18,696   57,248   22,169   658   20,285   11,422   45,735   17,107   21,579   11,679   1,818  
      LTRO A5.2  3,170   14,123   70,285   89,421   39,663   156,678   315,352   178,064   122,307   123,674  144,188  
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     1,585   -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     63   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  2   2   2   1,152   2   3   1   4   2   2   0  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  29,396   69,697   75,904   84,341   87,828   106,386   96,931   88,212   88,238   161,097  255,931  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy  
    Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     3,400   13,907   31,080   32,990   29,586   26,498   109,421  219,836  
     Other Securities A7.2  29,396   69,697   75,904   80,940   73,921   75,306   63,941   58,626   61,741   51,677   36,095  
Claims on the Government  A8  7,416   5,832   5,249   4,665   4,082   3,499   2,915   1,943   972   -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  29,835   4,787   4,787   13,121   20,946   32,178   40,078   53,105   76,686   90,153  104,406  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  433   438   438   663   802   940   1,079   1,078   1,313   1,313   1,313  
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of  
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  4,327   4,349   4,349   4,784   4,784   4,784   4,784   4,783   5,123   5,123   5,123  
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  -     -     -     7,674   15,360   26,454   34,216   47,244   70,250   83,718   97,970  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  25,075   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10  3   1   1   0   1   1   1   2   1   2   1  
Other Assets  A11  36,880   3,340   4,593   4,324   3,709   4,173   7,269   6,458   5,188   4,693   5,946  





Table XIX: The Balance Sheet of the National Central Bank of Spain (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1 62,865 67,613 76,018 88,274 91,918 97,025 99,641 104,377 118,152 125,190 130,134 
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2 20,559 52,321 54,315 35,089 26,964 50,934 72,005 30,783 17,851 27,839 55,226 
     Current Accounts  L2.1 20,558 38,327 24,136 24,736 19,950 14,561 12,852 15,950 12,631 21,239 44,220 
     Deposit Facility L2.2 - 215 30,106 10,352 6,998 33,335 59,047 14,833 5,220 6,600 11,000 
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3 - 13,775 - - - 3,000 - - - - - 
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4 - - - - - - - - - - - 
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5 1 3 72 1 17 37 106 1 0 - 6 
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3 - - - 0 0 0 110 1 0 210 0 
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4 17,503 20,356 20,545 32,726 9,489 5,570 10,952 4,164 434 466 20,000 
     General government L4.1 15,057 18,030 18,771 31,233 9,337 5,426 9,010 2,117 58 122 17,818 
     Other liabilities  L4.2 2,446 2,325 1,774 1,493 152 144 1,942 2,048 376 344 2,182 
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5 127 158 172 264 400 381 142 145 520 83 2,232 
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7 154 117 72 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8 341 321 330 3,078 3,272 3,355 3,296 3,162 3,372 3,599 3,604 
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9 24,114 21,142 42,047 41,034 50,864 174,826 336,831 213,382 189,718 254,103 327,733 
Items in Course of Settlement L10 206 240 247 104 138 240 184 1,679 22 29 199 
Other Liabilities L11 548 579 492 376 300 506 351 176 129 184 365 
Provisions L12 2,652 4,006 4,848 5,312 5,479 6,365 7,806 9,014 10,185 11,667 14,620 
Revaluation Accounts L13 5,294 4,371 5,812 7,020 9,275 12,012 12,569 9,039 14,518 17,312 19,360 
Capital and Reserves L14 1,500 2,000 2,000 2,000 1,950 1,950 1,950 1,900 1,900 1,900 1,900 
Profit for the Year L15 1,948 2,005 2,090 2,673 2,570 2,400 3,845 3,148 2,519 2,270 1,625 
TOTAL LIABILITIES  137,811 175,229 208,988 217,951 202,621 355,567 549,683 380,972 359,322 444,853 577,000 
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Table XX: The Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank 
Assets €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Receivables A1  9,930   10,280   10,664   12,355   17,016   19,644   20,359   14,064   15,980   15,795   17,820  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in Foreign 
Currency (FC) 
A2  29,728   29,022   41,611   35,456   39,714   41,428   41,323   39,391   44,400   49,745   51,137  
     Receivables from the IMF A2.1  415   450   347   346   415   664   653   627   669   715   716  
     Balances with Banks & Security  
     Investments 
     External Loans and Other External Assets 
A2.2  29,313   28,573   41,264   35,110   39,299   40,763   40,670   38,764   43,731   49,030   50,421  
Claims on EA residents in FC A3  2,774   3,868   22,226   3,294   4,327   4,828   2,838   1,271   1,784   1,863   2,473  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in € A4  4   25   629   -     1,800   1,456   -     535   -     -     -    
Lending to EA Credit Institutions re Monetary 
Policy Operations in € 
A5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      MRO A5.1  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      LTRO A5.2  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      FTRO A5.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
      Marginal Lending Facility A5.5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit Institutions (€) A6  0   100   0   0   33   205   0   0   2   53   99  
Securities of EA Residents (€) A7  -     -     -     2,182   17,926   22,819   22,056   18,160   17,788   77,809  160,815  
     Securities Held for Monetary Policy 
     Purposes  
A7.1  -     -     -     2,182   17,926   22,819   22,056   18,160   17,788   77,809  160,815  
     Other Securities A7.2  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Claims on the Government  A8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims A9  53,805   71,372   295,117   70,873   67,176   120,483   97,681   76,495   81,323   86,674   90,097  
     Participating Interest in the ECB A9.1  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Claims Arising from the Transfer of   
     Foreign Reserves to the ECB 
A9.2  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Claims Related to Allocation of € Banknotes A9.3  50,259   54,131   61,022   64,513   67,176   71,090   73,007   76,495   81,323   86,674   90,097  
     Net claims Arising from Balances of T2 A9.4  3,546   17,241   234,096   6,360   -     49,393   24,674   -     -     -     -    
Items in Course of Settlement A10  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    - 
Other Assets  A11  9,525   11,376   13,656   13,838   15,532   20,009   23,036   24,259   24,013   24,707   26,543  





Table XX: The Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank (continued) 
Liabilities €mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes in Circulation L1  50,259   54,131   61,022   64,513   67,176   71,090   73,007   76,495   81,323   86,674   90,097  
Liabilities to Euro Area Credit Institutions 
re. Monetary Policy Operations in € 
L2  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1,852  
     Current Accounts  L2.1  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Deposit Facility L2.2  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Fixed-Term Deposits L2.3  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Fine-Tuning Reverse Operations L2.4  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Deposits related to Margin Calls L2.5  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Liabilities to EA Credit Inst. in € L3  -     -     -     -     33   205   -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to Other EA Residents  L4  1,065   1,050   1,020   1,056   1,072   1,056   1,024   1,054   1,020   1,026   1,060  
     Other liabilities  L4.2  1,065   1,050   1,020   1,056   1,072   1,056   1,024   1,054   1,020   1,026   1,060  
Liabilities to non-Euro Area Residents L5  105   14,571   253,931   9,515   1,202   77,117   50,888   24,766   900   2,331   16,731  
Liabilities to Euro Area Residents in 
Foreign Currency (FC) 
L6  -     -     273   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to non-EA Residents in FC  L7  331   667   1,445   19   478   407   -     18   458   -     -    
Counterpart of SDR Allocated by IMF L8  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities L9  39,782   40,042   40,150   40,204   61,430   40,308   40,308   40,430   64,133  123,876  191,994  
Items in Course of Settlement L10  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Liabilities L11  2,162   2,593   5,213   1,337   1,812   2,744   2,490   1,342   1,144   1,380   1,985  
Provisions L12  2,394   2,694   4,039   4,043   5,217   6,408   7,595   7,620   7,689   7,703   7,706  
Revaluation Accounts L13  5,578   6,169   11,353   10,915   19,627   24,325   23,335   13,358   19,938   24,833   28,626  
Capital and Reserves L14  4,089   4,127   4,137   4,142   5,306   6,484   7,650   7,653   7,697   7,740   7,740  
Profit for the Year L15  -  -   1,322   2,253   171   728   995   1,440   989   1,082   1,193  







Subscribed Capital of the ECB 
Euro Area NCBs 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-2012 2013 (Jul) 2014 2015-2016 
Euro Area NCBs 
AT 115,745 116,129 116,129 111,855 208,940 208,940 209,680 212,506 212,506 
BE 141,910 142,334 142,334 139,730 261,010 261,010 261,705 268,222 268.222 
CY   7,195 7,886 14,731 14,731 14,430 16,378 16,378 
EE      19,262 19,269 20,871 20,871 
FI 71,712 71,709 71,709 72,233 134,928 134,928 134,836 136,005 136,006 
FR 827,533 828,814 828,814 819,234 1,530,294 1,530,294 1,530,028 1,534,899 1,534,899 
DE 1,176,171 1,182,149 1,182,149 1,090,912 2,037,777 2,037,777 2,030,804 1,948,209 1,948,208 
GR 105,584 104,660 104,660 113,192 211,436 211,436 210,904 220,094 220,094 
IE 51,301 51,183 51,183 63,984 119,519 119,519 120,277 125,646 125,646 
IT 726,278 721,792 721,792 719,886 1,344,716 1,344,716 1,348,471 1,332,645 1,332,645 
LV        30,537 30,537 
LT         44,729 
LU 8,725 9,073 9,073 10,064 18,799 18,799 18,825 21,975 21,975 
MT   3,583 3,641 6,801 6,801 6,874 7,015 7,015 
NL 222,336 224,303 224,303 229,746 429,156 429,156 429,352 433,379 433,379 
PT 98,233 98,720 98,720 100,834 188,354 188,354 190,910 188,723 188,723 
SK    39,944 74,614 74,614 74,487 83,623 83,623 
SI  18,400 18,400 18,941 35,381 35,381 35,398 37,400 37,400 
ES 432,698 434,918 434,918 478,365 893,565 893,565 893,420 957,028 957,028 








Subscribed Capital of the ECB 
Non-Euro Area NCBs 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011-2012 2013 (Jul) 2014 2015-2016 
Non-Euro Area NCB 
BG  50,884 50,884 50,037 93,467 93,467 93,571 92,987 92,987 
HR       64,355 65,199 65,199 
CY 7,234 7,195        
CZ 81,155 79,958 79,958 83,368 155,728 155,728 157,385 174,012 174,012 
DK 87,159 87,205 87,205 85,459 159,634 159,634 159,712 161,000 161,000 
EE 9,927 9,810 9,810 10,312 19,262     
HU 77,260 75,701 75,701 79,820 149,100 149,100 148,736 149,363 149,363 
LV 16,572 16,205 16,205 16,343 30,528 30,528 29,682   
LT 24,624 24,068 24,068 24,517 45,797 45,797 44,307 44,729  
MT 3,600 3,583        
PL 285,913 280,820 280,820 282,007 526,777 526,777 525,890 554,565 554,565 
RO  145,099 145,099 141,971 265,196 265,196 264,661 281,710 281,710 
SK 39,771 38,971 38,971       
SI 18,614         
SE 134,292 134,298 134,298 130,087 242,997 242,997 244,775 246,042 246,042 
UK 800,322 802,672 802,672 836,285 1,562,145 1,562,145 1,562,265 1,480,244 1,480,244 
 1,586,443 1,756,469 1,745,691 1,740,207 3,250,632 3,231,370 3,295,338 3,249,851 3,205,122 
          






Fully Paid-Up Capital of the ECB 
Euro Area NCBs 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 (Jul) 2014 2015-2016 
 
Euro Area NCBs 
AT 115,745 116,129 116,129 111,855 144,216 176,578 208,940 209,680 212,506 212,506 
BE 141,910 142,334 142,334 139,730 180,157 220,584 261,010 261,705 268,222 268.222 
CY   7,195 7,886 10,168 12,450 14,731 14,430 16,378 16,378 
EE      16,278 19,262 19,269 20,871 20,871 
FI 71,712 71,709 71,709 72,233 93,131 114,029 134,928 134,836 136,005 136,006 
FR 827,533 828,814 828,814 819,234 1,056,254 1,293,274 1,530,294 1,530,028 1,534,899 1,534,899 
DE 1,176,171 1,182,149 1,182,149 1,090,912 1,406,534 1,722,155 2,037,777 2,030,804 1,948,209 1,948,208 
GR 105,584 104,660 104,660 113,192 145,939 178,688 211,436 210,904 220,094 220,094 
IE 51,301 51,183 51,183 63,984 82,495 101,007 119,519 120,277 125,646 125,646 
IT 726,278 721,792 721,792 719,886 928,162 1,136,439 1,344,716 1,348,471 1,332,645 1,332,645 
LV         30,537 30,537 
LT          44,729 
LU 8,725 9,073 9,073 10,064 12,976 15,887 18,799 18,825 21,975 21,975 
MT   3,583 3,641 4,694 5,747 6,801 6,874 7,015 7,015 
NL 222,336 224,303 224,303 229,746 296,216 362,686 429,156 429,352 433,379 433,379 
PT 98,233 98,720 98,720 100,834 130,008 159,181 188,354 190,910 188,723 188,723 
SK    39,944 51,501 63,058 74,614 74,487 83,623 83,623 
SI  18,400 18,400 18,941 24,421 29,901 35,381 35,398 37,400 37,400 
ES 432,698 434,918 434,918 478,365 616,765 755,165 893,565 893,420 136,005 957,028 





Appendix 3.3 (cont.) 
 
Fully Paid-Up Capital of the ECB 
Non-Euro Area NCBs 
€mn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 (Jul) 2014 2015-2016 
 
Non-Euro Area NCBs 
BG  3,562 3,562 3,503 3,505 3,505 3,505 3,509 3,487 3,487 
HR        2,413 2,445 2,445 
CY 506 504         
CZ 5,681 5,597 5,597 5,836 5,840 5,840 5,840 5,902 6,525            6,525 
DK 6,101 6,104 6,104 5,982 5,986 5,986 5.986 5,989 6,038 6,038 
EE 695 687 687 722 722      
HU 5,408 5,299 5,299 5,588 5,591 5,591 5,591 5,578 5,601 5,601 
LV 1,160 1,134 1,134 1,144 1,145 1,145 1,145 1,113   
LT 1,724 1,685 1,685 1,716 1,717 1,717 1,717 1,662 1,677  
MT 252 251         
PL 20,014 19,657 19,657 19,740 19,754 19,754 19,754 19,721 20,796 20,796 
RO  10,157 10,157 9,938 9,945 9,945 9,945 9,925 10,564 10,564 
SK 2,784 2,728 2,728        
SI 1,303          
SE 9,400 9,401 9,401 9,107 9,112 9,112 9,112 9,179 9,227 9,227 
UK 56,023 56,187 56,187 58,540 58,580 58,580 58,580 58,585 55,509 55,509 
 111,051 122,953 122,198 121,814 121,899 121,176 121,176 123,576 121,869 120,192 
           




^A financial statement of the greater institution of the Eurosystem referred to as the “Mega-ECB” compiled as the summation of all the EANCBs and the ECB. 
Source: Annual Reports of the National Central Banks and the ECB; own computation; 
Appendices to Chapter 4 
 
Appendix 4.1:                                       Financial Statement of the Eurosystem^ (ESTA) – 2006-2016 
Assets (€bn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Gold and Gold Rec. 176.8 201.5 217.7 266.9 367.4 423.5 438.7 302.9 343.6 338.7 382.1 
Claims on non-€ Res. (FC) 142.5 139.1 160.5 200.2 228.8 247.7 258.5 239.6 270.4 306.8 329.4 
Claims on EA Res. (FC) 23.5 42.1 252.9 27.8 22.4 95.5 25.2 22.4 27.9 31.8 29.5 
Claims on non-€ Res. in € 12.6 18.7 18.8 15.3 22.7 25.4 19.1 20.1 18.9 20.3 19.1 
Lending to EA Credit Inst. 
re MPO in € 
450.6 637.4 860.8 750.4 546.8 863.7 1,127.5 753.1 630.5 559.1 595.9 
      MRO 330.5 368.6 239.5 79.2 227.1 144.8 89.7 168.7 156.1 89.0 39.1 
      LTRO 120.0 268.5 617.7 668.3 299.0 703.9 1,035.8 583.3 473.3 469.5 556.6 
      FTRO - - - - 20.6 - - - - - - 
      MLF 0.1 0.1 4.1 1.3 0.0 14.8 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.5 0.2 
Other Claims on EA 
Credit Inst. (€) 
11.1 23.9 57.1 26.3 45.7 173.0 202.8 74.8 59.9 107.9 65.4 
Securities of EA Res. in € 79.5 139.3 272.4 329.9 459.1 621.1 588.4 592.1 592.2 1,164.0 1,979.2 
     Securities MP - - - 28.8 135.3 273.9 278.2 236.8 218.0 805.0 1,643.5 
     Other Sec. 79.5 139.3 272.4 301.1 323.8 347.3 309.3 355.3 374.2 359.0 320.6 
Claims on Gov. 39.4 37.1 37.4 36.2 35.0 33.9 30.0 28.3 26.7 25.1 26.5 
Intra-Claims 301.9 383.7 676.4 592.0 755.9 1,171.5 1,333.1 1,073.4 1,042.8 1,289.5 1,559.4 
Items in Course of 
Settlement 
0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Other Assets 213.5 268.6 214.4 249.3 274.3 249.6 272.8 240.1 238.2 227.5 234.9 




Financial Statement of the Eurosystem (ESTA) – 2006-2016 (continued) 
Liabilities €bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Banknotes 628.2 676.7 762.9 806.5 839.7 888.7 912.6 956.2 1,016.6 1,083.5 1,126.2 
Liabilities to EA Credit 
Inst. re. MPO in € 
174.1 379.3 492.4 395.7 378.1 849.5 925.4 473.2 366.5 768.3 1,315.1 
     CA  173.5 267.4 291.8 233.5 212.8 223.6 447.1 282.6 318.2 555.8 873.7 
     Deposits 0.6 8.8 177.4 162.2 93.5 362.6 195.6 57.4 34.1 125.6 271.2 
     FT Deposits - 78.6 - - 60.0 144.4 196.7 94.3 - - - 
     Dep re. MC 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 1.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Other Liabilities to EA 
Credit Inst. in € 
0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 2.8 2.4 6.7 3.0 4.6 5.2 7.5 
Liabilities to other EA 
Res. in € 
53.4 46.2 91.1 129.7 79.8 79.7 135.7 91.2 64.1 141.9 220.8 
Liabilities to non-EA 
Res.in € 
16.7 45.2 293.7 46.8 47.7 156.9 184.5 115.4 48.3 54.6 205.7 
Liabilities to EA 
Residents in FC 
7.7 12.0 27.7 10.8 13.9 11.0 6.9 5.7 2.6 3.6 3.9 
Liabilities to non-EA 
Res. FC  
5.2 6.0 6.7 2.9 2.5 2.6 3.0 1.9 3.7 2.9 9.0 
Counterpart of SDR by 
the IMF 
5.5 5.3 5.5 51.3 54.5 55.9 55.0 52.7 56.2 59.2 59.3 
Intra-ES Liabilities 297.0 378.5 671.3 586.9 749.6 1,164.0 1,324.5 1,064.8 1,033.9 1,280.4 1,550.3 
Items in Course of 
Settlement 
0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Other Liabilities 41.8 87.9 111.5 117.3 107.4 140.0 148.5 121.0 122.2 116.2 109.6 
Provisions 35.1 35.5 44.1 44.8 49.4 59.5 76.6 81.5 86.2 91.3 101.2 
Revaluation A/C 121.9 147.2 175.8 220.3 331.7 394.2 407.4 262.8 331.5 346.0 394.6 
Capital & Reserves 55.8 60.9 71.5 64.5 90.9 92.2 95.0 97.5 100.6 104.4 106.4 
Profit  8.3 9.7 13.6 16.2 9.8 7.8 13.8 18.1 13.9 13.0 11.1 





Actual and Implied Total Assets  
€bn  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AT  
Actual TA 56.5 65.6  94.9  75.5  84.3  105.8  115.1  102.3  98.0  114.1  132.3 
Implied TA 42.2  54.9  80.1  69.4  76.7  108.4  119.2  93.2  91.2  113.5  145.6 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 
BE  
Actual TA 86.5  116.8  166.8  106.3  80.4  135.7  116.9  83.9  82.1    98.0  143.5 
Implied TA 51.8  67.2  98.2  86.7  95.9  135.4  148.9  116.3  115.1  143.3  183.8 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 
CY  
Actual TA   11.4 13.7 12.2 15.6 15.5 14.6 12.1 12.6 14.6 
Implied TA   5.0 4.9 5.4 7.6 8.4 6.4 7.0 8.7 11.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   2.3 2.8 2.3 2.0 1.8 2.3 1.7 1.4 1.3 
EE  
Actual TA      3.7 4.8 4.7 6.5 7.4 7.7 
Implied TA      10.0 11.0 8.6 9.0 11.1 14.3 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA      0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 
FI  
Actual TA 21.7 25.1 36.9 38.1 48.9 102.3 104.9 52.9 51.0 62.0 85.7 
Implied TA 26.2 33.9 49.4 44.8 49.6 70.0 77.0 59.9 58.4 72.7 93.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.5 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
FR  
Actual TA 254.2 386.8 632.3 534.2 514.9 756.2 773.9 585.4 615.3 762.1 915.7 
Implied TA 301.9 391.5 571.5 508.3 562.0 793.7 873.2 680.1 658.8 820.0 1,051.7 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
DE  
Actual TA 404.8 520.9 725.6 625.5 715.6 900.1 1,081.4 848.0 818.5 1,077.6 1,482.2 
Implied TA 429.1 558.4 815.2 676.8 748.4 1,056.9 1,162.7 902.7 836.2 1,040.8 1,334.9 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 
GR  
Actual TA 37.7 46.0 80.9 90.5 143.2 174.9 165.6 114.4 108.5 170.9 152.5 
Implied TA 38.5 49.4 72.2 70.2 77.6 109.7 120.6 93.7 94.5 117.6 150.8 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.5 1.0 
IE  
Actual TA 41.6 55.1 121.0 127.1 207.1 179.9 140.8 110.9 84.4 81.5 88.5 
Implied TA 18.7 24.2 35.3 39.7 43.9 62.0 68.2 53.5 53.9 67.1 86.1 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 2.2 2.3 3.4 3.2 4.7 2.9 2.1 2.1 1.6 1.2 1.0 
IT 
  
Actual TA 237.9  267.1  336.4  326.0  362.2  580.2   647.0  585.6  563.2  632.3 834.7 
Implied TA 265.0  341.0  497.7  446.6  493.8  697.4  767.3  599.4  572.0  711.9  913.1 





Actual and Implied Total Assets (cont.) 
€bn  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
MT  Actual TA     3.4  3.8  3.8  3.8  3.8  4.5  4.7  5.9 
 Implied TA   2.5  2.3  2.5  3.5  3.9  3.1  3.0  3.7  4.8 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   1.2  1.5  1.5  1.1  1.0  1.2  1.5  1.3  1.2 
NL  
Actual TA 73.1  109.2  136.1  139.1  142.8  279.7  266.2  168.5  150.8  225.0  310.2 
Implied TA 81.1  106.0  154.7  142.5  157.6  222.6  244.9  190.8  186.0  231.5  297.0 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 0.9  1.0   0.9  1.0  0.9  1.3  1.1  0.9  0.8  1.0  1.0 
PT  
Actual TA 35.4  41.8  60.1   66.0  103.9  115.5  124.6 116.0  110.2  123.3   
146.4 
Implied TA 35.8  46.6  68.1  62.6  69.2  97.7  107.5   84.9  81.0  100.8  129.3 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA 1.0  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.5  1.2  1.2  1.4  1.4  1.2  1 1
SK  
Actual TA    26.8  27.1  29.5  26.8  23.8  25.1  25.9  31.7 
Implied TA    24.8  27.4  38.7  42.6  33.1  35.9  44.7  57.3 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA    1.1  1.0  0.8  0.6   0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 
SI  
Actual TA  8.9  11.1  10.6  9.3  11.3  13.6  11.6  11.8  11.5  14.4 
Implied TA  8.7  12.7  11.8  13.0  18.3  20.2  15.7  16.1  20.0  25.6 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.7   0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6 
ES   
Actual TA 149.3  188.9  250.6  234.4  222.1  383.0  574.3  401.6  382.7  477.1  620.8 
Implied TA 157.9  205.4  299.9  296.8  328.2  463.4  509.9  397.1  410.8  511.3  655.8 














Actual and Implied Total Assets excluding Intra-Eurosystem Claims 
€bn 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AT Actual TA – intra ES claims 37.9  43.6  71.5  55.3  56.3     68.3     69.1     56.7     65.7     82.1  99.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  33.4     43.7     60.5     52.9     55.7     75.9     82.2     63.3     62.0     77.6  102.1 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA    1.1   1.0   1.2   1.0   1.0   0.9   0.8   0.9   1.1   1.1  1.0 
BE Actual TA – intra ES claims  60.8     88.8   132.0     83.6     58.0   113.6     98.2     67.0     64.8     81.4  128.9 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  41.0     53.6     74.2     66.1     69.6     94.8   102.7     79.0     78.2     97.9  128.9 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   1.5   1.7   1.8   1.3   0.8   1.2   1.0   0.8   0.8   0.8  1.0 
CY Actual TA – intra ES claims        10.6     13.3     11.7     14.7     14.3     14.4     11.8  9.5  7.3 
Implied TA – intra ES claims     3.7  3.7  3.9  5.3  5.8  4.4  4.8  6.0  7.9 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA     2.8   3.6   3.0   2.8   2.5   3.3   2.5   1.6  0.9 
EE Actual TA – intra ES claims           1.1  1.2  1.1  1.3  2.6  4.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims           7.0  7.6  5.8  6.1  7.6  10.0 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA             0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.3  0.5 
FI Actual TA – intra ES claims 14.9     16.3     21.4     22.6     23.8     29.8     28.8     24.9     25.0     35.3  57.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  20.7     27.0     37.4     34.2     36.0     49.0     53.1     40.7     39.7     49.6  65.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   0.7   0.6   0.6   0.7   0.7   0.6   0.5   0.6   0.6   0.7  0.9 
FR Actual TA – intra ES claims     159.5   295.3   486.0   435.6   415.3   644.1   668.9   482.9   507.5   646.7  798.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims     239.1   312.1   431.9   387.6   408.0   555.6   602.2   462.0   447.5   560.3  737.6 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   0.7   0.9   1.1   1.1   1.0   1.2   1.1   1.0   1.1   1.2  1.1 
DE Actual TA – intra ES claims     370.6   415.9   510.2   416.6   359.6   391.6   387.1   304.0   324.6   458.5  692.3 
Implied TA – intra ES claims     339.8   445.1   616.0   516.2   543.3   739.8   801.9   613.2   568.0   711.1  936.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   1.1   0.9   0.8   0.8   0.7   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.6   0.6  0.7 
GR Actual TA – intra ES claims  34.9     42.6     71.8     86.9   139.8   169.9   161.0   110.5   104.4   166.6  148.0 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  30.5     39.4     54.5     53.6     56.4     76.8     83.2     63.7     64.2     80.3  105.8 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   1.1   1.1   1.3   1.6   2.5   2.2   1.9   1.7   1.6   2.1  1.4 
IE Actual TA – intra ES claims  40.4     53.7   116.7   125.2   205.2   177.2   138.3   108.8     82.1     79.2  86.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  14.8     19.3     26.7     30.3     31.9     43.4     47.0     36.3     36.6     45.9  60.4 




Actual and Implied Total Assets excluding Intra-Eurosystem Claims (cont.) 
€bn 
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
IT Actual TA – intra ES claims     197.2   210.5   252.0   250.1   338.4   550.3   617.4   550.4   518.1   576.8  775.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims     209.9   271.8   376.1   340.6   358.5   488.2   529.2   407.2   388.5   486.4  640.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   0.9   0.8   0.7   0.7   0.9   1.1   1.2   1.4   1.3   1.2  1.2 
MT Actual TA – intra ES claims      2.7  3.3   3.7   3.6  3.7  3.6  4.4  4.6 4.7 
Implied TA – intra ES claims      1.9   1.7   1.8   2.5   2.7   2.1   2.0   2.6  3.4 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA    1.5 1.9 2.0 1.5 1.4 1.8 2.1 1.8 1.4 
NL Actual TA – intra ES claims  49.2     91.4   101.7     97.3     73.1     90.4   107.4     81.3     84.0   118.0  168.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  64.2     84.5   116.9   108.7   114.4   155.8   168.9   129.6   126.4   158.2  208.3 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   0.8   1.1   0.9   0.9   0.6   0.6   0.6   0.6   0.7   0.7  0.8 
PT Actual TA – intra ES claims  23.2    26.6    36.0     45.1   82.0      89.5  95.8  84.6     75.0    84.8  105.2 
Implied TA – intra ES claims  28.4     37.2     51.4     47.7     50.2     68.4     74.1     57.6     55.0     68.9  90.7 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA   0.8   0.7   0.7   0.9   1.6   1.3   1.3   1.5   1.4   1.2  1.2 
SK Actual TA – intra ES claims          22.6     24.1     26.8     24.0     19.7     20.2     22.9  29.5 
Implied TA – intra ES claims          18.9     19.9     27.1     29.4     22.5     24.4     30.5  40.2 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA      1.2   1.2   1.0   0.8   0.9   0.8   0.7  0.7 
SI Actual TA – intra ES claims   6.0  7.1  7.6  6.3  8.0     10.3  9.1  6.6  9.1  13.0 
Implied TA – intra ES claims   6.9  9.6  9.0  9.4     12.8     13.9     10.7     10.9     13.7  18.0 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA    0.9   0.7   0.8   0.7   0.6   0.7   0.8   0.6   0.7  0.7 
LT Actual TA – intra ES claims          7.8 11.9 
Implied TA – intra ES claims          16.3 21.5 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA           0.5 0.6 
LV Actual TA – intra ES claims         5.1 8.0 11.6 
Implied TA – intra ES claims         8.9 11.1 14.7 
Ratio of Actual to Implied TA          0.6 0.7 0.8 
ES Actual TA – intra ES claims     113.6   176.4   213.8   212.8   193.1   336.5   522.6   339.5   295.8   376.0  505.1 
Implied TA – intra ES claims     125.0   163.8   226.6   226.3   238.2   324.4   351.6   269.8   279.0   349.3  459.9 




The Actual Share of ESTA excluding intra ES claims and the Adjusted Capital Key 
  
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AT Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  3.3 2.9 3.4 2.9 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.7 
Adjusted Capital Key 
2.9 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 
BE Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
5.3 5.9 6.3 4.4 2.9 4.2 3.3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3.5 
Adjusted Capital Key 
3.6 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
CY Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
    0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 
Adjusted Capital Key 
  0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
EE Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
          0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Adjusted Capital Key 
     0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 
FI Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  1.3 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Adjusted Capital Key  
1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 
FR Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  13.9 19.6 23.2 22.9 20.7 23.6 22.6 21.2 23.0 23.3 21.8 
Adjusted Capital Key 
20.8 20.7 20.6 20.4 20.4 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.3 20.1 20.1 
DE Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  32.2 27.6 24.4 21.9 18.0 14.3 13.1 13.4 14.7 16.5 18.9 
Adjusted Capital Key 
29.6 29.5 29.4 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.1 27.0 25.7 25.6 25.6 
GR Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  3.0 2.8 3.4 4.6 7.0 6.2 5.4 4.9 4.7 6.0 4.0 
Adjusted Capital Key 
2.7 2.6 2.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.9 
IE Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  3.5 3.6 5.6 6.6 10.3 6.5 4.7 4.8 3.7 2.8 2.4 
Adjusted Capital Key 






The Actual Share of ESTA excluding intra ES claims and the Adjusted Capital Key (cont.) 
  
 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
IT Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  17.2 14.0 12.0 13.1 16.9 20.1 20.8 24.2 23.5 20.7 21.2 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
18.3 18.0 18.0 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.9 17.6 17.5 17.5 
MT Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
    0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
NL Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  4.3 6.1 4.9 5.1 3.7 3.3 3.6 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.6 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 
PT Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
2.0 1.8 1.7 2.4 4.1 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.9 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 
SK Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims        1.2 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
   1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 
SI Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
  0.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 
 Adjusted Capital Key  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
LT Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
         0.3 0.3 
 Adjusted Capital Key 
         0.6 0.6 
LV Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
        0.2 0.3 0.3 
 Adjusted Capital Key         0.4 0.4 0.4 
ES Actual Share of TA – intra ES Claims  
9.9 11.7 10.2 11.2 9.6 12.3 17.6 14.9 13.4 13.5 13.8 
 Adjusted Capital Key 





Appendix 4.4 Conventional Loss Absorption Capacity 
Capital and Reserves 
€bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.3 
Belgium 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.6 4.9 5.2 5.5 
Cyprus   0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Estonia      0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Finland 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 
France 11.2 13.3 20.5 12.1 34.4 32.7 32.9 33.5 34.6 36.1 36.5 
Germany 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.6 
Greece 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
Ireland  1.1 1.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7 3.3 3.6 
Italy 16.8 17.3 19.6 20.1 21.1 21.7 22.6 23.5 24.3 25.0 25.3 
Latvia         0.5 0.5 0.5 
Lithuania          0.4 0.4 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Malta   0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Netherlands 6.5 7.1 7.3 7.1 7.2 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.9 7.9 7.9 
Portugal 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 
Slovakia    0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Slovenia  0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Spain 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 
ECB             4.1              4.1              4.1              4.1              5.3              6.5              7.7              7.7              7.7              7.7              7.7  




Capital and Reserves plus Revaluation Accounts 
€bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  7.3 7.7 8.6 9.9 12.9 14.6 15.3 11.0 12.8 12.4 14.0 
Belgium 5.3 6.1 7.1 8.2 11.6 13.1 13.7 11.0 12.3 12.7 13.9 
Cyprus   0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Estonia      0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Finland 2.4 2.6 3.5 3.7 4.4 5.1 4.9 4.0 4.8 5.3 5.5 
France 32.8 40.9 52.4 55.0 102.3 114.4 117.9 85.5 99.9 104.5 115.8 
Germany 50.9 60.0 68.1 81.8 115.5 134.4 137.6 93.1 109.5 110.7 125.2 
Greece 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.7 4.1 4.9 5.1 3.2 3.9 3.9 4.5 
Ireland  1.2 1.3 1.6 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.4 5.7 12.3 14.1 14.5 
Italy 40.2 47.3 53.5 65.0 91.4 104.7 109.5 77.7 90.5 93.0 103.5 
Latvia         0.5 0.5 0.5 
Lithuania          0.6 0.7 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Malta   0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Netherlands 15.6 17.8 19.4 22.0 27.6 31.1 32.1 24.7 27.0 26.7 29.3 
Portugal 4.0 5.1 6.0 7.8 11.4 13.3 13.8 9.0 10.9 10.6 12.3 
Slovakia    0.7 0.9 1.1 1.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 
Slovenia  0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 
Spain 6.8 6.4 7.8 9.0 11.2 14.0 14.5 10.9 16.4 19.2 21.3 
ECB             9.7            10.3            15.5            15.1            24.9            30.8            31.0            21.0            27.6            32.6  36.4 




Capital and Reserves, Revaluation Accounts plus Provisions 
€bn 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria  9.8 10.5 11.6 13.4 16.6 18.6 20.1 16.0 18.2 18.2 19.9 
Belgium 6.2 7.1 8.2 8.3 11.6 13.1 13.8 11.0 12.3 12.7 13.9 
Cyprus   0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.8 1.1 1.0 1.0 
Estonia      0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Finland 5.0 4.9 5.6 6.0 7.3 8.1 8.6 7.9 9.0 9.6 10.0 
France 33.4 41.5 54.4 56.6 103.5 115.4 118.9 86.4 100.9 105.4 116.7 
Germany 56.3 65.2 75.1 88.3 123.5 146.5 156.5 112.3 129.2 130.3 147.1 
Greece 2.4 2.9 3.5 4.7 6.5 8.8 11.3 9.8 10.6 11.1 12.0 
Ireland  1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.9 6.1 12.6 14.3 14.8 
Italy 54.5 60.2 68.8 80.8 108.3 123.0 130.8 101.1 115.4 119.5 133.1 
Latvia         0.5 0.5 0.5 
Lithuania          0.7 0.8 
Luxembourg 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.6 1.7 
Malta   0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Netherlands 15.8 17.9 19.9 22.4 27.8 31.2 32.1 24.7 27.0 27.2 30.3 
Portugal 6.1 7.1 8.2 10.2 14.0 16.3 17.0 12.3 14.5 14.6 16.5 
Slovakia    0.7 0.9 1.1 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 
Slovenia  0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5 
Spain 9.4 10.4 12.7 14.3 16.7 20.3 22.3 20.0 26.6 30.9 35.9 
ECB           12.1            13.0            19.5            19.1            30.1            37.2            38.6            28.6            35.3            40.3            44.1  




Appendix to Chapter 5 
 
Appendix 5.1 
Estimations Results when Luxembourg is included in the panel of EA 
countries 
 
As noted in Chapter 5, the bivariate relationship between Actual Total Assets and 
Implied Total Assets is clear-cut across the cross-section of all the 19 Euro Area 
countries except for one outlier – Luxembourg. Being a country with distinctive 
characteristics, Luxembourg was excluded from the balanced panel used for the 
analysis in Chapter 5. In view of this, this Appendix replicates the econometric 
analysis carried out in Chapter 5 but also includes Luxembourg in order to capture 
whether excluding an outlier has any significant impact on the results.  
 
When Luxembourg is included in the analysis, in the case of the three ECM versions 
considered (Models 2, 3 and 4), the Mean Group estimate of the adjustment coefficient 
ranges between 30 per cent and 45 per cent as compared to the range of 32 per cent 
and 43 per cent in the case when Luxembourg is excluded from the analysis. In the 
case of the PAM (Model 5), the speed of adjustment varies from 82 per cent when 
Luxembourg is excluded to 85 per cent with a panel of 12 Euro Area countries. In the 
case of Model 8, Model 9 and Model 10, the speed of adjustment, which was already 
relatively slow, is slower when Luxembourg is included (around 5 per cent as 
compared to 17 per cent). Both AIC and BIC confirm that Model 10 remains the most 
preferred model when Luxembourg is included in the panel of countries under 
analysis. Therefore, one can conclude that there is only a minimal impact on the 
econometric results when Luxembourg is included in the analysis. 
 
Appendix Table 5.1 presents a summary of the results while Appendix Tables 5.2 to 




Appendix Table 5.1 Summary Table:  
The Effect on the Estimation Results when Luxembourg is included in 
the Analysis 
 
Speed of Adjustment  
Excluding Luxembourg Including Luxembourg 
Model 1 53.0 58.7 
Model 2 36.7 42.4 
Model 3 42.7 45.1 
Model 4 32.3 29.7 
Model 5 81.8 85.0 
Model 6 72.1 69.6 
Model 7 70.9 69.3 
Model 8 17.3 0.05 
Model 9 14,6 0.03 


























Appendix Table 5.2 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) 
Specification 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟏: 𝒂𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝒐𝒊 +  𝜹𝟏𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕 +  𝜹𝟐𝒊𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜹𝟑𝒊𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝒖𝒊𝒕 



































































































































Appendix Table 5.3 Country-Specific Estimates  
based on ARDL (1,1) Specification 
𝐌𝐨𝐝𝐞𝐥 𝟐: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎𝒊 +  𝜹𝟏𝒊∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 + 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 −  𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 



































































































Appendix Table 5.4 Mean Group Estimators for Model 1 to Model 5 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
?̂? 0.9550 0.9533 0.2143 0.2476 0.2086 0.2349   0.9906 1.3045 
𝛿1̂ 0.9970 0.1111 1.0490 0.0957       
𝛿2̂ -0.4776 0.1374         
𝛿3̂ 0.4131 0.1257         
𝜆?̂?         0.7811 0.1464 
?̂?   0.4243 0.1012 0.4513 0.0995 0.2970 0.0738 0.8497 0.0862 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1490 0.1577 0.1598 0.1612 0.1670 
?̅?2 0.9732 0.6364 0.0792 0.1497 0.5925 
BIC 0.4344 0.2235 -0.0950 -0.4386 0.3374 







Appendix Table 5.5 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) 
Specification 
Model 3: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 =  𝜶𝟎𝒊 + 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 − 𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 



















































































Appendix Table 5.6 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) 
Specification 
Model 4: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 −  ∆𝒃𝒊𝒕 = 𝝀𝒊(𝒃𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 −  𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 


















































Appendix Table 5.7 Country-Specific Estimates based on ARDL (1,1) 
Specification 
Model 5: ∆𝒂𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝟏𝒊 +  𝝀𝒊𝜽𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒕 −  𝝀𝒊𝒂𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 +  𝒖𝒊𝒕 































































































Appendix Table 5.8 Fixed Effects Estimators: Model 6 and Model 7 
 
Model 6 
One-way Fixed Effects 
Model 7 
Two-way Fixed Effects 
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛿1̂ 1.0107 0.0895 0.5077 0.6136 
𝛿2̂ -0.7603 0.1075 -0.7965 0.5741 
𝛿3̂ 0.6963 0.0740 0.6927 0.0769 
𝛼0̂   7.1173 4.3067 
   FE (cross) FE (period) 
𝛼0̂ – AT 0.5913 0.5685 -0.3280 2 -0.3683 
𝛼0̂ – BE 0.5476 0.5791 -0.2518 3 -0.1014 
𝛼0̂ – FI 0.5670 0.5456 -0.5970 4 -0.1357 
𝛼0̂ – FR 0.6931 0.6656 0.8487 5 -0.0420 
𝛼0̂ – DE 0.7200 0.6797 1.0309 6 0.1336 
𝛼0̂ – GR 0.6762 0.5691 -0.2458 7 0.1342 
𝛼0̂ – IE 0.7560 0.5462 -0.4877 8 0.0432 
𝛼0̂ – IT 0.6450 0.6585 0.7272 9 -0.0164 
𝛼0̂ – NL 0.6423 0.6027 0.1049 10 0.1190 
𝛼0̂ – PT 0.6498 0.5629 -0.3341 11 0.2337 
𝛼0̂ – ES 0.6428 0.6387 0.5045   
𝛼0̂ – LU 1.2398 0.5000 -0.9719   
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1605 0.1626 
?̅?2 0.9689 0.9681 
BIC -0.35556 -0.0616 








Appendix Table 5.9 Pooled OLS Estimators: Model 8 to Model 10 
 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
𝛼0̂ 0.1663 0.2117 -0.0034 0.0161   
𝛿1̂ 1.0497 0.0815     
𝛿2̂ -1.0135 0.0841     
𝛿3̂ 0.9492 0.0293     
?̂?   0.0318 0.0196 0.0332 0.0183 
Goodness-of-fit statistics for dynamic models 
SER 0.1659 0.1654 0.1648 
?̅?2 0.9668 0.0136 0.0215 
BIC -0.6294 -0.6976 -0.7371 













Appendices to Chapter 6 
 
Appendix 6.1 
Further Details on the Methodological Approach: an Indicator-Based 
Typology  
 
As discussed in Chapter 6, an analysis of the central bank balance sheet based merely 
on size-indicators stops short of providing a proper investigation of the central bank’s 
operational strategies: rather a more comprehensive analysis that focus on the 
relative distribution of central bank assets and liabilities is required. This is conducted 
through the computation of a set of balance sheet indicators that summarize central 
bank balance sheet configuration. This is deemed useful as it allows the classification 
of EANCBs on the basis of the composition of their assets and liabilities using only a 
limited number of parameters. Moreover, the use of balance sheet ratios enables the 
assessment of relative changes in balance sheet composition through time as well as 
relative differences between EANCBs. 
 
Chapter 6 introduced and applied two frameworks to the EANCBs: the Pattipeilohy’s 
Framework and a new proposed framework – the FEANCB. The application of these 
two frameworks classified the national central banks by the composition of their 
assets and liabilities by employing an indicator-based methodology. As the content 
of Chapter 6 focused more on the outcome of these frameworks and only skimmed 
through the adopted approach to derive the outcome, this Appendix provides details 
on the methodology, which consists of a set of balance sheet ratios and a 
corresponding classification scheme for each framework.  
 
The approach to apply the new Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks 
consists of classifying the balance sheet items into main categories as defined in Table 




assets (ADOM) and Cross-Border Assets (ACB). On the liabilities side, there are three 
main categories: banknotes in circulation (LB), Liabilities to Domestic Institutions 
(LDOM) and Cross-Border Liabilities (LCB). A number of balance sheet ratios are 
calculated to apply the classification rules presented in Appendix Table 6.1.1 
(Column 2). The intuition behind these rules is explained in Column 3. Based on these 
classification rules, each EANCB is classified as either a Foreign Exchange Holder 
(FXH), Domestic Assets Holder (DAH) or Intra-Eurosystem Lender (IEL) with  
respect to the asset side of its balance sheet (Column 1). Each EANCB is also classified 
 
Appendix Table 6.1.1 A Taxonomy of Central Bank Balance Sheets 











AFX > (ACB + ADOM) 
More than half of central bank assets are 
foreign exchange reserves 
Domestic Assets 
Holder (DAH) 
(ACB + ADOM) > AFX 
and ADOM > ACB 
More than half of central bank assets are 
Euro-denominated assets. Of Euro-
denominated assets  more than half 
consist of domestic activity 
Intra-Eurosystem 
Lender (IEL) 
(ACB + ADOM) > AFX 
and ACB > ADOM   
More than half of central bank assets are 
Euro-denominated assets. Of Euro-
denominated assets more than half 
consist of intra-Euro Area cross-border 
activity 
   
Liabilities 
Note Issuer (NI) LB > (LCB + LDOM) 
Total reserves83 at the central bank are 
less than banknotes in circulation 
Banker for Domestic 
Counterparties (BDM) 
LB < (LCB + LDOM) and 
LDOM > LCB 
Total reserves at the central bank are 
more than banknotes in circulation. Of 
total reserves, more than half is 
associated with domestic activity. 
Intra-Eurosystem 
Borrowers (IEB) 
LB < (LCB + LDOM) and 
LCB > LDOM 
Total reserves at the central bank are 
more than banknotes in circulation. Of 
total reserves, more than half is 
associated with Intra-Euro Area cross-
border activity. 
Source: own compilation 
 




on the basis of the composition of its liabilities side as being either a Note Issuer (NI), 
Banker for Domestic Counterparties (BDM) or Intra-Eurosystem Borrower (IEB).  
 
As an example, an EANCB which is classified as a cross-border lender has the 
majority of its assets (apart from foreign exchange reserves) coming from cross-
border activity. In this vein, the purchase by the Bundesbank of securities issued by 
the Italian government under the Asset Purchase Programme gives rise to cross-
border activity on the Bundesbank balance sheet. Similarly, the Bundesbank may 
hold positions (under item 7.2 in its balance sheet) of euro-denominated securities 
issued by residents of any other Euro Area Member State such as sovereign Italian 
bonds. This gives rise to cross-border activity of the Bundesbank balance sheet. In 
 
Appendix Table 6.1.2 A Taxonomy of Central Bank Balance Sheets 










FX > (G + L) 
More than half of central bank assets are 
foreign exchange reserves 
Treasuries Holder 
(TH) 
(G + L) > FX and G > L  
More than half of central bank assets are 
domestic assets. Of domestic assets more 
than half has domestic government as 
counterparty/issuer 
Private Sector Lender 
(PSL) 
(G + L ) > FX and L > G 
More than half of central bank assets are 
domestic assets. Of domestic assets more 
than half has domestic private sector as 
counterparty/issuer 
Liabilities 
Note Issuer (NI) Bn > (Rg + Rs)^ 
Total deposits at central bank are less than 
banknotes in circulation 
Government’s Banker 
(GB) 
Bn < (Rg + Rs)^ and 
Rg > Rs 
Total deposits at central bank are more 
than banknotes in circulation. Of total 
deposits, more than half is associated with 
domestic government. 
Bankers’ Bank (BB) 
Bn < (Rg + Rs)^ and  
Rs > Rg 
Total deposits at central bank are more 
than banknotes in circulation. Of total 
deposits, more than half is associated with 
domestic banking sector. 
^These classification rules are different from those in Pattipeilohy (2016). In the latter study, these rules 
are Bn > 10(Rg + Rs) for the first category and Bn < 10(Rg + Rs) for the second and third category. 




both of these cases, ACB will increase and if it exceeds ADOM, then the Bundesbank will 
be classified as an Intra-Eurosystem Lender. 
 
Turning to the application of Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the EANCBs, there is a 
clear similarity in the method adopted, despite that the PF is based on different 
groupings of assets and liabilities. As explained earlier in Table 6.1, according to PF, 
the asset side is categorized into three groups: foreign exchange reserves (FX), 
domestic private sector debt (L) and domestic public sector debt (G). On the liabilities 
side, there are also three main categories: banknotes in circulation (Bn), liabilities to 
the banking sector (Rs) and liabilities to government (Rg). As illustrated in Appendix 
Table 6.1.2, a set of ratios is calculated to implement the classification rules in Column 
2. Based on these classifications, each central bank is identified as being either a 
Foreign Exchange Holder (FXH), a Treasuries Holder (TH) or a Prviate Sector Lender 
(PSL). On the liabilities side, each central bank is labeled as being either a Note Issuer 
(NI), a Government’s Banker (GB) or a Banker’s Bank (BB).  
 
Having explained the methodology of applying both frameworks, is it clear that the 
main difference between them is the categorization of the assets and liabilities into 
main groups (Table 6.1 and Table 6.2) and the way the classification rules are set 
(Appendix Table 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). This difference, as explained earlier, emerge from 
the fact that while the FEANCB account for intra-Eurosystem positions on the 
EANCBs’ balance sheet, these are ignored in the PF. However, the latter framework 
focuses more on the domestic assets/liabilities, distinguishing between private and 







Appendix 6.2  
The Classification of Securities between Domestic and Cross-Border Assets 
in the FEANCB 
 
As noted earlier, the classification of the SMP, CBPP, CSPP and other securities 
between domestic and intra-Euro Area activities is not straightforward and differs 
according to the EANCB in the FEANCB. As shown in Appendix Table 6.2.1, which 
presents the differential classification of these items, for some EANCBs, particularly 
the ‘periphery’ EANCBs and the larger EANCBs, such programmes involve the 
purchase of local government and domestic private sector securities and are therefore 
classified as domestic assets. In contrast, the participation in these programmes by 
EANCBs in countries who were able to withstand the negative repercussions of the 
financial crisis on the financial and banking sector, led to cross-border positions on 
their balance sheet and are classified as such.  
^Balance Sheet Item 7 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Appendix Table 6.2.1 was compiled on the basis of sparsed published information 
and a number of assumptions. With respect to the SMP, according to the ECB, this 
programme involved the purchase of Greek, Irish, Portuguese, Italian and Spanish 
 
84 Other Securities (Balance Sheet Item No. 7.2) consist of purchases of euro-denominated bonds other than those 
under asset Item 7.1 ‘Securities held for monetary policy purposes’ and under asset Item 11.3 ‘Other financial assets’. 
Appendix Table 6.2.1:  
 
Differential Classification for Securities^ 
Intra-Euro Area Cross-Border and Domestic Positions 
Securities Cross-border Positions 
Domestic 
Positions 
Covered Bond Purchase 
Programme 
AT, BE, CY, EE, FI, GR, LU,  
SK, SI 
DE, ES, FR, IE, IT, 
NL, PT 
Securities Market Programme 
AT, BE, CY,  DE, EE, FI, FR, 
LV, LU, MT, NL, SK, SI 
ES, GR, IE, IT, PT,  
Corporate Sector Purchase 
Programme 
BE, FI   DE, ES,  FR, IT 
Public Sector Purchase Programme  All EANCBs 
Other securities84 
AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, FL, FR, 
LT, LV, MT, NL, SK, SI, LU 




government bonds. Therefore, it is assumed that these countries bought their own 
bonds and therefore classified as domestic assets. Meanwhile, the purchase of these 
bonds by EANCBs from other EA Member States is assumed to involve cross-border 
transactions. In the case of the PSPP, it was clearly stated that EANCBs bought their 
respective sovereign bonds and not the ones of other jurisdictions and are therefore 
entirely classified as domestic (similar to the treatment in PF). The new issuance of 
covered bonds eligible for CBPP involved issues by Spain, France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy, Ireland and Portugal. Similar to the assumption taken in the case 
of the SMP, it was assumed that these countries bought only covered bonds issued 
by institutions within their jurisdiction and therefore their involvement was classified 
as being domestic. Involvement in the CBPP by other EANCBs was assumed to be 
cross-border. The CSPP purchases were carried out by six EANCBs, four (DE, FR, IT, 
ES) of which covered only the market segment within their jurisdiction and therefore 
are assumed to be involved only with domestic purchases while for the other two 
(BE, FI) it is assumed to involve cross-border transactions. 
 
At this juncture, the following example illustrates how the two frameworks contrast 
with respect to the definition of ‘domestic assets/liabilities’. When the Bundesbank 
bought securities under the SMP, although no information is available with respect 
to which securities they purchased, it is known that it purchased either Greek, Irish, 
Portuguese, Italian or Spanish government bonds. Therefore, according to the new 
framework, for the Bundesbank this transaction involved a cross-border position on 
its balance sheet. In contrast, when applying Pattipeilohy’s Framework to the 
EANCBs no distinction is made whether the Bundesbank bought German bonds or 
bonds of any other jurisdiction within the Euro Area and considers both as being 
domestic since the transaction involves EANCBs within the Eurosystem. This 
treatment results from the fact that this framework was originally designed for 
central banks that do not form part of a system of central banks and therefore 
transactions are carried out either with counterparties within the same jurisdiction – 





Appendix 6.3                      Overview of Changes in Central Banks’ Balance Sheet Composition – Assets 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
EANCB 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria DAH DAH DAH DAH IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL DAH DAH 
Belgium DAH DAH DAH DAH IEL DAH DAH IEL IEL IEL DAH 
Cyprus   DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH IEL 
Estonia      IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL DAH 
Finland IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL 
France FXH DAH DAH DAH IEL DAH DAH IEL DAH DAH DAH 
Germany DAH DAH DAH DAH IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL 
Greece  DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 
Ireland DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 
Italy DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 
Latvia         FXH IEL IEL 
Lithuania          DAH DAH 
Luxembourg DAH DAH IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL 
Malta   IEL DAH IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL 
Netherlands IEL DAH DAH DAH IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL 
Portugal DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 
Slovakia    IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL DAH 
Slovenia  IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL IEL DAH 
Spain DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 
Eurosystem DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH DAH 






Overview of Changes in Central Banks’ Balance Sheet Composition – Liabilities 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
 
EANCB 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
Belgium IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB BDM BDM 
Cyprus   IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB BDM BDM BDM 
Estonia      NI BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM 
Finland NI NI IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
France NI BDM IEB BDM NI BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM 
Germany NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
Greece NI IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
Ireland BDM BDM BDM IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB NI NI 
Italy NI NI NI NI NI IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
Latvia         BDM BDM IEB 
Lithuania          BDM IEB 
Luxembourg NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI BDM 
Malta   BDM BDM IEB BDM BDM BDM IEB BDM BDM 
Netherlands NI IEB BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM 
Portugal IEB BDM IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
Slovakia    IEB IEB IEB BDM NI NI NI NI 
Slovenia  IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB BDM BDM NI BDM 
Spain NI NI BDM BDM IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB IEB 
Eurosystem NI NI BDM BDM BDM BDM BDM IEB NI BDM BDM 





  Overview of Changes in Central Banks’ Balance Sheet Composition - Assets 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
EANCB 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria PSL PSL PSL PSL TH TH PSL TH TH TH TH 
Belgium PSL PSL PSL PSL TH PSL PSL TH TH TH TH 
Cyprus   PSL PSL PSL PSL TH TH TH TH TH 
Estonia      TH TH TH TH TH TH 
Finland FX FX TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH 
France FX FX PSL PSL FX PSL PSL TH TH TH TH 
Germany PSL PSL PSL PSL FX FX FX FX FX TH TH 
Greece  TH TH PSL PSL PSL PSL TH PSL PSL PSL TH 
Ireland PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL TH TH TH TH 
Italy FX FX TH TH TH PSL PSL PSL PSL TH TH 
Luxembourg PSL PSL PSL PSL TH PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL 
Malta   FX PSL PSL TH TH TH TH FX FX 
Netherlands FX PSL PSL PSL FX FX PSL TH TH TH TH 
Portugal FX FX PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL TH 
Slovakia    TH TH TH TH TH TH TH TH 
Slovenia  FX TH TH TH TH PSL PSL TH TH TH 
Lithuania          TH TH 
Latvia         FX FX TH 
Spain TH TH PSL PSL TH PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL TH 
            
Eurosystem^ PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL PSL TH TH 
^The typology for the Eurosystem is based on the consolidated data as published by the ECB. Results will not be affected by using ESTA since this framework does not take 




Appendix 6.6                   Overview of Changes in Central Banks’ Balance Sheet Composition - Liabilities 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
EANCB 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
Austria BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB 
Belgium BB BB BB BB BB BB BB NI NI BB BB 
Cyprus   BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB 
Estonia      NI BB BB BB BB BB 
Finland NI NI BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB 
France NI BB BB BB NI BB BB BB BB BB BB 
Germany NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
Greece  NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
Ireland BB BB GB GB GB NI NI NI NI NI NI 
Italy NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI 
Luxembourg NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI NI BB 
Malta   BB BB BB BB BB BB NI BB BB 
Netherlands NI NI BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB 
Portugal BB BB BB BB BB BB BB BB GB BB GB 
Slovakia    NI NI NI BB NI NI NI NI 
Slovenia  BB BB BB BB BB BB BB GB NI NI 
Lithuania          BB BB 
Latvia         BB BB BB 
Spain NI NI NI NI NI NI BB NI NI NI BB 
            
Eurosystem NI NI NI NI NI BB BB NI NI NI BB 
The typology for the Eurosystem is based on the ECB consolidated published data. Results will not be affected by using ESTA since this framework does not take intra-























Simplified Balance Sheet – AUSTRIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX 11,306 13,522 25,223 12,669 16,733 23,944 21,595 17,500 21,329 21,618 24,034 
ADOM 12,575 13,113 27,362 20,6+64 8,602 11,028 16,307 7,505 13,067 26,030 41,166 
ACB 5,155             6,898                   8,356                    12,839                 20,351                    22,089                   19,635                    20,055                   19,804            21,147                   19,379                    
AO 8,665 9,726 9,309 8,527 9,160 9,488 9,877 10,252 9,964 9,957 9,018 
TOTAL ASSETS  37,701   43,261   70,250   54,699   54,847   66,549   67,414   55,313   64,163   78,752   93,597  
Simplified Balance Sheet – AUSTRIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  1,138  -633   6,737   3,725  -3,427  -10,113  -18,658  -17,675  -2,427  -440  -66  
LDOM  4,478   6,559   15,701   15,574   11,767   20,809   23,432   15,154   12,817   22,372   30,816  
LCB  21,160   25,402   35,662   19,584   27,496   34,614   39,897   39,148   30,083   29,147   31,138  
Equity  7,316   7,679   8,619   9,927   12,878   14,569   15,351   11,043   12,849   12,427   13,974  
LO  3,608   4,253   3,530   5,889   6,132   6,669   7,391   7,643   10,842   15,246   17,735  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 













Simplified Balance Sheet – BELGIUM  
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX      10,423        11,949        47,330        16,931        20,550        30,722         23,486         19,749         21,504        22,514       22,835  
ADOM       40,261        56,342        60,818        43,665          9,514        49,655        41,449        15,987         11,677         22,237       53,212  
ACB 6,387 6,863 17,087 17,348 21,248 25,787 25,284 23,589 23,770 26,030 38,490 
AO        3,463       13,266          5,162          4,818          4,911          5,198           5,849          5,897          5,868         6,339          6,986  
TOTAL ASSETS 60,535  88,421  130,397  82,762  56,223  111,361  96,068  65,221   62,819    77,119  121,523  
Simplified Balance Sheet – BELGIUM 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB -1,623  -1,806   2,071   7,087   8,375   11,988   15,421   17,995   20,408   23,240   26,815  
LDOM  7,974   17,834   10,993   15,111   13,100   22,635   19,869   13,924   10,813   25,435   50,860  
LCB  45,269   61,660   104,243   42,490   13,871   52,859   38,059   15,454   12,335   7,726   18,589  
Equity  5,550   6,429   7,501   10,099   12,399   14,000   15,082   11,905   12,973   13,208   14,493  
LO  3,365   4,304   5,589   7,976   8,479   9,878   7,636   5,943   6,291   7,510   10,765  
TOTAL  
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – CYPRUS  
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX       1,477  1,406  1,382         1,334          1,078             693            808             821            978  
ADOM          6,052          9,111          6,969          6,975         11,214        12,501         9,813          6,743          4,301  
ACB   2,610  2,579  3,024  2,595  1,746  990  988  3,916  7,340  
AO              445             208             198          3,701             152            120            119             122             125  
TOTAL ASSETS         10,583        13,304        11,573        14,606        14,190       14,305         11,729        11,602       12,745  
Simplified Balance Sheet – CYPRUS  
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB    1,232   1,301   1,205   1,048   779   2,190   2,201   1,738   1,124  
LDOM    1,740   3,546   2,559   4,097   4,241   3,702   5,380   8,073   9,805  
LCB    6,551   7,128   6,442   7,909   7,473   6,841   2,498   -     -    
Equity    397   549   610   711   827   778   657   790   821  
LO    663   781   757   840   871   794   993   1,002   995  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  ESTONIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX       167   247   267   424   463   434  
ADOM       12   24   16   54   1,306   3,308  
ACB       1,377   2,520   2,537   3,852   3,243   1,332  
AO       44   45   41   46   54   67  
TOTAL ASSETS       1,599   2,835   2,861   4,376   5,066   5,141  
Simplified Balance Sheet – ESTONIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB       639   703   839   922   1,058   1,219  
LDOM       466   1,528   1,417   2,800   3,331   3,192  
LCB       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity       374   406   417   442   455   487  
LO       121   199   188   212   221   243  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  FINLAND 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  6,571   6,804   8,154   8,554   7,599   8,432   8,563   8,255   8,936   9,433   10,231  
ADOM  1,085   233   2,600   2,836   51   2,351   3,681   2,475   758   7,994   25,661  
ACB  7,314   10,998   13,833   19,182   33,838   82,686   84,574   34,427   32,981   34,795   38,391  
AO  933   1,048   1,254   1,130   1,090   1,171   1,115   1,052   1,082   1,088   1,341  
TOTAL ASSETS  15,903   19,083   25,841   31,702   42,578   94,640   97,933   46,209   43,757   53,309   75,625  
Simplified Balance Sheet – FINLAND 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  6,481   7,424   8,358   9,385   10,466   11,164   11,796   12,231   12,831   13,687   14,613  
LDOM  3,766   5,910   11,119   13,557   21,958   72,533   74,600   23,858   20,310   27,638   47,696  
LCB  -     -     -     -     33   76   -     -     -     -     -    
Equity  2,651   2,968   3,887   4,138   4,732   5,322   5,278   4,237   4,955   5,422   5,675  
LO  3,005   2,784   2,478   4,620   5,386   5,557   6,262   5,883   5,663   6,565   7,641  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  FRANCE 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  80,016   86,901   139,111   110,913   140,920   180,611   155,531   119,498   134,400   145,253   153,359  
ADOM  15,926   75,022   155,174   136,853   71,683   192,566   241,256   124,184   135,371   258,405   400,746  
ACB  30,520   26,222   84,283   76,732   94,825   147,643   133,143   128,792   119,176   119,053   107,688  
AO  42,248   105,252   98,879   106,743   97,692   110,854   127,007   100,710   107,593   99,631   94,705  
TOTAL ASSETS  168,710   293,397   477,447   431,241   405,120   631,674   656,937   473,184   496,540   622,342   756,498  
Simplified Balance Sheet – FRANCE 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  56,777   61,540   69,290   76,363   80,909   88,584   95,796   101,932   108,299   112,759   119,846  
LDOM  26,631   74,047   104,027   80,143   47,818   181,812   195,641   110,266   112,408   233,681   346,624  
LCB  -     12,035   117,880   62,077   28,363   77,515   54,850   16,195   17,020   29,315   14,123  
Equity  34,091   43,167   54,891   57,424   104,886   115,976   121,086   87,965   102,008   106,766   119,307  
LO  51,209   102,606   131,359   155,232   143,144   167,787   189,562   156,826   156,803   139,821   156,495  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  GERMANY 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  84,765   99,596   162,447   129,954   162,100   202,731   191,972   143,879   158,745   159,532   177,553  
ADOM  263,837   285,472   303,895   243,078   132,456   84,546   95,892   74,630   88,624   210,681   408,471  
ACB  18,573   84,250   128,854   195,282   358,666   531,915   718,465   565,770   506,630   624,599   789,518  
AO  6,361   14,355   17,364   19,731   18,037   18,450   18,979   16,756   16,843   17,160   17,472  
TOTAL ASSETS  373,536   483,673   612,560   588,045   671,259   837,642   1,025,308   801,035   770,842   1,011,972   1,393,014  
Simplified Balance Sheet – GERMANY 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  255,215   283,279   328,379   348,110   366,720   391,753   427,539   461,509   508,432   552,630   592,169  
LDOM  47,992   109,556   167,109   122,150   146,605   229,617   311,832   143,472   92,135   220,388   444,274  
LCB  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity  55,138   64,329   74,369   85,925   117,708   135,054   138,241   97,671   112,445   113,909   125,621  
LO  15,190   26,510   42,706   31,857   40,229   81,218   147,696   98,381   57,830   125,044   230,952  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  GREECE 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX 3,250 3,756 5,700 5,023 6,299 7,771 7,322 5,528 6,891 7,316 8,045 
ADOM 20,780 27,710 60,739 77,016 126,903 154,611 146,803 98,845 90,525 147,468 124,249 
ACB 2,103 2,446 2,314 2,272 3,186 2,999 3,161 2,936 3,596 6,436 7,774 
AO 8,792 8,750 2,167 2,283 2,273 3,054 2,492 2,186 2,146 2,294 2,316 
TOTAL ASSETS 34,925 42,661 70,920 86,594 138,661 168,436 159,778 109,495 103,158 163,513 142,384 
Simplified Balance Sheet – GREECE 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  16,907   18,669   20,776   20,972   29,670   41,395   38,036   35,480   32,356   48,383   43,243  
LDOM  5,446   8,301   9,315   9,341   11,310   8,541   7,890   8,902   6,597   5,136   9,177  
LCB  8,184   10,797   35,348   49,036   87,133   104,808   98,355   51,116   49,319   94,387   72,257  
Equity  1,318   1,740   2,043   2,723   4,079   4,865   5,065   3,191   3,858   3,887   4,531  
LO  3,071   3,154   3,438   4,521   6,448   8,827   10,431   10,806   11,028   11,720   13,176  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  IRELAND 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  718   1,077   5,770   1,613   1,726   2,490   1,791   1,188   1,461   2,024   3,404  
ADOM  35,242   49,762   107,748   108,417   150,760   170,816   132,625   103,425   76,147   70,739   74,833  
ACB  3,814   2,121   1,860   2,031   1,662   2,039   2,114   2,371   3,022   3,698   3,543  
AO  480   568   754   12,836   50,341   901   955   1,127   678   775   1,005  
TOTAL ASSETS  40,253   53,529   116,132   124,897   204,489   176,246   137,485   108,110   81,308   77,235   82,786  
Simplified Balance Sheet – IRELAND 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  16,842   20,258   23,323   25,520   27,289   28,414   29,269   30,528   31,534   32,686   33,965  
LDOM  18,378   29,865   45,264   41,168   27,302   21,601   23,154   13,503   10,866   23,735   29,628  
LCB  2,545   595   44,364   53,519   145,185   120,434   79,259   55,117   22,745   3,039   952  
Equity  1,155   1,253   1,558   1,737   1,953   2,196   2,444   5,699   12,292   14,132   14,486  
LO  1,333   1,558   1,623   2,949   2,760   3,602   3,360   3,263   3,870   3,643   3,755  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  ITALY 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  64,390   69,122   82,595   93,851   120,986   136,835   140,603   106,397   118,375   121,133   130,344  
ADOM  41,197   46,179   109,672   96,018   152,636   344,381   404,372   370,914   331,445   380,274   545,743  
ACB  30,845   43,745   31,401   63,222   11,849   8,451   9,189   10,001   9,982   9,988   10,021  
AO  82,126   85,331   43,764   48,166   47,491   49,311   52,202   54,228   48,454   43,712   52,312  
TOTAL ASSETS  218,557   244,376   267,431   301,256   332,961   538,978   606,367   541,540   508,255   555,107   738,420  
Simplified Balance Sheet – ITALY 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  119,728   128,458   139,472   143,198   145,417   153,564   146,343   144,674   142,159   142,027   145,955  
LDOM  40,104   52,338   54,854   65,340   65,229   57,407   61,467   47,914   23,295   28,959   81,763  
LCB  -     -     -     -     -     190,899   253,799   228,382   208,576   248,547   355,667  
Equity  40,351   47,371   53,677   66,715   92,208   105,878   112,009   80,764   93,495   95,824   106,150  
LO  18,374   16,209   19,427   26,003   30,107   31,231   32,750   39,806   40,730   39,750   48,884  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  LATVIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX          3,138   3,699   3,685  
ADOM          90   738   973  
ACB          1,589   3,020   6,051  
AO          92   166   161  
TOTAL ASSETS          4,910   7,624   10,870  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LATVIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB          734   497   247  
LDOM          2,475   4,831   4,239  
LCB          797   1,312   5,292  
Equity          479   451   453  
LO          425   531   638  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  LITHUANIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX           2,677   3,078  
ADOM           2,854   6,643  
ACB           1,971   1,069  
AO           77   117  
TOTAL ASSETS           7,580   10,908  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LITHUANIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB           2,209   2,525  
LDOM           4,140   3,171  
LCB           -     3,590  
Equity           633   680  
LO           598   941  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  LUXMEBOURG 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  237   1,445   11,110   632   731   4,418   2,315   2,061   2,814   2,272   2,259  
ADOM  41,512   33,645   40,660   16,166   3,783   6,320   7,002   8,419   3,789   4,664   8,049  
ACB  8,966   21,739   48,131   58,084   73,563   115,678   110,619   107,650   110,018   151,471   189,958  
AO  1,731   2,180   743   2,166   1,642   792   485   430   478   552   584  
TOTAL ASSETS  52,446   59,009   100,645   77,049   79,719   127,207   120,420   118,560   117,098   158,958   200,851  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LUXEMBOURG 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  41,081   46,201   52,622   60,560   66,910   72,034   76,352   87,526   93,492   95,494   96,590  
LDOM  10,215   11,213   45,919   13,832   9,990   51,725   39,031   25,142   17,243   57,796   98,276  
LCB  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity  199   204   260   501   481   418   528   341   376   346   367  
LO  951   1,392   1,845   2,155   2,339   3,029   4,508   5,552   5,987   5,322   5,618  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  MALTA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX    691   618   654   674   750   569   629   690   832  
ADOM    618   1,253   1,075   513   379   215   412   394   751  
ACB    782   770   1,210   1,600   1,739   2,095   2,291   2,198   2,997  
AO    631   602   705   770   736   731   995   1,224   956  
TOTAL ASSETS    2,723   3,244   3,643   3,558   3,603   3,610   4,326   4,506   5,536  
Simplified Balance Sheet – MALTA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB    748   768   806   868   848   841   867   974   1,034  
LDOM    845   978   891   1,522   1,721   1,444   796   1,728   3,571  
LCB    667   814   1,225   428   200   672   1,927   920   -    
Equity    284   315   327   338   371   374   395   407   426  
LO    179   369   395   402   463   279   341   476   505  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  NETHERLANDS 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  18,905   20,471   34,581   28,864   35,252   40,298   41,400   33,353   35,970   35,388   35,166  
ADOM  14,514   50,358   40,160   40,840   10,105   11,318   27,894   11,759   14,280   45,520   88,658  
ACB  17,640   11,732   14,834   30,029   57,087   180,045   145,991   76,051   47,503   82,016   115,661  
AO  7,639   8,265   9,654   11,587   8,029   7,637   8,538   3,051   2,577   2,783   3,392  
TOTAL ASSETS  58,698   90,826   99,229   111,320   110,473   239,298   223,823   124,214   100,330   165,707   242,877  
Simplified Balance Sheet – NETHERLANDS 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  23,793   23,590   23,818   22,478   21,208   19,322   17,287   15,847   13,598   11,961   11,480  
LDOM  13,673   21,532   29,396   57,928   50,099   175,611   158,045   73,985   50,135   114,484   172,470  
LCB  -     21,949   18,814   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity  15,634   17,753   19,425   22,047   27,609   31,120   32,095   25,835   27,956   26,905   29,317  
LO  5,598   6,002   7,776   8,866   11,557   13,246   16,396   8,547   8,641   12,357   29,610  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  PORTUGAL 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX 8,280 8,469 8,583 11,095 16,264 16,821 17,621 13,072 16,494 17,988 24,260 
ADOM 6,745 7,796 18,754 24,153 54,455 61,927 67,659 61,926 49,133 55,566 67,818 
ACB 3,180 5,145 1,794 2,879 3,016 1,892 1,833 1,835 1,606 1,653 1,697 
AO 4,786 4,956 5,866 6,452 6,971 7,308 7,268 6,561 6,455 6,612 6,307 
TOTAL ASSETS 22,990 26,366 34,996 44,579 80,707 87,947 94,381 83,394 73,688 81,819 100,081 
Simplified Balance Sheet – PORTUGAL 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  4,516   3,041   1,575   663   333  -1,369  -4,022  -5,895  -8,621  -10,394  -11,976  
LDOM  5,074   9,266   5,402   8,774   4,922   10,435   13,359   15,848   11,419   13,306   17,494  
LCB  6,601   6,206   18,953   23,436   59,921   60,964   66,026   59,565   54,638   61,705   71,588  
Equity  4,223   5,408   6,367   8,064   11,633   13,371   14,263   9,267   11,223   10,790   12,711  
LO  2,576   2,445   2,701   3,642   3,896   4,547   4,755   4,609   5,029   6,413   10,264  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  SLOVAKIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX     1,373   1,725   2,160   2,029   1,595   2,929   2,831   3,277  
ADOM     2,163   1,054   1,307   1,981   362   626   4,830   11,894  
ACB     13,240   14,555   16,254   13,942   14,036   13,073   9,231   6,869  
AO     5,784   6,420   6,608   6,595   6,083   5,480   5,330   5,315  
TOTAL ASSETS     22,560   23,754   26,329   24,548   22,076   22,109   22,222   27,355  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVAKIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB     4,646   5,947   7,241   8,163   8,701   9,357   10,058   10,854  
LDOM     1,237   1,766   975   8,932   6,968   6,354   6,264   5,409  
LCB     14,500   13,306   13,600   -     76   -     -     5,042  
Equity     727   903   1,122   1,768   1,435   979   796   1,042  
LO     1,451   1,833   3,390   5,684   4,896   5,418   5,104   5,008  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  SLOVENIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX   1,214   943   996   1,059   1,011   990   876   974   1,004   964  
ADOM   1,128   1,833   2,135   697   2,029   4,031   3,716   1,329   2,963   6,171  
ACB   3,427   3,821   4,068   4,117   4,488   4,820   4,044   6,260   4,589   4,518  
AO   257   329   285   214   211   227   226   204   291   340  
TOTAL ASSETS   6,025   6,926   7,483   6,086   7,740   10,069   8,861   8,767   8,847   11,993  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVENIA 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB   565   817   991   1,166   1,366   1,372   2,184   2,527   3,485   4,412  
LDOM   750   1,262   1,505   1,166   2,013   2,361   3,796   4,160   3,361   4,201  
LCB   3,491   3,556   3,334   2,093   2,728   4,409   1,024   -     -     1,223  
Equity   818   853   995   1,028   1,010   1,132   986   1,066   1,059   1,111  
LO   402   439   658   634   623   794   870   1,013   942   1,045  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet –  SPAIN 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX  11,500   15,222   22,947   19,245   23,596   40,288   40,589   35,675   44,039   53,247   64,710  
ADOM  58,680   146,904   173,732   180,245   153,463   278,083   460,934   285,329   233,101   296,452   401,937  
ACB  30,748   9,761   7,716   6,462   6,493   6,568   6,675   6,263   6,743   6,742   6,436  
AO  36,883   3,341   4,594   4,325   3,710   4,174   7,270   6,460   5,189   4,695   5,947  
TOTAL ASSETS  137,811   175,229   208,988   210,277   187,261   329,113   515,467   333,727   289,072   361,136   479,030  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SPAIN 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB  86,979   85,517   83,143   80,600   76,558   70,571   65,425   57,133   47,902   41,473   32,164  
LDOM  35,616   70,351   73,085   66,322   36,301   56,359   81,125   32,901   17,910   28,171   73,045  
LCB -   3,238   34,922   41,034   50,864   174,826   336,831   213,382   189,718   254,103   327,733  
Equity  8,741   8,376   9,902   11,693   13,795   16,362   18,364   14,086   18,937   21,482   22,884  
LO  6,475   7,747   7,936   10,628   9,743   10,994   13,722   16,226   14,606   15,908   23,204  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 













Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX 42,432  43,171  74,500  51,105  61,056  65,899  64,520  54,726  62,164  67,403  71,430  
ADOM 0  100  0  2,182  17,959  23,024  22,056  18,160  17,790  77,861  160,914  
ACB 3,550  17,266  234,725  6,360  1,800  50,849  24,674  535  -    -    -    
AO 9,525  11,376  13,656  13,838  15,532  20,009  23,036  24,259  24,013  24,707  26,543  
TOTAL ASSETS 55,507  71,913  322,881  73,485  96,347  159,781  134,285  97,680  103,968  169,971  258,887  
Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    
LDOM 39,782  40,042  40,150  40,204  61,430  40,308  40,308  40,430  64,133  123,876  191,994  
LCB 1,065  1,050  1,020  1,056  1,105  1,261  1,024  1,054  1,020  1,026  2,912  
Equity 9,668  10,296  16,812  17,311  25,103  31,537  31,980  22,451  28,624  33,655  37,559  
LO 4,992  20,525  264,900  14,914  8,709  86,675  60,973  33,745  10,192  11,414  26,422  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





























^Total assets and total liabilities may differ due to rounding. Eurosystem data is the amalgamation of the nineteen EANCBs and the ECB referred to earlier as ESTA. 
Simplified Balance Sheet –  EUROSYSTEM^ 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX 342,793  382,720  631,161  494,842  618,632  766,606  722,401  564,880  642,025  677,306  740,879  
ADOM 552,354  793,765  1,109,816  1,006,794  902,166  1,401,464  1,685,559  1,200,367  1,078,029  1,623,718  2,435,498  
ACB 168,794  252,612  602,399 513,378  710,489  1,204,954 1,310,123  1,003,979 912,883  1,115,796  1,358,731  
AO 213,632  268,671  214,572  249,481  274,415  249,681  272,828  240,171  238,277  227,568  235,010  
TOTAL ASSETS 1,277,572  1,697,767  2,557,949  2,264,495  2,505,702  3,622,705  3,990,912  3,009,397  2,871,214  3,644,388  4,770,119  
Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROSYSTEM 
Framework for Euro Area National Central Banks (FEANCB) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB 627,834  676,103  762,361  806,367  839,551  888,469  912,451  956,039  1,016,571  1,083,526  1,126,213  
LDOM 220,412  418,572  577,051  517,561  453,888  919,419  1,029,252  543,249  408,933  833,856  1,438,622  
LCB 123,540  185,414  461,109  357,156  497,363  881,968  1,019,467  727,402  653,788  854,077  1,099,190  
Equity 186,035  217,791  260,844  300,889  432,333  494,224  516,290  378,446  446,009  463,343  512,096  
LO 119,746  199,891  496,587  282,511  282,548  438,639  513,453  404,259  345,913  409,588  593,896  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 




Appendix 6.8 Detailed Balance Sheets – Framework for a Euro Area National Central Banks 
Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Austria 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX            
Gold and Gold Receivables 4,481 5,115 5,595 6,899 9,501 10,954 11,353 7,843 8,892 8,761 9,885 
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 5,204     7,192      6,342     5,597     7,147     8,446      9,216      8,963   11,607    11,637  12,210  
Claims on EA Residents  
in Foreign Currency 
    1,621     1,215    13,286      173           85      4,544   1,026         695    829    1,221   1,940  
ACB                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €   604 
 
987 1,634 1,596 2,685 2,040 1,532 1,858 2,041 1,489 1,246 
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj) 1,274 1,278 1,278 1,230 1,263 1,295 1,327 1,335 1,359 1,359 1,359 
SMP - - - - 2,263 5,787 5,893 5,274 4,235 3,543 2,890 
CBPP - - - 678 1,562 1,777 2,000 1,828 1,894 4,311 4,778 
Other Securities 3,277 4,633 5,443 9,334 12,578 11,190 8,882 9,760 10,275 10,444 9,105 
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to MPO in €  
12,151 12,695 22,533 20,236 8,182 10,612 15,894 7,094 12,659 14,223 11,346 
Public Sector Purchase Programme - - - - - - - - - 11,402 29,419 
Claims on the Federal Government 424 419 429 427 420 416 413 411 408 405 401 
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
- - 4,400 - - - - - - - - 
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement 103 101 103 106 73 26 - - - - - 
Other Assets 8,562 9,625 9,206 8,421 9,087 9,463 9,877 10,252 9,964 9,957 9,018 




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Austria (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes  1,138  -633   6,737   3,725  -3,427  -10,113  -18,658  -17,675  -2,427  -440  -66  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions re 
Monetary Policy Operations in € 
 4,474   6,548   15,642   15,513   11,699   20,801   23,228   14,938   12,636   21,532   27,446  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 -     -     50   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
 5   11   9   62   68   8   203   216   181   840   3,370  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities  21,160   25,402   35,662   19,584   27,496   34,614   39,897   39,148   30,083   29,147   31,138  
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
 21,160   25,402   35,662   19,584   27,496   34,614   39,897   39,148   30,083   29,147   31,138  
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation Accounts  3,176   3,529   4,474   5,757   8,690   10,366   11,125   6,806   8,595   8,125   9,662  
Capital and Reserve  4,126   4,133   4,142   4,149   4,166   4,185   4,198   4,217   4,229   4,246   4,294  
Profit for the Year  14   17   3   21   22   19   28   20   26   56   18  
LO                                  
Other Liabilities   3,608   4,253   3,530   5,889   6,132   6,669   7,391   7,643   10,842   15,246   17,735  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Belgium  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables  3,533   4,158   4,547   5,606   7,720   8,899   9,223   6,370   7,223   7,115   8,028  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 6,621   6,997   6,663   11,080   12,409   13,927   14,022   13,109   13,826   15,050   14,411  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
 269   794   36,120   246   421   7,896   242   269   455   349   396  
ACB             
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €   346   187   344   507   582   773   663   555   563   419   805  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  1,562   1,567   1,567   1,537   1,577   1,618   1,658   1,665   1,723   1,723   1,723  
SMP - - - -  2,814   7,005   6,957   6,123   4,845   4,054   3,358  
CBPP - - -  984   1,954   2,109   1,999   1,479   2,196   5,274   7,300  
CSPP - - - - - - - - - - 11,382  
Other Securities  4,479   5,109   5,176  14,321  14,320  14,282  14,007  13,766  14,443  14,559  13,922  
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in €  
 39,910   56,312   57,967   41,277  7,215   40,421   40,010   15,985   11,676   7,738   14,322  
Public Sector Purchase Programme - - - - - - - - -  14,324   37,027  
Claims on the Federal Government - - -  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 351   31   2,851   2,388   2,299   9,234   1,439   2   1   174   1,863  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  3,463   13,266   5,162   4,818   4,911   5,198   5,849   5,897   5,868   6,339   6,986  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Belgium (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes -1,623  -1,806   2,071   7,087   8,375   11,988   15,421   17,995   20,408   23,240   26,815  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions re 
Monetary Policy Operations in € 
 7,928   17,789   10,804   14,777   12,996   22,570   19,572   13,798   10,763   25,224   50,686  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 -     -     130   226   22   -     -     -     -     173   139  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
 46   45   58   108   82   65   296   126   49   38   35  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities  45,269   61,660   104,243   42,490   13,871   52,859   38,059   15,454   12,335   7,726   18,589  
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
 45,269   61,660   140,243   42,490   13,871   52,859   38,059   15,454   12,335   7,726   18,589  
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation Accounts  3,246   3,930   4,655   5,515   7,690   9,014   9,433   6,310   7,409   7,441   8,370  
Capital and Reserve  2,059   2,216   2,401   2,672   3,877   4,087   4,312   4,648   4,885   5,217   5,485  
Profit for the Year  244   283   445   1,912   832   899   1,337   947   680   550   638  
LO                                  
Other Liabilities   3,365   4,304   5,589   7,976   8,479   9,878   7,636   5,943   6,291   7,510   10,765  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Cyprus  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables                 278       342 472        544        563               389         441 435               490          
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency   
428  541  374  391  343  278  352  375  470  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
  771  522  536  399  172  26  15  12  18  
ACB             
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €           69            -         -                -            -              -              5             5             5  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)            95         106         108         110         112         109        127      2,500      5,973  
SMP   - - 138 353        302  260 243 199 171 
CBPP   - 51 109 109 125 92 111 308 409 
Other Securities    2,446   2,422   2,669   2,022   1,207   529   502   903   782  
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
      4,370      7,559      5,466      5,521         411       1,600      1,116         886         650  
Public Sector Purchase Programme   - - - - - - - 815 2,267 
Claims on the Federal Government    1,597   1,551   1,503   1,454   1,403   1,351   1,297   1,242   1,185  
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
   85   1   - -   9,400   9,550   7,400   3,800   200  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement    66   40   29   57   32   38   37   35   35  
Other Assets    378   168   168   3,644   120   82   82   87   90  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Cyprus (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes    1,232   1,301   1,205   1,048   779   2,190   2,201   1,738   1,124  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions 
re Monetary Policy Operations in € 
   1,292   3,101   2,289   3,173   3,984   2,773   4,131   7,210   9,037  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
   -     -     -     -     -     -     10   -     50  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
   448   445   270   924   257   928   1,239   862   718  
LCB                              
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities    6,551   7,128   6,442   7,909   7,473   6,841   2,498   -     -    
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
   6,551   7,128   6,442   7,909   7,473   6,841   2,498   -     -    
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                               
Revaluation Accounts    326   370   478   549   567   382   441   425   474  
Capital and Reserve    62   64   117   145   148   170   216   249   272  
Profit for the Year    9   115   15   17   112   225   -     116   74  
LO                              
Other Liabilities     663   781   757   840   871   794   993   1,002   995  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Estonia  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables                      10   10   7   8   8   9  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
      152   216   220   352   372   323  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
      5   21   40   64   83   102  
ACB             
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €        2   3   2   0   1   12  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)       831   1,952   2,038   3,406   2,975   1,138  
SMP       342   341   274   216   143   109  
CBPP       2   32   32   28   13   13  
Other Securities       200   191   191   202   111   59  
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
     0 13.9 5 52 75 86 
Public Sector Purchase Programme       -     -     -     -     1,228   3,217  
Claims on the Federal Government       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
      12   10   11   2   2   5  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement       -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets       44   45   41   46   54   67  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Estonia (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes       639   703   839   922   1,058   1,219  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions 
re Monetary Policy Operations in € 
      466   1,528   1,417   2,800   3,331   3,192  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in Euro 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
LCB                        
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities       -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
      -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                         
Revaluation Accounts       10   14   10   23   11   19  
Capital and Reserve       341   358   384   402   414   437  
Profit for the Year       23   34   23   17   30   31  
LO                        
Other Liabilities        121   199   188   212   221   243  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Finland  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables  761   896   980   1,208   1,664   1,918   1,988   1,373   1,557   1,534   1,731  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 4,749   4,514   4,597   6,226   5,223   5,886   6,171   6,585   7,019   7,482   7,852  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
 1,061   1,394   2,577   1,120   712   628   404   297   360   417   648  
ACB             
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €   368   394   581   845   1,662   1,946   1,970   1,347   1,044   1,443   1,803  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  1,948   3,741   5,987   10,335   20,507   66,850   71,133   23,017   20,621   20,993   22,730  
SMP  -     -     -     -     1,238   3,630   3,447   2,808   2,365   1,973   1,606  
CBPP  -     -     -     531   965   1,007   1,109   909   1,203   2,798   3,789  
CSPP            1,488  
Other Securities  4,998   6,863   7,265   7,471   9,466   9,253   6,915   6,346   7,748   7,588   6,975  
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in € 
 1,025   230   2,600   2,710   50   2,311   3,681   2,475   722   690   6,728  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     7,304   18,902  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 60   3   -     126   1   40   -     -     36   -     31  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Assets  933   1,048   1,254   1,130   1,090   1,171   1,115   1,052   1,082   1,088   1,341  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Finland (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes  6,481   7,424   8,358   9,385   10,466   11,164   11,796   12,231   12,831   13,687   14,613  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions 
re Monetary Policy Operations in € 
 3,766   5,910   8,110   13,543   21,696   71,697   73,799   23,803   20,308   27,559   47,665  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
 -     -     3,009   14   262   836   801   55   2   79   31  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities  -     -     -     -     33   76   -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
 -     -     -     -     33   76   -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation Accounts  762   854   1,622   1,703   2,274   2,806   2,609   1,556   2,304   2,762   2,982  
Capital and Reserve  1,596   1,704   1,864   2,015   2,175   2,262   2,332   2,442   2,501   2,514   2,562  
Profit for the Year  293   410   401   420   283   254   337   239   150   146   131  
LO                                  
Other Liabilities   3,005   2,784   2,478   4,620   5,386   5,557   6,262   5,883   5,663   6,565   7,641  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of France  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables  42,210   47,557   49,802   60,006   82,640   95,282   98,751   68,217   77,343   76,211   85,993  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 30,410   25,304   23,716   36,953   46,340   40,720   48,708   37,069   40,949   50,091   55,309  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
 7,396   14,040   65,593   13,954   11,940   44,609   8,072   14,212   16,108   18,951   12,057  
ACB             
Claims on non-euro residents in €   2,303   2,257   5,793   2,940   6,901   10,113   6,539   6,363   3,226   4,376   3,778  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  19,995   9,454   9,750   9,276   9,492   10,047   10,318   10,143   10,083   9,930   9,958  
SMP      9,353   36,946   37,661   33,243   27,310   24,092   20,662  
Other Securities  8,222   14,511   68,740   64,516   69,079   90,538   78,625   79,043   78,557   80,656   73,290  
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in €  
 13,695   71,055   134,463   120,984   34,984   129,336   181,933   74,250   76,054   89,303   70,730  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     103,750   253,248  
CBPP  -     -     -     4,166   11,505   12,786   14,141   11,024   14,459   32,963   42,537  
CSPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     15,600  
Claims on the Federal Government 82 42 0  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 2,149   3,925   20,711   11,703   25,194   50,444   45,182   38,910   44,858   32,389   18,631  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    -    
Other Assets  42,248   105,252   98,879   106,743   97,692   110,854   127,007   100,710   107,593   99,631   94,705  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of France (continued)  
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes  56,777   61,540   69,290   76,363   80,909   88,584   95,796   101,932   108,299   112,759   119,846  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions re 
Monetary Policy Operations in € 
 26,378   73,698   90,843   61,076   44,643   171,001   189,832   106,980   109,955   219,802   328,789  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 18   40   139   62   1,688   1,874   926   20   15   10   3,953  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
 235   309   13,045   19,005   1,487   8,937   4,883   3,266   2,438   13,869   13,882  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities  -     12,035   117,880   62,077   28,363   77,515   54,850   16,195   17,020   29,315   14,123  
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
 -     12,035   117,880   62,077   28,363   77,515   54,850   16,195   17,020   29,315   14,123  
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation Accounts  21,633   27,558   31,978   42,892   67,961   81,709   85,050   52,037   65,335   68,438   79,246  
Capital and Reserve  11,212   13,292   20,453   12,059   34,366   32,697   32,890   33,487   34,607   36,100   36,539  
Profit for the Year  1,246   2,317   2,460   2,473   2,559   1,570   3,146   2,441   2,066   2,228   3,522  
LO                                  
Other Liabilities   51,209   102,606   131,359   155,232   143,144   167,787   189,562   156,826   156,803   139,821   156,495  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Germany  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables  53,114   62,433   68,194   83,939  115,403   132,874   137,513   94,876   107,475   105,792  119,253  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 31,651   30,112   30,990   41,603   46,697   51,729   51,118   48,878   51,270   53,740   56,512  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
 -     7,051   63,263   4,412   -     18,128   3,341   125   -     -     1,788  
ACB             
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €   300   300   300   300   -     -     -     -     -     -     438  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  18,273   83,950   128,554   189,706   337,851   475,894   667,895   523,370   473,007   596,929   766,912  
SMP - - - -  15,569   51,135   50,570   42,400   33,623   27,670   22,168  
Other Securities  -     -     -     5,276   5,246   4,886   -     -     -     -     -    
ADOM            
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in €  
 256,348   267,955   277,424   223,610   103,076   55,796   73,093   52,055   65,572   58,096   65,474  
Public Sector Purchase Programme - - - - - - - - -  104,227   269,646  
Claims on the Federal Government  4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440   4,440  
Other claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 3,049   13,077   22,031   7,136   9,610   8,464   1,442   4,691   2,011   3,540   3,025  
CBPP - - -  7,892   15,330   15,846   16,917   13,444   16,601   40,378   53,865  
CSPP - - - - - - - - - -  12,021  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement  1   4   2   2   1   3   2   3   1   1   1  
Other Assets  6,360   14,351   17,362   19,729   18,036   18,447   18,977   16,753   16,842   17,159   17,471  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Germany (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual Issue of Notes  255,215   283,279   328,379   348,110   366,720   391,753   427,539   461,509   508,432   552,630   592,169  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA Credit Institutions re 
Monetary Policy Operations in € 
 47,956   109,513   166,939   112,163   146,432   228,872   299,962   141,459   90,195   208,741   411,350  
Other Liabilities to EA Credit 
Institutions in € 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     466  
Liabilities to Other EA Residents in 
Euro: General Government 
 36   43   170   9,987   173   745   11,870   2,013   1,940   11,647   32,458  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem Liabilities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities Equivalent to the     
     Transfer of Foreign Reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     Correspondent Accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net Liabilities re the Allocation of     
     Euro Banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Other     
     Operational Requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation Accounts  45,933   55,044   63,108   76,778   110,502   129,411   132,577   88,080   104,491   105,720   119,658  
Capital and Reserve  5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,000   5,564  
Profit for the Year  4,205   4,285   6,261   4,147   2,206   643   664   4,591   2,954   3,189   399  
LO                                  
Other Liabilities   15,190   26,510   42,706   31,857   40,229   81,218   147,696   98,381   57,830   125,044   230,952  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Greece 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and Gold Receivables  2,211   2,617   2,925   3,633   5,005   5,770   5,985   4,145   4,721   4,656   5,262  
Claims on non-Euro Residents in 
Foreign Currency 
 486   439   302   1,108   1,010   982   993   1,059   1,571   2,046   2,579  
Claims on EA Residents in Foreign 
Currency 
 553   700   2,474   282   284   1,019   344   324   600   613   205  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-Euro Residents in €   649   1,002   831   0   0   0   0   0   0   0   0  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  1,454   1,444   1,483   1,598   1,600   1,633   1,814   1,743   1,774   1,782   1,854  
CBPP  -     -     -     674   1,586   1,366   1,347   1,193   1,822   4,654   5,920  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA Credit Institutions 
related to Monetary Policy 
Operations in €  
 4,795   8,727   38,355   49,655   97,669   76,160   19,347   63,226   56,039   38,599   22,953  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     13,082   34,213  
Claims on the Federal Government  8,745   8,232   7,778   7,294   6,867   6,660   6,170   5,658   5,249   4,844   6,353  
Other Claims on EA Credit 
Institutions in €  
942   232   77   73   73   52,009   101,851   9,791   1   68,915   43,665  
SMP  -     -     -     -     3,332   6,400   5,618   4,877   3,965   2,975   2,352  
Other Securities  6,298   10,519   14,529   19,994   18,963   13,383   13,818   15,294   25,270   19,053   14,713  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  2   3   1   2   0   0   2   2   -     -     -    
Other Assets  8,790   8,746   2,167   2,280   2,272   3,054   2,490   2,185   2,146   2,294   2,316  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Greece (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  16,907   18,669   20,776   20,972   29,670   41,395   38,036   35,480   32,356   48,383   43,243  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 4,530   7,108   7,794   8,008   10,528   4,703   2,169   1,959   3,076   1,387   907  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 22   33   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 894   1,159   1,521   1,333   782   3,838   5,721   6,943   3,521   3,749   8,270  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  8,184   10,797   35,348   49,036   87,133   104,808   98,355   51,116   49,319   94,387   72,257  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 8,184   10,797   35,348   49,036   87,088   104,750   98,355   51,116   49,319   94,387   72,257  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     45  58     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  651   965   1,249   1,917   3,264   4,050   4,250   2,376   3,043   3,072   3,716  
Capital and Reserve  667   775   794   805   815   815   815   816   815   815   815  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
LO                                  
Other liabilities   3,071   3,154   3,438   4,521   6,448   8,827   10,431   10,806   11,028   11,720   13,176  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Ireland  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  93   110   120   148   204   235   244   168   191   188   212  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 566   522   587   1,346   1,382   1,081   1,051   1,019   1,270   1,836   3,191  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 59   446   5,063   119   141   1,174   496   -     -     -     -    
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   3,243   1,553   1,274   1,234   883   1,231   1,229   1,515   2,127   2,813   2,653  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  570   569   585   796   779   808   886   857   895   885   890  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 27,044   39,449   93,412   92,858   132,010   107,236   70,936   39,046   20,700   10,735   7,418  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     6,824   17,440  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
1,060   429   114   636   514   42,849   40,426   562   351   373   160  
SMP  -     -     -     -     2,137   3,903   3,409   2,688   2,518   1,950   1,712  
CBPP  -     -     -     532   866   886   953   619   879   2,329   3,282  
Other securities  7,137   9,884   14,222   14,391   15,233   15,941   16,901   60,510   51,700   48,527   44,821  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  47   7   4   3   3   13   14   23   0   0   -    
Other assets  433   561   750   12,834   50,337   888   941   1,104   678   775   1,005  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Ireland (continued)   
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  16,842   20,258   23,323   25,520   27,289   28,414   29,269   30,528   31,534   32,686   33,965  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 12,915   21,839   19,447   14,908   11,414   6,029   3,518   3,243   4,055   10,018   19,225  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 5,463   8,025   25,817   26,260   15,888   15,572   19,636   10,261   6,811   13,718   10,403  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  2,545   595   44,364   53,519   145,185   120,434   79,259   55,117   22,745   3,039   952  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 2,545   595   44,364   53,519   145,185   120,434   79,259   55,117   22,745   3,039   952  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  58   88   242   205   230   303   335   3,262   9,611   10,819   10,887  
Capital and Reserve  1,097   1,165   1,316   1,531   1,723   1,893   2,110   2,437   2,681   3,313   3,599  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
LO                                  
Other liabilities   1,333   1,558   1,623   2,949   2,760   3,602   3,360   3,263   3,870   3,643   3,755  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Italy  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  38,050   44,793   48,995   60,410   83,197   95,924   99,417   68,677   77,865   76,718   86,558  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 19,483   19,276   26,647   31,782   35,724   38,016   38,283   36,834   39,269   43,202   42,498  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 6,857   5,052   6,952   1,658   2,065   2,896   2,903   886   1,241   1,213   1,288  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     1   9   11   6   99   629   1,405   1,516   1,521   1,554  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  30,845   43,744   31,392   63,211   11,843   8,352   8,560   8,596   8,467   8,467   8,467  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 20,957   28,070   50,344   27,156   47,635   209,995   271,784   235,869   194,522   158,276   204,238  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     71,573   186,646  
Claims on the Federal Government  18,252   18,098   17,946   17,794   17,642   17,458   14,620   14,484   14,349   14,215   14,081  
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 10   10   154   359   2,954   2,655   1,540   9,030   4,959   101   35  
SMP  -     -     -     -     8,018   33,217   33,598   28,621   23,403   19,987   16,405  
CBPP  -     -     -     5,015   10,061   9,839   10,925   8,951   12,083   29,948   36,343  
CSPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    5,827                  
5,827  Other securities  1,977   -     41,228   45,694   66,326   71,217   71,906   73,958   82,129   86,174   82,16   
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  8   1   2   3   6   14   8   13   4   11   19  
Other assets  82,118   85,330   43,762   48,163   47,485   49,297   52,194   54,216   48,450   43,701   52,293  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Italy (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  119,728   128,458   139,472   143,198   145,417   153,564   146,343   144,674   142,159   142,027   145,955  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 17,159   42,623   35,441   34,313   22,740   33,878   27,665   20,789   15,436   24,138   71,984  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     8   -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 22,945   9,716   19,413   31,027   42,488   23,529   33,802   27,117   7,859   4,821   9,780  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     -     -     -     190,899   253,799   228,382   208,576   248,547   355,667  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     190,899   253,799   228,382   208,576   248,547   355,667  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  23,446   29,976   33,880   44,968   70,206   83,004   86,900   54,191   66,201   67,981   78,118  
Capital and Reserve  16,771   17,300   19,622   20,079   21,149   21,745   22,607   23,538   24,297   25,046   25,346  
Profit for the year  134   95   175   1,669   852   1,129   2,501   3,035   2,998   2,797   2,686  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   18,374   16,209   19,427   26,003   30,107   31,231   32,750   39,806   40,730   39,750   48,884  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Latvia 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     211   208   234  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,441   2,950   3,092  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     486   541   359  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     215   169   145  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     279   307   293  
SMP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1,336   3,650  
CBPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other securities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1,095   1,207   1,962  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     86   264   257  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     472   707  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     4   2   9  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     92   166   161  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Latvia (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     734   497   247  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,423   4,784   4,191  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1   9   1  
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     51   38   47  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     797   1,312   5,292  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     797   1,312   5,292  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     479   451   453  
Capital and Reserve  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Profit for the year  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
LO                                  
Other liabilities   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     425   531   638  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Lithuania 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     182   206  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,379   2,736  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     116   137  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     317   71  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     739   500  
SMP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
CBPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other securities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     916   497  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     346   303  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,508   6,340  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     0   0  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     77   117  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Lithuania (continued)  
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,209   2,525  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,842   2,481  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     26   -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1,273   690  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     3,590  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     3,590  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     193   224  
Capital and Reserve  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     418   429  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     22   27  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     598   941  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Luxembourg  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  36   42   45   55   76   88   91   63   72   70   79  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 164   97   239   506   560   695   660   687   639   638   843  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 37   1,306   10,826   71   95   3,635   1,564   1,311   2,103   1,564   1,337  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   1,301   1,254   2,235   1,601   1,560   2,045   1,299   1,026   1,529   1,300   806  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  5,315   18,399   42,168   52,573   68,000   109,438   105,883   103,670   105,220   147,672   187,320  
SMP  -     -     -     -     292   515   464   422   364   194   153  
CBPP  -     -     -     45   138   129   117   61   127   403   569  
Other securities  2,350   2,085   3,728   3,865   3,573   3,550   2,856   2,470   2,779   1,902   1,110  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 41,511   32,915   40,080   15,156   2,769   5,199   5,675   5,819   3,357   3,657   4,907  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     996   2,822  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 1   731   580   1,010   1,014   1,121   1,327   2,600   431   11   320  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  0   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     0  
Other assets  1,731   2,180   743   2,166   1,642   792   485   430   478   552   584  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Luxembourg (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  41,081   46,201   52,622   60,560   66,910   72,034   76,352   87,526   93,492   95,494   96,590  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 9,742   10,780   45,532   13,489   9,642   51,223   38,479   24,565   16,664   57,237   97,433  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 473   434   387   344   348   502   553   576   579   559   843  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  31   31   84   319   298   233   342   152   186   154   173  
Capital and Reserve  161   168   172   175   182   184   185   187   188   190   192  
Profit for the year  7   4   3   7   2   1   2   2   2   2   2  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   951   1,392   1,845   2,155   2,339   3,029   4,508   5,552   5,987   5,322   5,618  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Malta  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  -     -     4   5   4   10   13   13   5   4   3  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 -     -     251   375   399   387   512   419   519   528   647  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 -     -     435   238   251   277   224   138   106   158   182  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     -     260   96   105   182   383   607   837   946   983  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  -     -     47   48   49   50   51   52   53   53   1,072  
SMP  -     -     -     -     119   165   128   90   67   56   52  
CBPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other securities  -     -     475   626   937   1,203   1,177   1,345   1,333   1,143   890  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     -     454   1,253   1,075   498   378   200   411   115   55  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     278   686  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -     -     164   1   1   15   0   15   0   1   10  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     5   5   7   14   6   6   6   9   11  
Other assets  -     -     626   597   698   756   730   725   989   1,215   945  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Malta (continued)  
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  -     -     748   768   806   868   848   841   867   974   1,034  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 -     -     483   585   501   1,101   1,474   1,144   499   1,457   2,917  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 -     -     362   393   390   421   247   300   297   271   654  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     667   814   1,225   428   200   672   1,927   920   -    
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     667   814   1,225   428   200   672   1,927   920   -    
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  -     -     8   17   12   14   18   10   19   12   20  
Capital and Reserve  -     -     234   253   266   282   301   314   328   345   356  
Profit for the year  -     -     42   46   48   42   52   50   48   50   50  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   -     -     179   369   395   402   463   279   341   476   505  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Netherlands  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  9,947   11,353   12,239   15,090   20,782   23,961   24,834   17,155   19,450   19,164   21,622  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 8,081   6,625   8,190   12,445   13,802   15,973   16,414   16,198   16,119   15,993   12,872  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 877   2,493   14,152   1,329   668   364   152   -     401   231   672  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   481   643   98   95   28   126   185   243   248   359   1,013  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  12,384   2,478   2,478   17,883   42,850   155,179   122,626   48,477   22,250   57,410   89,352  
SMP  -     -     -     -     4,201   11,516   11,395   10,196   7,846   7,237   6,087  
Other securities  4,775   8,611   12,258   12,051   10,008   13,224   11,785   17,135   17,159   17,010   19,209  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 11,089   45,961   34,815   37,596   2,569   3,380   24,511   8,814   10,782   13,000   16,552  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     23,119   60,204  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
3,425   4,397   5,345   1,612   4,295   4,628   -     100   251   240   302  
CBPP  -     -     -     1,632   3,241   3,310   3,383   2,845   3,247   9,161   11,600  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  7,639   8,265   9,654   11,587   8,029   7,637   8,538   3,051   2,577   2,783   3,392  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Netherlands (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  23,793   23,590   23,818   22,478   21,208   19,322   17,287   15,847   13,598   11,961   11,480  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 13,662   21,528   29,372   57,902   50,000   175,606   158,038   73,938   49,943   114,399   170,959  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     145  
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 11   4   24   26   99   5   7   47   192   85   1,366  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     21,949   18,814   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     21,949   18,814   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  9,169   10,659   12,110   14,941   20,365   23,413   24,284   16,846   19,135   18,804   21,347  
Capital and Reserve  6,465   7,094   7,315   7,106   7,244   7,707   7,811   7,811   7,870   7,918   7,927  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     1,178   951   183   43  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   5,598   6,002   7,776   8,866   11,557   13,246   16,396   8,547   8,641   12,357   29,610  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Portugal  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  5,937   6,989   7,644   9,425   12,979   14,964   15,509   10,714   12,147   11,968   13,503  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 1,548   842   931   1,670   2,732   1,524   1,663   2,013   3,997   5,832   10,374  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 795   638   7   0   553   332   449   345   351   188   383  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   2,092   4,044   635   1,694   1,864   694   512   562   354   418   388  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  1,088   1,101   1,158   1,185   1,152   1,198   1,322   1,273   1,252   1,235   1,309  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 161   2,464   10,210   16,061   40,899   46,001   52,784   47,864   31,191   26,161   22,372  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     10,104   26,414  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -   0   1   1   0   0   58   44   59   33   28  
SMP  -     -     -     -     2,773   5,859   5,659   4,873   3,960   3,239   2,715  
CBPP  -     -     -     648   1,388   1,410   1,325   1,159   1,312   3,346   3,125  
Other securities  6,583   5,331   8,544   7,443   9,395   8,656   7,832   7,988   12,612   12,682   13,165  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  4   0   6   6   2   0   0   3   0   0   0  
Other assets  4,781   4,956   5,860   6,447   6,969   7,308   7,268   6,558   6,454   6,612   6,307  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Portugal (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  4,516   3,041   1,575   663   333  -1,369  -4,022  -5,895  -8,621  -10,394  -11,976  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 5,049   9,266   5,402   8,771   4,921   5,691   8,136   8,218   3,589   7,712   5,649  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 25   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 0   0   0   2   1   4,743   5,223   7,629   7,830   5,593   11,845  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  6,601   6,206   18,953   23,436   59,921   60,964   66,026   59,565   54,638   61,705   71,588  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 6,601   6,206   18,953   23,436   59,912   60,923   66,026   59,565   54,591   61,687   71,588  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     9   41   -     0   47   18   0  
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  2,935   3,971   4,788   6,479   10,055   12,061   12,657   7,758   9,637   9,296   11,027  
Capital and Reserve  1,100   1,155   1,230   1,330   1,381   1,278   1,156   1,256   1,282   1,261   1,244  
Profit for the year  188   282   349   254   198   31   449   253   304   233   441  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   2,576   2,445   2,701   3,642   3,896   4,547   4,755   4,609   5,029   6,413   10,264  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Slovakia  
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  -     -     -     781   1,075   1,240   1,285   888   1,006   992   1,119  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 -     -     -     486   538   652   622   671   1,819   1,653   1,885  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 -     -     -     106   112   268   122   36   103   186   273  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     -     -     2,450   2,911   3,090   2,583   2,931   3,905   3,324   2,187  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  -     -     -     594   605   617   1,606   3,378   3,007   1,231   711  
SMP  -     -     -     -     840   1,864   1,721   1,283   820   635   411  
CBPP  -     -     -     268   554   552   491   387   538   1,607   2,219  
Other securities  -     -     -     9,928   9,645   10,132   7,541   6,057   4,802   2,433   1,341  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     -     -     2,063   1,005   1,264   1,942   329   570   661   761  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     4,141   11,110  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -     -     -     100   49   43   40   33   56   28   23  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     0   -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  -     -     -     5,784   6,420   6,608   6,595   6,083   5,480   5,330   5,315  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Slovakia (continued)   
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  -     -     -     4,646   5,947   7,241   8,163   8,701   9,357   10,058   10,854  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 -     -     -     1,198   715   646   691   1,285   752   1,496   1,877  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     39   1,050   329   5,635   2,960   4,601   4,768   2,788  
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 -     -     -     0   0   1   2,607   2,723   1,001   0   744  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     -     -     14,500   13,306   13,600   -     76   -     -     5,042  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     -     -     14,500   13,306   13,600   -     76   -     -     5,042  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  -     -     -     298   544   765   1,210   588   519   434   537  
Capital and Reserve  -     -     -     358   358   358   358   358   358   358   358  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     71   -     -     199   490   102   5   147  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   -     -     -     1,451   1,833   3,390   5,684   4,896   5,418   5,104   5,008  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Slovenia 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  -     58   64   78   108   125   129   89   101   100   112  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 -     657   618   672   692   641   592   578   734   685   591  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 -     498   262   245   259   246   269   209   139   220   260  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   -     1,083   1,140   878   768   786   782   784   1,022   1,059   1,217  
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  -     241   239   248   253   259   264   264   2,686   542   282  
SMP  -     -     -     -     402   992   975   662   489   288   219  
CBPP  -     -     -     85   266   173   123   65   188   680   995  
Other securities  -     2,103   2,442   2,857   2,428   2,279   2,676   2,269   1,875   2,021   1,804  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     156   1,198   2,115   602   1,740   3,982   3,337   1,098   901   714  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     2,011   5,255  
Claims on the Federal Government  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -     972   636   20   95   289   49   379   230   51   201  
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  -     257   329   285   214   211   227   226   204   291   340  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Slovenia (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  -     565   817   991   1,166   1,366   1,372   2,184   2,527   3,485   4,412  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 -     356   984   1,220   882   1,126   1,320   2,068   1,434   1,627   2,249  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     53   10   14   14   15   18   14   8   4   3  
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 -     341   268   271   270   872   1,023   1,714   2,718   1,730   1,949  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     3,491   3,556   3,334   2,093   2,728   4,409   1,024   -     -     1,223  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     3,491   3,556   3,334   2,093   2,728   4,409   1,024   -     -     1,223  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  -     18   101   167   188   163   156   69   116   122   151  
Capital and Reserve  -     800   752   724   802   831   844   866   874   882   903  
Profit for the year  -     -     -     104   38   17   132   50   75   54   57  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   -     402   439   658   634   623   794   870   1,013   942   1,045  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Spain 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  6,467   5,145   5,627   6,938   9,555   11,017   11,418   7,888   8,943   8,811   9,941  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 3,856   7,498   8,379   12,307   14,040   25,020   26,593   25,612   32,296   40,577   49,834  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 1,177   2,579   8,941   0   0   4,251   2,577   2,175   2,800   3,858   4,934  
ACB                                   
Claims on non-euro residents in €   913   4,974   2,929   1,015   907   844   813   402   307   306   -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  29,835   4,787   4,787   5,447   5,585   5,724   5,862   5,861   6,436   6,436   6,436  
ADOM                                  
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 21,866   71,374   92,577   90,088   61,550   168,196   361,087   195,170   143,889   135,353   146,006  
Public Sector Purchase Programme  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     72,282   173,152  
Claims on the Federal Government  7,416   5,832   5,249   4,665   4,082   3,499   2,915   1,943   972   -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 -   2   2   1,152   2   3   1   4   2   2   0  
SMP  -     -     -     -     7,383   24,476   24,469   21,751   17,894   15,844   13,733  
CBPP  -     -     -     3,400   6,524   6,604   8,521   7,835   8,604   21,294   28,199  
Other securities  29,396   69,697   75,904   80,940   73,921   75,306   63,941   58,626   61,741   51,677   36,095  
CSPP  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    - 4,751 
AO                                  
Items in Course of Settlement  3   1   1   0   1   1   1   2   1   2   1  
Other assets  36,880   3,340   4,593   4,324   3,709   4,173   7,269   6,458   5,188   4,693   5,946  




Detailed Balance Sheet of the Central Bank of Spain (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Actual issue of notes  86,979   85,517   83,143   80,600   76,558   70,571   65,425   57,133   47,902   41,473   32,164  
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 20,559   52,321   54,315   35,089   26,964   50,934   72,005   30,783   17,851   27,839   55,226  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     0   0   0   110   1   0   210   0  
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro: General government 
 15,057   18,030   18,771   31,233   9,337   5,426   9,010   2,117   58   122   17,818  
LCB                                  
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  -     3,238   34,921   41,034   50,864   174,826   336,831   213,382   189,718   254,102   327,733  
     Liabilities equivalent to the     
     transfer of foreign reserves 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to Target 2 and    
     correspondent accounts (net) 
 -     3,238   34,921   41,034   50,864   174,826   336,831   213,382   189,718   254,102   327,733  
     Net liabilities re the allocation of     
     euro banknotes within the ES 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
     Liabilities related to other     
     operational requirements 
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Equity                                   
Revaluation accounts  5,294   4,371   5,812   7,020   9,275   12,012   12,569   9,039   14,518   17,312   19,360  
Capital and Reserve  1,500   2,000   2,000   2,000   1,950   1,950   1,950   1,900   1,900   1,900   1,900  
Profit for the year  1,948   2,005   2,090   2,673   2,570   2,400   3,845   3,148   2,519   2,270   1,625  
LO                                  
Other liabilities   6,475   7,747   7,936   10,628   9,743   10,994   13,722   16,226   14,606   15,908   23,204  





Detailed Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
AFX             
Gold and gold receivables  9,930   10,280   10,664   12,355   17,016   19,644   20,359   14,064   15,980   15,795   17,820  
Claims on non-euro residents 
denominated in foreign currency 
 29,728   29,022   41,611   35,456   39,714   41,428   41,323   39,391   44,400   49,745   51,137  
Claims on EA residents denominated in 
foreign currency 
 2,774   3,868   22,226   3,294   4,327   4,828   2,838   1,271   1,784   1,863   2,473  
ACB             
Claims on non-euro residents in €   4   25   629   -     1,800   1,456   -     535   -     -     -    
Intra-Eurosystem Claims (BN adj)  3,546   17,241   234,096   6,360   -     49,393   24,674   -     -     -     -    
ADOM            
Lending to EA credit institutions related 
to monetary policy operations 
denominated in euro  
 -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other claims on EA credit institutions in 
euro 
 0   100   0   0   33   205   0   0   2   53   99  
Securities  -     -     -     2,182   17,926   22,819   22,056   18,160   17,788   77,809   160,815  
AO            
Items in Course of Settlement  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
Other assets  9,525   11,376   13,656   13,838   15,532   20,009   23,036   24,259   24,013   24,707   26,543  






Detailed Balance Sheet of the European Central Bank (continued) 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
LB            
Banknotes in Circulation  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
LDOM            
Liabilities to EA credit institutions re 
monetary policy operations in euro 
 1,065   1,050   1,020   1,056   1,105   1,261   1,024   1,054   1,020   1,026   2,912  
Other liabilities to EA credit 
institutions in Euro 
 -     -     -     -     33   205   -     -     -     -     -    
Liabilities to other EA residents in 
Euro 
 1,065   1,050   1,020   1,056   1,072   1,056   1,024   1,054   1,020   1,026   1,060  
LCB            
Intra-Eurosystem liabilities  39,782   40,042   40,150   40,204   61,430   40,308   40,308   40,430   64,133   123,876   191,994  
Equity             
Revaluation accounts  5,578   6,169   11,353   10,915   19,627   24,325   23,335   13,358   19,938   24,833   28,626  
Capital and Reserve  4,089   4,127   4,137   4,142   5,306   6,484   7,650   7,653   7,697   7,740   7,740  
Profit for the year  -     -     1,322   2,253   171   728   995   1,440   989   1,082   1,193  
LO            
Other liabilities   4,992   20,525   264,900   14,914   8,709   86,675   60,973   33,745   10,192   11,414   26,422  





















Simplified Balance Sheet – AUSTRIA  
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  11,910   14,509   26,857   14,266   19,419   25,984   23,127   19,358   23,369   23,108   25,280  
L  12,151   12,695   22,533   20,914   9,744   12,389   17,894   8,922   14,553   18,534   16,124  
G  3,701   5,052   5,872   9,761   15,261   17,393   15,188   15,445   14,918   25,794   41,816  
ES_C 1,274  1,278  1,278  1,230  1,263  1,295  1,327  1,335  1,359  1,359  1,359  
OA  8,665   9,726   13,710   8,527   9,161   9,488   9,877   10,252   9,964   9,957   9,018  
TOTAL ASSETS  37,701   43,261   70,250   54,699   54,847   66,549   67,414   55,313   64,163   78,752   93,597  
Simplified Balance Sheet – AUSTRIA  
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  1,138  -633   6,737   3,725  -3,427  -10,113  -18,658  -17,675  -2,427  -440  -66  
Rs  4,474   6,548   15,692   15,513   11,699   20,801   23,228   14,938   12,636   21,532   27,446  
Rg  5   11   9   62   68   8   203   216   181   840   3,370  
ES_L  21,160   25,402   35,662   19,584   27,496   34,614   39,897   39,148   30,083   29,147   31,138  
OL  10,925   11,932   12,149   15,816   19,011   21,239   22,742   18,686   23,691   27,673   31,709  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 






















Simplified Balance Sheet – BELGIUM  
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  10,769   12,136   47,674   17,438   21,132   31,494   24,149   20,303   22,067   22,933   23,639  
L  39,910   56,312   57,967   42,261   9,169   42,530   42,009   17,464   13,871   13,013   33,004  
G  4,479   5,109   15,176   14,321   17,134   21,287   20,963   19,890   19,289   32,938   54,307  
ES_C 1,562  1,567  1,567  1,537  1,577  1,618  1,658  1,665  1,723  1,723  1,723  
OA  3,814   13,297   8,013   7,205   7,211   14,432   7,288   5,899   5,869   6,513   8,849  
TOTAL ASSETS 60,535  88,421  130,397  82,762  56,224  111,361  96,067  65,221   62,819  77,119  121,523  
Simplified Balance Sheet – BELGIUM 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN -1,623  -1,806   2,071   7,087   8,375   11,988   15,421   17,995   20,408   23,240   26,815  
Rs  7,928   17,789   10,934   15,003   13,018   22,570   19,572   13,798   10,763   25,397   50,825  
Rg  46   45   58   108   82   65   296   126   49   38   35  
ES_L 45,269  61,660  140,243  42,490  13,871  52,859  38,059  15,454  12,335  7,726  18,589  
OL  8,914   10,733   13,091   18,075   20,878   23,878   22,718   17,848   19,264   20,718   25,258  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – CYPRUS  
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX    1,545   1,406   1,382   1,334   1,078   693   813   826   983  
L    4,370   7,611   5,575   5,630   536   1,692   1,227   1,194   1,059  
G    4,043   3,973   4,310   3,829   2,912   2,140   2,041   3,159   4,405  
ES_C   95  106  108  110  112  109  127  2,500  5,973  
OA    529   209   198   3,702   9,552   9,670   7,519   3,922   325  
TOTAL ASSETS   10,583  13,304  11,573  14,606  14,190  14,305  11,729  11,602  12,745  
Simplified Balance Sheet – CYPRUS 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN    1,232   1,301   1,205   1,048   779   2,190   2,201   1,738   1,124  
Rs   1,292  3,101  2,289  3,173  3,984  2,773  4,141  7,210  9,087  
Rg    448   445   270   924   257   928   1,239   862   718  
ES_L   6,551  7,128  6,442  7,909  7,473  6,841  2,498  -    -    
OL    1,059   1,329   1,367   1,551   1,697   1,572   1,650   1,792   1,816  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – ESTONIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX       168   250   269   425   465   446  
L       2   46   37   80   88   99  
G       542   533   465   418   1,482   3,385  
ES_C      831  1,952  2,038  3,406  2,975  1,138  
OA       56   55   52   48   56   72  
TOTAL ASSETS      1,600  2,836  2,861  4,376  5,066  5,141  
Simplified Balance Sheet – ESTONIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN       639   703   839   922   1,058   1,219  
Rs       466   1,528   1,417   2,800   3,331   3,192  
Rg      - - - - - - 
ES_L      - - - - - - 
OL       495   605   605   654   676   731  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – FINLAND 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  6,939   7,198   8,735   9,399   9,261   10,378   10,533   9,602   9,980   10,876   12,034  
L  1,025   230   2,600   3,241   1,015   3,318   4,790   3,384   1,925   3,488   12,005  
G  4,998   6,863   7,265   7,471   10,704   12,883   10,361   9,154   10,113   16,864   27,484  
ES_C 1,948  3,741  5,987  10,335  20,507  66,850  71,133  23,017  20,621  20,993  22,730  
OA  993   1,051   1,254   1,256   1,091   1,211   1,115   1,052   1,118   1,088   1,372  
TOTAL ASSETS 15,903  19,083  25,841  31,702  42,578  94,640  97,932  46,209  43,757  53,309  75,625  
Simplified Balance Sheet – FINLAND 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  6,481   7,424   8,358   9,385   10,466   11,164   11,796   12,231   12,831   13,687   14,613  
Rs  3,766   5,910   8,110   13,543   21,696   71,697   73,799   23,803   20,308   27,559   47,665  
Rg  -     -     3,009   14   262   836   801   55   2   79   31  
ES_L  -     -     -     -     33   76   -     -     -     -     -    
OL  5,656   5,752   6,365   8,758   10,118   10,879   11,540   10,120   10,618   11,987   13,316  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – FRANCE 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  82,319   89,158   144,904   113,853   147,821   190,724   162,070   125,861   137,626   149,629   157,137  
L  13,695   71,055   134,463   125,150   46,489   142,122   196,074   85,274   90,513   122,266   128,867  
G  8,304   14,553   68,740   64,551   78,910   126,508   116,286   113,159   106,580   210,349   350,452  
ES_C 19,995  9,454  9,750  9,276  9,492  10,046  10,318  10,143  10,083  9,929  9,958  
OA  44,397   109,177   119,590   118,411   122,408   162,274   172,189   138,748   151,737   130,169   110,084  
TOTAL ASSETS 168,710  293,397  477,447  431,241  405,120  631,674  656,937  473,185  496,539  622,342  756,498  
Simplified Balance Sheet – FRANCE 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  56,777   61,540   69,290   76,363   80,909   88,584   95,796   101,932   108,299   112,759   119,846  
Rs  26,396   73,738   90,982   61,138   46,331   172,875   190,758   107,000   109,970   219,812   332,742  
Rg  235   309   13,045   19,005   1,487   8,937   4,883   3,266   2,438   13,869   13,882  
ES_L  -     12,035   117,880   62,077   28,363   77,515   54,850   16,195   17,020   29,315   14,123  
OL  85,300   145,773   186,250   212,656   248,030   283,763   310,648   244,791   258,811   246,587   275,802  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – GERMANY 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  85,065   99,896   162,747   130,254   162,100   202,731   191,972   143,879   158,745   159,532   177,991  
L  256,348   267,955   277,424   231,502   118,406   71,642   90,010   65,499   82,173   98,474   131,360  
G  4,440   4,440   4,440   9,716   25,255   60,461   55,010   46,840   38,063   136,337   296,254  
ES_C  18,273   83,950   128,554   189,706   337,851   475,894   667,895   523,370   473,007   596,929   766,912  
OA  9,410   27,432   39,395   26,867   27,647   26,914   20,421   21,447   18,854   20,700   20,497  
TOTAL ASSETS  373,536   483,673   612,560   588,045   671,259   837,642   1,025,308   801,035   770,842   1,011,972   1,393,014  
Simplified Balance Sheet – GERMANY 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  255,215   283,279   328,379   348,110   366,720   391,753   427,539   461,509   508,432   552,630   592,169  
Rs  47,956   109,513   166,939   112,163   146,432   228,872   299,962   141,459   90,195   208,741   411,816  
Rg  36   43   170   9,987   173   745   11,870   2,013   1,940   11,647   32,458  
ES_L  -     -     -     -    -   -    -     -     -     -     -    
OL  70,328   90,839   117,075   117,782   157,937   216,272   285,937   196,052   170,275   238,953   356,573  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – GREECE 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  3,899   4,758   6,531   5,023   6,299   7,771   7,322   5,528   6,891   7,316   8,045  
L  4,795   8,727   38,355   50,329   99,255   77,526   20,694   64,419   57,861   43,253   28,873  
G  15,043   18,750   22,307   27,288   29,142   26,443   25,606   25,828   34,484   39,954   57,631  
ES_C  1,454   1,444   1,483   1,598   1,600   1,633   1,814   1,743   1,774   1,782   1,854  
OA  9,734   8,982   2,244   2,355   2,346   55,064   104,343   11,977   2,147   71,209   45,981  
TOTAL ASSETS  34,925   42,661   70,920   86,594   138,641   168,436   159,778   109,495   103,158   163,513   142,384  
Simplified Balance Sheet – GREECE 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  16,907   18,669   20,776   20,972   29,670   41,395   38,036   35,480   32,356   48,383   43,243  
Rs  4,552   7,141   7,794   8,008   10,528   4,703   2,169   1,959   3,076   1,387   907  
Rg  894   1,159   1,521   1,333   782   3,838   5,721   6,943   3,521   3,749   8,270  
ES_L 8,184  10,797  35,348  49,036  87,133  104,808  98,355  51,116  49,319  94,387  72,257  
OL  4,389   4,895   5,482   7,244   10,527   13,692   15,497   13,997   14,886   15,607   17,707  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – IRELAND 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  3,961   2,630   7,044   2,847   2,610   3,721   3,019   2,702   3,588   4,836   6,057  
L  27,044   39,449   93,412   93,390   132,876   108,122   71,889   39,665   21,579   13,064   10,700  
G  7,137   9,884   14,222   14,390   17,370   19,845   20,311   63,198   54,217   57,302   63,973  
ES_C  570   569   585   796   779   808   886   857   895   885   890  
OA  1,540   997   868   13,472   50,854   43,751   41,381   1,688   1,029   1,148   1,166  
TOTAL ASSETS  40,253   53,529   116,132   124,896   204,489   176,247   137,486   108,110   81,308   77,235   82,786  
Simplified Balance Sheet – IRELAND 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  16,842   20,258   23,323   25,520   27,289   28,414   29,269   30,528   31,534   32,686   33,965  
Rs  12,915   21,839   19,447   14,908   11,414   6,029   3,518   3,243   4,055   10,018   19,225  
Rg  5,463   8,025   25,817   26,260   15,888   15,572   19,636   10,261   6,811   13,718   10,403  
ES_L 2,545 595 44,364 53,519 145,185 120,434 79,259 55,117 22,745 3,039 952  
OL  2,488   2,811   3,181   4,686   4,713   5,798   5,804   8,962   16,163   17,775   18,241  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – ITALY 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  64,390   69,123   82,603   93,862   120,992   136,935   141,232   107,802   119,890   122,654   131,898  
L  20,957   28,070   50,344   32,171   57,696   219,834   282,709   244,820   206,605   188,224   246,408  
G  20,229   18,098   59,173   63,487   91,985   121,891   120,126   117,063   119,881   191,949   299,299  
ES_C 30,845  43,744  31,392  63,211  11,843  8,352  8,560  8,596  8,467  8,467  8,467  
OA  82,136   85,341   43,918   48,525   50,445   51,966   53,742   63,259   53,412   43,813   52,347  
TOTAL ASSETS 218,557  244,376  267,431  301,256  332,961  538,978  606,369  541,540  508,256  555,107  738,420  
Simplified Balance Sheet – ITALY 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  119,728   128,458   139,472   143,198   145,417   153,564   146,343   144,674   142,159   142,027   145,955  
Rs  17,159   42,623   35,441   34,313   22,740   33,878   27,665   20,797   15,436   24,138   71,984  
Rg  22,945   9,716   19,413   31,027   42,488   23,529   33,802   27,117   7,859   4,821   9,780  
ES_L  -     -     -     -    -   190,899  253,799  228,382  208,576  248,547  355,667  
OL  58,725   63,580   73,104   92,718   122,315   137,108   144,759   120,570   134,226   135,574   155,034  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – LATVIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX          3,353   3,868   3,830  
L          86   264   257  
G          1,095   3,015   6,320  
ES_C         279  307  293  
OA          97   169   170  
TOTAL ASSETS         4,910  7,624  10,870  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LATVIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN          734   497   247  
Rs          2,424   4,793   4,192  
Rg          51   38   47  
ES_L          797   1,312   5,292  
OL          904   983   1,091  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – LITHUANIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX           2,994   3,150  
L           346   303  
G           3,424   6,837  
ES_C          739  500  
OA           77   117  
TOTAL ASSETS          7,580  10,907  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LITHUANIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN           2,209   2,525  
Rs           2,867   2,481  
Rg           1,273   690  
ES_L           -     3,590  
OL           1,230   1,621  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 














Simplified Balance Sheet – LUXEMBOURG 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  1,539   2,699   13,346   2,234   2,291   6,463   3,614   3,087   4,342   3,572   3,065  
L  41,511   32,915   40,080   15,201   2,907   5,328   5,792   5,880   3,484   4,060   5,476  
G  2,350   2,085   3,728   3,865   3,866   4,065   3,320   2,893   3,143   3,091   4,085  
ES_C  5,315   18,399   42,168   52,573   68,000   109,438   105,883   103,670   105,220   147,672   187,320  
OA  1,732   2,911   1,323   3,177   2,656   1,913   1,812   3,030   909   563   904  
TOTAL ASSETS  52,446   59,009   100,645   77,049   79,720   127,206   120,420   118,560   117,098   158,958   200,851  
Simplified Balance Sheet – LUXEMBOURG 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  41,081   46,201   52,622   60,560   66,910   72,034   76,352   87,526   93,492   95,494   96,590  
Rs  9,742   10,780   45,532   13,489   9,642   51,223   38,479   24,565   16,664   57,237   97,433  
  Rg  473   434   387   344   348   502   553   576   579   559   843  
ES_L  -     -     -     -    -    -     -     -     -    -    -    
OL  1,150   1,596   2,104   2,656   2,820   3,447   5,037   5,893   6,364   5,668   5,984  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 






Simplified Balance Sheet – MALTA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX    951   714   758   856   1,132   1,176   1,466   1,635   1,816  
L    454   1,253   1,075   498   378   200   411   115   55  
G    475   626   1,056   1,368   1,305   1,436   1,400   1,477   1,628  
ES_C    47   48   49   50   51   52   53   53   1,072  
OA    795   603   705   785   737   746   995   1,225   966  
TOTAL ASSETS    2,723   3,244   3,644   3,558   3,603   3,610   4,326   4,506   5,536  
Simplified Balance Sheet – MALTA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN    748   768   806   868   848   841   867   974   1,034  
Rs    483   585   501   1,101   1,474   1,144   499   1,457   2,917  
Rg    362   393   390   421   247   300   297   271   654  
ES_L   667  814  1,225  428  200  672  1,927  920  -    
OL    463   684   722   740   834   654   736   883   931  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 































Simplified Balance Sheet – NETHERLANDS 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  19,386   21,114   34,679   28,959   35,280   40,424   41,585   33,596   36,218   35,747   36,179  
L  11,089   45,961   34,815   39,228   5,810   6,690   27,894   11,659   14,029   22,161   28,152  
G  4,775   8,611   12,258   12,051   14,209   24,740   23,180   27,331   25,005   47,366   85,500  
ES_C 12,384  2,478  2,478  17,883  42,850  155,179  122,626  48,477  22,250  57,410  89,352  
OA  11,064   12,662   14,999   13,199   12,324   12,265   8,538   3,151   2,828   3,023   3,694  
TOTAL ASSETS 58,698  90,826  99,229  111,320  110,473  239,298  223,823  124,214  100,330  165,707  242,877  
Simplified Balance Sheet – NETHERLANDS 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  23,793   23,590   23,818   22,478   21,208   19,322   17,287   15,847   13,598   11,961   11,480  
Rs  13,662   21,528   29,372   57,902   50,000   175,606   158,038   73,938   49,943   114,399   171,104  
Rg  11   4   24   26   99   5   7   47   192   85   1,366  
ES_L  -     21,949   18,814   -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
OL  21,232   23,755   27,201   30,913   39,166   44,366   48,491   34,382   36,597   39,262   58,927  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – PORTUGAL 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  10,372   12,513   9,218   12,788   18,129   17,515   18,133   13,634   16,849   18,407   24,647  
L  161   2,464   10,210   16,709   42,287   47,411   54,109   49,022   32,503   29,507   25,497  
G  6,583   5,331   8,544   7,443   12,168   14,515   13,491   12,860   16,572   26,026   42,293  
ES_C 1,088  1,101  1,158  1,185  1,152  1,198  1,322  1,273  1,252  1,235  1,309  
OA  4,787   4,956   5,866   6,453   6,972   7,308   7,326   6,605   6,513   6,645   6,334  
TOTAL ASSETS 22,990  26,366  34,996  44,578  80,707  87,947  94,381  83,394  73,688  81,819  100,081  
Simplified Balance Sheet – PORTUGAL 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  4,516   3,041   1,575   663   333  -1,369  -4,022  -5,895  -8,621  -10,394  -11,976  
Rs  5,074   9,266   5,402   8,771   4,921   5,691   8,136   8,218   3,589   7,712   5,649  
Rg  0   0   0   2   1   4,743   5,223   7,629   7,830   5,593   11,845  
ES_L  6,601   6,206   18,953   23,436   59,921   60,964   66,026   59,565   54,638   61,705   71,588  
OL  6,799   7,853   9,067   11,705   15,529   17,918   19,018   13,876   16,252   17,203   22,975  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 

























Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVAKIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX     3,823   4,636   5,249   4,613   4,526   6,834   6,154   5,464  
L     2,331   1,559   1,816   2,433   716   1,108   2,269   2,980  
G     9,928   10,485   11,996   9,261   7,340   5,622   7,209   12,862  
ES_C    594  605  617  1,606  3,378  3,007  1,231  711  
OA     5,884   6,469   6,651   6,635   6,117   5,536   5,358   5,339  
TOTAL ASSETS    22,560  23,754  26,329  24,547  22,076  22,109  22,222  27,355  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVAKIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN     4,646   5,947   7,241   8,163   8,701   9,357   10,058   10,854  
Rs   
 
 1,237   1,766   975   6,325   4,245   5,353   6,263   4,664  
Rg     0   0   1   2,607   2,723   1,001   0   744  
ES_L     14,500   13,306   13,600   -     76   -     -     5,042  
OL     2,178   2,736   4,512   7,452   6,332   6,397   5,900   6,050  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 

























Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVENIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX   2,296   2,083   1,874   1,827   1,797   1,772   1,660   1,996   2,063   2,181  
L   156   1,198   2,200   868   1,913   4,105   3,402   1,286   1,581   1,709  
G   2,103   2,442   2,857   2,830   3,271   3,651   2,931   2,364   4,320   7,279  
ES_C  241  239  248  253  259  264  264  2,686  542  282  
OA   1,228   965   304   309   501   276   605   435   341   542  
TOTAL ASSETS  6,025  6,926  7,483  6,087  7,741  10,068  8,861  8,767  8,847  11,993  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SLOVENIA 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN   565   817   991   1,166   1,366   1,372   2,184   2,527   3,485   4,412  
Rs   409   994   1,234   896   1,141   1,338   2,082   1,442   1,632   2,252  
Rg   341   268   271   270   872   1,023   1,714   2,718   1,730   1,949  
ES_L   3,491   3,556   3,334   2,093   2,728   4,409   1,024   -     -     1,223  
OL   1,219   1,291   1,653   1,662   1,634   1,926   1,856   2,079   2,001   2,157  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – SPAIN 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX  12,413   20,196   25,876   20,260   24,503   41,132   41,401   36,077   44,346   53,553   64,710  
L  21,866   71,374   92,577   93,488   68,074   174,800   369,608   203,005   152,493   156,647   178,956  
G  36,812   75,529   81,153   85,606   85,386   103,280   91,325   82,320   80,606   139,803   222,981  
ES_C 29,835  4,787  4,787  5,447  5,585  5,724  5,862  5,861  6,436  6,436  6,436  
OA  36,885   3,343   4,596   5,476   3,712   4,177   7,271   6,464   5,191   4,697   5,947  
TOTAL ASSETS 137,811  175,229  208,988  210,277  187,261  329,113  515,467  333,727  289,072  361,136  479,030  
Simplified Balance Sheet – SPAIN 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN  86,979   85,517   83,143   80,600   76,558   70,571   65,425   57,133   47,902   41,473   32,164  
Rs  20,559   52,321   54,315   35,089   26,964   50,934   72,115   30,784   17,852   28,049   55,227  
Rg  15,057   18,030   18,771   31,233   9,337   5,426   9,010   2,117   58   122   17,818  
ES_L 0  3,238  34,922  41,034  50,864  174,826  336,831  213,382  189,718  254,103  327,733  
OL  15,216   16,123   17,837   22,322   23,538   27,357   32,086   30,311   33,542   37,390   46,088  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





















Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX 42,436  43,196  75,129  51,105  62,856  67,355  64,520  55,261  62,164  67,403  71,430  
L -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    
G -    -    -    2,182  17,926  22,819  22,056  18,160  17,788  77,809  160,815  
ES_C 3,546  17,241  234,096  6,360  -    49,393  24,674  -    -    -    -    
OA 9,525  11,476  13,656  13,838  15,565  20,214  23,036  24,259  24,016  24,760  26,641  
TOTAL ASSETS 55,507  71,913  322,881  73,485  96,347  159,781  134,285  97,680  103,968  169,971  258,887  
Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    -    
Rs -    -    -    -    33  205  -    -    -    -    1,852  
Rg 1,065  1,050  1,020  1,056  1,072  1,056  1,024  1,054  1,020  1,026  1,060  
ES_L 39,782  40,042  40,150  40,204  61,430  40,308  40,308  40,430  64,133  123,876  191,994  
OL 14,660  30,821  281,712  32,224  33,812  118,213  92,953  56,197  38,815  45,069  63,982  
TOTAL 



















^Eurosystem is defined as published by the ECB in its Annual Report.  For purposes of applying PF, defining Eurosystem as ESTA gives the same results given that 
the main difference concerns ES_C and ES_L which are not taken into account in this analysis.
Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROSYSTEM^ 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Assets (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
FX 354,752  401,411  631,038  509,742  640,946  791,662  741,253  584,793  660,725  697,308  759,716  
L 450,541  637,178  860,312  778,672  607,620  925,468  1,194,519  809,388  703,341  748,589  893,742  
G 116,973  181,045  308,634  336,041  431,496  590,790  547,594  560,950  543,980  996,549  1,703,490  
ES_C  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
OA 227,764  288,252  275,122  278,570  322,148  425,350  479,346  318,135  300,194  338,100  305,951  
TOTAL ASSETS 1,150,030  1,507,886  2,075,106  1,903,025  2,002,210  2,733,270  2,962,712  2,273,266  2,208,240  2,780,546   3,662,899  
Simplified Balance Sheet – EUROSYSTEM 
Pattipeilohy’s Framework 
Liabilities (€mn) 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
BN 628,238  676,678  762,921  806,522  839,702  888,676  912,592  956,185  1,016,616  1,083,539  1,126,216  
Rs 174,116  379,309  492,638  395,954  380,816  851,900  932,074  476,169  371,146  773,619  1,322,691  
Rg 45,166  38,115  83,282  120,495  71,685  65,590  95,341  65,871  36,738  59,295  114,880  
ES_L  -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -     -    
OL 302,510  413,784  736,268  580,053  710,008  927,104  1,022,607  775,060  783,739  864,092  1,099,113  
TOTAL 
LIABILITIES 





Notes explaining the reasons why some EANCBs do not feature in Figures in 
Chapter 6: 
1. The central banks of Malta and Slovenia were excluded from the analysis 
since they constitute a low percentage of the Eurosystem. 
 
2. The central banks of Latvia and Lithuania were excluded from the analysis 
since they joined the Eurosystem only very recently – Latvia (2014) and 
Lithuania (2015). 
 
3. Figure 6.1: EE is not taken into account because of relatively very low 
domestic assets such that the ratio CB/Dom is abnormally high. On the other 
hand, SK is also not taken into account because of very high cross-border 
assets, which render the ratio ACB/ADom to be abnormally high. LU is an outlier 
because of very low AFX such that the ratio (ACB+ADOM)/AFX is abnormally high.  
 
4. Figure 6.3: LU is an outlier because cross-border liabilities are zero. These 
consisted of only one item related to the allocation of euro banknotes, which 
was not taken into account due to the adjustment explained in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 6. AT is excluded from this figure because of negative banknotes in 
circulation (refer to the compilation of this data presented in Chapter 3). 
 
5. Figure 6.7: SK is left out of the analysis because G is abnormally high and 
therefore the ratio G/L is high. 
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